modern rule in Maryland

2008Moore v. State, 23 Md.App. 540, 548 , 329 A.2d 48 (1974) (“ ‘The true test of merger under the modern doctrine is whether one crime necessarily involves the other, *101 viz., when the facts necessary to prove the lesser offense are essential ingredients in establishing the greater offense, the lesser offense is merged into the greater offense.’ ”) (quoting Stewart v. State, 4 Md.App. 565, 569 , 244 A.2d 452 (1968)).

2008Moore v. State, 23 Md.App. 540, 548 , 329 A.2d 48 (1974) (“ ‘The true test of merger under the modern doctrine is whether one crime necessarily involves the other, *101 viz., when the facts necessary to prove the lesser offense are essential ingredients in establishing the greater offense, the lesser offense is merged into the greater offense.’ ”) (quoting Stewart v. State, 4 Md.App. 565, 569 , 244 A.2d 452 (1968)).

1994After a scholarly survey by Judge McAuliffe of the respective merits of the orthodox rule, the so-called “modern rule,” and a moderated, intermediate version of the modem rule, the Court of Appeals, 331 Md. at 569 , 629 A.2d 633 , overruled earlier Maryland case law and expressly adopted the moderated version of the modern rule: We hold that the factual portion of an inconsistent out-of-court statement is sufficiently trustworthy to be offered as substantive evidence of guilt when the statement is based on the declarant’s own knowledge of the facts, is reduced to writing and signed or otherwis

1994After a scholarly survey by Judge McAuliffe of the respective merits of the orthodox rule, the so-called “modern rule,” and a moderated, intermediate version of the modem rule, the Court of Appeals, 331 Md. at 569 , 629 A.2d 633 , overruled earlier Maryland case law and expressly adopted the moderated version of the modern rule: We hold that the factual portion of an inconsistent out-of-court statement is sufficiently trustworthy to be offered as substantive evidence of guilt when the statement is based on the declarant’s own knowledge of the facts, is reduced to writing and signed or otherwis

1969Tender v. State, 2 Md.

1968Tender v. State, 2 Md.

1970Chittum v. State, 1 Md.

1969And it is also the general rule that if a lesser offense is a necessary ingredient of a greater offense, a verdict of guilty on both is improper under the modern doctrine of merger, Chittum v. State, 1 Md.

2012Instead, the Court of Appeals adopted a more modern rule permitting recovery “if a physical injury resulted from the commission of the tort, regardless of impact.” Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 34 , 867 A.2d 276 (2005).

2012Instead, the Court of Appeals adopted a more modern rule permitting recovery “if a physical injury resulted from the commission of the tort, regardless of impact.” Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 34 , 867 A.2d 276 (2005).

2001As alluded to, in more recent years, “a ‘reasonableness rule’(termed a modern rule in some foreign jurisdictions) has been engrafted upon the general rule.” Markey, 92 Md.App. at 150 , 607 A.2d at 88 .

2001As alluded to, in more recent years, “a ‘reasonableness rule’(termed a modern rule in some foreign jurisdictions) has been engrafted upon the general rule.” Markey, 92 Md.App. at 150 , 607 A.2d at 88 .

1969Thomas v. State, 3 Md.

1969App. 565, 569 , 244 A. 2d 452 (1968) : “The true test of merger under the modern doctrine is whether one crime necessarily involves the other, vis., when the facts necessary to prove the lesser offense are essential ingredients in establishing the *118 greater offense, the lesser offense is merged with the greater offense.” In Thomas v. State, 3 Md.

2025This is especially true with respect to champerty, given the modern rule that choses in action are “generally assignable.” See Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Thornton Mellon, LLC, 478 Md. 396, 452 (2022) (quoting Summers v. Freishtat, 274 Md. 404, 407 (1975)); Hernandez, 20 319 Md. at 234 .

2021We explained that the modern rule simply applied the same rule to emotional injuries that applies to other types of injuries—that is, “recovery could be had if the injury was objectively ascertainable and was shown to be a provable consequence of the wrongful conduct.” Id. 35 We also explained that in Vance, the “rule itself underwent a significant expansion when we gave an elastic definition to the word ‘physical.’” Id.

2021We explained that the modern rule simply applied the same rule to emotional injuries that applies to other types of injuries—that is, “recovery could be had if the injury was objectively ascertainable and was shown to be a provable consequence of the wrongful conduct.” Id. 35 We also explained that in Vance, the “rule itself underwent a significant expansion when we gave an elastic definition to the word ‘physical.’” Id.

2012In the classic case of Bowman v. Williams, the Court held that this physical injury can be proved by: (1) an external condition, (2) symptoms of a resulting pathological, (3) physiological, or (4) mental state. 164 Md. 397, 404 , 165 A. 182 (1933).

2012In the classic case of Bowman v. Williams, the Court held that this physical injury can be proved by: (1) an external condition, (2) symptoms of a resulting pathological, (3) physiological, or (4) mental state. 164 Md. 397, 404 , 165 A. 182 (1933).

2012This Court, speaking through Judge Krauser (now Chief Judge), and after a thorough review of the authorities, 157 Md.App. at 521-24 , 852 A.2d at 1038-40 , concluded that “a broad consensus has emerged that the pendency of an appeal should not suspend the operation of a judgment for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel.

2012This Court, speaking through Judge Krauser (now Chief Judge), and after a thorough review of the authorities, 157 Md.App. at 521-24 , 852 A.2d at 1038-40 , concluded that “a broad consensus has emerged that the pendency of an appeal should not suspend the operation of a judgment for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel.

2006In Gnau v. Kinlein, 217 Md. 43, 48 , 141 A.2d 492 , 495 (1958), we addressed restrictive covenants when we stated: ‘Whether a restrictive covenant is personal to a grantee or a grantor, or to both, or binds their respective successors in title, and so the land by whomever owned from *636 time to time, as well as whether a grantor intended to bind land retained by him, is a question of intention, which may be ascertained from the language of the conveyances alone or from that language together with other evidence of intent.’ * * “ ‘... [I]n more recent years, a “reasonableness rule” (termed a m

1998Second, "[b]ecause the client's power to end the relationship is an implied term of the retainer contract, the modern rule is that if the client terminates the representation, with or without cause, the client does not breach the retainer contract, and thus, the attorney is not entitled to recover on the [express] contract." Id.

1998Second, “[bjecause the client’s power to end the relationship is an implied term of the retainer contract, the modern rule is that if the client terminates the representation, with or without cause, the client does not breach the retainer contract, and thus, the attorney is not entitled to recover on the [express] contract.” Id.

1998Defining forfeiture in this context, the court said: “Forfeiture, unlike an express waiver which involves an evaluation of defendant’s state of mind, occurs by operation of law and as a matter of public policy.” Id. at 580, 482 N.E.2d at 59 n. * (citing, inter alia, People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d 338 , 441 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 , 424 N.E.2d 537 , 539 n. 2 (1981)); see Cruz v. Com., 24 Va.App. 454 , 482 S.E.2d 880, 883 (1997) (en banc) (“Under the modern rule, ... an accused may forfeit both the constitutional right and the statutory right to be present at trial.”); see also Flowers v. State, 608 So.2

1998Defining forfeiture in this context, the court said: “Forfeiture, unlike an express waiver which involves an evaluation of defendant’s state of mind, occurs by operation of law and as a matter of public policy.” Id. at 580, 482 N.E.2d at 59 n. * (citing, inter alia, People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d 338 , 441 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 , 424 N.E.2d 537 , 539 n. 2 (1981)); see Cruz v. Com., 24 Va.App. 454 , 482 S.E.2d 880, 883 (1997) (en banc) (“Under the modern rule, ... an accused may forfeit both the constitutional right and the statutory right to be present at trial.”); see also Flowers v. State, 608 So.2

1997Quoting from Himmel v. Hendler, 161 Md. 181, 187-88 , 155 A. 316 (1931), we further opined: In interpreting words used to create restrictions, the court should endeavor to ascertain the real purpose and intention of the parties and to discover the purpose from the surrounding, circumstances at the time of the creation of the restriction, as well as from the words used.

1997Quoting from Himmel v. Hendler, 161 Md. 181, 187-88 , 155 A. 316 (1931), we further opined: In interpreting words used to create restrictions, the court should endeavor to ascertain the real purpose and intention of the parties and to discover the purpose from the surrounding, circumstances at the time of the creation of the restriction, as well as from the words used.

1995Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 , 106 S.Ct. 1348 , 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), the Supreme Court articulated the modern standard for summary judgment, which has been cited with approval by this court in Seaboard, 91 Md.App. at 242-45 , 603 A.2d 1357 .

1995Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 , 106 S.Ct. 1348 , 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), the Supreme Court articulated the modern standard for summary judgment, which has been cited with approval by this court in Seaboard, 91 Md.App. at 242-45 , 603 A.2d 1357 .

1991Latrobe Brewing Co. v. Comptroller, 232 Md. 64, 71 , 192 A.2d 101 (1963).

1991Latrobe Brewing Co. v. Comptroller, 232 Md. 64, 71 , 192 A.2d 101 (1963).

1989He relies, in part, upon United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1238 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 , 107 S.Ct. 574 , 93 L.Ed.2d 578 (1986), in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the traditional division between papers with personal content and corporate content has been blurred____ Under the modern analysis, it is relevant to the issue whether the documents are privately owned by the individual being subpoenaed or in his possession, the compelled production, identification, and authentication of incriminating material by the possessor will incriminate him whether or

1989He relies, in part, upon United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1238 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 , 107 S.Ct. 574 , 93 L.Ed.2d 578 (1986), in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the traditional division between papers with personal content and corporate content has been blurred____ Under the modern analysis, it is relevant to the issue whether the documents are privately owned by the individual being subpoenaed or in his possession, the compelled production, identification, and authentication of incriminating material by the possessor will incriminate him whether or

1989He relies, in part, upon United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1238 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 , 107 S.Ct. 574 , 93 L.Ed.2d 578 (1986), in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the traditional division between papers with personal content and corporate content has been blurred____ Under the modern analysis, it is relevant to the issue whether the documents are privately owned by the individual being subpoenaed or in his possession, the compelled production, identification, and authentication of incriminating material by the possessor will incriminate him whether or