modern rule in Massachusetts

2005Hausman Co., 376 Mass. 757, 761 (1978), citing Sullivan v. O’Connor, 363 Mass. 579 , 588 n. 6 (1973).

1995See Sullivan v. O’Connor, 363 Mass. 579 , 588 n.6 (1973); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, Comment a (Tent.

2025Under the old rule, a commercial tenant’s covenant to pay rent was independent from the Landlord’s covenants, and the Tenant was relieved from its obligations— including its obligation to pay rent—“only by actual or constructive eviction.” Id. at 715 , quoting Barry v. Frankini, 287 Mass. 196, 201 (1934).

2021Under the old rule, a commercial tenant’s covenant to pay rent was independent from the Landlord’s covenants, and the Tenant was relieved from its obligations—including its obligation to pay rent—“only by actual or constructive eviction.” Id., 437 Mass. at 715 , quoting Barry v. Frankini, 287 Mass. 196, 201 (1934).

2025Cf. Wesson v. Leone Enterprises, Inc., 437 Mass. 708, 720 (2002); Classic Restaurant Concepts, LLC v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 323 , 339 (2024).[1] Judge Squires-Lee has already held that § 20.2 bars Generation Bio from withholding rent even if Centerpoint breached some requirement of the Lease. -------------------------------------------- [1] In 2002, the Supreme Judicial Court “abandon[ed] the common-law rule of independent covenants in commercial leases in favor of the modern rule of mutually dependent covenants as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of

2025Cf. Wesson v. Leone Enterprises, Inc., 437 Mass. 708, 720 (2002); Classic Restaurant Concepts, LLC v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 323 , 339 (2024).[1] Judge Squires-Lee has already held that § 20.2 bars Generation Bio from withholding rent even if Centerpoint breached some requirement of the Lease. -------------------------------------------- [1] In 2002, the Supreme Judicial Court “abandon[ed] the common-law rule of independent covenants in commercial leases in favor of the modern rule of mutually dependent covenants as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of

2005Hausman Co., 376 Mass. 757, 761 (1978), citing Sullivan v. O’Connor, 363 Mass. 579 , 588 n. 6 (1973).

2001Corp. v. E.F Hauserman Co., 376 Mass. 757, 760-61 (1978) (citations omitted). 7 See Rhode Island Hosp.

2023Trust Nat'l Bank v. Varadian, 419 Mass. 841, 849 (1995) ("When a promise is enforceable in whole or in part by virtue of reliance, it is a 'contract,' and it is enforceable pursuant to a 'traditional contract theory' antedating the modern doctrine of consideration" [citation omitted]). 21 caused the necessity of legal action and the damages." Siegel v. Berkshire Life Ins.

2023Co., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 318, 323 (2007).

2016See Keo, supra, at 39-40 n.21, quoting Ruszcyk, supra, at 420 n.3.

2016See Keo, supra, at 39-40 n.21, quoting Ruszcyk, supra, at 420 n.3.

2012In Krasner v. Berk, supra, we recognized that there may be circumstances when, although a party claiming incapacity has some, or sufficient, understanding of the nature and consequences of the transaction, the contract would still be voidable where, “by reason of mental illness or defect, [the person] is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition.” 10 Id. at 468 , citing Ortelere, supra at 204-205 . 11 This modern test — also described as an “affective” or “volitional” test — recognizes that competence can be lost

2012See Ortelere, supra at 204-205 , quoting Note, Mental Illness and the Law of Contracts, 57 Mich. L.R. 1020, 1036 (1959) (recommending “that a complete test for contractual incapacity should provide protection to those persons whose contracts are merely uncontrolled reactions to their mental illness” as well to those who could not understand nature and consequences of their actions).

2011There is some merit to the defendant’s argument that it would be difficult to reconcile a rule that would deter persons — even original aggressors — from forcefully intervening on behalf of an apparently blameless third person, with a policy rationale based on “the social desirability of encouraging people to go to the aid of third parties who are in danger of harm as a result of the unlawful actions of others.” Commonwealth v. Monico, 373 Mass. 298, 303 (1999) (discussing Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 649 [1976], which announced the modern defense of another rule).

2011There is some merit to the defendant’s argument that it would be difficult to reconcile a rule that would deter persons — even original aggressors — from forcefully intervening on behalf of an apparently blameless third person, with a policy rationale based on “the social desirability of encouraging people to go to the aid of third parties who are in danger of harm as a result of the unlawful actions of others.” Commonwealth v. Monico, 373 Mass. 298, 303 (1999) (discussing Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 649 [1976], which announced the modern defense of another rule).

1996Prestige Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Advantage Car Rental and Sales, Inc., 656 So. 2d 541, 544 (Fla. 1995); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 1986).

1996Prestige Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Advantage Car Rental and Sales, Inc., 656 So. 2d 541, 544 (Fla. 1995); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 1986).

1995By resort to the common law, our courts have recognized two categories of assault: (1) “the oldest conception ... an attempted but unaccomplished battery without regard to whether the victim was put in fear,” Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 303 (1973) and, (2) the modern rule, 4 encompassing “putting a person in fear, as by the defendant’s displaying a gun and the person’s apprehending the danger, even if the defendant did not intend to shoot.” Ibid.

1995By resort to the common law, our courts have recognized two categories of assault: (1) “the oldest conception ... an attempted but unaccomplished battery without regard to whether the victim was put in fear,” Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 303 (1973) and, (2) the modern rule, 4 encompassing “putting a person in fear, as by the defendant’s displaying a gun and the person’s apprehending the danger, even if the defendant did not intend to shoot.” Ibid.

1992See generally, Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 693 (1975).

1992Co., 407 Mass. 572 , 582 n.13 (1990; Ernest & Norman Hart Bros. v. Town Contractors, Inc., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 60, 65 (1984), and the modern rule recognizing the validity of forum selection clauses were adopted, see M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 407 U.S. 1 , 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1913 , 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), enforcement of the clause in the instant case might have hinged on whether the parties’ contractual choice of both California courts and California law was deemed to frustrate the strong legislative policy embodied in G.L.c. 93Afor the regulation of fair trade and commerce in Massachusetts.

1978Co., *761 356 Mass. 13, 17 (1969). 1 When a promise is enforceable in whole or in part by virtue of reliance, it is a "contract,” and it is enforceable pursuant to a "traditional contract theory” antedating the modern doctrine of consideration.

1965Co. v. United States, 269 F. 2d 406, 408-409 (1st Cir.); United States v. Bruce Constr.