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24 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1882–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Powell v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2005By the preponderance of authority it seems to be sufficient if the court has evidence before it which establishes the existence of the evidence relied on to show the perjury or mistake, in such a clear and convincing manner as to leave no room for doubt as to the existence of the evidence so relied on, and the court is satisfied that the evidence is not collusive, that it seems to be true, and ought, if true, to produce on another trial an opposite result on the merits. 133 Va. at 755-56 , 112 S.E. at 661 (emphases added). 2005By the preponderance of authority it seems to be sufficient if the court has evidence before it which establishes the existence of the evidence relied on to show the perjury or mistake, in such a clear and convincing manner as to leave no room for doubt as to the existence of the evidence so relied on, and the court is satisfied that the evidence is not collusive, that it seems to be true, and ought, if true, to produce on another trial an opposite result on the merits. 133 Va. at 755-56 , 112 S.E. at 661 (emphases added). | 2 | 2 |
Green's Executors v. Smithgreen2 sentences2004See Green’s Ex ’rs v. Smith, 146 Va. 442, 452-55 , 131 S.E. 846, 848-49 (1926). 2004See Green’s Ex ’rs v. Smith, 146 Va. 442, 452-55 , 131 S.E. 846, 848-49 (1926). | 2 | 2 |
Peoples v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1998The following principles are well established in Virginia: “ ‘[W]here the proper determination of a fact depends upon circumstantial evidence, the safe, practical rule to follow is that in no case is evidence to be excluded of facts or circumstances connected with the principal transaction, from which an inference can be reasonably drawn as to the truth of a disputed fact.[’ ”] “ ‘The modern doctrine in this connection is extremely liberal in the admission of any circumstance which may throw light upon the matter being investigated, and while a single circumstance, standing alone, may appear t 1998The following principles are well established in Virginia: “ ‘[W]here the proper determination of a fact depends upon circumstantial evidence, the safe, practical rule to follow is that in no case is evidence to be excluded of facts or circumstances connected with the principal transaction, from which an inference can be reasonably drawn as to the truth of a disputed fact.[’ ”] “ ‘The modern doctrine in this connection is extremely liberal in the admission of any circumstance which may throw light upon the matter being investigated, and while a single circumstance, standing alone, may appear t | 2 | 2 |
Widgeon v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1993Widgeon v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 658, 664 , 128 S.E. 459, 461 (1925); see also Peoples v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 692, 704 , 137 S.E. 603, 606 (1927); Hope v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 491, 496 , 386 S.E.2d 807, 810 (1989), aff'd en banc, 10 Va.App. 381 , 392 S.E.2d 830 (1990). 1927In Widgeon v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 664 , 128 S. E. 459, 460 , it is said: “The modern doctrine as to the admissibility of circumstantial evidence is admirably stated by Prentis, J., in Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758 , 99 S. E. 562 , 4 A. L. | 1 | 2 |
Duncan v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2003The modern test to determine whether a guarantee extended by the Bill of Rights also applies to the individual states is whether the clause in question “is fundamental to the American scheme of justice----” Duran v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 , 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1447 , 20 L. 2003The modern test to determine whether a guarantee extended by the Bill of Rights also applies to the individual states is whether the clause in question “is fundamental to the American scheme of justice----” Duran v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 , 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1447 , 20 L. | 1 | 1 |
Woodard v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2001“Under the modern rule, it is understood that the ‘only time requirement is that the complaint have been made without a delay which is unexplained or is inconsistent with the occurrence of the offense.’ ” Woodard v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 24, 27 , 448 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994) (quoting Edward W. 2001“Under the modern rule, it is understood that the ‘only time requirement is that the complaint have been made without a delay which is unexplained or is inconsistent with the occurrence of the offense.’ ” Woodard v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 24, 27 , 448 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994) (quoting Edward W. | 1 | 1 |
Cruz v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000Under the modern rule, however, an accused may forfeit both the constitutional right and the statutory right to be present at trial." Cruz v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 454, 460 , 482 S.E.2d 880, 883 (1997) (en banc) (citations omitted). [B]efore proceeding in absentia, the court must first determine that the absence of the accused denotes a waiver of the right to be present at trial. 2000Under the modern rule, however, an accused may forfeit both the constitutional right and the statutory right to be present at trial." Cruz v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 454, 460 , 482 S.E.2d 880, 883 (1997) (en banc) (citations omitted). [B]efore proceeding in absentia, the court must first determine that the absence of the accused denotes a waiver of the right to be present at trial. | 1 | 1 |
Sisk v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1997Head, 3 Va.App. at 168-69 , 348 S.E.2d at 426-27 ; see also Sisk v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 459, 463 , 350 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1986). 1997Head, 3 Va.App. at 168-69 , 348 S.E.2d at 426-27 ; see also Sisk v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 459, 463 , 350 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Callands v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1996Herron, 208 Va. at 330, 157 S.E.2d at 198 (1967) (citing 4 Wigmore, Evidence 1135, at 222 (3rd ed.1940)). | 1 | 1 |
Hope v. Com.green1 sentence1993Widgeon v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 658, 664 , 128 S.E. 459, 461 (1925); see also Peoples v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 692, 704 , 137 S.E. 603, 606 (1927); Hope v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 491, 496 , 386 S.E.2d 807, 810 (1989), aff'd en banc, 10 Va.App. 381 , 392 S.E.2d 830 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Holmes v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1983See also in this connection Holmes v. Comm., 156 Va. 963 (1931), citing with approval from 20 R.C.L. 308, 969, "all such evidence should be scrutinized with the greatest care and caution." In a review of the old rule and the modern rule the Virginia court has said the following: The modern rule is not so strict. | 1 | 1 |
Rutledge v. Dodenhoffgreen2 sentences1978Illustrative of the reasons underpinning the new rule are those articulated by the court in Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 413-14 , 175 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1970): The rationale.. .is that the seller and buyer are not on an equal footing in such a transaction. [T]he primary purpose of the transaction is to provide the purchaser with a habitable dwelling and the transfer of the land is secondary. 1978Illustrative of the reasons underpinning the new rule are those articulated by the court in Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 413-14 , 175 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1970): The rationale.. .is that the seller and buyer are not on an equal footing in such a transaction. [T]he primary purpose of the transaction is to provide the purchaser with a habitable dwelling and the transfer of the land is secondary. | 1 | 1 |
Hartley v. Ballougreen2 sentences1978Today, it appears from the cases collected in Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969, Supp. 1977) that the “modern trend” of judicial authority favors implied warranties in sales by builder-vendors to initial vendees whether the sale occurred before or after construction was completed.1 2 As defined in Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 62 , 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974), the modern rule holds: [I]n every contract for the sale of a recently completed dwelling, and in every contract for the sale of a dwelling then under construction, the vendor, if he be in the business of building such dwellings, shall be he 1978Today, it appears from the cases collected in Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969, Supp. 1977) that the “modern trend” of judicial authority favors implied warranties in sales by builder-vendors to initial vendees whether the sale occurred before or after construction was completed.1 2 As defined in Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 62 , 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974), the modern rule holds: [I]n every contract for the sale of a recently completed dwelling, and in every contract for the sale of a dwelling then under construction, the vendor, if he be in the business of building such dwellings, shall be he | 1 | 1 |
Byerly v. Byerlygreen1 sentence1967In John Nix & Co. v. Herbert, . 149 Va. 131, 135 , 140 S. E. 121, 122, 123 , we said: “The general rule is that the burden of proof is on the bailor to show that the loss of or injury to goods was due to the negligence or other fault of the warehouseman; but it is sufficient if he proves facts from which such negligence or fault may be presumed, so as to make a prima facie case, and, therefore, by the great weight of authority, upon proof that the goods were delivered to the warehouseman in good condition, he will be liable for any loss or injury to them while in his custody, and for the value | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Noell v. Commonwealthred2 sentences1997Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 608-09 , 115 S.E. 679, 681 (1923), overruled by Jones v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 425 , 317 S.E.2d 482 (1984); Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 , 113 S.Ct. 748, 751 , 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). 5 Under the modern rule, however, an accused may forfeit both the constitutional right and the statutory right to be present at trial. 1997Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 608-09 , 115 S.E. 679, 681 (1923), overruled by Jones v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 425 , 317 S.E.2d 482 (1984); Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 , 113 S.Ct. 748, 751 , 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). 5 Under the modern rule, however, an accused may forfeit both the constitutional right and the statutory right to be present at trial. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Randolph v. Wright
green
2 sentences1927In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.’ ” In Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 , it is said: “Parol evidence of the circumstances, situation and connection of the testator, and his transactions between making his will and his death, are admissible to throw light on his intention. 1925In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.” To the same effect are the holdings in Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 ; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687 ; McCabe v. Cary's Executor, 135 Va. 428 , 116 S. E. 485 ; Starke v. Berry, 118 Va. 706 , 88 S. E. 68 ; Swan v. Swan’s Ex’or, 136 Va. 496 , 117 S. E. 858 . | 2 | 1925–1927 |
Karnes v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1927In Widgeon v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 664 , 128 S. E. 459, 460 , it is said: “The modern doctrine as to the admissibility of circumstantial evidence is admirably stated by Prentis, J., in Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758 , 99 S. E. 562 , 4 A. L. 1927In Widgeon v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 664 , 128 S. E. 459, 460 , it is said: “The modern doctrine as to the admissibility of circumstantial evidence is admirably stated by Prentis, J., in Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758 , 99 S. E. 562 , 4 A. L. | 2 | 1925–1927 |
Zschernig v. Miller
green
1 sentence2026Zschernig v. Miller is the starting point for the modern doctrine of foreign affairs preemption. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Tardy v. Creasy
green
2 sentences2024In Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553 (1886), the Supreme Court of Virginia analyzed a restrictive covenant in a manner similar to the modern “touch and concern” rule, considering the benefits and burdens of the covenant at bar in that case; however, since the Supreme Court declined to enforce the covenant on the grounds that it violated “public policy” in either law or equity, it merely supports the adoption of the modern rule in dicta. 81 Va. at 565 . 2024In Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553 (1886), the Supreme Court of Virginia analyzed a restrictive covenant in a manner similar to the modern “touch and concern” rule, considering the benefits and burdens of the covenant at bar in that case; however, since the Supreme Court declined to enforce the covenant on the grounds that it violated “public policy” in either law or equity, it merely supports the adoption of the modern rule in dicta. 81 Va. at 565 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Sloan v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2024Almost a half of a century after Hercules Powder, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Sloan v. Johnson, appears to have completed the adoption of the modern rule by holding that the use-restrictive covenant in that case ran with the land at law after analyzing its benefits and burdens and concluding that a covenant that restricted construction on the lot in question “‘touches and concerns’ the land because it limits the number of houses that may be constructed upon each lot.” 254 Va. at 277 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. BMC Properties
green
1 sentence2024Yet, this jurisprudential ambiguity was clarified slightly in Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. BMC Properties, 255 Va. 75 (1998), where the Supreme Court enforced a restrictive negative competition-focused covenant at law, applying it to enjoin a competing business from entering the burdened property and finding that it “established each of the [common law] requirements” with no further reasoning. 255 Va. at 81. - 17 - Since the covenant at bar in Waynesboro Village only concerned the operations at the burdened property, the strict touch and concern rule would have commanded a different result th | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Head v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1997Head, 3 Va.App. at 168-69 , 348 S.E.2d at 426-27 ; see also Sisk v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 459, 463 , 350 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1986). 1997Head, 3 Va.App. at 168-69 , 348 S.E.2d at 426-27 ; see also Sisk v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 459, 463 , 350 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1986). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Crosby v. United States
green
2 sentences1997Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 608-09 , 115 S.E. 679, 681 (1923), overruled by Jones v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 425 , 317 S.E.2d 482 (1984); Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 , 113 S.Ct. 748, 751 , 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). 5 Under the modern rule, however, an accused may forfeit both the constitutional right and the statutory right to be present at trial. 1997Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 608-09 , 115 S.E. 679, 681 (1923), overruled by Jones v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 425 , 317 S.E.2d 482 (1984); Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 , 113 S.Ct. 748, 751 , 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). 5 Under the modern rule, however, an accused may forfeit both the constitutional right and the statutory right to be present at trial. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Jones v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1997Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 608-09 , 115 S.E. 679, 681 (1923), overruled by Jones v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 425 , 317 S.E.2d 482 (1984); Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 , 113 S.Ct. 748, 751 , 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). 5 Under the modern rule, however, an accused may forfeit both the constitutional right and the statutory right to be present at trial. 1997Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 608-09 , 115 S.E. 679, 681 (1923), overruled by Jones v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 425 , 317 S.E.2d 482 (1984); Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 , 113 S.Ct. 748, 751 , 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). 5 Under the modern rule, however, an accused may forfeit both the constitutional right and the statutory right to be present at trial. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hope v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1993Widgeon v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 658, 664 , 128 S.E. 459, 461 (1925); see also Peoples v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 692, 704 , 137 S.E. 603, 606 (1927); Hope v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 491, 496 , 386 S.E.2d 807, 810 (1989), aff'd en banc, 10 Va.App. 381 , 392 S.E.2d 830 (1990). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Hope v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1993Widgeon v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 658, 664 , 128 S.E. 459, 461 (1925); see also Peoples v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 692, 704 , 137 S.E. 603, 606 (1927); Hope v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 491, 496 , 386 S.E.2d 807, 810 (1989), aff'd en banc, 10 Va.App. 381 , 392 S.E.2d 830 (1990). 1993Widgeon v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 658, 664 , 128 S.E. 459, 461 (1925); see also Peoples v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 692, 704 , 137 S.E. 603, 606 (1927); Hope v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 491, 496 , 386 S.E.2d 807, 810 (1989), aff'd en banc, 10 Va.App. 381 , 392 S.E.2d 830 (1990). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
red
2 sentences1990The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11 , 92 S.Ct. at 1913 . 1990The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11 , 92 S.Ct. at 1913 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Mann v. Clowser
green
2 sentences1978Acknowledging that this appeal poses an issue of first impression in this Commonwealth, and urging us to affirm the trial court’s adoption of the modern rule, plaintiffs invoke an analogy they see in Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887 , 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950). 1978Acknowledging that this appeal poses an issue of first impression in this Commonwealth, and urging us to affirm the trial court’s adoption of the modern rule, plaintiffs invoke an analogy they see in Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887 , 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
John Nix & Co. v. Herbert
green
1 sentence1967In John Nix & Co. v. Herbert, . 149 Va. 131, 135 , 140 S. E. 121, 122, 123 , we said: “The general rule is that the burden of proof is on the bailor to show that the loss of or injury to goods was due to the negligence or other fault of the warehouseman; but it is sufficient if he proves facts from which such negligence or fault may be presumed, so as to make a prima facie case, and, therefore, by the great weight of authority, upon proof that the goods were delivered to the warehouseman in good condition, he will be liable for any loss or injury to them while in his custody, and for the value | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Revenue Aero Club, Inc. v. Alexandria Airport, Inc.
green
2 sentences1967In John Nix & Co. v. Herbert, . 149 Va. 131, 135 , 140 S. E. 121, 122, 123 , we said: “The general rule is that the burden of proof is on the bailor to show that the loss of or injury to goods was due to the negligence or other fault of the warehouseman; but it is sufficient if he proves facts from which such negligence or fault may be presumed, so as to make a prima facie case, and, therefore, by the great weight of authority, upon proof that the goods were delivered to the warehouseman in good condition, he will be liable for any loss or injury to them while in his custody, and for the value 1967In John Nix & Co. v. Herbert, . 149 Va. 131, 135 , 140 S. E. 121, 122, 123 , we said: “The general rule is that the burden of proof is on the bailor to show that the loss of or injury to goods was due to the negligence or other fault of the warehouseman; but it is sufficient if he proves facts from which such negligence or fault may be presumed, so as to make a prima facie case, and, therefore, by the great weight of authority, upon proof that the goods were delivered to the warehouseman in good condition, he will be liable for any loss or injury to them while in his custody, and for the value | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Carter Coal Co. v. Bates neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Hawkins neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Senger v. Senger's Ex'or green | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Starke v. Berry's Executors neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| McCabe v. Cary's green | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Swan v. Swan's green | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Tabb's Curator v. Cabell green | 1 | 1893–1893 |
| Burwell v. Hobson neutral | 1 | 1882–1882 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.