modern rule in Tennessee

2004Wampol v. Kountz, 14 S.D. 334, 339 , 85 N.W. 595 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 765 ; footnote, 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 87, p. 305, quoting Farr v. Semmler, 24 S.D. 290 , 123 N.W. 835, 838 .

2004Wampol v. Kountz, 14 S.D. 334, 339 , 85 N.W. 595 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 765 ; footnote, 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 87, p. 305, quoting Farr v. Semmler, 24 S.D. 290 , 123 N.W. 835, 838 .

2017In Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d at 812-13 , the Tennessee Supreme Court restated and explained the concept of “tangible employment action,” and the affirmative defense available if such an action has not been taken, as follows: The United States Supreme Court developed the modern framework for determining an employer’s liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment in the companion cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 , 118 S.Ct. 2275 , 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 , 118 S.Ct. 2257 , 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).

2017In Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d at 812-13 , the Tennessee Supreme Court restated and explained the concept of “tangible employment action,” and the affirmative defense available if such an action has not been taken, as follows: The United States Supreme Court developed the modern framework for determining an employer’s liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment in the companion cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 , 118 S.Ct. 2275 , 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 , 118 S.Ct. 2257 , 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).

2017In Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d at 812-13 , the Tennessee Supreme Court restated and explained the concept of “tangible employment action,” and the affirmative defense available if such an action has not been taken, as follows: The United States Supreme Court developed the modern framework for determining an employer’s liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment in the companion cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 , 118 S.Ct. 2275 , 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 , 118 S.Ct. 2257 , 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).

2017In Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d at 812-13 , the Tennessee Supreme Court restated and explained the concept of “tangible employment action,” and the affirmative defense available if such an action has not been taken, as follows: The United States Supreme Court developed the modern framework for determining an employer’s liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment in the companion cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 , 118 S.Ct. 2275 , 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 , 118 S.Ct. 2257 , 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).

2004Wampol v. Kountz, 14 S.D. 334, 339 , 85 N.W. 595 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 765 ; footnote, 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 87, p. 305, quoting Farr v. Semmler, 24 S.D. 290 , 123 N.W. 835, 838 .

2004Wampol v. Kountz, 14 S.D. 334, 339 , 85 N.W. 595 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 765 ; footnote, 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 87, p. 305, quoting Farr v. Semmler, 24 S.D. 290 , 123 N.W. 835, 838 .

2002The court defined common authority as the "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched." Bartram, 925 S.W.2d at 230 -31 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 , 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. 988 , 993 n.7 (1974)).

2002The court defined common authority as the "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched." Bartram, 925 S.W.2d at 230 -31 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 , 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. 988 , 993 n.7 (1974)).

1992In Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. 192 , 17 S.W.2d 8 , in an opinion by Mr. Justice McKinney, the modern rule that contracts of infants are not void but only voidable and subject to be disaf-firmed by the minor either before or after attaining majority appears to have been favored.

1992In Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. 192 , 17 S.W.2d 8 , in an opinion by Mr. Justice McKinney, the modern rule that contracts of infants are not void but only voidable and subject to be disaf-firmed by the minor either before or after attaining majority appears to have been favored.

2017In Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d at 812-13 , the Tennessee Supreme Court restated and explained the concept of “tangible employment action,” and the affirmative defense available if such an action has not been taken, as follows: The United States Supreme Court developed the modern framework for determining an employer’s liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment in the companion cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 , 118 S.Ct. 2275 , 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 , 118 S.Ct. 2257 , 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).

2014For example, in Hill v. Petrotech Resources Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302 (Ky. 2010), the respondents sued Hill for defamation, and filed a motion for a temporary injunction to prohibit Hill from making further defamatory statements about them.

2014Id.

2014As discussed in more detail, infra, the Lothschuetz Court specifically “limit[ed] the application of such injunction to the statements which have been found in . . . proceedings to be false and libelous.” Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200 , 1206 (Guy, J., majority opinion except as to injunctive relief), 1209 (Wellford, J., majority opinion as to injunctive relief, concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lassiter v. Lassiter, 456 F.Supp.2d 876, 884 (E.D.

2008Id.

2002The court defined common authority as the "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched." Bartram, 925 S.W.2d at 230 -31 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 , 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. 988 , 993 n.7 (1974)).

2000In discussing Pennsylvania’s switch to allow substantive use of prior inconsistent statements, one commentator asserts that Relying primarily on the same rationale as that employed in [Commonwealth v.] Brady, [ 510 Pa. 123 , 507 A.2d 66 (Pa.1986),] forty-one states have elected to follow some version of the modern rule, and thus allow the admission of a non-party witness' prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.

2000In discussing Pennsylvania’s switch to allow substantive use of prior inconsistent statements, one commentator asserts that Relying primarily on the same rationale as that employed in [Commonwealth v.] Brady, [ 510 Pa. 123 , 507 A.2d 66 (Pa.1986),] forty-one states have elected to follow some version of the modern rule, and thus allow the admission of a non-party witness' prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.

1985A case from another jurisdiction illustrating the modern rule of joinder of claims is Renger Memorial Hospital v. Texas, 585 S.W.2d 352 (Tex.Civ.App.1979), in which the state of Texas sued the hospital seeking to cancel its charter and also to collect a promissory note and foreclose a lien on the land securing the note.