modern rule in District of Columbia

1991Under the modern rule, to be actionable, the emotional distress must be serious and foreseeable, i.e., “ ‘medically diagnosable’ and ‘medically significant’.” Asuncion, supra, 514 A.2d at 1189 (citing Bass, supra, 646 S.W.2d at 772-73 ).

1991Under the modern rule, to be actionable, the emotional distress must be serious and foreseeable, i.e., “ ‘medically diagnosable’ and ‘medically significant’.” Asuncion, supra, 514 A.2d at 1189 (citing Bass, supra, 646 S.W.2d at 772-73 ).

2011See Martin I, supra, 240 A.2d at 365 (holding that statute provides that a marriage contracted by a person who was adjudged, and known to have been, mentally incompetent was voidable, but not void ab ini-tio ); Hurwitz, supra, 193 A.2d at 360 (acknowledging the general rule that the contracts of a minor are voidable at the minor’s option, and extending the rule to contracts between two minors). 14 In its order, the trial court explained that allowing persons found mentally incompetent to “void at their election contracts entered into during periods of infancy or incompetency is grounded in the

2011See Martin I, supra, 240 A.2d at 365 (holding that statute provides that a marriage contracted by a person who was adjudged, and known to have been, mentally incompetent was voidable, but not void ab ini-tio ); Hurwitz, supra, 193 A.2d at 360 (acknowledging the general rule that the contracts of a minor are voidable at the minor’s option, and extending the rule to contracts between two minors). 14 In its order, the trial court explained that allowing persons found mentally incompetent to “void at their election contracts entered into during periods of infancy or incompetency is grounded in the

2011See Martin I, supra, 240 A.2d at 365 (holding that statute provides that a marriage contracted by a person who was adjudged, and known to have been, mentally incompetent was voidable, but not void ab ini-tio ); Hurwitz, supra, 193 A.2d at 360 (acknowledging the general rule that the contracts of a minor are voidable at the minor’s option, and extending the rule to contracts between two minors). 14 In its order, the trial court explained that allowing persons found mentally incompetent to “void at their election contracts entered into during periods of infancy or incompetency is grounded in the

2003In deviating from the common law rule allowing a person to resist an unlawful arrest forcibly, one court determined “that this rule is no longer consistent with the needs of modern society and should be abrogated.” Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596 , 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (1983). 17 The court “conclude[d] that in the absence of excessive or unnecessary force by an arresting officer, a person may not use force to resist an arrest by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer, engaged in the performance of his duties, regardless of whether the arrest was unla

2003In deviating from the common law rule allowing a person to resist an unlawful arrest forcibly, one court determined “that this rule is no longer consistent with the needs of modern society and should be abrogated.” Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596 , 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (1983). 17 The court “conclude[d] that in the absence of excessive or unnecessary force by an arresting officer, a person may not use force to resist an arrest by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer, engaged in the performance of his duties, regardless of whether the arrest was unla

2002The Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision in Gilman is "an especially persuasive authority when the District's common law is silent.” Napoleon v. Heard, 455 A.2d 901, 903 (D.C.1983). 13 ."The rationale most often used to support application of the modern rule [enforcing forum selection clauses] is that it comports with traditional concepts of freedom of contract and recognizes the present nationwide and worldwide scope of business relations which generate potential multi-jurisdictional litigation.” Paul Business Systems, Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 240 Va. 337 , 397 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1990). 14 .

2002The Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision in Gilman is "an especially persuasive authority when the District's common law is silent.” Napoleon v. Heard, 455 A.2d 901, 903 (D.C.1983). 13 ."The rationale most often used to support application of the modern rule [enforcing forum selection clauses] is that it comports with traditional concepts of freedom of contract and recognizes the present nationwide and worldwide scope of business relations which generate potential multi-jurisdictional litigation.” Paul Business Systems, Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 240 Va. 337 , 397 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1990). 14 .

2002The Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision in Gilman is "an especially persuasive authority when the District's common law is silent.” Napoleon v. Heard, 455 A.2d 901, 903 (D.C.1983). 13 ."The rationale most often used to support application of the modern rule [enforcing forum selection clauses] is that it comports with traditional concepts of freedom of contract and recognizes the present nationwide and worldwide scope of business relations which generate potential multi-jurisdictional litigation.” Paul Business Systems, Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 240 Va. 337 , 397 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1990). 14 .

2002The question before us, then, is whether appellant has shown that enforcement of the clause in the Agreement is “unreasonable under the circumstances.” A. First, “[a]s a threshold matter, the validity of a forum selection clause ... depends on whether the existence of the clause was reasonably communicated to the plaintiff.” O’Brien v. Okemo Mt, 17 F.Supp.2d 98, 103 (D.Conn.1998).

1996Oliver, supra, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 373 , 134 N.E.2d at 202 (emphasis added); accord, Pardon, supra, 157 S.E.2d at 702 (quoting Oliver ).

1996Oliver, supra, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 373 , 134 N.E.2d at 202 (emphasis added); accord, Pardon, supra, 157 S.E.2d at 702 (quoting Oliver ).

1996Oliver, supra, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 373 , 134 N.E.2d at 202 (emphasis added); accord, Pardon, supra, 157 S.E.2d at 702 (quoting Oliver ).

1989See, e.g., Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 12-15 , 18 So.2d 633, 637 (1944); Hannah v. State Bank of Wood Lake, Minn., 195 Minn. 54, 57 , 261 N.W. 583, 584 (1935).

1989See, e.g., Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 12-15 , 18 So.2d 633, 637 (1944); Hannah v. State Bank of Wood Lake, Minn., 195 Minn. 54, 57 , 261 N.W. 583, 584 (1935).

1989See Etgen v. Washington County Building & Loan Ass’n, 184 Md. 412, 418-19 , 41 A.2d 290, 292-93 (1945).

1989See Etgen v. Washington County Building & Loan Ass’n, 184 Md. 412, 418-19 , 41 A.2d 290, 292-93 (1945).

1989“Under the modern rule, changes by one party that simply describe the interest con *1023 veyed with greater particularity, Boys v. Long, 268 P.2d 890, 891-93 (Okla.1954), or correct an erroneous property description, Whitman v. Whitman, supra, 206 La. at 11-15, 18 So.2d at 635-36, or rectify a clerical error in drafting, Hannah v. State Bank of Wood Lake, Minn., 195 Minn. 54, 57 , 261 N.W. 583, 584 (1935), do not permit the nonconsenting party to repudiate liability.

1989“Under the modern rule, changes by one party that simply describe the interest con *1023 veyed with greater particularity, Boys v. Long, 268 P.2d 890, 891-93 (Okla.1954), or correct an erroneous property description, Whitman v. Whitman, supra, 206 La. at 11-15, 18 So.2d at 635-36, or rectify a clerical error in drafting, Hannah v. State Bank of Wood Lake, Minn., 195 Minn. 54, 57 , 261 N.W. 583, 584 (1935), do not permit the nonconsenting party to repudiate liability.

1989“Under the modern rule, changes by one party that simply describe the interest con *1023 veyed with greater particularity, Boys v. Long, 268 P.2d 890, 891-93 (Okla.1954), or correct an erroneous property description, Whitman v. Whitman, supra, 206 La. at 11-15, 18 So.2d at 635-36, or rectify a clerical error in drafting, Hannah v. State Bank of Wood Lake, Minn., 195 Minn. 54, 57 , 261 N.W. 583, 584 (1935), do not permit the nonconsenting party to repudiate liability.

1989“Under the modern rule, changes by one party that simply describe the interest con *1023 veyed with greater particularity, Boys v. Long, 268 P.2d 890, 891-93 (Okla.1954), or correct an erroneous property description, Whitman v. Whitman, supra, 206 La. at 11-15, 18 So.2d at 635-36, or rectify a clerical error in drafting, Hannah v. State Bank of Wood Lake, Minn., 195 Minn. 54, 57 , 261 N.W. 583, 584 (1935), do not permit the nonconsenting party to repudiate liability.

1986Seymour v. Slide & Spur Gold Mines, 153 U.S. 523, 525 , 14 S.Ct. 847 , 38 L.Ed. 807 (1894); Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U.S. 282, 289-93 , 10 S.Ct. 93, 95-6 , 33 L.Ed. 817 (1889); Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U.S. (10 OTTO) 55, 60-61, 25 L.Ed. 547 (1879); Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., supra, 96 U.S. (6 OTTO) at 13. 11 See also Groo v. Norman & Robinson, 42 App.D.C. 387, 390 (1914) (“The modern rule, from which we have been unable to find any substantial departure, is that the title of a [foreign] corporation to real estate held in excess of its powers [under the law

1979The modern rule is that in the absence of facts and circumstances which indicate that the agreement is for a specific term, an employment contract which provides for an annual rate of compensation, but makes no provision as to the duration of employment, is not a contract for one year but is terminable at will by either party. 7 See, e. g., Henkel, supra 344 N.E.2d at 119 ; Horizon Corporation v. Weinberg, 23 Ariz.App. 215 , 531 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1975). 8 Appellants’ reliance on' Heritage by-laws and D.C.Code 1973, § 29-1025, is misplaced.

1979The modern rule is that in the absence of facts and circumstances which indicate that the agreement is for a specific term, an employment contract which provides for an annual rate of compensation, but makes no provision as to the duration of employment, is not a contract for one year but is terminable at will by either party. 7 See, e. g., Henkel, supra 344 N.E.2d at 119 ; Horizon Corporation v. Weinberg, 23 Ariz.App. 215 , 531 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1975). 8 Appellants’ reliance on' Heritage by-laws and D.C.Code 1973, § 29-1025, is misplaced.

1978See, e. g., Kassan v. Stout, 9 Cal.3d 39 , 507 P.2d 87 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 783 (1973); Brooks v. LaSalle National Bank, 11 Ill.App.3d 791 , 298 N.E.2d 262 (1973); Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711 (Del.1972); Edwards v. C.

1978See, e. g., Kassan v. Stout, 9 Cal.3d 39 , 507 P.2d 87 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 783 (1973); Brooks v. LaSalle National Bank, 11 Ill.App.3d 791 , 298 N.E.2d 262 (1973); Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711 (Del.1972); Edwards v. C.

1976Moreover, this court in Williston v. Heritage Supply Company, D.C.Mun.App., 155 A.2d 253, 255 (1959), explicitly adopted the modern rule that an admitted or proven signature may be allowed in evidence solely for the purpose of comparison with a disputed signature.