modern rule in Pennsylvania

1981Thereafter, in Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 396 Pa. 530 , 153 A. 2d 901 (1959), the court reasoned that the holdings in the earlier Lindenfelser case, supra, and DeLuca, 388 Pa. 167 , 130 A. 2d 179 (1957), “. . . together set down the modern rule to be that where husband and wife are separated but not divorced, and where one of them is excluded from the exercise or enjoyment of rights inherent in an estate held by the entireties, an accounting of property so held may be ordered and the property divided equally between them.” Id at 534-535, 153 A. 2d at 905 .

1981Thereafter, in Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 396 Pa. 530 , 153 A. 2d 901 (1959), the court reasoned that the holdings in the earlier Lindenfelser case, supra, and DeLuca, 388 Pa. 167 , 130 A. 2d 179 (1957), “. . . together set down the modern rule to be that where husband and wife are separated but not divorced, and where one of them is excluded from the exercise or enjoyment of rights inherent in an estate held by the entireties, an accounting of property so held may be ordered and the property divided equally between them.” Id at 534-535, 153 A. 2d at 905 .

1955Historically the presumption of legitimacy was “one of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law” but under the modern rule “ 'countervailing evi *583 dence may shatter the presumption [of legitimacy] though the possibility of access is not susceptible of exclusion to the point of utter demonstration.’ See, In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1 , 170 N.E. 471”: Commonwealth v. Gantz, 128 Pa. Superior Ct. 97 , 193 A. 72 .

1955Historically the presumption of legitimacy was “one of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law” but under the modern rule “ 'countervailing evi *583 dence may shatter the presumption [of legitimacy] though the possibility of access is not susceptible of exclusion to the point of utter demonstration.’ See, In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1 , 170 N.E. 471”: Commonwealth v. Gantz, 128 Pa. Superior Ct. 97 , 193 A. 72 .

1950The modern rule is that “The presumption only stands until met Avith such evidence as makes it appear clearly and to the satisfaction of the fact finding body that sexual intercourse did not take place between the husband and wife at any time when he could have been the father of the . . . children.”: Dulsky v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 116 Pa. Superior Ct. 520 , 177 A. 60 .

1950The modern rule is that “The presumption only stands until met Avith such evidence as makes it appear clearly and to the satisfaction of the fact finding body that sexual intercourse did not take place between the husband and wife at any time when he could have been the father of the . . . children.”: Dulsky v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 116 Pa. Superior Ct. 520 , 177 A. 60 .

1989State Hospital for Criminal Insane v. Consolidated Water Supply Co., 267 Pa. 29 , 110 A. 281 (1920).

1989State Hospital for Criminal Insane v. Consolidated Water Supply Co., 267 Pa. 29 , 110 A. 281 (1920).

1981Thereafter, in Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 396 Pa. 530 , 153 A. 2d 901 (1959), the court reasoned that the holdings in the earlier Lindenfelser case, supra, and DeLuca, 388 Pa. 167 , 130 A. 2d 179 (1957), “. . . together set down the modern rule to be that where husband and wife are separated but not divorced, and where one of them is excluded from the exercise or enjoyment of rights inherent in an estate held by the entireties, an accounting of property so held may be ordered and the property divided equally between them.” Id at 534-535, 153 A. 2d at 905 .

1981Thereafter, in Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 396 Pa. 530 , 153 A. 2d 901 (1959), the court reasoned that the holdings in the earlier Lindenfelser case, supra, and DeLuca, 388 Pa. 167 , 130 A. 2d 179 (1957), “. . . together set down the modern rule to be that where husband and wife are separated but not divorced, and where one of them is excluded from the exercise or enjoyment of rights inherent in an estate held by the entireties, an accounting of property so held may be ordered and the property divided equally between them.” Id at 534-535, 153 A. 2d at 905 .

1955Historically the presumption of legitimacy was “one of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law” but under the modern rule “ 'countervailing evi *583 dence may shatter the presumption [of legitimacy] though the possibility of access is not susceptible of exclusion to the point of utter demonstration.’ See, In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1 , 170 N.E. 471”: Commonwealth v. Gantz, 128 Pa. Superior Ct. 97 , 193 A. 72 .

1955Historically the presumption of legitimacy was “one of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law” but under the modern rule “ 'countervailing evi *583 dence may shatter the presumption [of legitimacy] though the possibility of access is not susceptible of exclusion to the point of utter demonstration.’ See, In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1 , 170 N.E. 471”: Commonwealth v. Gantz, 128 Pa. Superior Ct. 97 , 193 A. 72 .

1975In a well-reasoned, carefully documented and forward looking opinion, Judge Wieand, of Lehigh County, held that despite Pennsylvania’s adoption of the traditional rule that generally a release of the one responsible for the releasor’s original injury, barred subsequent action by the injured party against a physician or surgeon for negligent treatment of the injury, had been adopted by Pennsylvania in 1937 in Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209 , 192 Atl. 107 (1937), it was highly questionable whether our courts would continue to follow that decision in view of the modern rule now adopted by a sizable

1975In a well-reasoned, carefully documented and forward looking opinion, Judge Wieand, of Lehigh County, held that despite Pennsylvania’s adoption of the traditional rule that generally a release of the one responsible for the releasor’s original injury, barred subsequent action by the injured party against a physician or surgeon for negligent treatment of the injury, had been adopted by Pennsylvania in 1937 in Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209 , 192 Atl. 107 (1937), it was highly questionable whether our courts would continue to follow that decision in view of the modern rule now adopted by a sizable

1952The modern rule as restated in the Gianni case has been followed without exception in our court (Cf. McMinn v. Mammone, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 1 , 82 A. 2d 70 ) and in the Supreme Court, notably in Speier v. Michelson, 303 Pa. 66 , 154 A. 127 and more recently in Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592 , 79 A. 2d 255 .

1952The modern rule as restated in the Gianni case has been followed without exception in our court (Cf. McMinn v. Mammone, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 1 , 82 A. 2d 70 ) and in the Supreme Court, notably in Speier v. Michelson, 303 Pa. 66 , 154 A. 127 and more recently in Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592 , 79 A. 2d 255 .

1918Parol evidence should be avoided, whenever it can be done, that a purchaser or heirs-at-law may be able to judge, from the instrument itself, what lands are or are not to be affected by it.” What was stated at the time the above opinion was written to be the modern principle has now become a more or less ancient doctrine and has been consistently followed and applied in a long line of subsequent decisions of which Best v. Hammond, 55 Pa. 409 ; Root’s Est., 187 Pa. 118 ; Hunter v. Hunter, 229 Pa. 349 , and Metzger’s Est., 242 Pa. 69, 72 , are illustrations.

1904In support of his conclusion the learned auditor cited, among other cases, Root’s Estate, Root’s Appeal, 187 Pa. 118 , and quotes from Mr. Justice Dean as follows: “ The modern doctrine is that where a subject exists which satisfies the terms of the will, and to which they are perfectly applicable, there is no latent ambiguity.

1910It is true that Oxenreider was hired at the rate of $10.00 per month to feed and care for this stock along with the other stock owned by Davies on the latter farm, whose hay, straw and grain was used by the stock and the implements were placed in Davies’ barn. ■ The rule of law as to possession has been many times •declared, and as stated in Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263 , “The modern doctrine upon this subject appears to be that, in determining the kind of possession necessary to be given, regard must be had, not only to the character of the property, but also to the nature of the transaction,

1901No such change of possession as will defeat the fair and honest object of the parties is required: Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 ; Ziegler v. Handrick, 106 Pa. 87 ; McClure v. Forney, 107 Pa. 414 ;” Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263 . “ The results of these cases were summarized in Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 , Avhere it was said that the character of the property, the use to be made of it, the nature and object of the transaction, the position of the parties, and the usages of the trade or business are all to be considered in deciding the sufficiency of the possession taken by the puchasen This

1901No such change of possession as will defeat the fair and honest object of the parties is required: Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 ; Ziegler v. Handrick, 106 Pa. 87 ; McClure v. Forney, 107 Pa. 414 ;” Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263 . “ The results of these cases were summarized in Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 , Avhere it was said that the character of the property, the use to be made of it, the nature and object of the transaction, the position of the parties, and the usages of the trade or business are all to be considered in deciding the sufficiency of the possession taken by the puchasen This

1891No such change of possession as will defeat the fair and honest object of the parties is required: Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 ; Ziegler v. Handrick, 106 Pa. 87 ; McClure v. Forney, 107 Pa. 414 .

1901No such change of possession as will defeat the fair and honest object of the parties is required: Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 ; Ziegler v. Handrick, 106 Pa. 87 ; McClure v. Forney, 107 Pa. 414 ;” Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263 . “ The results of these cases were summarized in Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 , Avhere it was said that the character of the property, the use to be made of it, the nature and object of the transaction, the position of the parties, and the usages of the trade or business are all to be considered in deciding the sufficiency of the possession taken by the puchasen This

1901No such change of possession as will defeat the fair and honest object of the parties is required: Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 ; Ziegler v. Handrick, 106 Pa. 87 ; McClure v. Forney, 107 Pa. 414 ;” Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263 . “ The results of these cases were summarized in Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 , Avhere it was said that the character of the property, the use to be made of it, the nature and object of the transaction, the position of the parties, and the usages of the trade or business are all to be considered in deciding the sufficiency of the possession taken by the puchasen This

1901No such change of possession as will defeat the fair and honest object of the parties is required: Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 ; Ziegler v. Handrick, 106 Pa. 87 ; McClure v. Forney, 107 Pa. 414 ;” Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263 . “ The results of these cases were summarized in Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 , Avhere it was said that the character of the property, the use to be made of it, the nature and object of the transaction, the position of the parties, and the usages of the trade or business are all to be considered in deciding the sufficiency of the possession taken by the puchasen This

1901No such change of possession as will defeat the fair and honest object of the parties is required: Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 ; Ziegler v. Handrick, 106 Pa. 87 ; McClure v. Forney, 107 Pa. 414 ;” Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263 . “ The results of these cases were summarized in Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576 , Avhere it was said that the character of the property, the use to be made of it, the nature and object of the transaction, the position of the parties, and the usages of the trade or business are all to be considered in deciding the sufficiency of the possession taken by the puchasen This

2015Id.

2009Interpreting a line of cases which began with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 788 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467 , 434 A.2d 1185 (1981), set out the modern standard for the steps a court-appointed attorney must take in order to withdraw from representation of a criminal defendant in a direct appeal.

2009Interpreting a line of cases which began with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 788 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467 , 434 A.2d 1185 (1981), set out the modern standard for the steps a court-appointed attorney must take in order to withdraw from representation of a criminal defendant in a direct appeal.

2009Interpreting a line of cases which began with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 788 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467 , 434 A.2d 1185 (1981), set out the modern standard for the steps a court-appointed attorney must take in order to withdraw from representation of a criminal defendant in a direct appeal.

2009Interpreting a line of cases which began with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 788 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467 , 434 A.2d 1185 (1981), set out the modern standard for the steps a court-appointed attorney must take in order to withdraw from representation of a criminal defendant in a direct appeal.

2007E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 , 111 S.Ct. 1522 , 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 , 92 S.Ct. 1907 , 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972).

2007E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 , 111 S.Ct. 1522 , 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 , 92 S.Ct. 1907 , 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972).