modern rule in Indiana

1990Johnson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1985), 133 Ill.App.3d 472 , 88 Ill.Dec. 449 , 478 N.E.2d 1057 .

1990Johnson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1985), 133 Ill.App.3d 472 , 88 Ill.Dec. 449 , 478 N.E.2d 1057 .

1977Pursley v. Hisch (1949), 119 Ind. App. 232, 237 , 85 N.E.2d 270 . 5 I.L.E., Children Born Out of Wedlock, § 2, p. 142. ‘While the presumption that every child born during wedlock is legitimate is one of the most firmly established principles of common law, such presumption is not conclusive, and may be rebutted.’ Duke v. Duke (1963), 134 Ind. App. 172, 174 , 185 N.E.2d 478, 479 (Transfer denied).

1977Pursley v. Hisch (1949), 119 Ind. App. 232, 237 , 85 N.E.2d 270 . 5 I.L.E., Children Born Out of Wedlock, § 2, p. 142. ‘While the presumption that every child born during wedlock is legitimate is one of the most firmly established principles of common law, such presumption is not conclusive, and may be rebutted.’ Duke v. Duke (1963), 134 Ind. App. 172, 174 , 185 N.E.2d 478, 479 (Transfer denied).

1975This is also the modern rule at common law.’ Schutz v. Rose (1964), 136 Ind. App. 165, 169 , 196 N.E.2d 285, 287 .

1975This is also the modern rule at common law.’ Schutz v. Rose (1964), 136 Ind. App. 165, 169 , 196 N.E.2d 285, 287 .

1975The test to be used is this: A damage verdict will only be reversed by this Court after we have examined the evidence concerning the injuries, and it is apparent that the amount of damages assessed by the jury is so small or so great as to indicate that the jury was motivated by ‘prejudice, passion, partiality or corruption, or considered some improper element.’ Green v. Oakley (1969), 145 Ind. App. 307 , 250 N.E.2d 594 .

1975The test to be used is this: A damage verdict will only be reversed by this Court after we have examined the evidence concerning the injuries, and it is apparent that the amount of damages assessed by the jury is so small or so great as to indicate that the jury was motivated by ‘prejudice, passion, partiality or corruption, or considered some improper element.’ Green v. Oakley (1969), 145 Ind. App. 307 , 250 N.E.2d 594 .

1969Kilmer v. Parrish (1908), 144 Ill.

1964Kilmer v. Parrish (1908), 144 Ill.

2024But the modern rule, by contrast, holds that criminal contempt is “a crime in Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-MI-68 | September 5, 2024 Page 2 of 12 every fundamental respect.” Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201 .

2012Id. at 1266 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 50 (1982); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 885, 886 (1979); 3 Harper, Gray & James, The Law of Torts 37 (2d ed., 1986)).

2007In Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. 2004), our supreme court abandoned the acceptance rule as an “outmoded relic” in favor of what has been termed the modern rule or foreseeability doctrine.

2007Id. at 737 .

2005We have reiterated this modern rule in many cases since Fields, most recently in Robinson v. State, 814 N.E.2d 704 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

2005In Robinson, we stated that "the Indiana rule is that a private citizen may not use force in resisting a peaceful arrest by an individual [whom] he knows, or has reason to know, is a police officer performing his duties regardless of whether the arrest in question is lawful or unlawful." Id. at 708 {citation omitted).

2000The modern rule dispenses with these concepts and instead requires the court to determine whether the party against whom the prior judgment is pled had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances of the particular case to apply collateral estoppel.” Hayworth, 669 N.E.2d at 167 ; Sullivan, 606 N.E.2d at 138; Exide Corp., 727 N.E.2d at 478 ; Slutsky, 713 N.E.2d at 291 .

2000The modern rule dispenses with these concepts and instead requires the court to determine whether the party against whom the prior judgment is pled had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances of the particular case to apply collateral estoppel.” Hayworth, 669 N.E.2d at 167 ; Sullivan, 606 N.E.2d at 138; Exide Corp., 727 N.E.2d at 478 ; Slutsky, 713 N.E.2d at 291 .

2000The modern rule dispenses with these concepts and instead requires the court to determine whether the party against whom the prior judgment is pled had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances of the particular case to apply collateral estoppel.” Hayworth, 669 N.E.2d at 167 ; Sullivan, 606 N.E.2d at 138; Exide Corp., 727 N.E.2d at 478 ; Slutsky, 713 N.E.2d at 291 .

1993For a more thorough treatment of the evolution of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases in Indiana, see Vergara v. Doan (1992), Ind., 593 N.E.2d 185 . 4 .

1992Failure to Disclose The modern rule, upon which the majority bases much of its opinion, that a party is not obliged to provide a list of rebuttal witnesses, originated in our supreme court's decision in Chatman v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 531 , 334 N.E.2d 673 .

1992Failure to Disclose The modern rule, upon which the majority bases much of its opinion, that a party is not obliged to provide a list of rebuttal witnesses, originated in our supreme court's decision in Chatman v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 531 , 334 N.E.2d 673 .

1992In the seminal opinion of Langley v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 199, 203 , 267 N.E.2d 538, 540 , Justice Hunter observed the rules of post-conviction relief were "not ... in-ten[ded] ... to provide a means whereby one convicted could repeatedly re-litigate claims of improper conviction, or could un-qualifiedly, upon a legitimate waiver of the right to appeal ... raise an untimely challenge directed at some aspect of the proceedings against him." (Original emphasis.) Accordingly, our supreme court established the modern rule that waiver is an affirmative defense to a petition for post-conviction re

1992In the seminal opinion of Langley v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 199, 203 , 267 N.E.2d 538, 540 , Justice Hunter observed the rules of post-conviction relief were "not ... in-ten[ded] ... to provide a means whereby one convicted could repeatedly re-litigate claims of improper conviction, or could un-qualifiedly, upon a legitimate waiver of the right to appeal ... raise an untimely challenge directed at some aspect of the proceedings against him." (Original emphasis.) Accordingly, our supreme court established the modern rule that waiver is an affirmative defense to a petition for post-conviction re

1992Additionally, the Court of Appeals expressed its displeasure with the rule, while affirming the trial court's entry of summary judgment in the present case, by stating: "In any event, regardless of whether the release rule has ever constituted anything but an abomination in law, we must follow our supreme court's precedents of Bellew, supra and Cooper, supra." 564 N.E.2d at 965 .

1992Ind. & Mich, Elec., supra. Thus, the trial court should have granted Modern's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to future lost profits for future customers and for customers not affected by the transaction between Modern and Distributors.

1992App., 580 N.E.2d 679 at 686 , written by Chief Judge Ratliff, who authored Summers : "It has been said previously, that to be admissible the subject matter of an expert's testimony must be beyond the understanding of laymen. [Citations omitted.] However, in Summers , we rejected this traditional test and said that the proper and modern test is whether the expert has some special knowledge which would assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or deciding a factual issue." In any event, as noted by the majority here, the questioned testimony meets the traditional test as well as the

1992That the Summers test was intended to be different from and to replace the former test is made clear from Cox v. American Aggregates Corp. (1991) ist Dist.Ind.App., 580 N.E.2d 679 at 686 , written by Chief Judge Ratliff, who authored Summers: "It has been said previously, that to be admissible the subject matter of an expert's testimony must be beyond the understanding of laymen. [Citations omitted.] However, in Summers, we rejected this traditional test and said that the proper and modern test is whether the expert has some special knowledge which would assist the trier of fact in understandi

1990Mihay v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 498, 500 ; Summers v. State (1986), Ind.App., 495 N.E.2d 799 .

1990Mihay v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 498, 500 ; Summers v. State (1986), Ind.App., 495 N.E.2d 799 .

1987Johnson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1985), 133 Ill.App.3d 472 , 88 Ill.Dec. 449 , 479 N.E.2d 1057 .

1984The modern rule as to what represents a * marketable title was enunciated in Kenefick v. Schumaker (1917), 64 Ind.App. 552 , 116 N.E. 319 .

1984The modern rule as to what represents a * marketable title was enunciated in Kenefick v. Schumaker (1917), 64 Ind.App. 552 , 116 N.E. 319 .