modern doctrine in Missouri

1974Deeds § 90; 2 Devlin, Deeds, Sec. 843a; Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284 , 70 S.W. 702 ; Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442 , 147 S.W.2d 660 , 133 A.L.R. 586 ; Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731 , 92 S.W.2d 157 . ‘In accordance with the modern rule, which is to ascertain the grantor’s intention from all the terms of a deed in all cases where it is possible so to do and to consider all the clauses together without undue reference to their location in the deed, where two clauses are inconsistent, the paramount rule is that the deed must be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as coll

1974Deeds § 90; 2 Devlin, Deeds, Sec. 843a; Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284 , 70 S.W. 702 ; Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442 , 147 S.W.2d 660 , 133 A.L.R. 586 ; Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731 , 92 S.W.2d 157 . ‘In accordance with the modern rule, which is to ascertain the grantor’s intention from all the terms of a deed in all cases where it is possible so to do and to consider all the clauses together without undue reference to their location in the deed, where two clauses are inconsistent, the paramount rule is that the deed must be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as coll

1994Id.

1994Id.

1968The leading case on duress as a defense in Missouri seems to be Weisert v. Bramman, 358 Mo. 636 , 216 S.W.2d 430 , where the court stated: “The modern rule of duress as established by the above cases is that ‘duress is to be tested, not by the nature of the threats, but rather by the state of mind induced thereby in the victim’; and that ultimate fact in issue is whether the al leged injured party was bereft of the free exercise of his will power; and of which, the means used to produce such state of mind, the age, sex, capacity, situation, and relation of the parties, are all evidentiary. * *

1968The leading case on duress as a defense in Missouri seems to be Weisert v. Bramman, 358 Mo. 636 , 216 S.W.2d 430 , where the court stated: “The modern rule of duress as established by the above cases is that ‘duress is to be tested, not by the nature of the threats, but rather by the state of mind induced thereby in the victim’; and that ultimate fact in issue is whether the al leged injured party was bereft of the free exercise of his will power; and of which, the means used to produce such state of mind, the age, sex, capacity, situation, and relation of the parties, are all evidentiary. * *

2006"The modern test for duress is whether the threat has left the individual bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making of a contract.” Id. 9 .

2000In Renwood Food Products v. Schaefer, 240 Mo.App. 939 , 223 S.W.2d 144 (1949), the court adopted the rationale for this rule from an English case: Lord Atkinson, in Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916, 1 A.C. 688] 702, summarized the modern rule as follows: ‘He (employer) is undoubtedly entitled to have his interest in his trade secrets protected, such as secret processes of manufacture which may be of vast value.

2000In Renwood Food Products v. Schaefer, 240 Mo.App. 939 , 223 S.W.2d 144 (1949), the court adopted the rationale for this rule from an English case: Lord Atkinson, in Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916, 1 A.C. 688] 702, summarized the modern rule as follows: ‘He (employer) is undoubtedly entitled to have his interest in his trade secrets protected, such as secret processes of manufacture which may be of vast value.

1995Id.

1982Besides being in the best interests of both the clients and the legal profession as a whole, Rosenberg, supra, at 1021 , it can be said that the modern rule strikes a better balance between the client’s power to discharge his attorney without undue restrictions and the attorney’s right to fair compensation for services rendered.

1982Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal.3d 784 , 494 P.2d 9 , 100 Cal.Rptr. 385 (1972).

1982Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal.3d 784 , 494 P.2d 9 , 100 Cal.Rptr. 385 (1972).

1982As stated in Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170 , 114 N.E. 46 (1916), at p. 47, “the peculiar relation of trust and confidence that such a relationship implies injects into the contract certain special and unique features.” Taking into account this special relationship, and the greater freedom to change legal representation mandated thereby, the courts which observe the modern rule allow a client to discharge his attorney, with or without cause, at any time. 1 In other words, when a client becomes dissatisfied with his attorney, he may release that attorney and hire another.

1982As stated in Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170 , 114 N.E. 46 (1916), at p. 47, “the peculiar relation of trust and confidence that such a relationship implies injects into the contract certain special and unique features.” Taking into account this special relationship, and the greater freedom to change legal representation mandated thereby, the courts which observe the modern rule allow a client to discharge his attorney, with or without cause, at any time. 1 In other words, when a client becomes dissatisfied with his attorney, he may release that attorney and hire another.

1974The ordinance does not restrain individuals from working as plumbers, it simply requires the man who holds himself out to do this important work shall be fitted for it, and the ordinance imposes no unreasonable burden upon him.” Ex parte Smith, supra, 1 . c. 132 S.W. 609 -610. 1 See Anno: Validity of regulations as to plumbers and plumbing, 36 A.L.R. 1342 ; Anno: Plumbing Regulations — Validity, 22 A.L.R.2d 816 .

1974The primary or dominant intent expressed in the instrument, when ascertained, will control.’ 16 Am.Jur., Sec. 173, p. 536.” Certainly, in so far as any interest of Effie is concerned, it would have been better not only to have listed her with other grantees in the usual place but to have used more customary operative words of conveyance; but, as was said in Monroe v. Lyons, 339 Mo. 515 , 98 S.W.2d 544 (1936) at 1.c. 546: “We recognize that a deed must contain operative words of conveyance, but it is not indispensible that any particular words or phrases be employed.

1974The primary or dominant intent expressed in the instrument, when ascertained, will control.’ 16 Am.Jur., Sec. 173, p. 536.” Certainly, in so far as any interest of Effie is concerned, it would have been better not only to have listed her with other grantees in the usual place but to have used more customary operative words of conveyance; but, as was said in Monroe v. Lyons, 339 Mo. 515 , 98 S.W.2d 544 (1936) at 1.c. 546: “We recognize that a deed must contain operative words of conveyance, but it is not indispensible that any particular words or phrases be employed.

1974Deeds § 90; 2 Devlin, Deeds, Sec. 843a; Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284 , 70 S.W. 702 ; Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442 , 147 S.W.2d 660 , 133 A.L.R. 586 ; Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731 , 92 S.W.2d 157 . ‘In accordance with the modern rule, which is to ascertain the grantor’s intention from all the terms of a deed in all cases where it is possible so to do and to consider all the clauses together without undue reference to their location in the deed, where two clauses are inconsistent, the paramount rule is that the deed must be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as coll

1974Deeds § 90; 2 Devlin, Deeds, Sec. 843a; Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284 , 70 S.W. 702 ; Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442 , 147 S.W.2d 660 , 133 A.L.R. 586 ; Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731 , 92 S.W.2d 157 . ‘In accordance with the modern rule, which is to ascertain the grantor’s intention from all the terms of a deed in all cases where it is possible so to do and to consider all the clauses together without undue reference to their location in the deed, where two clauses are inconsistent, the paramount rule is that the deed must be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as coll

1974Deeds § 90; 2 Devlin, Deeds, Sec. 843a; Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284 , 70 S.W. 702 ; Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442 , 147 S.W.2d 660 , 133 A.L.R. 586 ; Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731 , 92 S.W.2d 157 . ‘In accordance with the modern rule, which is to ascertain the grantor’s intention from all the terms of a deed in all cases where it is possible so to do and to consider all the clauses together without undue reference to their location in the deed, where two clauses are inconsistent, the paramount rule is that the deed must be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as coll

1974Deeds § 90; 2 Devlin, Deeds, Sec. 843a; Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284 , 70 S.W. 702 ; Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442 , 147 S.W.2d 660 , 133 A.L.R. 586 ; Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731 , 92 S.W.2d 157 . ‘In accordance with the modern rule, which is to ascertain the grantor’s intention from all the terms of a deed in all cases where it is possible so to do and to consider all the clauses together without undue reference to their location in the deed, where two clauses are inconsistent, the paramount rule is that the deed must be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as coll

1974But the modern doctrine is expressed in Rbviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) and McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967).

1974But the modern doctrine is expressed in Rbviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) and McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967).

1974But the modern doctrine is expressed in Rbviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) and McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967).

1974But the modern doctrine is expressed in Rbviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) and McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967).