modern rule in New York

2004A child has some rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magnitude ( cf. Goss v Lopes , 419 US 565, 574 ; Matter of Winship , 397 US 358 , [*10]365; Tinker v Des Moines School Dist. , 393 US 503, 506 ; Matter of Gault , 387 US 1, 47 .) (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar, the biological mother/respondent is in her early thirties and obviously could get pregnant again, intentionally or unintentionally, and have even more children.

1991A child has rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magnitude” (Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, supra, at 546; see, Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565, 574 ; Matter of Winship, 397 US 358, 386 ; Tinker v Des Moines School Dist., 393 US 503, 505 ; Matter of Gault, 387 US 1, 47 ).

2004A child has some rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magnitude ( cf. Goss v Lopes , 419 US 565, 574 ; Matter of Winship , 397 US 358 , [*10]365; Tinker v Des Moines School Dist. , 393 US 503, 506 ; Matter of Gault , 387 US 1, 47 .) (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar, the biological mother/respondent is in her early thirties and obviously could get pregnant again, intentionally or unintentionally, and have even more children.

1991A child has rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magnitude” (Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, supra, at 546; see, Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565, 574 ; Matter of Winship, 397 US 358, 386 ; Tinker v Des Moines School Dist., 393 US 503, 505 ; Matter of Gault, 387 US 1, 47 ).

2004A child has some rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magnitude ( cf. Goss v Lopes , 419 US 565, 574 ; Matter of Winship , 397 US 358 , [*10]365; Tinker v Des Moines School Dist. , 393 US 503, 506 ; Matter of Gault , 387 US 1, 47 .) (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar, the biological mother/respondent is in her early thirties and obviously could get pregnant again, intentionally or unintentionally, and have even more children.

1991A child has rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magnitude” (Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, supra, at 546; see, Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565, 574 ; Matter of Winship, 397 US 358, 386 ; Tinker v Des Moines School Dist., 393 US 503, 505 ; Matter of Gault, 387 US 1, 47 ).

1965In Matter of Smith ( 254 N. Y. 283, 289 ), the Court of Appeals stated: “It is the modern rule that ‘ with the exception of direct statements of intention, no extrinsic fact relevant to any legitimate question arising in the interpretation of writings and admissible under the .general rules of evidence,’ can be shut out. * * * Sometimes the rule has been stated with the proviso that extrinsic facts may be shown in cases only ‘ where the language alone is of doubtful import. ’ * * * We take this to mean merely that the probable intention of the writer, as indicated by extrinsic facts, may not p

1964In Matter of Smith ( 254 N. Y. 283, 289 ) the court stated: ‘ ‘ It is the modern rule that ‘ with the exception of direct statements of intention, no extrinsic fact relevant to any legitimate question arising in the interpretation of writings and admissible under the general rules of evidence,’ can be shut out.

1964(Thayer’s Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 445; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 5, § 2470; Matter of Neil, 238 N. Y. 138 ; Dobbins v. Pratt Chuck Co., 242 N. Y. 106 .) Sometimes the rule has been stated with the proviso that extrinsic facts may be shown in cases only ‘ where the language alone is of doubtful import.’ (Morris v. Sickly, 133 N. Y. 456 .) We take this to mean merely that the probable intention of the writer, as indicated by extrinsic facts, may not prevail over the plain meaning of the written word, nor have any force whatever, unless the words incorporated in the writing are suscepti

1960(Thayer’s Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 445; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 5, § 2470; Matter of Neil, 238 N. Y. 138 ; Dobbins v. Pratt Chuck Co., 242 N".

1906The modern rule is content with less, but is well settled in Hawk v. Senseman, 6 Serg. & Rawle, 21 , that to effect an ouster of the co-tenant there must be ‘an actual, continued, visible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession.’ It must be such that knowledge of its existence is brought home to the co-tenant.

1905The modern rule is content with less, but is well stated in Hawk v. Senseman ( 6 Serg. & Rawle 21 ) that to effect an ouster of the co-tenant there must be ‘ an actual, continued, visible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession.’ * * * If no explicit notice is given to the co-tenant of the denial of his right, the occupant must make his possession so visibly hostile and notorious, and so apparently exclusive and adverse, as to justify an inference of knowledge on the part of the tenant sought to be ousted, and of laches if he fails to discover and assert his rights.” In Felix v. Felix, 105

2024In Gilly v City of New York , 69 NY2d 509, 510 [1987], the Court of Appeals wrote, "The substance of a report prepared by a physician employed by defendant to examine plaintiff, and furnished to her, can be elicited by plaintiff as part of her direct case." The Court referred to McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. ( 15 NY2d 20 [1964]), where it was held that a physician-defendant could be called as an expert witness by the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action.

2024In Gilly v City of New York , 69 NY2d 509, 510 [1987], the Court of Appeals wrote, "The substance of a report prepared by a physician employed by defendant to examine plaintiff, and furnished to her, can be elicited by plaintiff as part of her direct case." The Court referred to McDermott v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. ( 15 NY2d 20 [1964]), where it was held that a physician-defendant could be called as an expert witness by the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action.

1985The modern rule with respect to this doctrine has been cogently set forth in Schwartz v Public Administrator of County of Bronx ( 24 NY2d 65, 71 ): “New York law has now reached the point where there are but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

1983In Schwartz v Public Administrator of County of Bronx ( 24 NY2d 65 ), the Court of Appeals set forth what might be termed the modern rule with respect to this doctrine.

1964(Thayer’s Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 445; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 5, § 2470; Matter of Neil, 238 N. Y. 138 ; Dobbins v. Pratt Chuck Co., 242 N. Y. 106 .) Sometimes the rule has been stated with the proviso that extrinsic facts may be shown in cases only ‘ where the language alone is of doubtful import.’ (Morris v. Sickly, 133 N. Y. 456 .) We take this to mean merely that the probable intention of the writer, as indicated by extrinsic facts, may not prevail over the plain meaning of the written word, nor have any force whatever, unless the words incorporated in the writing are suscepti

1930(Thayer’s Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 445; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 5, § 2470; Matter of Neil, 238 N. Y. 138 ; Dobbins v. Pratt Chuck Co., 242 N. Y. 106 .) Sometimes the rule has been stated with the proviso that extrinsic facts may be shown in cases only “ where the language alone is of doubtful import.” (Morris v. Sickly, 133 N. Y. 456 .) We take this to mean merely that the probable intention of the writer, as indicated by extrinsic facts, may not prevail over the plain meaning of the written word, nor have any force whatever, unless the words incorporated in the writing are suscepti

1964(Thayer’s Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 445; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 5, § 2470; Matter of Neil, 238 N. Y. 138 ; Dobbins v. Pratt Chuck Co., 242 N. Y. 106 .) Sometimes the rule has been stated with the proviso that extrinsic facts may be shown in cases only ‘ where the language alone is of doubtful import.’ (Morris v. Sickly, 133 N. Y. 456 .) We take this to mean merely that the probable intention of the writer, as indicated by extrinsic facts, may not prevail over the plain meaning of the written word, nor have any force whatever, unless the words incorporated in the writing are suscepti

1930(Thayer’s Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 445; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 5, § 2470; Matter of Neil, 238 N. Y. 138 ; Dobbins v. Pratt Chuck Co., 242 N. Y. 106 .) Sometimes the rule has been stated with the proviso that extrinsic facts may be shown in cases only “ where the language alone is of doubtful import.” (Morris v. Sickly, 133 N. Y. 456 .) We take this to mean merely that the probable intention of the writer, as indicated by extrinsic facts, may not prevail over the plain meaning of the written word, nor have any force whatever, unless the words incorporated in the writing are suscepti

1933The rule of Matter of Totten ( 179 N. Y. 112 ), in which the modern doctrine of savings bank trusts had its inception, provides, in substance, that the opening of an account similar to that here in question effects the erection of a tentative trust, which is subject to revocation by the depositor at any time prior to his death, and that a fixed trust is constituted only in respect to the funds which remain in the account at the death of the depositor unless some previous act of fixation has been accomplished by him.

1929The modern doctrine respecting voluntary or “ savings bank trusts,” like those involved in the present proceeding, is laid down in Matter of Totten ( 179 N. Y. 112 ).

1906Zeller’s Lessee v. Eckert, 4 How., (U. S.) 295; Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat., 213 ; McClung v. Ross, 5 id., 124; Challefoux v. Ducharme, 8 Wis., 287 ; Long v. Mast, 11 Penn.

1882(Zeller’s Lessee v. Eckert, 4 How. [U. S.] 295; Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213 ; MeClung v. Ross, 5 id. 124; Challefoux v. Ducharme, 8 Wis. 287 ; Long v. Mast, 11 Penn.

1906Zeller’s Lessee v. Eckert, 4 How., (U. S.) 295; Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat., 213 ; McClung v. Ross, 5 id., 124; Challefoux v. Ducharme, 8 Wis., 287 ; Long v. Mast, 11 Penn.

1882(Zeller’s Lessee v. Eckert, 4 How. [U. S.] 295; Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213 ; MeClung v. Ross, 5 id. 124; Challefoux v. Ducharme, 8 Wis. 287 ; Long v. Mast, 11 Penn.

2025"Our precedents do not go so far as to exculpate sporting facility owners of this ordinary type of alleged negligence" (<i>Morgan v State of New York</i>, 90 NY2d 471, 488-489 [1997]).{**44 NY3d at 971}</p> <div><u>B.</u></div> <p>In 1975, the Legislature adopted CPLR 1411 "to abolish contributory negligence and assumption of the risk as absolute defenses in favor of a comparative fault regime" in tort cases (<i>Custodi v Town of Amherst</i>, 20 NY3d 83, 87 [2012]).^<b>[FN3]</b> Despite the statute's plain language, and the justifications articulated in its legislative history for ab

2024Indeed, in reviewing the standard applied to stress-based injuries prior to Matter of Wolfe — which standard [FN3] is substantially similar to the modern standard enunciated herein — we recognized that it was necessary to overrule the prior standard to the extent that it failed to take into account the requisite consideration of an individual claimant's particular vulnerabilities ( see Matter of Rackley v County of Rensselaer , 141 AD2d at 234 ; see also Matter of Wolfe v Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co. , 36 NY2d at 510 ).

2007Auth. ( 88 NY2d 116 [1996]), the Court dispensed with the 100-year-old rule that had imposed vicarious liability on common carriers for all acts of their employees, including acts outside the scope of employment, in favor of a more modern rule treating common carriers like other employers.

2007Auth. ( 88 NY2d 116 [1996]), the Court dispensed with the 100-year-old rule that had imposed vicarious liability on common carriers for all acts of their employees, including acts outside the scope of employment, in favor of a more modern rule treating common carriers like other employers.

2005As to a mitigation of penalties, then, it is safe to assume, as the modern rule does, that it was the legislative design that the lighter penalty should be imposed in all cases that subsequently reach the courts.” (Oliver, supra at 160 .) A minor defendant charged with first degree murder in Oliver was tried before the enactment of a statute that held children under 15 should not be subject to criminal sanctions.

2003Assoc. v Eskin, supra; accord Frank, supra).

1996The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed and held ( 81 AD2d, at 912 ): "Under the modern doctrine of impossibility of performance, a party restrained by a judicial order will be excused from performance of a contract if the party did not contribute to the issuance of the order (Lowenschuss v Kane, 520 F2d 255, 265; 6 Corbin, Contracts, § 1346; 18 Williston, Contracts [3d ed], § 1939, p 49; Restatement, Contracts, §§ 457; 458; 10 NY Jur, Contracts, § 373, p 361).

1996Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 ).

1991While both are of special concern to the State, custody and visitation are significantly different (see, Weiss v Weiss, 52 NY2d 170, 175; Matter of Ronald FF. v Cindy GG., 70 NY2d 141, 144 ). 2 Custody disputes implicate a parent’s right to rear a child — with the child’s corresponding right to be raised by a parent (see, Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d, at 546 , supra).