modern rule in West Virginia

2006Staley v. Kreinbihl, 152 Ohio St. 315 , 89 N.E.2d 593, 598 (Ohio 1949) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2006Staley v. Kreinbihl, 152 Ohio St. 315 , 89 N.E.2d 593, 598 (Ohio 1949) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1937Va. 250 , 73 S. E. 971 , citing Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 54 W.

1912Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 54 W.

2004It has been observed that “[m]ost of the more recent cases follow this approach.” 14 James P. Nehf, Corbin on Contracts § 74.2, at 15 (Rev. ed. 2001) (hereinafter referred to as “Corbin on Contracts”). 9 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 904 , 116 S.Ct. 2432, 2469 , 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 to demonstrate requirements for the common-law doctrine of impossibility); Cazares v. Saenz, 256 Cal. Rptr. 209 , 212 & n. 7, 208 Cal.App.3d 279 , 285 & n. 7 (1989) (applying section 262 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and acknow

2004It has been observed that “[m]ost of the more recent cases follow this approach.” 14 James P. Nehf, Corbin on Contracts § 74.2, at 15 (Rev. ed. 2001) (hereinafter referred to as “Corbin on Contracts”). 9 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 904 , 116 S.Ct. 2432, 2469 , 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 to demonstrate requirements for the common-law doctrine of impossibility); Cazares v. Saenz, 256 Cal. Rptr. 209 , 212 & n. 7, 208 Cal.App.3d 279 , 285 & n. 7 (1989) (applying section 262 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and acknow

2004It has been observed that “[m]ost of the more recent cases follow this approach.” 14 James P. Nehf, Corbin on Contracts § 74.2, at 15 (Rev. ed. 2001) (hereinafter referred to as “Corbin on Contracts”). 9 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 904 , 116 S.Ct. 2432, 2469 , 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 to demonstrate requirements for the common-law doctrine of impossibility); Cazares v. Saenz, 256 Cal. Rptr. 209 , 212 & n. 7, 208 Cal.App.3d 279 , 285 & n. 7 (1989) (applying section 262 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and acknow

2004It has been observed that “[m]ost of the more recent cases follow this approach.” 14 James P. Nehf, Corbin on Contracts § 74.2, at 15 (Rev. ed. 2001) (hereinafter referred to as “Corbin on Contracts”). 9 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 904 , 116 S.Ct. 2432, 2469 , 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 to demonstrate requirements for the common-law doctrine of impossibility); Cazares v. Saenz, 256 Cal. Rptr. 209 , 212 & n. 7, 208 Cal.App.3d 279 , 285 & n. 7 (1989) (applying section 262 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and acknow

1995A child has rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magnitude.’ Id. at 386 , 343 S.E.2d at 109 (quoting In re Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543 , 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 , 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (1976)).

1995A child has rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magnitude.’ Id. at 386 , 343 S.E.2d at 109 (quoting In re Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543 , 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 , 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (1976)).

1987NEELY, Justice, dissenting: In Reddy v. Community Health Foundation of Man, 171 W.Va. 368 , 298 S.E.2d 906 (1982), we held that the common law rule that a covenant not to compete operates as a restraint on trade and is therefore void and unenforceable, had been replaced by the modern rule that an anti-competitive covenant will be upheld if it is supported by consideration, ancillary to a lawful contract, and both reasonable and consistent with the public interest.

1987NEELY, Justice, dissenting: In Reddy v. Community Health Foundation of Man, ___ W.Va. ___, 298 S.E.2d 906 (1982), we held that the common law rule that a covenant not to compete operates as a restraint on trade and is therefore void and unenforceable, had been replaced by the modern rule that an anti-competitive covenant will be upheld if it is supported by consideration, ancillary to a lawful contract, and both reasonable and consistent with the public interest.

1981An indictment or information for such an offense is sufficient if it follows the language of the statute substantially or charges the offense in equivalent words or others of the same import, if the defendant is thereby fully informed of the particular offense charged.” 157 W.

1981Va. at 476-77, 96 S.E. at 70 .

1980Confronted again with the “effective assistance of counsel” issue, the Court, in State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640 , 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974) rejected the “farce and mockery of justice” test and adopted a more modern standard under which the effectiveness of counsel assistance would be judged.

1980Confronted again with the “effective assistance of counsel” issue, the Court, in State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640 , 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974) rejected the “farce and mockery of justice” test and adopted a more modern standard under which the effectiveness of counsel assistance would be judged.

1966Alberty v. United States, 162 US 499 , 40 L. ed. 1051, 16 S. Ct. 864 ; Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28 , 58 Am.

1966Alberty v. United States, 162 US 499 , 40 L. ed. 1051, 16 S. Ct. 864 ; Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28 , 58 Am.

1966Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 , 16 S.Ct. 864 , 40 L.Ed. 1051 ; Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28 , 58 Am.

1966Alberty v. United States, 162 US 499 , 40 L. ed. 1051, 16 S. Ct. 864 ; Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28 , 58 Am.

1961Jur., Perjury, §§ §64, 65, and 67; Commonwealth v. Davis, (Ky.) 18 S.W. 10 ; State v. Miller, 24 W.

1961Jur., Perjury, §§ §64, 65, and 67; Commonwealth v. Davis, (Ky.) 18 S.W. 10 ; State v. Miller, 24 W.

1958Ed. [620], 621; Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 , 25 S.Ct. 358 , 49 L.Ed. 643 * * *. `It is within the undoubted power of government to restrain some individuals from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some contracts. * * *'" This Court has followed the more modern doctrine in holding that the general welfare provision is not to be narrowly limited; that "`Neither the "contract" clause nor the "due process" clause (of Federal and State Constitutions) * * has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably neces

1958Ed. [620], 621; Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 , 25 S.Ct. 358 , 49 L.Ed. 643 * * *. `It is within the undoubted power of government to restrain some individuals from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some contracts. * * *'" This Court has followed the more modern doctrine in holding that the general welfare provision is not to be narrowly limited; that "`Neither the "contract" clause nor the "due process" clause (of Federal and State Constitutions) * * has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably neces

1958This Court has followed the more modern doctrine in holding that the general welfare provision is not to be narrowly limited; that “ ‘Neither the “contract” clause nor the “due process” clause (of Federal and State Constitutions) has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community.’ Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558 , 58 L.

1958This Court has followed the more modern doctrine in holding that the general welfare provision is not to be narrowly limited; that “ ‘Neither the “contract” clause nor the “due process” clause (of Federal and State Constitutions) has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community.’ Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558 , 58 L.

1954In commenting upon the rule the Supreme Court of Oregon in Hansen v. Oregon-Washington Railroad and Navigation Company, 97 Oregon 190, 188 P. 963 , rehearing denied, 97 Or. 190 , 191 P. 655 , uses this language “* * * upon proof of delivery of chattels in good condition and proof of return in bad condition, or proof of failure to. return, the law raises a presumption that the injury or failure to return was caused by the negligence of the bailee, and such proof plus the presumption, which because of necessity the law arbitrarily raises, make a prima facie case, which requires the bailee to go

1954In commenting upon the rule the Supreme Court of Oregon in Hansen v. Oregon-Washington Railroad and Navigation Company, 97 Oregon 190, 188 P. 963 , rehearing denied, 97 Or. 190 , 191 P. 655 , uses this language “* * * upon proof of delivery of chattels in good condition and proof of return in bad condition, or proof of failure to. return, the law raises a presumption that the injury or failure to return was caused by the negligence of the bailee, and such proof plus the presumption, which because of necessity the law arbitrarily raises, make a prima facie case, which requires the bailee to go

1950Where there is no express limitation in space, the courts will endeavor to interpret the contract as providing for a reasonable limitation in view of the attendant circumstances.” This Court has followed the modern rule in the case of Boggs v. Friend, 77 W.

1950Va. 531 , 87 S. E. 873 , in which the Court had under appraisement a contract between a seller and purchaser of an established business which bound the seller, as incidental to the sale and purchase of the property, not to “engage in the blacksmith business in the vicinity or neighborhood where said blacksmith shop was located, or at any other place so near thereto as to constitute a rival business or detract from the patronage which would naturally or likely go to the shop and business so purchased by plaintiff from him.” The second point of the syllabus in the Boggs case, in which this Court

1937Under the modern rule, “ survivor-ship will be referred to the event plainly intended by the testator, whether that event be before, at the time of, or after the death of the testator.” Neal v. Hamilton Co., 70 W.

1937Va. 250 , 73 S. E. 971 , citing Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 54 W.