modern rule in Kansas

1994She was in a condition of complete dependence. [Citation omitted.] However, the inclusion of Art. 15 , sec. 6 , in the Kansas Constitution and the enactment of G.S. 1949, 23-201, et seq ., now K.S.A. 23-201 , et seq ., as Justice Burch, speaking for the court, explained it, — "`. . . irretrievably broke down the common-law theory of marital unity, destroyed the notion of feminine subjection to baronial authority, threw off the restraints of coverture, and installed the modern doctrine of the equality of man and wife before the law.' ( Harrington v. Lowe , 73 Kan. 1 , 18 , 84 P. 570 .) "The obv

1994She was in a condition of complete dependence. [Citation omitted.] However, the inclusion of Art. 15 , sec. 6 , in the Kansas Constitution and the enactment of G.S. 1949, 23-201, et seq ., now K.S.A. 23-201 , et seq ., as Justice Burch, speaking for the court, explained it, — "`. . . irretrievably broke down the common-law theory of marital unity, destroyed the notion of feminine subjection to baronial authority, threw off the restraints of coverture, and installed the modern doctrine of the equality of man and wife before the law.' ( Harrington v. Lowe , 73 Kan. 1 , 18 , 84 P. 570 .) "The obv

1942If 1.) And in Scott v. Gillespie, 103 Kan. 745 , 176 Pac. 132 , the court specifically held: “The old rule, that the devise of a fee may not be impaired by a subsequent ■contradictory provision, is qualified by the modern rule, that the intention, as gathered from all parts of the will, must control.” (Syl.

1942If 1.) And in Scott v. Gillespie, 103 Kan. 745 , 176 Pac. 132 , the court specifically held: “The old rule, that the devise of a fee may not be impaired by a subsequent ■contradictory provision, is qualified by the modern rule, that the intention, as gathered from all parts of the will, must control.” (Syl.

1942If 3.) This was specifically followed in Otis v. Otis, 104 Kan. 88 , 177 Pac. 520 ; and in Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 , it was held: “Rule followed that in the' construction of a will the testator’s intention is to be gleaned from the entire text of the testament, and not by giving such ■controlling significance to any one paragraph as to render abortive other and •subsequent provisions of the will which likewise indicate part of the testator’s purposes.” (Syl. f[ 1.) And in the opinion it was said: “The old rule that a seemingly unqualified devise in an independent and pr

1942If 3.) This was specifically followed in Otis v. Otis, 104 Kan. 88 , 177 Pac. 520 ; and in Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 , it was held: “Rule followed that in the' construction of a will the testator’s intention is to be gleaned from the entire text of the testament, and not by giving such ■controlling significance to any one paragraph as to render abortive other and •subsequent provisions of the will which likewise indicate part of the testator’s purposes.” (Syl. f[ 1.) And in the opinion it was said: “The old rule that a seemingly unqualified devise in an independent and pr

1942If 3.) This was specifically followed in Otis v. Otis, 104 Kan. 88 , 177 Pac. 520 ; and in Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 , it was held: “Rule followed that in the' construction of a will the testator’s intention is to be gleaned from the entire text of the testament, and not by giving such ■controlling significance to any one paragraph as to render abortive other and •subsequent provisions of the will which likewise indicate part of the testator’s purposes.” (Syl. f[ 1.) And in the opinion it was said: “The old rule that a seemingly unqualified devise in an independent and pr

1942If 3.) This was specifically followed in Otis v. Otis, 104 Kan. 88 , 177 Pac. 520 ; and in Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 , it was held: “Rule followed that in the' construction of a will the testator’s intention is to be gleaned from the entire text of the testament, and not by giving such ■controlling significance to any one paragraph as to render abortive other and •subsequent provisions of the will which likewise indicate part of the testator’s purposes.” (Syl. f[ 1.) And in the opinion it was said: “The old rule that a seemingly unqualified devise in an independent and pr

2024In Kansas, the traditional rule of corpus delicti may be bypassed by finding the confession to be trustworthy. 303 Kan. at 410 . 26 In Dern, the Kansas Supreme Court found the evidentiary standard of review applicable to sufficiency of the evidence claims also applied when determining if a confession is trustworthy under the modern standard: "The evidentiary standard for finding a confession or admission sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy the State's obligation to present a prima facie showing of the corpus delicti is akin to the standard of review applicable to sufficiency of the evidence cl

2017Again, the standard for sanctioning such behavior is purposely strict in order to serve the public and the profession by maintaining the trust that is so critical to the attorney-client relationship. 'A. The "Truly Compelling Mitigating Circumstances" Standard Is Not "Illusory" '¶ 13 The modern standard for attorney sanctions in cases of intentional misappropriation was first set out by this court in Babilis, where we adopted the rule that "intentional misappropriation of client funds will result in disbarment unless the lawyer can demonstrate truly compelling mitigating circumstances." 951 P.

2012See Williams, 241 Kan. at 114-16 ; see also City of Neodesha, (No. 101,183, slip op. at 19-20, 25-26) (holding that all strict liability claims in Kansas are governed by abnormally dangerous activity doctrine adopted in Williams); Pullen v. West, 278 Kan. 183, 189 , 92 P.3d 584 (2004) (strict liability applies only if the defendant engages in an abnormally dangerous activity).

2012See Williams, 241 Kan. at 114-16 ; see also City of Neodesha, (No. 101,183, slip op. at 19-20, 25-26) (holding that all strict liability claims in Kansas are governed by abnormally dangerous activity doctrine adopted in Williams); Pullen v. West, 278 Kan. 183, 189 , 92 P.3d 584 (2004) (strict liability applies only if the defendant engages in an abnormally dangerous activity).

2006Larson’s treatise also observes that then-judge Benjamin Cardozo’s opinion in Matter of Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, *386 229 N.Y. 470 , 128 N.E. 711 (1920), is considered the starting point of the modern rule permitting recovery to an innocent victim of a coworker’s horseplay.

2006Larson’s treatise also observes that then-judge Benjamin Cardozo’s opinion in Matter of Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, *386 229 N.Y. 470 , 128 N.E. 711 (1920), is considered the starting point of the modern rule permitting recovery to an innocent victim of a coworker’s horseplay.

1995Flotz v. Struxness , 168 Kan. 714 (1950).

1993The district court'cited as authority Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528 (D.

1991Tamara fails to acknowledge this immediately following text: “[T]he inclusion of Art. 15, § 6, in the Kansas Constitution and the enactment of G.S. 1949, 23-201, et seq., now K.S.A. 23-201, et seq., as Justice Burch, speaking for the court, explained it,— \ . . irretrievably broke down the common-law theory of marital unity, destroyed the notion of feminine subjection to baronial authority, threw off the restraints of coverture, and installed the modern doctrine of the equality of man and wife before the law.’ (Harrington v. Lowe, 73 Kan. 1, 18 , 84 Pac. 570 .)” 196 Kan. at 145 .

1986This court in Angell v. Railway Co., 98 Kan. 268 , 157 Pac. 1196 (1916), stated that the more reason able as well as the more modern rule is that a judgment against joint tortfeasors may be affirmed as to part of them and reversed as to the others but only where no substantial injustice will result from that procedure.

1986This court in Angell v. Railway Co., 98 Kan. 268 , 157 Pac. 1196 (1916), stated that the more reason able as well as the more modern rule is that a judgment against joint tortfeasors may be affirmed as to part of them and reversed as to the others but only where no substantial injustice will result from that procedure.

1986In Beachy v. Jones, 108 Kan. 236, 245 , 195 Pac. 184 (1921), the court stated that in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, the new trial granted by the court should be on all of the issues involved and between all the parties to the original action.

1986In Beachy v. Jones, 108 Kan. 236, 245 , 195 Pac. 184 (1921), the court stated that in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, the new trial granted by the court should be on all of the issues involved and between all the parties to the original action.

1986Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. at 683 .

1986Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. at 683 .

1980It should be noted this appeal is concerned only with the phrase “appeal to the prurient interest.” The State does not question the remaining elements in the modern test of obscenity, e.g., “patent offensiveness,” “contemporary community standards,” or “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973).

1980It should be noted this appeal is concerned only with the phrase “appeal to the prurient interest.” The State does not question the remaining elements in the modern test of obscenity, e.g., “patent offensiveness,” “contemporary community standards,” or “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973).

1978I prefer to subscribe to what was referred to as the modern rule in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C.

1978I prefer to subscribe to what was referred to as the modern rule in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C.

1978Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 , 95 L.Ed. 624 , 71 S.Ct. 80 (1950), overruled on another point in Smither and Company, Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C.

1978Cir.1950), cert. *156 denied, 340 U.S. 852 , 95 L.Ed. 624 , 71 S.Ct. 80 (1950), overruled on another point in Smither and Company, Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C.

1978(Lukens v. First National Bank, 151 Kan. 937 , 101 P.2d 914 [1940].) In Lukens this court stated that it has followed the more modern rule which does not recognize probable cause as a sufficient defense to a claim for actual damages for wrongful garnishment.

1978(Lukens v. First National Bank, 151 Kan. 937 , 101 P.2d 914 [1940].) In Lukens this court stated that it has followed the more modern rule which does not recognize probable cause as a sufficient defense to a claim for actual damages for wrongful garnishment.

1978Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 , 95 L.Ed. 624 , 71 S.Ct. 80 (1950), overruled on another point in Smither and Company, Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C.

1978Cir.1950), cert. *156 denied, 340 U.S. 852 , 95 L.Ed. 624 , 71 S.Ct. 80 (1950), overruled on another point in Smither and Company, Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C.

1978Cir.1950), cert. *156 denied, 340 U.S. 852 , 95 L.Ed. 624 , 71 S.Ct. 80 (1950), overruled on another point in Smither and Company, Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C.

1978Cir.1950), cert. *156 denied, 340 U.S. 852 , 95 L.Ed. 624 , 71 S.Ct. 80 (1950), overruled on another point in Smither and Company, Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C.

1976“The rendering of inconsistent verdicts has always been an exclusive privilege and prerogative of the jury, and it is not our duty to unravel the ratiocinations of the jury’s collective logic” (Odom v. United States, 377 F. 2d 853, 857 , 22 ALR 3d 705, 711-712 ).

1976“The rendering of inconsistent verdicts has always been an exclusive privilege and prerogative of the jury, and it is not our duty to unravel the ratiocinations of the jury’s collective logic” (Odom v. United States, 377 F. 2d 853, 857 , 22 ALR 3d 705, 711-712 ).

1972(Ryan v. Ryan, 156 Kan. 348 , 133 P. 2d 119 ; Crisler v. C.

1972(Ryan v. Ryan, 156 Kan. 348 , 133 P. 2d 119 ; Crisler v. C.

1945In support of that contention our attention is directed to Manufacturing Co. v. Deposit Co., 100 Kan. 28 , 163 Pac. 1076 , and Haynes Hardware Co. v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 156 Kan. 356 , 133 P. 2d 574 .

1945In support of that contention our attention is directed to Manufacturing Co. v. Deposit Co., 100 Kan. 28 , 163 Pac. 1076 , and Haynes Hardware Co. v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 156 Kan. 356 , 133 P. 2d 574 .

1945In support of that contention our attention is directed to Manufacturing Co. v. Deposit Co., 100 Kan. 28 , 163 Pac. 1076 , and Haynes Hardware Co. v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 156 Kan. 356 , 133 P. 2d 574 .

1945In support of that contention our attention is directed to Manufacturing Co. v. Deposit Co., 100 Kan. 28 , 163 Pac. 1076 , and Haynes Hardware Co. v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 156 Kan. 356 , 133 P. 2d 574 .

1943In exercising such discretion, the court may and should consider all the circumstances in the case, including lapse of time and circumstances which would establish laches, acquiescence, or estoppel, and whether the public interest will be served, for the court may refuse the writ or judgment of ouster upon considerations of public policy, interest, or convenience.” In our own early decisions some cases will be found which do not accord with the modern rule just quoted, as in State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of Garfield Co., 54 Kan. 372 , 38 Pac. 559 , with the deplorable consequences which afflicted

1943A similar regrettable result, on a smaller scale, followed the decision of this court on a technical defect in the organization of the Gove county high school, in State v. Bentley, 80 Kan. 227 , 101 Pac. 1073 .

1943A similar regrettable result, on a smaller scale, followed the decision of this court on a technical defect in the organization of the Gove county high school, in State v. Bentley, 80 Kan. 227 , 101 Pac. 1073 .

1942If 3.) This was specifically followed in Otis v. Otis, 104 Kan. 88 , 177 Pac. 520 ; and in Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 , it was held: “Rule followed that in the' construction of a will the testator’s intention is to be gleaned from the entire text of the testament, and not by giving such ■controlling significance to any one paragraph as to render abortive other and •subsequent provisions of the will which likewise indicate part of the testator’s purposes.” (Syl. f[ 1.) And in the opinion it was said: “The old rule that a seemingly unqualified devise in an independent and pr

1942If 3.) This was specifically followed in Otis v. Otis, 104 Kan. 88 , 177 Pac. 520 ; and in Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 , it was held: “Rule followed that in the' construction of a will the testator’s intention is to be gleaned from the entire text of the testament, and not by giving such ■controlling significance to any one paragraph as to render abortive other and •subsequent provisions of the will which likewise indicate part of the testator’s purposes.” (Syl. f[ 1.) And in the opinion it was said: “The old rule that a seemingly unqualified devise in an independent and pr

1940(Jacobs v. Greening, 109 Kan. 674 , 202 Pac. 72 ; Dody v. Bank, 82 Kan. 406 , 108 Pac. 804 .) It may also be noted that liability on the garnishment bond given under our statute (G.