modern rule in Montana

1936(Nolan v. Benninghoff, 64 Mont. 68 , 208 Pac. 905 .) The modern rule is, where mate *601 rial and relevant to the issue, a party may testify directly as to motive, intent or belief. (2 Jones’ Commentaries on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 708, p. 1329; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 581.) This rule is recognized by the courts of every state of the Union, with the exception of Alabama.

1936(Nolan v. Benninghoff, 64 Mont. 68 , 208 Pac. 905 .) The modern rule is, where mate *601 rial and relevant to the issue, a party may testify directly as to motive, intent or belief. (2 Jones’ Commentaries on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 708, p. 1329; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 581.) This rule is recognized by the courts of every state of the Union, with the exception of Alabama.

1932R. 435, 269 Pac. 437, 438 .) Thus the ancient doctrine in New York becomes the modern doctrine in California, whose laws are more nearly like ours than are those of any of the states in which the contrary doctrine is announced, and, in my opinion, this is the wholesome and proper doctrine for adopting here, when the question is presented for our consideration for the first time in this state.

1930Co. , 149 Wis. 421 , 39 L.R.A. (n.s.) 509, 135 N.W. 839 , and Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yards Co. , 89 Neb. 393 , 33 L.R.A. (n.s.) 983, 131 N.W. 612 . (17 Illinois Law Review, 563.) Professor Throckmorton approves the modern rule in these words: "And there is now a very respectable body of modern judicial authority in support of the sound and reasonable rule that every instrument in the nature of a release of a joint tort-feasor should be construed so as to carry out the intent of the parties, and, as not having the effect of releasing those tort-feasors not parties to it unless the intent to

1930Co. , 149 Wis. 421 , 39 L.R.A. (n.s.) 509, 135 N.W. 839 , and Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yards Co. , 89 Neb. 393 , 33 L.R.A. (n.s.) 983, 131 N.W. 612 . (17 Illinois Law Review, 563.) Professor Throckmorton approves the modern rule in these words: "And there is now a very respectable body of modern judicial authority in support of the sound and reasonable rule that every instrument in the nature of a release of a joint tort-feasor should be construed so as to carry out the intent of the parties, and, as not having the effect of releasing those tort-feasors not parties to it unless the intent to

1930(McCurdy v. Mining Co., 3 Nev. 27 ; Dalton v. Bowker, 8 Nev. 201 ; Powers v. Hibbard, 114 Mich. 553 , 72 N. W. 347 ; Wilson v. Terry, 130 Mich. 78 , 89 N. W. 568 ; Bodine v. Arthur, 91 Ky. 53 , 34 Am.

1930Co. , 149 Wis. 421 , 39 L.R.A. (n.s.) 509, 135 N.W. 839 , and Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yards Co. , 89 Neb. 393 , 33 L.R.A. (n.s.) 983, 131 N.W. 612 . (17 Illinois Law Review, 563.) Professor Throckmorton approves the modern rule in these words: "And there is now a very respectable body of modern judicial authority in support of the sound and reasonable rule that every instrument in the nature of a release of a joint tort-feasor should be construed so as to carry out the intent of the parties, and, as not having the effect of releasing those tort-feasors not parties to it unless the intent to

1930Co. , 149 Wis. 421 , 39 L.R.A. (n.s.) 509, 135 N.W. 839 , and Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yards Co. , 89 Neb. 393 , 33 L.R.A. (n.s.) 983, 131 N.W. 612 . (17 Illinois Law Review, 563.) Professor Throckmorton approves the modern rule in these words: "And there is now a very respectable body of modern judicial authority in support of the sound and reasonable rule that every instrument in the nature of a release of a joint tort-feasor should be construed so as to carry out the intent of the parties, and, as not having the effect of releasing those tort-feasors not parties to it unless the intent to

1930(McCurdy v. Mining Co., 3 Nev. 27 ; Dalton v. Bowker, 8 Nev. 201 ; Powers v. Hibbard, 114 Mich. 553 , 72 N. W. 347 ; Wilson v. Terry, 130 Mich. 78 , 89 N. W. 568 ; Bodine v. Arthur, 91 Ky. 53 , 34 Am.

1930(McCurdy v. Mining Co., 3 Nev. 27 ; Dalton v. Bowker, 8 Nev. 201 ; Powers v. Hibbard, 114 Mich. 553 , 72 N. W. 347 ; Wilson v. Terry, 130 Mich. 78 , 89 N. W. 568 ; Bodine v. Arthur, 91 Ky. 53 , 34 Am.

1926It is said that to permit a sale of such securities would often, and perhaps generally, result in a ruinous sacrifice, greatly injurious to the debtor, and equally so to the creditor, unless he should avail himself of his superior information in respect to the solvency of the maker of the paper, to purchase it at the sale for less than its value, which would be a great hardship upon the pledgor; that a sale of the paper is not necessary to enable the pledgee to make it available for the satisfaction of his *451 demand, inasmuch as he is clothed with the necessary power to enable him to enforce

1924The modern doctrine, however, is that they are statutes of repose, enacted to suppress stale and fraudulent claims, and intended for the relief and quiet of defendants by putting at rest controverted questions of fact. (3 Parsons on Contracts, c. 6; Anaconda Mining Co. v. Saile, 16 Mont. 8 , 50 Am.

1909It follows that the qualifications of a witness are equally essential in the use of extrajudicial assertions.” In the case of State v. Haywards, 62 Minn. 474 , 65 N. W. 63 , the supreme court said: “According to the modern doctrine, inmates of lunatic asylums, and other persons conceded to be insane when offered as witnesses, may be held competent.

1909It follows that the qualifications of a witness are equally essential in the use of extrajudicial assertions.” In the case of State v. Haywards, 62 Minn. 474 , 65 N. W. 63 , the supreme court said: “According to the modern doctrine, inmates of lunatic asylums, and other persons conceded to be insane when offered as witnesses, may be held competent.

1909In the case of Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S. 93 , 26 L.

1909In the case of Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S. 93 , 26 L.

1909Such persons are presumed to be incompetent as witnesses, and, if challenged for incompetency, it is the duty of the judge to examine into the question as a preliminary matter, and if he is of the opinion that the witness is so insane that he has not sufficient capacity to understand the obligations of an oath, to perceive what occurred, and remember and narrate what he perceived, then he should hold him incompetent; but if the judge is of the opinion that the witness has this capacity, he may hold him competent and leave the question of his credibility to the jury.” In District of Columbia v.

1909Such persons are presumed to be incompetent as witnesses, and, if challenged for incompetency, it is the duty of the judge to examine into the question as a preliminary matter, and if he is of the opinion that the witness is so insane that he has not sufficient capacity to understand the obligations of an oath, to perceive what occurred, and remember and narrate what he perceived, then he should hold him incompetent; but if the judge is of the opinion that the witness has this capacity, he may hold him competent and leave the question of his credibility to the jury.” In District of Columbia v.

1909This court in Gerber v. Stuart, 1 Mont. 172 , laid down the rule thus: “While it appears on examination of the authorities, especially the older ones, that the addition to a signature of ‘agent,’ ‘president,’ ‘superintendent,’ and similar words has been held to be mere description of the person, and not of the capacity in which the party acted, the modern rule seems to be that, if from the whole instrument it appears that the party intended to act for and bind his principal, the principal and not the agent will be bound, and that, where the addition or description is so inartificially expresse

1899(Etheridge v. Sperry, supra.) Leopold v. Silverman, 7 Mont. 266, 16 Pac. 580 , decided by the territorial Supreme Court, followed the supposed doctrine of Robinson v. Elliott, 22 Wall. 512 , 22 L.

1899(Etheridge v. Sperry, supra.) Leopold v. Silverman, 7 Mont. 266, 16 Pac. 580 , decided by the territorial Supreme Court, followed the supposed doctrine of Robinson v. Elliott, 22 Wall. 512 , 22 L.