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48 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1913–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vinmar, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Districtgreen2 sentences2007The Supreme Court’s decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady governs the modern analysis of state taxes on interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause . 430 U.S. 274, 288 , 97 S. Ct. 1076, 1083 (1977); Vinmar, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , 947 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1997); Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. 2007The Supreme Court’s decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady governs the modern analysis of state taxes on interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. 430 U.S. 274, 288 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1083 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977); Vinmar, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 947 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex.1997); Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. | 3 | 3 |
Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v. Nueces County Appraisal Districtgreen2 sentences2007Co. v. Nueces County Appraisal Dist. , 876 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. 1994) . 2007Co. v. Nueces County Appraisal Dist., 876 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex.1994). | 3 | 3 |
Williams v. Shamrock Oil Gas Corp.green2 sentences2008Further, "[a]lthough a contract which in express terms declares that time is of the essence, it is not necessarily so unless the parties intended it to be." Id . (citing Williams v. Shamrock Oil Co. , 95 S.W.2d 1292, 1295 (Tex. 1936)). 2008Further, “[a]lthough a contract which in express terms declares that time is of the essence, it is not necessarily so unless the parties intended it to be.” Id. (citing Williams v. Shamrock Oil Co., 95 S.W.2d 1292, 1295 (Tex. 1936)). | 2 | 2 |
Gamez v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Gamez, 737 S.W.2d at 322 . 2000See Gamez, 737 S.W.2d at 322 . | 2 | 2 |
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Bradygreen2 sentences2007The Supreme Court’s decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady governs the modern analysis of state taxes on interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. 430 U.S. 274, 288 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1083 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977); Vinmar, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 947 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex.1997); Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. 2007The Supreme Court’s decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady governs the modern analysis of state taxes on interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. 430 U.S. 274, 288 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1083 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977); Vinmar, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 947 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex.1997); Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. | 1 | 4 |
Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries of Wash.green2 sentences2008As the Court explained, such *844 an approach would be “defeat[ing] the purpose of the federal act, which seeks to give ‘to these hardworking men, engaged in a somewhat hazardous employment, the justice involved in the modern principle of compensation,’ and the state acts ... which ai[m] at ‘sure and certain relief for workmen.’ ” Id. (quoting Davis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus, of Wash, 317 U.S. 249, 254 , 63 S.Ct. 225 , 87 L.Ed. 246 (1946)). 2008As the Court explained, such an approach would be A defeat[ing] the purpose of the federal act, which seeks to give > to these hardworking men, engaged in a somewhat hazardous employment, the justice involved in the modern principle of compensation, = and the state acts . . . which ai[m] at > sure and certain relief for workmen. = @ Id. (quoting Davis v. Dep = t of Labor & Indus. of Wash. , 317 U.S. 249, 254 (1946)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Akin Products Companygreen2 sentences2005Co., 286 S.W.2d at 111 ("The early common-law doctrine of duress has been expanded and many courts have adopted the modern doctrine of `business compulsion' . . . ."); see also Ward v. Scarborough, 236 S.W. 434, 437 (Tex.Com.App. 1922). 2005Co., 286 S.W.2d at 111 (“The early common-law doctrine of duress has been expanded and many courts have adopted the modern doctrine of ‘business compulsion’ .... ”); see also Ward v. Scarborough, 236 S.W. 434, 437 (Tex.Com.App.1922). | 1 | 1 |
Ward v. Scarboroughgreen2 sentences2005Co., 286 S.W.2d at 111 ("The early common-law doctrine of duress has been expanded and many courts have adopted the modern doctrine of `business compulsion' . . . ."); see also Ward v. Scarborough, 236 S.W. 434, 437 (Tex.Com.App. 1922). 2005Co., 286 S.W.2d at 111 (“The early common-law doctrine of duress has been expanded and many courts have adopted the modern doctrine of ‘business compulsion’ .... ”); see also Ward v. Scarborough, 236 S.W. 434, 437 (Tex.Com.App.1922). | 1 | 1 |
Durban v. Guajardogreen1 sentence2004However, our holding does not stand for the proposition that a conversion claim will necessarily support a claim for mental anguish. [7] Mental anguish requires proof of a A high degree of mental pain and distress @ that is A more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. @ Parkway Co. v. Woodruff , 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995); see also Durban v. Guajardo , 79 S.W.3d 198, 208 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2002, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Seminole Pipeline Co., MAPCO, Inc. v. Broad Leaf Partners, Inc.green1 sentence2004Retzlaff alleged in his petition that Deshay acted with A ill will, spite, evil motive or a purpose to injure [him], @ and that he suffered A [p]hysical pain and mental anguish in the past and future. @ This court has held that A the modern rule provides for recovery of emotional distress damages in cases of intentional torts @ and that A intentional injury to property will support a claim of mental anguish . . . . @ Seminole Pipeline Co. v. Broad Leaf Partners, Inc. , 979 S.W.2d 730, 756 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Parkway Co. v. Woodruffgreen1 sentence2004However, our holding does not stand for the proposition that a conversion claim will necessarily support a claim for mental anguish. [7] Mental anguish requires proof of a A high degree of mental pain and distress @ that is A more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. @ Parkway Co. v. Woodruff , 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995); see also Durban v. Guajardo , 79 S.W.3d 198, 208 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2002, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2001This test is nearly identical to one recognized by this Court as far back as 1911: "A variance is not now regarded as material unless it is such as might mislead the defense, or might expose the accused to the danger of being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.” Feeny v. State, 62 Tex.Crim. 585 , 138 S.W. 135, 138 (1911)(op. on reh’gXquoting with approval rule cited by advocate in Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625 , 124 S.W. 668 (Tex.Crim.App.1910)); see also Jones v. State, 115 Tex.Crim. 418 , 27 S.W.2d 653, 656 (1930)(quoting Wharton’s on Evidence favorably, “The modern rule is that a 2001This test is nearly identical to one recognized by this Court as far back as 1911: "A variance is not now regarded as material unless it is such as might mislead the defense, or might expose the accused to the danger of being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.” Feeny v. State, 62 Tex.Crim. 585 , 138 S.W. 135, 138 (1911)(op. on reh’gXquoting with approval rule cited by advocate in Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625 , 124 S.W. 668 (Tex.Crim.App.1910)); see also Jones v. State, 115 Tex.Crim. 418 , 27 S.W.2d 653, 656 (1930)(quoting Wharton’s on Evidence favorably, “The modern rule is that a | 1 | 1 |
Feeny v. Stategreen2 sentences2001This test is nearly identical to one recognized by this Court as far back as 1911: "A variance is not now regarded as material unless it is such as might mislead the defense, or might expose the accused to the danger of being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.” Feeny v. State, 62 Tex.Crim. 585 , 138 S.W. 135, 138 (1911)(op. on reh’gXquoting with approval rule cited by advocate in Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625 , 124 S.W. 668 (Tex.Crim.App.1910)); see also Jones v. State, 115 Tex.Crim. 418 , 27 S.W.2d 653, 656 (1930)(quoting Wharton’s on Evidence favorably, “The modern rule is that a 2001This test is nearly identical to one recognized by this Court as far back as 1911: "A variance is not now regarded as material unless it is such as might mislead the defense, or might expose the accused to the danger of being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.” Feeny v. State, 62 Tex.Crim. 585 , 138 S.W. 135, 138 (1911)(op. on reh’gXquoting with approval rule cited by advocate in Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625 , 124 S.W. 668 (Tex.Crim.App.1910)); see also Jones v. State, 115 Tex.Crim. 418 , 27 S.W.2d 653, 656 (1930)(quoting Wharton’s on Evidence favorably, “The modern rule is that a | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Christensengreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. 2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marquartgreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. 2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Ahart v. Colorado Department of Corrections, Division of Adult Services, Buena Vista Correctional Facilitygreen1 sentence2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Motor Vehicle Administration v. Richardsgreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. 2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Turnergreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. 2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Riche v. Director of Revenuegreen1 sentence2001See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admn. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining "[w]e have emphasized repeatedly that the State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”); Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Adult Servs., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy); State v. Turner, 257 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
| Birchler v. Castello Land Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Estate of Cohorngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Dubelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kaufman v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| McGowen v. Bushgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Estate of Brown
green
2 sentences2004Id. 2004Id. | 3 | 2002–2004 |
Maryland v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2017Utilizing an inquiry during the second step of the sequence that is dispositive on the first would make little sense. 6 This practical hurdle aside, Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754-55 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981), a case decided under the modern framework,, militates against HCAD’s conclusion. 2017Utilizing an inquiry during the second step of the sequence that is dispositive on the first would make little sense. 6 This practical hurdle aside, Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754-55 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981), a case decided under the modern framework,, militates against HCAD’s conclusion. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences2008As the Court explained, such *844 an approach would be “defeat[ing] the purpose of the federal act, which seeks to give ‘to these hardworking men, engaged in a somewhat hazardous employment, the justice involved in the modern principle of compensation,’ and the state acts ... which ai[m] at ‘sure and certain relief for workmen.’ ” Id. (quoting Davis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus, of Wash, 317 U.S. 249, 254 , 63 S.Ct. 225 , 87 L.Ed. 246 (1946)). 2008As the Court explained, such an approach would be A defeat[ing] the purpose of the federal act, which seeks to give > to these hardworking men, engaged in a somewhat hazardous employment, the justice involved in the modern principle of compensation, = and the state acts . . . which ai[m] at > sure and certain relief for workmen. = @ Id. (quoting Davis v. Dep = t of Labor & Indus. of Wash. , 317 U.S. 249, 254 (1946)). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Langley v. Norris
green
2 sentences2008As noted in Langley , "Under the modern rule, whether time is of the essence of the contract is dependent on its provisions, purpose, and the surrounding circumstances, showing the intention in the parties that the contract must be performed at or within a given time." 167 S.W.2d at 612 . 2008As noted in Langley, “Under the modern rule, whether time is of the essence of the contract is dependent on its provisions, purpose, and the surrounding circumstances, showing the intention in the parties that the contract must be performed at or within a given time.” 167 S.W.2d at 612 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Sefzik
green
2 sentences2022State agencies “are immune from suits under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act unless the Legislature has waived immunity for the particular claims at issue.” Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 620 . 2022Co. v. Ladd Page 8 v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011) (per curium) set forth the modern standard for sovereign immunity in UDJA actions. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Teague v. Lane
red
2 sentences2017A. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 384 (1989), articulated the modern test for determining when a U.S. Supreme Court opinion announces a “new rule” of constitutional law that precludes collateral attacks on a final judgment of conviction. 2017A. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 384 (1989), articulated the modern test for determining when a U.S. Supreme Court opinion announces a “new rule” of constitutional law that precludes collateral attacks on a final judgment of conviction. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2008Thus, the Court concluded that state workers’ compensation laws share concurrent jurisdiction with the LHWCA, 2 and “if state remedial schemes are more generous than federal law, concurrent jurisdiction could result in more favorable awards for workers’ injuries than under an exclusively federal compensation system.” 3 Moreover, concurrent jurisdiction presented no danger of double recovery “since employers’ awards under one compensation scheme would be credited against any recovery under the second scheme.” Id. at 725 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 2432 (citing Calbeck, 370 U.S. at 131 , 82 S.Ct. 1196 ). 2008Thus, the Court concluded that state workers’ compensation laws share concurrent jurisdiction with the LHWCA, 2 and “if state remedial schemes are more generous than federal law, concurrent jurisdiction could result in more favorable awards for workers’ injuries than under an exclusively federal compensation system.” 3 Moreover, concurrent jurisdiction presented no danger of double recovery “since employers’ awards under one compensation scheme would be credited against any recovery under the second scheme.” Id. at 725 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 2432 (citing Calbeck, 370 U.S. at 131 , 82 S.Ct. 1196 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Rowan v. State
green
2 sentences2001This test is nearly identical to one recognized by this Court as far back as 1911: "A variance is not now regarded as material unless it is such as might mislead the defense, or might expose the accused to the danger of being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.” Feeny v. State, 62 Tex.Crim. 585 , 138 S.W. 135, 138 (1911)(op. on reh’gXquoting with approval rule cited by advocate in Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625 , 124 S.W. 668 (Tex.Crim.App.1910)); see also Jones v. State, 115 Tex.Crim. 418 , 27 S.W.2d 653, 656 (1930)(quoting Wharton’s on Evidence favorably, “The modern rule is that a 2001We see little value in maintaining both doctrines. [22] Stevens, supra ; Rojas, supra . [23] This test is nearly identical to one recognized by this Court as far back as 1911: "A variance is not now regarded as material unless it is such as might mislead the defense, or might expose the accused to the danger of being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense." Feeny v. State, 62 Tex.Crim. 585 , 138 S.W. 135, 138 (1911)(op. on reh'g)(quoting with approval rule cited by advocate in Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625 , 124 S.W. 668 (Tex. Crim.App.1910)); see also Jones v. State, 115 Tex.Crim. 418 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Rojas v. State
green
1 sentence2001We see little value in maintaining both doctrines. [22] Stevens, supra ; Rojas, supra . [23] This test is nearly identical to one recognized by this Court as far back as 1911: "A variance is not now regarded as material unless it is such as might mislead the defense, or might expose the accused to the danger of being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense." Feeny v. State, 62 Tex.Crim. 585 , 138 S.W. 135, 138 (1911)(op. on reh'g)(quoting with approval rule cited by advocate in Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625 , 124 S.W. 668 (Tex. Crim.App.1910)); see also Jones v. State, 115 Tex.Crim. 418 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Stevens v. State
green
1 sentence2001We see little value in maintaining both doctrines. [22] Stevens, supra ; Rojas, supra . [23] This test is nearly identical to one recognized by this Court as far back as 1911: "A variance is not now regarded as material unless it is such as might mislead the defense, or might expose the accused to the danger of being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense." Feeny v. State, 62 Tex.Crim. 585 , 138 S.W. 135, 138 (1911)(op. on reh'g)(quoting with approval rule cited by advocate in Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625 , 124 S.W. 668 (Tex. Crim.App.1910)); see also Jones v. State, 115 Tex.Crim. 418 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Gutierrez v. Collins green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Gandara v. Novasad green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hart v. Van Zandt green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Duncan v. Horning green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Rosas v. Buddies Food Store green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| H. E. Butt Grocery Store v. Hamilton green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Hill v. Kimball green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Besteiro v. Besteiro green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Cadena v. Cadena green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Oliphant v. Markham neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Ware v. Paxton green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Stull's Chemicals, Inc. v. Davis green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| United States v. Moreland green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Sabinal State Bank v. Ebell green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Wright v. Lancaster green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Schaake v. Dolley green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Austin National Bank v. Sheppard green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Crow v. City of Corpus Christi green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Austin Nat. Bank v. Sheppard green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Greenlee green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Texas & New Orleans Railroad v. Sturgeon green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Mississippi & Dominion Steamship Co. v. Swift green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Jones' Unknown Heirs v. Dorchester green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Tempel v. Dodge green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Couch v. Texas Pacific Railway Co. green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Haney v. Temple Trust Co. green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.