modern rule in Florida

1993In Florida, the first step was taken in Gable v. Silver, 258 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. discharged, 264 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1972).

1982In Gable v. Silver, 264 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1972), the Florida Supreme Court held that implied warranties of fitness and merchantability extend to the purchase of new homes or condominiums from builders.

1994Id. at 790 .

1993In Florida, the first step was taken in Gable v. Silver, 258 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. discharged, 264 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1972).

1987Id. at 1212 n. 1.

1983The rule we adopt today has the advantages of promoting social policy and fulfilling the reasonable expectations of the purchaser while fully protecting the ability of the insurer to protect its own interest. ( 279 S.E.2d at 774 ) The North Carolina Supreme Court further held the insurer should bear the burden of proving it has been materially prejudiced by the breach of the notice provision, but that any breach must first be shown by the insured to have been in good faith.

1977This is so because in the absence of such presumption the legislature would have the power to nullify the will of the people expressed in their constitution, the most sacrosanct of all expressions of the people. [ Id . at 851; emphasis supplied.] See also State v. Harris, 136 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1962), and Alsdorf v. Broward County, 333 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1976); cf .

1977The basic modern rule was announced in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, ( 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ) supra: "`Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person.

1977The basic modern rule was announced in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, ( 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ) supra: "`Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person.

1977This is so because in the absence of such presumption the legislature would have the power to nullify the will of the people expressed in their constitution, the most sacrosanct of all expressions of the people. [ Id . at 851; emphasis supplied.] See also State v. Harris, 136 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1962), and Alsdorf v. Broward County, 333 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1976); cf .

1973Dist. v. Paul, 179 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1965); and relevant cases cited therein. [1] Gray v. Bryant, 125 So.2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960): "The will of the people is paramount in determining whether a constitutional provision is self-executing and the modern doctrine favors the presumption that constitutional provisions are intended to be self-operating.

1972In Allen v. Wilkinson, 1968, 250 Md. 395 , 243 A.2d 515 , the Maryland court declined to adopt the modern rule with the following language: "...

1972In Allen v. Wilkinson, 1968, 250 Md. 395 , 243 A.2d 515 , the Maryland court declined to adopt the modern rule with the following language: "...

1972Both of our neighboring states have balked at the modern rule: Livingston v. Bedford, 1969, 284 Ala. 323 , 224 So.2d 873 ; and Amos v. McDonald, 1971, 123 Ga. App. 509 , 181 S.E.2d 515 .

1972Both of our neighboring states have balked at the modern rule: Livingston v. Bedford, 1969, 284 Ala. 323 , 224 So.2d 873 ; and Amos v. McDonald, 1971, 123 Ga. App. 509 , 181 S.E.2d 515 .

1972In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 1966, 91 Idaho 55 , 415 P.2d 698 , the court said: "The foregoing decisions ... show the trend of judicial opinion is to invoke the doctrine of implied warranty *15 of fitness in cases involving sales of new houses by the builder.

1972In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 1966, 91 Idaho 55 , 415 P.2d 698 , the court said: "The foregoing decisions ... show the trend of judicial opinion is to invoke the doctrine of implied warranty *15 of fitness in cases involving sales of new houses by the builder.

1972Both of our neighboring states have balked at the modern rule: Livingston v. Bedford, 1969, 284 Ala. 323 , 224 So.2d 873 ; and Amos v. McDonald, 1971, 123 Ga. App. 509 , 181 S.E.2d 515 .

1972Both of our neighboring states have balked at the modern rule: Livingston v. Bedford, 1969, 284 Ala. 323 , 224 So.2d 873 ; and Amos v. McDonald, 1971, 123 Ga. App. 509 , 181 S.E.2d 515 .

1970E. g., Farley v. Collins, Fla.1962, 146 So.2d 366, 368 ; Day v. Stickle, Fla.App.1959, 113 So.2d 559, 563 .

1970E. g., Farley v. Collins, Fla.1962, 146 So.2d 366, 368 ; Day v. Stickle, Fla.App.1959, 113 So.2d 559, 563 .

1970Bruce Messinger testified only that Mrs. Bell was driving the car, and this appears to be the type of independent fact included within the rationale of Herring v. Eiland, supra. In addition, it has frequently been held that the exception that the Dead Man’s Statute makes in the modern rule allowing testimony of interested wit nesses should be narrowly construed.

1963This is the modern rule and the more logical and reasonable one in view of the development of municipalities in this country, rather than the English common law background referred to in Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Peters (U.S.), 91 at 98, 9 L.

1963In the case of Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., Fla. 1956, 88 So.2d 299 , our Supreme Court held that a manufacturer of a chair could be found liable under the theory of implied warranty to a prospective purchaser in a retail store who was injured by a latent defect under the arm of the chair which severed one of his fingers.

1957Young v. McKinnie, 1854, 5 Fla. 542 , a case involving election, although not specifically in point, is indication of a preference for the modern rule that the intention of the testator must be found in the will itself.

1931Clearwater Growers Association, 93 Fla. 214 , 111 Sou. 722 , in which case the Court said: ‘ ‘ In construing statutes and contracts against monopolies or in restrain of trade both State and Federal Courts *851 in this country have applied the rule of reason rather than the literal import of the statute and have said in substance that it must amount to an undue or unreasonable restraint of trade.

1931Clearwater Growers Association, 93 Fla. 214 , 111 Sou. 722 , in which case the Court said: ‘ ‘ In construing statutes and contracts against monopolies or in restrain of trade both State and Federal Courts *851 in this country have applied the rule of reason rather than the literal import of the statute and have said in substance that it must amount to an undue or unreasonable restraint of trade.