ease bar in Kentucky

2007Even in 1904, this Court in Louisville and Evansville Mail Co. v. Barnes' Adm’r, 117 Ky. 860 , 79 S.W. 261 (Ky.1904), recognized the essential question to be whether the plaintiffs claim had been settled in full as determined by the intent of the parties, and intent itself is an issue of fact for the jury.

2007Even in 1904, this Court in Louisville and Evansville Mail Co. v. Barnes' Adm’r, 117 Ky. 860 , 79 S.W. 261 (Ky.1904), recognized the essential question to be whether the plaintiffs claim had been settled in full as determined by the intent of the parties, and intent itself is an issue of fact for the jury.

1998Also see Black v. Tichenor, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 794 (1965), and Handy v. Kentucky State Highway Dep’t, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 560 (1960).

1998Also see Black v. Tichenor, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 794 (1965), and Handy v. Kentucky State Highway Dep’t, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 560 (1960).

1998Appellant argues that our holding in Dyer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 647 (1991), should be read as rejecting the holding in Kimbrough which mandates a renewal of the directed verdict motion.

1998In Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788 S.W.2d 500 (1990), this Court held that the law of the ease doctrine prevents review of issues raised in the direct appeal.

1998“It is not the purpose of RCr 11.42 to permit a convicted defendant to retry issues which could and should have been raised in the original proceeding, nor those that were raised in the trial court and upon appeal considered by this court.” Id. at 501 *904 (quoting Thacker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 476 S.W.2d 838, 839 (1972)).

1995Appellant contends that the Commonwealth is, in essence, using the same prior DUI convictions to enhance his present DUI conviction to the felony of 4th offense and to enhance the DUI 4th charge to a PFO which constitutes impermissible double enhancement under Heady, supra. We disagree.

1994Id. at 675 .

1982This is the distinguishing feature between the ease at bar and Milligan, supra, in that in the latter situation, absent its being a party, there was no duty upon the Board to conform to the edicts of the judiciary.

1944Jur. secs. 541-2) it is only in cases where the appellate court concludes it had erroneously determined the law so as to constitute prejudicial error that it will review such determination, and if so inclined, depart from the rule which has been in force in this jurisdiction as far back as Rowland v. Craig et al., Sneed Ky. Dec. 330, 2 Ky. 330 .

1941In Carrs Fork Coal Company v. Johnson Drug Company, 249 Ky. 371 , 60 S. W. (2d) 952, 954 , we said: “This scrip or token is regarded by the statute as evidence of an advancement of wages, is transferable, and must be paid in lawful money, else its issue could not be allowed.

1941In Carrs Fork Coal Company v. Johnson Drug Company, 249 Ky. 371 , 60 S. W. (2d) 952, 954 , we said: “This scrip or token is regarded by the statute as evidence of an advancement of wages, is transferable, and must be paid in lawful money, else its issue could not be allowed.

1939Furthermore, there was no relationship of debtor and creditor between the parties as in the Hurt case, supra. We have noted that the chancellor relied upon the case of Miracle v. Stone, 190 Ky. 610 , 227 S. W. 1011 .

1939Furthermore, there was no relationship of debtor and creditor between the parties as in the Hurt case, supra. We have noted that the chancellor relied upon the case of Miracle v. Stone, 190 Ky. 610 , 227 S. W. 1011 .

1938In Riley v. Buchanan, 116 Ky. 625 , 76 S. W. 527 , 25 Ky. Law Rep. 863 , 63 L.

1938In Riley v. Buchanan, 116 Ky. 625 , 76 S. W. 527 , 25 Ky. Law Rep. 863 , 63 L.

1937Thomas v. National Concrete Construction Company, 166 Ky. 512 , 179 S. W. 439 ; Fehr Brewing Company v. Corley, 265 Ky. 308 , 96 S. W. (2d) 860 , and cases cited.

1937Thomas v. National Concrete Construction Company, 166 Ky. 512 , 179 S. W. 439 ; Fehr Brewing Company v. Corley, 265 Ky. 308 , 96 S. W. (2d) 860 , and cases cited.

1937Thomas v. National Concrete Construction Company, 166 Ky. 512 , 179 S. W. 439 ; Fehr Brewing Company v. Corley, 265 Ky. 308 , 96 S. W. (2d) 860 , and cases cited.

1937Thomas v. National Concrete Construction Company, 166 Ky. 512 , 179 S. W. 439 ; Fehr Brewing Company v. Corley, 265 Ky. 308 , 96 S. W. (2d) 860 , and cases cited.

1932Proof necessary to reform the terms of written instruments must be full, clear, and decisive, or as said in Vanover v. Justice, 174 Ky. 577 , 192 S. W. 653 , 655: “The rule is thoroughly established that, before a written obligation will be reformed or rescinded upon the ground of fraud in its execution, the fraud must be made to appear by the clearest and most convincing proof, ’ ’ and, further, we quote from the case of Ferguson v. Akers, 165 Ky. 289 , 176 S. W. 1149, 1150 , as particularly applicable to the ease at bar, wherein the court said: “Briefly, the evidence of Akers and Ferguson co

1932Proof necessary to reform the terms of written instruments must be full, clear, and decisive, or as said in Vanover v. Justice, 174 Ky. 577 , 192 S. W. 653 , 655: “The rule is thoroughly established that, before a written obligation will be reformed or rescinded upon the ground of fraud in its execution, the fraud must be made to appear by the clearest and most convincing proof, ’ ’ and, further, we quote from the case of Ferguson v. Akers, 165 Ky. 289 , 176 S. W. 1149, 1150 , as particularly applicable to the ease at bar, wherein the court said: “Briefly, the evidence of Akers and Ferguson co

1932Proof necessary to reform the terms of written instruments must be full, clear, and decisive, or as said in Vanover v. Justice, 174 Ky. 577 , 192 S. W. 653 , 655: “The rule is thoroughly established that, before a written obligation will be reformed or rescinded upon the ground of fraud in its execution, the fraud must be made to appear by the clearest and most convincing proof, ’ ’ and, further, we quote from the case of Ferguson v. Akers, 165 Ky. 289 , 176 S. W. 1149, 1150 , as particularly applicable to the ease at bar, wherein the court said: “Briefly, the evidence of Akers and Ferguson co

1932Proof necessary to reform the terms of written instruments must be full, clear, and decisive, or as said in Vanover v. Justice, 174 Ky. 577 , 192 S. W. 653 , 655: “The rule is thoroughly established that, before a written obligation will be reformed or rescinded upon the ground of fraud in its execution, the fraud must be made to appear by the clearest and most convincing proof, ’ ’ and, further, we quote from the case of Ferguson v. Akers, 165 Ky. 289 , 176 S. W. 1149, 1150 , as particularly applicable to the ease at bar, wherein the court said: “Briefly, the evidence of Akers and Ferguson co

1929But it is argued by counsel for appellant that a different rule was announced in the case of Mason v. Cook, 187 Ky. 260 , 218 *551 S. W. 740.

1925Rep. 762, 32 S. W. 603 ; Pence v. Shackelford, 142 Ky. 10 , 133 S. W. 956 ; Interstate Petroleum Co. v. Farris, 159 Ky. 820 , 169 S. W. 535 ; and Carter v. Braswell, 186 Ky. 760 , 217 S. W. 1019 .

1925Rep. 762, 32 S. W. 603 ; Pence v. Shackelford, 142 Ky. 10 , 133 S. W. 956 ; Interstate Petroleum Co. v. Farris, 159 Ky. 820 , 169 S. W. 535 ; and Carter v. Braswell, 186 Ky. 760 , 217 S. W. 1019 .

1925See Stoner v. Nall, 149 Ky. 124 , 148 S. W. 8 ; Newton v. Bayless Fruit Co., 155 Ky. 440 , 159 S. W. 968 ; Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Sorg, 180 Ky. 539 , 203 S. W. 300 ; Moors v. Ky. Electrical Co., 182 Ky. 825 , 208 S. W. 15 .

1925See Stoner v. Nall, 149 Ky. 124 , 148 S. W. 8 ; Newton v. Bayless Fruit Co., 155 Ky. 440 , 159 S. W. 968 ; Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Sorg, 180 Ky. 539 , 203 S. W. 300 ; Moors v. Ky. Electrical Co., 182 Ky. 825 , 208 S. W. 15 .

1925Rep. 762, 32 S. W. 603 ; Pence v. Shackelford, 142 Ky. 10 , 133 S. W. 956 ; Interstate Petroleum Co. v. Farris, 159 Ky. 820 , 169 S. W. 535 ; and Carter v. Braswell, 186 Ky. 760 , 217 S. W. 1019 .

1925Rep. 762, 32 S. W. 603 ; Pence v. Shackelford, 142 Ky. 10 , 133 S. W. 956 ; Interstate Petroleum Co. v. Farris, 159 Ky. 820 , 169 S. W. 535 ; and Carter v. Braswell, 186 Ky. 760 , 217 S. W. 1019 .

1925See Stoner v. Nall, 149 Ky. 124 , 148 S. W. 8 ; Newton v. Bayless Fruit Co., 155 Ky. 440 , 159 S. W. 968 ; Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Sorg, 180 Ky. 539 , 203 S. W. 300 ; Moors v. Ky. Electrical Co., 182 Ky. 825 , 208 S. W. 15 .

1925See Stoner v. Nall, 149 Ky. 124 , 148 S. W. 8 ; Newton v. Bayless Fruit Co., 155 Ky. 440 , 159 S. W. 968 ; Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Sorg, 180 Ky. 539 , 203 S. W. 300 ; Moors v. Ky. Electrical Co., 182 Ky. 825 , 208 S. W. 15 .

1925See Stoner v. Nall, 149 Ky. 124 , 148 S. W. 8 ; Newton v. Bayless Fruit Co., 155 Ky. 440 , 159 S. W. 968 ; Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Sorg, 180 Ky. 539 , 203 S. W. 300 ; Moors v. Ky. Electrical Co., 182 Ky. 825 , 208 S. W. 15 .

1925See Stoner v. Nall, 149 Ky. 124 , 148 S. W. 8 ; Newton v. Bayless Fruit Co., 155 Ky. 440 , 159 S. W. 968 ; Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Sorg, 180 Ky. 539 , 203 S. W. 300 ; Moors v. Ky. Electrical Co., 182 Ky. 825 , 208 S. W. 15 .

1925Rep. 762, 32 S. W. 603 ; Pence v. Shackelford, 142 Ky. 10 , 133 S. W. 956 ; Interstate Petroleum Co. v. Farris, 159 Ky. 820 , 169 S. W. 535 ; and Carter v. Braswell, 186 Ky. 760 , 217 S. W. 1019 .

1925Rep. 762, 32 S. W. 603 ; Pence v. Shackelford, 142 Ky. 10 , 133 S. W. 956 ; Interstate Petroleum Co. v. Farris, 159 Ky. 820 , 169 S. W. 535 ; and Carter v. Braswell, 186 Ky. 760 , 217 S. W. 1019 .

1924So the mere fact that the ground relied on for the divorce sought in the case at bar, is not the ground upon which the appellant obtained a divorce in the first action, and that the husband from whom she seeks a divorce in the ease at bar happens to be the same husband from whom she obtained the divorce granted her in the first action, can no more entitle her to a second divorce, than did the difference in the husbands entitle the wife in Iring v. Iring, supra, to the second divorce sought by her.

1922This conclusion was based upon a rule of construction announced in Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U. S. 428 , and other cases therein cited, and is thus stated in the syllabus of the opinion in McCormack v. Reinberger, et al., supra: “Where a devise over is to take effect only upon the failure of the devisee to perform two named conditions, the performance of one of -such conditions will prevent the taking effect of the devise over. ’ ’ In the ease at bar there is but one contingency the happening of which could, under the will of her father, have deprived the appellee, Elizabeth A. Short, of the r

1922Co. of N. Y. v. Roll, 187 Ky. 31 .) In the ease at bar we cannot ,say that the testimony of appellant conclusively rebuts the presumption arising from the proof of the mailing of the letter of April 24th, with postage prepaid, properly addressed to him, or that there are not other corroborating facts or circumstances which made the question one of fact to be determined as other issues of that kind are decided.

1922A demurrer filed to the petition was sustained as to the defendants, Longaere and Miller, and upon failure to further plead, the petition was dismissed as to them, but the demurrer was overruled as to- the other defendants and they answered and denied the affirmative allegations in the petition, and the college in- a separate paragraph pleaded its. exemption from liability because it was a charitable institution, thereby invoking the doctrine of the ease of Emery v. Jewish Hospital Association, 193 Ky. 400 , and others referred to therein; while in a third paragraph all of the answering defend

1921As said in Fairy v. Kennedy, 68 S. C. 250, 47 S. E. 138 , and approved in Kinkaid v. Rossa, 31 S. Dak. 559, Ann.