ease bar in Oregon

1975In Nolan and Nolan, 20 Or App 432 , 532 P2d 35 , Sup Ct review denied (1975), we set forth the general guidelines originally laid down in Siebert v. Siebert, 184 Or 496, 503 , 199 P2d 659 (1948), as follows: “* * * The financial condition of the parties; the nature and value of their respective properties; the contribution of each to any property held by them as tenants by the entirety; the duration of the marriage; the husband’s income, his earning capacity, his age, health, and ability to labor; and the wife’s age, health, station and ability to earn a living. * * •” In the ease at bar, the

1975In Nolan and Nolan, 20 Or App 432 , 532 P2d 35 , Sup Ct review denied (1975), we set forth the general guidelines originally laid down in Siebert v. Siebert, 184 Or 496, 503 , 199 P2d 659 (1948), as follows: “* * * The financial condition of the parties; the nature and value of their respective properties; the contribution of each to any property held by them as tenants by the entirety; the duration of the marriage; the husband’s income, his earning capacity, his age, health, and ability to labor; and the wife’s age, health, station and ability to earn a living. * * •” In the ease at bar, the

1975Penney Co., 269 Or 643, 652-55 , 525 P2d 1299 (1974), and quoted with approval the following rule from Mullins v. Rowe et ux, 222 Or 519, 524 , 353 P2d 861 (1960): “(1) The time to object to a defective verdict, if it is defective, is while the jury is still on hand so that the trial court can resubmit the matter with proper instructions. “(2) An objection not taken when the verdict is returned into court is waived. “(3) The only correct procedure to follow is to resubmit the matter to the same jury.” Notwithstanding his failure to make a timely objection, plaintiff contends he is still entitl

1975Penney Co., 269 Or 643, 652-55 , 525 P2d 1299 (1974), and quoted with approval the following rule from Mullins v. Rowe et ux, 222 Or 519, 524 , 353 P2d 861 (1960): “(1) The time to object to a defective verdict, if it is defective, is while the jury is still on hand so that the trial court can resubmit the matter with proper instructions. “(2) An objection not taken when the verdict is returned into court is waived. “(3) The only correct procedure to follow is to resubmit the matter to the same jury.” Notwithstanding his failure to make a timely objection, plaintiff contends he is still entitl

1975Penney Co., 269 Or 643, 652-55 , 525 P2d 1299 (1974), and quoted with approval the following rule from Mullins v. Rowe et ux, 222 Or 519, 524 , 353 P2d 861 (1960): “(1) The time to object to a defective verdict, if it is defective, is while the jury is still on hand so that the trial court can resubmit the matter with proper instructions. “(2) An objection not taken when the verdict is returned into court is waived. “(3) The only correct procedure to follow is to resubmit the matter to the same jury.” Notwithstanding his failure to make a timely objection, plaintiff contends he is still entitl

1975Penney Co., 269 Or 643, 652-55 , 525 P2d 1299 (1974), and quoted with approval the following rule from Mullins v. Rowe et ux, 222 Or 519, 524 , 353 P2d 861 (1960): “(1) The time to object to a defective verdict, if it is defective, is while the jury is still on hand so that the trial court can resubmit the matter with proper instructions. “(2) An objection not taken when the verdict is returned into court is waived. “(3) The only correct procedure to follow is to resubmit the matter to the same jury.” Notwithstanding his failure to make a timely objection, plaintiff contends he is still entitl

1975In State v. Borders, supra, this court gave extended consideration to this problem and particularly to the then leading case of State v. Mayes, supra. Subsequent to Borders , however, our Supreme Court, in State v. Stover, 271 Or 132, 142-43 , 531 P2d 258 (1975), after tracing the history of the above statutes, said that State v. Mayes, supra, was to be “limited to situations where the defendant was prosecuted for the same crime under the statutes of different sovereignties.” In the case at bar both prosecutions are by the same sovereignty.

1975In State v. Borders, supra, this court gave extended consideration to this problem and particularly to the then leading case of State v. Mayes, supra. Subsequent to Borders , however, our Supreme Court, in State v. Stover, 271 Or 132, 142-43 , 531 P2d 258 (1975), after tracing the history of the above statutes, said that State v. Mayes, supra, was to be “limited to situations where the defendant was prosecuted for the same crime under the statutes of different sovereignties.” In the case at bar both prosecutions are by the same sovereignty.

1975In Fischer v. Howard, 201 Or 426, 464 , 271 P2d 1059 (1954), we disposed of this contention by stating: “We are satisfied that when the plaintiff, after acquainting himself with the verdict, made no objections to its receipt and no motion that the cause be recommitted to the jury, he waived the objections now under analysis.

1975In Fischer v. Howard, 201 Or 426, 464 , 271 P2d 1059 (1954), we disposed of this contention by stating: “We are satisfied that when the plaintiff, after acquainting himself with the verdict, made no objections to its receipt and no motion that the cause be recommitted to the jury, he waived the objections now under analysis.

1975In Nolan and Nolan, 20 Or App 432 , 532 P2d 35 , Sup Ct review denied (1975), we set forth the general guidelines originally laid down in Siebert v. Siebert, 184 Or 496, 503 , 199 P2d 659 (1948), as follows: “* * * The financial condition of the parties; the nature and value of their respective properties; the contribution of each to any property held by them as tenants by the entirety; the duration of the marriage; the husband’s income, his earning capacity, his age, health, and ability to labor; and the wife’s age, health, station and ability to earn a living. * * •” In the ease at bar, the

1975In Nolan and Nolan, 20 Or App 432 , 532 P2d 35 , Sup Ct review denied (1975), we set forth the general guidelines originally laid down in Siebert v. Siebert, 184 Or 496, 503 , 199 P2d 659 (1948), as follows: “* * * The financial condition of the parties; the nature and value of their respective properties; the contribution of each to any property held by them as tenants by the entirety; the duration of the marriage; the husband’s income, his earning capacity, his age, health, and ability to labor; and the wife’s age, health, station and ability to earn a living. * * •” In the ease at bar, the

1973The mere fact that a person’s criminal activity violates two statutes, one defining a felony and the other a misdemeanor, does not confer upon him a constitutional right to be prosecuted for the misdemeanor.” State v. Dumont, supra, 3 Or App at 193 .

1973Bowser v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 182 Or 42 , 185 P2d 891 (1947).” The facts in the ease at bar are less favorable to employer’s position than those in Blaine were.

1973Bowser v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 182 Or 42 , 185 P2d 891 (1947).” The facts in the ease at bar are less favorable to employer’s position than those in Blaine were.

1971State v. Christensen, 3 Or App 442, 444-5 , 474 P2d 782 (1970), presented a situation almost identical with that of the ease at bar.

1971State v. Christensen, 3 Or App 442, 444-5 , 474 P2d 782 (1970), presented a situation almost identical with that of the ease at bar.

1970Co., 111 Or 510 , 225 P 192 (1924), is a case very similar to the ease at bar. *443 The insurance agent brought an action against his company for breach of the agency contract.

1970Co., 111 Or 510 , 225 P 192 (1924), is a case very similar to the ease at bar. *443 The insurance agent brought an action against his company for breach of the agency contract.

1968In Roviaro v. United States, 353 US 53, 62 , 77 S Ct 623 , 1 L Ed 2d 639 (1957), the court said: “We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable.

1968In Roviaro v. United States, 353 US 53, 62 , 77 S Ct 623 , 1 L Ed 2d 639 (1957), the court said: “We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable.

1966In Moudy v. Boylan et al, 219 Or 448 , 347 P2d 983 (1959), the factual situation closely resembled the facts in the ease at bar.

1966In Moudy v. Boylan et al, 219 Or 448 , 347 P2d 983 (1959), the factual situation closely resembled the facts in the ease at bar.

1965In Kaufman v. Fisher, 230 Or 626, 639 , footnote 10, 371 P2d 948 , we recognize that in appropriate cases plaintiff “may strengthen the inference through the use of expert testimony showing that accidents of the kind in question do not commonly happen in the absence of negligence by persons in the defendant’s position.” Seneris v. Haas, supra, is strikingly similar on its facts to the ease at bar.

1965In Kaufman v. Fisher, 230 Or 626, 639 , footnote 10, 371 P2d 948 , we recognize that in appropriate cases plaintiff “may strengthen the inference through the use of expert testimony showing that accidents of the kind in question do not commonly happen in the absence of negligence by persons in the defendant’s position.” Seneris v. Haas, supra, is strikingly similar on its facts to the ease at bar.

1965In Kaufman v. Fisher, 230 Or 626, 639 , footnote 10, 371 P2d 948 , we recognize that in appropriate cases plaintiff “may strengthen the inference through the use of expert testimony showing that accidents of the kind in question do not commonly happen in the absence of negligence by persons in the defendant’s position.” Seneris v. Haas, supra, is strikingly similar on its facts to the ease at bar.

1965The Gordon opinion utilized a statement, also found in other eases, by Judge Cooley in People v. Davis, 1884, 52 Mich 569, 573 , 18 NW 362 : “The State has no interest in interposing an obstacle to the disclosure of facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons.” In the instant ease the error requires reversal.

1965The Gordon opinion utilized a statement, also found in other eases, by Judge Cooley in People v. Davis, 1884, 52 Mich 569, 573 , 18 NW 362 : “The State has no interest in interposing an obstacle to the disclosure of facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons.” In the instant ease the error requires reversal.

1963The majority opinion in the Panushha case contains rather sweeping language to the effect that equitable conversion invariably applies whenever real property is sold under a title-retaining contract. 221 Or at 149-150 .

1963Referring to such maxim, we quoted from 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 5 ed, § 397, pp 91-92, in Dickerson v. Murfield, 173 Or 662, 670 , 147 P2d 194 , as follows: “ ‘ “* * * It says that whenever a party, who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse *399 to interfere on his 'behalf, to acknowledge has [sic] right, or to award him any remedy.” ’ ” In the ease at bar the father

1963Referring to such maxim, we quoted from 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 5 ed, § 397, pp 91-92, in Dickerson v. Murfield, 173 Or 662, 670 , 147 P2d 194 , as follows: “ ‘ “* * * It says that whenever a party, who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse *399 to interfere on his 'behalf, to acknowledge has [sic] right, or to award him any remedy.” ’ ” In the ease at bar the father

1962The fundamental principle governing criminal pleading is set forth in OEiS 132.540 (1) in these words: “The indictment is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that: # * # “(f) 'The act or omission charged as the crime is clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding *584 to know what is intended and with sneh a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment, upon a conviction, according to the right of the case # * State v. Briggen, 112 Or 681 , 231 P 125 , ruled: “

1962The fundamental principle governing criminal pleading is set forth in OEiS 132.540 (1) in these words: “The indictment is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that: # * # “(f) 'The act or omission charged as the crime is clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding *584 to know what is intended and with sneh a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment, upon a conviction, according to the right of the case # * State v. Briggen, 112 Or 681 , 231 P 125 , ruled: “

1962The fundamental principle governing criminal pleading is set forth in OEiS 132.540 (1) in these words: “The indictment is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that: # * # “(f) 'The act or omission charged as the crime is clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding *584 to know what is intended and with sneh a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment, upon a conviction, according to the right of the case # * State v. Briggen, 112 Or 681 , 231 P 125 , ruled: “

1962The fundamental principle governing criminal pleading is set forth in OEiS 132.540 (1) in these words: “The indictment is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that: # * # “(f) 'The act or omission charged as the crime is clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding *584 to know what is intended and with sneh a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment, upon a conviction, according to the right of the case # * State v. Briggen, 112 Or 681 , 231 P 125 , ruled: “

1962The fundamental principle governing criminal pleading is set forth in OEiS 132.540 (1) in these words: “The indictment is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that: # * # “(f) 'The act or omission charged as the crime is clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding *584 to know what is intended and with sneh a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment, upon a conviction, according to the right of the case # * State v. Briggen, 112 Or 681 , 231 P 125 , ruled: “

1962The fundamental principle governing criminal pleading is set forth in OEiS 132.540 (1) in these words: “The indictment is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that: # * # “(f) 'The act or omission charged as the crime is clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding *584 to know what is intended and with sneh a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment, upon a conviction, according to the right of the case # * State v. Briggen, 112 Or 681 , 231 P 125 , ruled: “

1961As taught in Oregon Worsted Co. v. State Tax Com., 217 Or 104 , 317 P2d 924 , 342 P2d 108 (1959), the burden of proof does not shift to the taxpayer until the commission has established “that the total original assessment has been materially undervalued.” In the ease at bar the commission did not prove such material undervaluation.

1961As taught in Oregon Worsted Co. v. State Tax Com., 217 Or 104 , 317 P2d 924 , 342 P2d 108 (1959), the burden of proof does not shift to the taxpayer until the commission has established “that the total original assessment has been materially undervalued.” In the ease at bar the commission did not prove such material undervaluation.