ease bar in Indiana

1998Voit, 634 N.E.2d at 770 .

1996Clark v. State, 269 Ind. 316 , 380 N.E.2d 550 (1978) also offers guidance.

1996Clark v. State, 269 Ind. 316 , 380 N.E.2d 550 (1978) also offers guidance.

1993The State, in its petition for rehearing, contends that our holding that a judge pro tempore appointed for one court session does not retain jurisdiction on a ease is in error, citing Harris v. State (1993), Ind.App., 616 N.E.2d 25 , trans. denied.

1989This Court has previously stated that on appeal we will reverse the trial court on a finding of sanity “only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion and the trier of fact has reached an opposite conclusion,.... ” Green v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 .

1989However, in Beck v. Beck (1981), 86 N.J. 480 , 432 A.2d 63 , 17 ALR4th 997, a sua sponte award of joint custody (as in the ease at bar where neither party requested joint custody) was affirmed.

1989However, in Beck v. Beck (1981), 86 N.J. 480 , 432 A.2d 63 , 17 ALR4th 997, a sua sponte award of joint custody (as in the ease at bar where neither party requested joint custody) was affirmed.

1982Finally, in Cunningham v. Associates Capital Services Corp., (1981) Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 681 this Court held a summary judgment affidavit did not meet the requirements of T.R. 56(E) under facts very similar to those in the ease at bar.

1982In the case of Johnson v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 256 , 369 N.E.2d 623 , this Court stated: “In the ease at bar the coroner’s report was fully certified by the deputy coroner who attested that he was the lawful custodian of the records.

1982In the case of Johnson v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 256 , 369 N.E.2d 623 , this Court stated: “In the ease at bar the coroner’s report was fully certified by the deputy coroner who attested that he was the lawful custodian of the records.

1982While such “dragnet” clauses are not favored by the law because of the possibility that they could work a fraud on creditors, Bowen v. Ratcliff, (1895) 140 Ind. 393, 397 , 39 N.E. 860, 682 , such danger does not exist between the parties.

1982While such “dragnet” clauses are not favored by the law because of the possibility that they could work a fraud on creditors, Bowen v. Ratcliff, (1895) 140 Ind. 393, 397 , 39 N.E. 860, 682 , such danger does not exist between the parties.

1980We find Shinn, supra, and Yount, supra, to be distinguishable from the ease at bar.

1979While we recognize the proposition in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski (1970) 399 U.S. 204 , 90 S.Ct. 1990 , 26 L.Ed.2d 523 , that a renter may effectively pay a share of local property taxes through his rental payments, we think this interest is too far removed from the actual levying of the tax to justify striking down the particular statute in the ease at bar.

1979While we recognize the proposition in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski (1970) 399 U.S. 204 , 90 S.Ct. 1990 , 26 L.Ed.2d 523 , that a renter may effectively pay a share of local property taxes through his rental payments, we think this interest is too far removed from the actual levying of the tax to justify striking down the particular statute in the ease at bar.

1975Thomas v. State (1973), [260] Ind. [1], *690 291 N.E.2d 557 ; Feltes et al. v. People of Colorado (Colo. 1972), 498 P.2d 1128 .” In the ease at bar, appellant’s possession of the disputed evidence was adequately established.

1975Thomas v. State (1973), [260] Ind. [1], *690 291 N.E.2d 557 ; Feltes et al. v. People of Colorado (Colo. 1972), 498 P.2d 1128 .” In the ease at bar, appellant’s possession of the disputed evidence was adequately established.

1973Ashton, supra, is different from the ease at bar in that the question was asked concerning prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching the witness’s credibility and was determined by our Supreme Court as a “. . . ‘fishing expedition’ which if answered would not necessarily reveal any admissible evidence. . . .” Ashton is further distinguishable from the case at bar in that in Ashton no questions had been asked the witness which opened up the examination so that cross examination could be gone into. *491 In the case of Jackson v. Beard (1970), 146 Ind. App. 382 , 255 N.E.2d 837 , the case o

1973Ashton, supra, is different from the ease at bar in that the question was asked concerning prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching the witness’s credibility and was determined by our Supreme Court as a “. . . ‘fishing expedition’ which if answered would not necessarily reveal any admissible evidence. . . .” Ashton is further distinguishable from the case at bar in that in Ashton no questions had been asked the witness which opened up the examination so that cross examination could be gone into. *491 In the case of Jackson v. Beard (1970), 146 Ind. App. 382 , 255 N.E.2d 837 , the case o

1973Ashton, supra, is different from the ease at bar in that the question was asked concerning prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching the witness’s credibility and was determined by our Supreme Court as a “. . . ‘fishing expedition’ which if answered would not necessarily reveal any admissible evidence. . . .” Ashton is further distinguishable from the case at bar in that in Ashton no questions had been asked the witness which opened up the examination so that cross examination could be gone into. *491 In the case of Jackson v. Beard (1970), 146 Ind. App. 382 , 255 N.E.2d 837 , the case o

1973Ashton, supra, is different from the ease at bar in that the question was asked concerning prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching the witness’s credibility and was determined by our Supreme Court as a “. . . ‘fishing expedition’ which if answered would not necessarily reveal any admissible evidence. . . .” Ashton is further distinguishable from the case at bar in that in Ashton no questions had been asked the witness which opened up the examination so that cross examination could be gone into. *491 In the case of Jackson v. Beard (1970), 146 Ind. App. 382 , 255 N.E.2d 837 , the case o

1973Ashton, supra, is different from the ease at bar in that the question was asked concerning prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching the witness’s credibility and was determined by our Supreme Court as a “. . . ‘fishing expedition’ which if answered would not necessarily reveal any admissible evidence. . . .” Ashton is further distinguishable from the case at bar in that in Ashton no questions had been asked the witness which opened up the examination so that cross examination could be gone into. *491 In the case of Jackson v. Beard (1970), 146 Ind. App. 382 , 255 N.E.2d 837 , the case o

1973Ashton, supra, is different from the ease at bar in that the question was asked concerning prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching the witness’s credibility and was determined by our Supreme Court as a “. . . ‘fishing expedition’ which if answered would not necessarily reveal any admissible evidence. . . .” Ashton is further distinguishable from the case at bar in that in Ashton no questions had been asked the witness which opened up the examination so that cross examination could be gone into. *491 In the case of Jackson v. Beard (1970), 146 Ind. App. 382 , 255 N.E.2d 837 , the case o

1969In Dooley v. Richard’s Standard Service (Ind. App. 10/16/69) 145 Ind. App. 470 , 18 Ind. Dec. 754 , 251 N. E. 2d 449 , Division One affirmed a Full Industrial Board’s negative award where the evidence was nearly identical in essence to that in the ease at bar.

1969In Dooley v. Richard’s Standard Service (Ind. App. 10/16/69) 145 Ind. App. 470 , 18 Ind. Dec. 754 , 251 N. E. 2d 449 , Division One affirmed a Full Industrial Board’s negative award where the evidence was nearly identical in essence to that in the ease at bar.

1969The opinion’s conclusion merely holds that “appellee did not suffer injury as a result of and in the course of his employment.” ( 132 Ind. App. at 695 .) This is almost the same negative pregnant which is employed as a “finding” in the ease at bar.

1968Even before Rule 2-6 was presented, our Supreme Court stated that errors in mis-naming parties as appellants or appellees were not jurisdictional In Buchanan v. Morris (1926), 198 Ind. 79 , 151 N. E. 385 , the court denied a motion to dismiss on these grounds and continued to decide .the case on its merits.

1968Even before Rule 2-6 was presented, our Supreme Court stated that errors in mis-naming parties as appellants or appellees were not jurisdictional In Buchanan v. Morris (1926), 198 Ind. 79 , 151 N. E. 385 , the court denied a motion to dismiss on these grounds and continued to decide .the case on its merits.

1919Art. 7, §1, Constitution of Indiana, §161 Burns 1914; Shoultz v. McPheeters (1881), 79 Ind. 373 ; Little v. State (1883), 90 Ind. 338 , 46 Am.

1919Art. 7, §1, Constitution of Indiana, §161 Burns 1914; Shoultz v. McPheeters (1881), 79 Ind. 373 ; Little v. State (1883), 90 Ind. 338 , 46 Am.

1916In the City of Gary v. Much (1913), 180 Ind. 26 , 101 N. E. 4 , cited by appellants, the city vacated a certain street, which was upon the boundary line of the corporation, and shut out the ingress and egress of an abutting property owner.

1916In the City of Gary v. Much (1913), 180 Ind. 26 , 101 N. E. 4 , cited by appellants, the city vacated a certain street, which was upon the boundary line of the corporation, and shut out the ingress and egress of an abutting property owner.

1915Co. (1894), 91 Iowa 278 , 59 N. W. 1 , is likewise distinguishable, because the horse in that ease was killed by the veterinary surgeon two hours before the policy expired, not because the animal was suffering pain, but- because it was believed to be impossible for the animal to recover, so that the humane doctrine which we think is rightly invoked in the ease at bar had no application to that ease.

1915Co. (1894), 91 Iowa 278 , 59 N. W. 1 , is likewise distinguishable, because the horse in that ease was killed by the veterinary surgeon two hours before the policy expired, not because the animal was suffering pain, but- because it was believed to be impossible for the animal to recover, so that the humane doctrine which we think is rightly invoked in the ease at bar had no application to that ease.

1914It appears to us that the ease at bar is not governed by the one definite theory line of cases, such as Oölitic Stone Co. v. Ridge (1908), 169 Ind. 639 , 83 N. E. 246 , for in that, and other like cases, while there was but one law in effect, it could not be determined whether the recovery had not been had on the theory most favorable to the successful party, that is, upon the theory of least legal resistance.

1914It appears to us that the ease at bar is not governed by the one definite theory line of cases, such as Oölitic Stone Co. v. Ridge (1908), 169 Ind. 639 , 83 N. E. 246 , for in that, and other like cases, while there was but one law in effect, it could not be determined whether the recovery had not been had on the theory most favorable to the successful party, that is, upon the theory of least legal resistance.

1914The case of Evansville Hoop, etc., Co. v. Bailey (1909), 43 Ind. App. 153 , 84 N. E. 549 , cited by appellee is likewise readily distinguishable in its facts from the ease at bar, as are also the cases of Bessler v. Laughlin (1907), 168 Ind. 38 , 79 N. E. 1033 ; Davis v. Mercer Lumber Co. (1905), 164 Ind. 413 , 73 N. E. 899 ; Cook v. Ormsby (1910), 45 Ind. App. 352 , 89 N. E. 525 . 8. 9.

1914The case of Evansville Hoop, etc., Co. v. Bailey (1909), 43 Ind. App. 153 , 84 N. E. 549 , cited by appellee is likewise readily distinguishable in its facts from the ease at bar, as are also the cases of Bessler v. Laughlin (1907), 168 Ind. 38 , 79 N. E. 1033 ; Davis v. Mercer Lumber Co. (1905), 164 Ind. 413 , 73 N. E. 899 ; Cook v. Ormsby (1910), 45 Ind. App. 352 , 89 N. E. 525 . 8. 9.