ease bar in Massachusetts

1973Kacouris v. Loukas, 333 Mass. 44 and Horn v. Hitchcock, 332 Mass. 643 , are distinguishable from the ease at bar in that in both those cases when the attaching creditor sought to enforce the attachment, it had expired by operation of law (i.e. the failure to perfect the attachment within 30 days of final judgment).

1973Kacouris v. Loukas, 333 Mass. 44 and Horn v. Hitchcock, 332 Mass. 643 , are distinguishable from the ease at bar in that in both those cases when the attaching creditor sought to enforce the attachment, it had expired by operation of law (i.e. the failure to perfect the attachment within 30 days of final judgment).

1967Piekos v. Bar chand, 333 Mass. 211 ; Scire v. Scire, 348 Mass. 768 .

1967Piekos v. Bar chand, 333 Mass. 211 ; Scire v. Scire, 348 Mass. 768 .

1964The ease at bar is governed in principle by Leary v. Keith, 256 Mass. 157, 158 , Tully v. Mandell, 269 Mass. 307, 309 , Zimmerman v. Litvich, 297 Mass. 91, 94 , and Woronka v. Sewall, 320 Mass. 362, 365 .

1964The ease at bar is governed in principle by Leary v. Keith, 256 Mass. 157, 158 , Tully v. Mandell, 269 Mass. 307, 309 , Zimmerman v. Litvich, 297 Mass. 91, 94 , and Woronka v. Sewall, 320 Mass. 362, 365 .

1964The ease at bar is governed in principle by Leary v. Keith, 256 Mass. 157, 158 , Tully v. Mandell, 269 Mass. 307, 309 , Zimmerman v. Litvich, 297 Mass. 91, 94 , and Woronka v. Sewall, 320 Mass. 362, 365 .

1964Even the case of Wine v. Commonwealth, 301 Mass. 451 , which we think closest in analogy to the instant case is clearly distinguishable.

1964The ease at bar is governed in principle by Leary v. Keith, 256 Mass. 157, 158 , Tully v. Mandell, 269 Mass. 307, 309 , Zimmerman v. Litvich, 297 Mass. 91, 94 , and Woronka v. Sewall, 320 Mass. 362, 365 .

1962Check v. Kaplan, 280 Mass. 170, 174 , and cases cited. 1 In the ease at bar no claim was made for jury trial.

1961Leathers dated October 20, 1955, which was recorded on October 24, 1955. 1 In Parker v. Parker, 1 Allen, 245 , 247, also cited by the plaintiffs, it was clear that ‘ ‘ [t]he acts of possession were few, intermittent, and equivocal. ’ ’ In the ease at bar there was an express finding that the acts were continuous.

1949Smith v. New England Cotton Yarn Co., 225 Mass. 287, 289 ; Ventromile et al. v. Malden Electric Co., 317 Mass. 132 .

1949Smith v. New England Cotton Yarn Co., 225 Mass. 287, 289 ; Ventromile et al. v. Malden Electric Co., 317 Mass. 132 .

1943By inferring that the cause was not guaranteed by a battery of substantial nature and there being no appreciable physical injury even if the battery was slight, the trial judge would be justified in treating the case as coming within the doctrine of Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad, 168 Mass. 285 and making a general finding for the defendant on count two of the declaration.

1940Leveillee v. Wright, supra. The question in the ease at bar as to whether the operator being unlicensed can be considered as a cause rather than a condition depends upon the legal effect to be given to that fact.

1939The case of Moreland v. Boston and Providence Railroad Corporation, 141 Mass. 31 , is to be distinguished from the ease at bar.

1939Sh. (1937) 15, at 23, the court said that the practice is “apparently founded upon a misreading of John Hetherington & Sons, Ltd. v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8 , and in Freeman v. Crowell & Thurlow Inc., Mass. Adv.

1938Boston Elevated, supra. Moreover the case of Edgerly vs.

1937Moreover, in Silano v. Carosella, 272 Mass. 203 it appeared that the prevailing party at a hearing before the report was finally settled by the trial judge, filed a request that it be amplified by including certain testimony and statements of fact.

1936Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass. 249 , is a case cited, but in that case the agreement by the defendant was, “to keep the place in repair and safe to live in” which, in our opinion, differentiates the case from the ease at bar.

1936The trial court in the ease at bar found “as a fact that the vendee did notify the vendor within a reasonable time of the breach and that he would hold him liable for damages.” Whether notice was given was a question of fact, Nashua Paper Co. v. Lindsay, 249 Mass. 365 , and whether notice was given within a reasonable time was also a question of fact, Smith v. Denholm & McKay Co., 288 Mass. 234, 241 .

1936The instant case, in its circumstances, is much like the 'case of Cormier v. Weiner, 277 Mass. 518 , where the landlord promised to install a gate and picket uprights so that the piazza “would be all right for a child to go out there”.

1936The trial court in the ease at bar found “as a fact that the vendee did notify the vendor within a reasonable time of the breach and that he would hold him liable for damages.” Whether notice was given was a question of fact, Nashua Paper Co. v. Lindsay, 249 Mass. 365 , and whether notice was given within a reasonable time was also a question of fact, Smith v. Denholm & McKay Co., 288 Mass. 234, 241 .

1932The principle declared in Lodge v. Swampscott, 216 Mass. 260 , to the effect that valid restrictions on the use of land are to be taken into account in the assessment of a tax is not pertinent to the ease at bar in view of the unmistakable words of the statute.

1932Donovan v. Haverhill, 247 Mass. 69 .

1927The decision in Mabardy v. McHugh, 202 Mass. 148 , is not pertinent to the facts in the ease at bar.

1927Hartnett v. Gryzmish, 218 Mass. 258 .

1922For the same reason the dictum in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Medfield & Medway Street Railway, 215 Mass. 156, 163 , is not applicable to the ease at bar.

1908Where there is a devise of personalty for life and the law imports a trust, or where there is a devise of a mixed fund and the duties of the trustee under the will are such that the power of conversion is clearly necessitated or contemplated, the power or the trust will extend over the real estate; Dorr v. Wainwright, 13 Pick. 328 ; White v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 171 Mass. 84, 96 ; May v. Brewster, 187 Mass. 524 ; but where there is simply a life estate and a remainder, even though there be in the bequest for life personalty as to which a trust will be implied and a trustee appointed, there is

1908Where there is a devise of personalty for life and the law imports a trust, or where there is a devise of a mixed fund and the duties of the trustee under the will are such that the power of conversion is clearly necessitated or contemplated, the power or the trust will extend over the real estate; Dorr v. Wainwright, 13 Pick. 328 ; White v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 171 Mass. 84, 96 ; May v. Brewster, 187 Mass. 524 ; but where there is simply a life estate and a remainder, even though there be in the bequest for life personalty as to which a trust will be implied and a trustee appointed, there is