ease bar in Rhode Island

1999In Larken Minnesota, Inc. v. Wray, 881 F.Supp. 1413 (D.Minn.1995), aff'd, 89 F.3d 841 (8th Cir.1996), a deadlock arose between two groups of limited partners.

1999In Larken Minnesota, Inc. v. Wray, 881 F.Supp. 1413 (D.Minn.1995), aff'd, 89 F.3d 841 (8th Cir.1996), a deadlock arose between two groups of limited partners.

1998This court held in Seamons v. Fitts, 21 R.I. 236 , 42 A. 863 (1899), that service upon the town treasurer did not meet the requirements of the statute since the town treasurer is not the town council, nor its representative to receive service of the statutory notice.

1998This court held in Seamons v. Fitts, 21 R.I. 236 , 42 A. 863 (1899), that service upon the town treasurer did not meet the requirements of the statute since the town treasurer is not the town council, nor its representative to receive service of the statutory notice.

1997Affirming the trial justice’s termination of the mother’s parental rights in regard to all her children, we found that the trial justice had reasonably concluded that a “caring parent would have known the source of the injuries and would have reported this information to physicians or to the police if she had not caused them herself or permitted them to happen.” Id. at 1385 .

1997In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, 567 So.2d 918 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990), the District Court of Appeals for the State of Florida held that Budget, a Florida car-rental company, which leased a vehicle in Florida that was involved in an accident in Georgia was jointly and severally liable for the negligence of its driver even though Georgia’s law would not have imposed vicarious liability on the owner.

1985For this reason, I maintain my position espoused in Rhode Island Liquor Stores Association v. The Evening Call, 497 A.2d 331 (R.I.1985), that it is incumbent upon the party seeking to suppress truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech to justify that suppression.

1985It is not my belief that the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, 69 Ohio St.2d 361 , 433 N.E.2d 138 (1982), for want of a substantial federal question controls the ease at bar.

1985It is not my belief that the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, 69 Ohio St.2d 361 , 433 N.E.2d 138 (1982), for want of a substantial federal question controls the ease at bar.

1984The court held that the charge as a whole was “correct and applied to the evidence.” Id. at 353 , 152 A.2d at 652-53 . 1 In the ease at bar the trial justice defined manslaughter in the following terms: “Now, manslaughter may be either voluntary or involuntary.

1984The court held that the charge as a whole was “correct and applied to the evidence.” Id. at 353 , 152 A.2d at 652-53 . 1 In the ease at bar the trial justice defined manslaughter in the following terms: “Now, manslaughter may be either voluntary or involuntary.

1982We deem this court’s comments in State v. Ouimette, 110 R.I. at 761 , 298 A.2d at 133 , particularly appropriate in the context of the ease at bar: “Inasmuch as the function of the jury is to seek the truth, testimony that tends to rehabilitate the veracity of the witness is relevant and material on the issue of credibility and should be admitted.” [Citation omitted.] Considering the totality of the evidence before the jury, we conclude that these erroneous rulings were not harmless.

1982We deem this court’s comments in State v. Ouimette, 110 R.I. at 761 , 298 A.2d at 133 , particularly appropriate in the context of the ease at bar: “Inasmuch as the function of the jury is to seek the truth, testimony that tends to rehabilitate the veracity of the witness is relevant and material on the issue of credibility and should be admitted.” [Citation omitted.] Considering the totality of the evidence before the jury, we conclude that these erroneous rulings were not harmless.

1940I. 207, 7 A.2d 713 , which was an action to recover against the estate -of a deceased person on a disallowed claim.

1930Gavros case (Mass.) 134 N. E. 269 ; Jacquemin vs.

1885The Supreme Court of Maine, in Atkinson v. White, supra, express an inclination to go even further, and to hold broadly that “ when a party has once tried a question in one suit, he shall not, without regard to mutual estoppel, again try the same question involving the same testimony in another suit.” We think, on the authority of these cases, it is competent for the defendant town to set up, by way of estoppel in the ease at bar, the -judgment recovered by the Bud-longs.