ease bar in Idaho

2004In support of his position, Patterson cites to a Texas appellate court opinion, Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), which involves facts similar to the ease at bar.

2003In Gomez , the Idaho Supreme Court found error under circumstances very similar to the ease at bar where the trial court excluded evidence that two of the state’s witnesses had not been prosecuted for an unrelated crime. 1 Id. at 673 , 52 P.3d at 317 .

2003In Gomez , the Idaho Supreme Court found error under circumstances very similar to the ease at bar where the trial court excluded evidence that two of the state’s witnesses had not been prosecuted for an unrelated crime. 1 Id. at 673 , 52 P.3d at 317 .

1995The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motion for the continuance, holding that “the situation in the ease at bar was precipitated by plaintiffs’ counsel’s lack of diligence in securing expert opinions on liability, and not by mere fortuity.” Likewise, this Court upheld the denial of a motion for a continuance in Krepcik v. Tippett, 109 Idaho 696 , 710 P.2d 606 (Ct.App.1985), where the party seeking the continuance was at least partially responsible for its necessity.

1995The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motion for the continuance, holding that “the situation in the ease at bar was precipitated by plaintiffs’ counsel’s lack of diligence in securing expert opinions on liability, and not by mere fortuity.” Likewise, this Court upheld the denial of a motion for a continuance in Krepcik v. Tippett, 109 Idaho 696 , 710 P.2d 606 (Ct.App.1985), where the party seeking the continuance was at least partially responsible for its necessity.

1985Johnson v. Pioneer Title Company of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727 , 662 P.2d 1171 (Ct.App.1983).

1985Johnson v. Pioneer Title Company of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727 , 662 P.2d 1171 (Ct.App.1983).

1940We held that “payment under a proper protest to the proper board or official is an essential prerequisite to entitle the party protesting to repayment of the excess (Asp v. Canyon County, 43 Ida. 560, 563 , 256 Pac. 92 ; Howell v. Board of Commrs., 6 Ida. 154 , 53 Pac. 542 ).” In the ease at bar the trial court found: “That all assessments levied for the payment of after-maturity interest were paid by the landowners within the said drainage district to the county treasurer, and by the ■ county treasurer to the defendant [Johnston], .... without any protest or objection, and with full knowledge

1940We held that “payment under a proper protest to the proper board or official is an essential prerequisite to entitle the party protesting to repayment of the excess (Asp v. Canyon County, 43 Ida. 560, 563 , 256 Pac. 92 ; Howell v. Board of Commrs., 6 Ida. 154 , 53 Pac. 542 ).” In the ease at bar the trial court found: “That all assessments levied for the payment of after-maturity interest were paid by the landowners within the said drainage district to the county treasurer, and by the ■ county treasurer to the defendant [Johnston], .... without any protest or objection, and with full knowledge

1940We held that “payment under a proper protest to the proper board or official is an essential prerequisite to entitle the party protesting to repayment of the excess (Asp v. Canyon County, 43 Ida. 560, 563 , 256 Pac. 92 ; Howell v. Board of Commrs., 6 Ida. 154 , 53 Pac. 542 ).” In the ease at bar the trial court found: “That all assessments levied for the payment of after-maturity interest were paid by the landowners within the said drainage district to the county treasurer, and by the ■ county treasurer to the defendant [Johnston], .... without any protest or objection, and with full knowledge

1940We held that “payment under a proper protest to the proper board or official is an essential prerequisite to entitle the party protesting to repayment of the excess (Asp v. Canyon County, 43 Ida. 560, 563 , 256 Pac. 92 ; Howell v. Board of Commrs., 6 Ida. 154 , 53 Pac. 542 ).” In the ease at bar the trial court found: “That all assessments levied for the payment of after-maturity interest were paid by the landowners within the said drainage district to the county treasurer, and by the ■ county treasurer to the defendant [Johnston], .... without any protest or objection, and with full knowledge

1939The latter part of November, Nineteen, thirty-seven.” As argued by respondent: “Rescission of the contract of purchase within three months after the discovery of the complete fraud (as in the ease at bar) is sufficiently prompt, especially where nothing transpired in the interim which would make recovery inequitable.” (Wilson v. Sunnyside Orchard Co., 33 Ida. 501 , 196 Pac. 302 .) *250 Next comes the contention: “The purchaser of land upon installments, who defaults in the payment of an installment as stipulated by the agreement, can not rescind the contract or breach the same and refuse to ma

1939The latter part of November, Nineteen, thirty-seven.” As argued by respondent: “Rescission of the contract of purchase within three months after the discovery of the complete fraud (as in the ease at bar) is sufficiently prompt, especially where nothing transpired in the interim which would make recovery inequitable.” (Wilson v. Sunnyside Orchard Co., 33 Ida. 501 , 196 Pac. 302 .) *250 Next comes the contention: “The purchaser of land upon installments, who defaults in the payment of an installment as stipulated by the agreement, can not rescind the contract or breach the same and refuse to ma

1937Bank, 10 Ida. 175 , 77 Pac. 334 ; Price v. Grice, 10 Ida. 443 , 79 Pac. 387 ; Nielson v. Peterson, 37 Ida. 171 , 215 Pac. 836 .

1937Bank, 10 Ida. 175 , 77 Pac. 334 ; Price v. Grice, 10 Ida. 443 , 79 Pac. 387 ; Nielson v. Peterson, 37 Ida. 171 , 215 Pac. 836 .

1937Bank, 10 Ida. 175 , 77 Pac. 334 ; Price v. Grice, 10 Ida. 443 , 79 Pac. 387 ; Nielson v. Peterson, 37 Ida. 171 , 215 Pac. 836 .

1937Bank, 10 Ida. 175 , 77 Pac. 334 ; Price v. Grice, 10 Ida. 443 , 79 Pac. 387 ; Nielson v. Peterson, 37 Ida. 171 , 215 Pac. 836 .

1937Bank, 10 Ida. 175 , 77 Pac. 334 ; Price v. Grice, 10 Ida. 443 , 79 Pac. 387 ; Nielson v. Peterson, 37 Ida. 171 , 215 Pac. 836 .

1937Bank, 10 Ida. 175 , 77 Pac. 334 ; Price v. Grice, 10 Ida. 443 , 79 Pac. 387 ; Nielson v. Peterson, 37 Ida. 171 , 215 Pac. 836 .

1932Again, in a case like this, it would be necessary for the information in some way to charge or disclose the name or identity of the person or persons whom it was intended by affidavit to defraud, or in some way disclose the manner in which the injury, fraud or wrong was intended to be effected or accomplished.” The rule announced would not apply in the case of a check, because on its face it is apparent that the maker, under some authorities (State v. Cleavland, 6 Nev. 181 ), would be injured or prejudiced.

1931Cr. 210, 232 Pac. 955 ; State v. Blair, supra.) In the ease at bar prosecutrix testified to the completed act of sexual intercourse with appellant, in a bedroom at appellant’s home, after which she went to sleep there.

1930In the case of Hefler v. Hunt, 120 Me. 10 , 112 Atl. 675 , the facts were very similar to the ease at bar.

1930In the case of Hefler v. Hunt, 120 Me. 10 , 112 Atl. 675 , the facts were very similar to the ease at bar.

1929In the ease of Black v. American International Corp., 264 Pa. St. 260, 107 Atl. 737, at 739 , the following language is found: “An action for the purchase money of land is in legal effect a petition or bill for specific performance of the contract of purchase, and is governed by the same equitable principles.” Also Portner v. Tanner, 30 Wyo. 85 , 30 A. L.

1929In the ease of Black v. American International Corp., 264 Pa. St. 260, 107 Atl. 737, at 739 , the following language is found: “An action for the purchase money of land is in legal effect a petition or bill for specific performance of the contract of purchase, and is governed by the same equitable principles.” Also Portner v. Tanner, 30 Wyo. 85 , 30 A. L.

1928R. v. Conner, 114 Miss. 63 , 75 So. 57 , a case very similar to the ease at bar, it was held that deposits by an agent for safekeeping to be regularly remitted to the principal were not to be classified as special deposits or entitled to preference as a trust fund.

1928R. v. Conner, 114 Miss. 63 , 75 So. 57 , a case very similar to the ease at bar, it was held that deposits by an agent for safekeeping to be regularly remitted to the principal were not to be classified as special deposits or entitled to preference as a trust fund.

1923(Jacobs v. Union Mercantile Co., 17 Mont. 61 , 42 Pac. 109 ; Berry v. French, 24 Colo. App. 519 , 135 Pac. 985 ; Stephens v. Parvin, 33 Colo. 60 , 78 Pac. 688 ; Lacey v. Bentley, 39 Colo. 449 , 89 Pac. 789 ; Yolo Co. v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 ; Sharpleigh Hardware Co. v. Knippenberg, 133 Cal. 308 , 65 Pac. 621 ; Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co., 15 Ida. 56 , 96 Pac. 193 ; Naylor v. Vermont Loan etc. Co., 6 Ida. 251 , 55 Pac. 297 .) In the ease at bar, however, there is such inconsistency between the two causes of action, and they are hence so uncertain and ambiguous, that it woul

1923(Jacobs v. Union Mercantile Co., 17 Mont. 61 , 42 Pac. 109 ; Berry v. French, 24 Colo. App. 519 , 135 Pac. 985 ; Stephens v. Parvin, 33 Colo. 60 , 78 Pac. 688 ; Lacey v. Bentley, 39 Colo. 449 , 89 Pac. 789 ; Yolo Co. v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 ; Sharpleigh Hardware Co. v. Knippenberg, 133 Cal. 308 , 65 Pac. 621 ; Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co., 15 Ida. 56 , 96 Pac. 193 ; Naylor v. Vermont Loan etc. Co., 6 Ida. 251 , 55 Pac. 297 .) In the ease at bar, however, there is such inconsistency between the two causes of action, and they are hence so uncertain and ambiguous, that it woul

1923(Jacobs v. Union Mercantile Co., 17 Mont. 61 , 42 Pac. 109 ; Berry v. French, 24 Colo. App. 519 , 135 Pac. 985 ; Stephens v. Parvin, 33 Colo. 60 , 78 Pac. 688 ; Lacey v. Bentley, 39 Colo. 449 , 89 Pac. 789 ; Yolo Co. v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 ; Sharpleigh Hardware Co. v. Knippenberg, 133 Cal. 308 , 65 Pac. 621 ; Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co., 15 Ida. 56 , 96 Pac. 193 ; Naylor v. Vermont Loan etc. Co., 6 Ida. 251 , 55 Pac. 297 .) In the ease at bar, however, there is such inconsistency between the two causes of action, and they are hence so uncertain and ambiguous, that it woul

1923(Jacobs v. Union Mercantile Co., 17 Mont. 61 , 42 Pac. 109 ; Berry v. French, 24 Colo. App. 519 , 135 Pac. 985 ; Stephens v. Parvin, 33 Colo. 60 , 78 Pac. 688 ; Lacey v. Bentley, 39 Colo. 449 , 89 Pac. 789 ; Yolo Co. v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 ; Sharpleigh Hardware Co. v. Knippenberg, 133 Cal. 308 , 65 Pac. 621 ; Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co., 15 Ida. 56 , 96 Pac. 193 ; Naylor v. Vermont Loan etc. Co., 6 Ida. 251 , 55 Pac. 297 .) In the ease at bar, however, there is such inconsistency between the two causes of action, and they are hence so uncertain and ambiguous, that it woul

1923The ease at bar falls within the doctrine laid down by this court in Brown v. Brown, 18 Ida. 345 , 110 Pac. 269 , and not under Bayhouse v. Urquides, supra. (Schmidt v. Williams, 34 Ida. 723, at 730 , 203 Pac. 1075 .) Where a person claims by adverse possession beyond the boundary described in his deed, but pays taxes only upon the lands described in his deed, he cannot successfully maintain an action to quiet title by adverse possession, and it is not sufficient for him to show that he paid taxes on other lands, supposing the disputed lands to be included therein; this is particularly true wh

1923The ease at bar falls within the doctrine laid down by this court in Brown v. Brown, 18 Ida. 345 , 110 Pac. 269 , and not under Bayhouse v. Urquides, supra. (Schmidt v. Williams, 34 Ida. 723, at 730 , 203 Pac. 1075 .) Where a person claims by adverse possession beyond the boundary described in his deed, but pays taxes only upon the lands described in his deed, he cannot successfully maintain an action to quiet title by adverse possession, and it is not sufficient for him to show that he paid taxes on other lands, supposing the disputed lands to be included therein; this is particularly true wh

1923The ease at bar falls within the doctrine laid down by this court in Brown v. Brown, 18 Ida. 345 , 110 Pac. 269 , and not under Bayhouse v. Urquides, supra. (Schmidt v. Williams, 34 Ida. 723, at 730 , 203 Pac. 1075 .) Where a person claims by adverse possession beyond the boundary described in his deed, but pays taxes only upon the lands described in his deed, he cannot successfully maintain an action to quiet title by adverse possession, and it is not sufficient for him to show that he paid taxes on other lands, supposing the disputed lands to be included therein; this is particularly true wh

1923The ease at bar falls within the doctrine laid down by this court in Brown v. Brown, 18 Ida. 345 , 110 Pac. 269 , and not under Bayhouse v. Urquides, supra. (Schmidt v. Williams, 34 Ida. 723, at 730 , 203 Pac. 1075 .) Where a person claims by adverse possession beyond the boundary described in his deed, but pays taxes only upon the lands described in his deed, he cannot successfully maintain an action to quiet title by adverse possession, and it is not sufficient for him to show that he paid taxes on other lands, supposing the disputed lands to be included therein; this is particularly true wh

1923Co., 36 Ida. 78 , 210 Pac. 591, 597 .) In the ease at bar appellant brought himself within this rule, but the foregoing instructions of the court exempted the respondent from proving the defense of an extraordinary drouth which was required by the Tapper ease and which respondent had pleaded.

1923Co., 36 Ida. 78 , 210 Pac. 591, 597 .) In the ease at bar appellant brought himself within this rule, but the foregoing instructions of the court exempted the respondent from proving the defense of an extraordinary drouth which was required by the Tapper ease and which respondent had pleaded.

1923(Jacobs v. Union Mercantile Co., 17 Mont. 61 , 42 Pac. 109 ; Berry v. French, 24 Colo. App. 519 , 135 Pac. 985 ; Stephens v. Parvin, 33 Colo. 60 , 78 Pac. 688 ; Lacey v. Bentley, 39 Colo. 449 , 89 Pac. 789 ; Yolo Co. v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 ; Sharpleigh Hardware Co. v. Knippenberg, 133 Cal. 308 , 65 Pac. 621 ; Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co., 15 Ida. 56 , 96 Pac. 193 ; Naylor v. Vermont Loan etc. Co., 6 Ida. 251 , 55 Pac. 297 .) In the ease at bar, however, there is such inconsistency between the two causes of action, and they are hence so uncertain and ambiguous, that it woul

1923(Jacobs v. Union Mercantile Co., 17 Mont. 61 , 42 Pac. 109 ; Berry v. French, 24 Colo. App. 519 , 135 Pac. 985 ; Stephens v. Parvin, 33 Colo. 60 , 78 Pac. 688 ; Lacey v. Bentley, 39 Colo. 449 , 89 Pac. 789 ; Yolo Co. v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 ; Sharpleigh Hardware Co. v. Knippenberg, 133 Cal. 308 , 65 Pac. 621 ; Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co., 15 Ida. 56 , 96 Pac. 193 ; Naylor v. Vermont Loan etc. Co., 6 Ida. 251 , 55 Pac. 297 .) In the ease at bar, however, there is such inconsistency between the two causes of action, and they are hence so uncertain and ambiguous, that it woul

1923(Jacobs v. Union Mercantile Co., 17 Mont. 61 , 42 Pac. 109 ; Berry v. French, 24 Colo. App. 519 , 135 Pac. 985 ; Stephens v. Parvin, 33 Colo. 60 , 78 Pac. 688 ; Lacey v. Bentley, 39 Colo. 449 , 89 Pac. 789 ; Yolo Co. v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 ; Sharpleigh Hardware Co. v. Knippenberg, 133 Cal. 308 , 65 Pac. 621 ; Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co., 15 Ida. 56 , 96 Pac. 193 ; Naylor v. Vermont Loan etc. Co., 6 Ida. 251 , 55 Pac. 297 .) In the ease at bar, however, there is such inconsistency between the two causes of action, and they are hence so uncertain and ambiguous, that it woul

1923(Jacobs v. Union Mercantile Co., 17 Mont. 61 , 42 Pac. 109 ; Berry v. French, 24 Colo. App. 519 , 135 Pac. 985 ; Stephens v. Parvin, 33 Colo. 60 , 78 Pac. 688 ; Lacey v. Bentley, 39 Colo. 449 , 89 Pac. 789 ; Yolo Co. v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 ; Sharpleigh Hardware Co. v. Knippenberg, 133 Cal. 308 , 65 Pac. 621 ; Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co., 15 Ida. 56 , 96 Pac. 193 ; Naylor v. Vermont Loan etc. Co., 6 Ida. 251 , 55 Pac. 297 .) In the ease at bar, however, there is such inconsistency between the two causes of action, and they are hence so uncertain and ambiguous, that it woul

1923(Jacobs v. Union Mercantile Co., 17 Mont. 61 , 42 Pac. 109 ; Berry v. French, 24 Colo. App. 519 , 135 Pac. 985 ; Stephens v. Parvin, 33 Colo. 60 , 78 Pac. 688 ; Lacey v. Bentley, 39 Colo. 449 , 89 Pac. 789 ; Yolo Co. v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 ; Sharpleigh Hardware Co. v. Knippenberg, 133 Cal. 308 , 65 Pac. 621 ; Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co., 15 Ida. 56 , 96 Pac. 193 ; Naylor v. Vermont Loan etc. Co., 6 Ida. 251 , 55 Pac. 297 .) In the ease at bar, however, there is such inconsistency between the two causes of action, and they are hence so uncertain and ambiguous, that it woul