79 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1868–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gaffney v. Stategreen1 sentence2014"When an appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, we first determine whether evidence adduced at the trial is legally sufficient to support the verdict." Clewis v. State, 992 S.W.2d 126 , 135(Tex. -4- Crim.App. 1996); Gaffney v. State, 937 S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tx.App.-Texarkana 1996, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
Aguirre v. Stategreen1 sentence1999We then stated, “[njothing held in Easter militates against our application of the principles enunciated in Garrett to the ease at bar.” 4 Id. at 322. | 1 | 1 |
Griffin v. Stategreen1 sentence1999Griffin v. State, 866 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1993, no writ) A pen packet *51 is inadmissible unless it is joined with independent testimony that the person convicted of the offense charged in the pen packet is the person before the court in the ease at bar. | 1 | 1 |
Hudson v. Wakefieldgreen2 sentences1998However, if the law of the ease doctrine is applied, “questions of law decided on appeal to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages.” Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.1986). 1998But the doctrine “does not necessarily apply when either the issues or the facts presented at successive appeals are not substantially the same as those involved on the first trial.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Peacock v. Humblegreen1 sentence1998See Peacock v. Humble, 933 S.W.2d 341, 342-43 (Tex.App. — Austin 1996, orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
City of Murphy v. City of Parkergreen1 sentence1998“Of course, no statute of limitations directly addresses the merits of a claim to which it is interposed as a bar.” City of Murphy v. City of Parker, 932 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Choate v. Murphygreen1 sentence1998Choate v. Murphy, 125 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex.Civ.App.— Beaumont 1939, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Morenogreen1 sentence1998See also State v. Moreno, 807 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). *593 In the ease at bar the relief sought was dismissal of the complaints charging offenses in municipal court. | 1 | 1 |
Dunn v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See 721 S.W.2d at 341 . | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See Mitchell v. State, 931 S.W.2d 950 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Johnston v. Vilardigreen1 sentence1997See Johnston, 817 S.W.2d at 797 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cary Browngreen1 sentence1996The ease at bar is not unlike United States v. Brown, 9 F.3d 907, 911-12 (11th Cir.1993), where the court held that the evidence was not inadmissible under 803 because the property “[wa]s not the type of evidence contemplated by the exclusion of Rule 803(8)(B).” We agree with the State that this rationale should be applied in the case at bar. | 1 | 1 |
Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co.green1 sentence1996It is clear from the record that Link did not participate in “ ‘the decision-making event’ that result[ed] in [the] judgment adjudicating [his] rights.” Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co., 925 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex.1996). | 1 | 1 |
| State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Paynegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wunderlich Contracting Company v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| LaPoint v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Almanza v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Swilley v. McCaingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Horne v. Moodygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Haggerton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rubin v. Adamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mhoon v. Caingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zajaczkowski v. Zajaczkowska
green
1 sentence2010In Zajaczkowski, the United States District Court of Maryland determined that, given the premium on the expeditious resolution of Hague Convention controversies, it would treat Hague Convention petitions like federal applications for writs of habeas corpus and would “hear evidence and argument in summary fashion and decide the ease at the hearing, unless, for good cause shown, it finds reason for delay.” 7 Zajac-zkowski, 932 F.Supp. at 132 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Champenois v. State
green
1 sentence2010Champenois, 874 S.W.2d at 258 ; Collins, 2007 WL 3287879 , at *4. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Huckabay v. Irving Hospital Authority
green
1 sentence2007Auth., 879 S.W.2d 64 , 66 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, writ dism’d by agr.). 3 We conclude the law of the ease doctrine is not applicable here and, thus, the First Court of Appeals’s decision in Four Brothers I does not foreclose Four Brothers’ and Columbia Star’s claims for damages against Tesoro for breach of the subleases. 4 B. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Beck v. State
green
1 sentence1999Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Young
green
2 sentences1998Article 44.01(a)(1) plainly allows a State’s appeal if the order of a court in a criminal case “dismisses an indictment, information or complaint, or any portion of an indictment, information or com-plaint_” Art. 44.01 must be “construed to achieve its purpose.” Young, 810 S.W.2d at 224 . “[T]he intent of the Legislature in enacting such Article was to allow for a state appeal from any trial court order terminating the criminal proceedings against a defendant.” Ibid. 1998Article 44.01(a)(1) plainly allows a State’s appeal if the order of a court in a criminal case “dismisses an indictment, information or complaint, or any portion of an indictment, information or com-plaint_” Art. 44.01 must be “construed to achieve its purpose.” Young, 810 S.W.2d at 224 . “[T]he intent of the Legislature in enacting such Article was to allow for a state appeal from any trial court order terminating the criminal proceedings against a defendant.” Ibid. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Ward v. State
green
1 sentence1997Specifically, appellant asserts that because assessment of the tax is a punishment as contemplated by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, any subsequent prosecution for the same offense is barred. 1 In Ward v. State, 870 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd), vacated, 513 U.S. 1011 , 115 S.Ct. 567 , 130 L.Ed.2d 485 (1994), the First Court of Appeals addressed the identical issue presented in the ease at bar. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz
green
1 sentence1997The majority’s reliance upon Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.1997), is misplaced. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
green
2 sentences1997In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 , 103 S.Ct. 1660 , 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), for example, Lyons complained that after being stopped for a traffic or vehicle code violation and offering no resistance or provocation, Los Angeles police officers seized him and applied a “choke-hold,” rendering him unconscious and damaging his larynx. 1997In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 , 103 S.Ct. 1660 , 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), for example, Lyons complained that after being stopped for a traffic or vehicle code violation and offering no resistance or provocation, Los Angeles police officers seized him and applied a “choke-hold,” rendering him unconscious and damaging his larynx. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Beddoe v. United States
green
1 sentence1997Specifically, appellant asserts that because assessment of the tax is a punishment as contemplated by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, any subsequent prosecution for the same offense is barred. 1 In Ward v. State, 870 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd), vacated, 513 U.S. 1011 , 115 S.Ct. 567 , 130 L.Ed.2d 485 (1994), the First Court of Appeals addressed the identical issue presented in the ease at bar. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Ristow v. South Carolina Ports Authority
red
2 sentences1997Specifically, appellant asserts that because assessment of the tax is a punishment as contemplated by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, any subsequent prosecution for the same offense is barred. 1 In Ward v. State, 870 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd), vacated, 513 U.S. 1011 , 115 S.Ct. 567 , 130 L.Ed.2d 485 (1994), the First Court of Appeals addressed the identical issue presented in the ease at bar. 1997Specifically, appellant asserts that because assessment of the tax is a punishment as contemplated by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, any subsequent prosecution for the same offense is barred. 1 In Ward v. State, 870 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd), vacated, 513 U.S. 1011 , 115 S.Ct. 567 , 130 L.Ed.2d 485 (1994), the First Court of Appeals addressed the identical issue presented in the ease at bar. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Employers Casualty Co. v. Block
green
1 sentence1996The Court in Gandy held a judgment that does not result from a fully adversarial trial is not admissible in an action by a plaintiff as a defendant insured’s assignee, disapproving its prior holding in Block, 744 S.W.2d at 943 , i.e., that the insurer was barred from collaterally attacking the underlying judgment by litigating the reasonableness of the damages. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy
green
1 sentence1996NO EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES Although the negligence action in the instant case was brought by Robert, rather than by Maldonado as Robert’s assignee, the damage award in the underlying judgment should not be admissible as evidence in the instant ease under the rule announced in Gandy. 925 S.W.2d at 711 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996Id. at 326 note 4. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bell v. State
green
1 sentence1996Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Preslar
green
1 sentence1995Id. at 509 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1995State v. Johnson, 821 S.W.2d 609 , 612 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Villalon v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Kelly v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Rodriguez v. State
green
1 sentence1994In so holding, we acknowledge the holdings of the court of criminal appeals in Rodriguez, 819 S.W.2d at 873 , and Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), but find them factually distinguishable from the ease at bar. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Crosby v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Guynn v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| White Ex Rel. White v. Corpus Christi Little Misses Kickball Ass'n green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Texas Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Reese v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Hirsch v. Travelers Insurance Company green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Deep Oil Development Co. v. Cox green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Fox v. Kroeger green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Taylor v. Merrill green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Lanier v. Foust and Douglass green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Galvin v. State neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Rojas v. State green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| State v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| South Plains Coaches, Inc. v. Behringer neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Hayes v. Taylor green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Industrial Cotton Oil Co. v. Lial neutral | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Davis v. Sears green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Legate v. Legate green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| North v. Atlas Brick Co. neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.