ease bar in Arkansas

1970By not awarding damages to Martha Baldridge, it indicated in the only way it could that it found against her.” The appellee relies heavily on our holding in Pigage v. Chism, 237 Ark. 873 , 377 S. W. 2d 32 , and argues that in rendering an inconsistent verdict in the ease at bar, the error lay in awarding damage to the secondary plaintiff, Mr. Baldridge, and not in the denial of damages to the primary plaintiff, Martha; that the appellee defendant is the only one who can be heard to complain of the error in awarding the damages to Mr. Baldridge individually, and that no such complaint has been

1970By not awarding damages to Martha Baldridge, it indicated in the only way it could that it found against her.” The appellee relies heavily on our holding in Pigage v. Chism, 237 Ark. 873 , 377 S. W. 2d 32 , and argues that in rendering an inconsistent verdict in the ease at bar, the error lay in awarding damage to the secondary plaintiff, Mr. Baldridge, and not in the denial of damages to the primary plaintiff, Martha; that the appellee defendant is the only one who can be heard to complain of the error in awarding the damages to Mr. Baldridge individually, and that no such complaint has been

1968(It should be here noted that a municipal court has the same jurisdiction authority as a justice court.) We there held that the statute authorizing penalty and attorney’s fees “becomes a part of the contract of insurance.” Appellant cites Baltimore & Ohio Telegraph Co. v. Lovejoy, 48 Ark. 301 , 38 S. W. 183 (1886), contending that the municipal court could not exercise jurisdiction on a penalty.

1968The same principle was applied in Federal Land Bank v. Floyd, 187 Ark. 616 , 61 S. W. 2d 449 (1933), which I cite because there as here the highest bidder was the judgment creditor, who merely credited his bid upon the judgment, leaving a deficiency.

1968The same principle was applied in Federal Land Bank v. Floyd, 187 Ark. 616 , 61 S. W. 2d 449 (1933), which I cite because there as here the highest bidder was the judgment creditor, who merely credited his bid upon the judgment, leaving a deficiency.

1968(It should be here noted that a municipal court has the same jurisdiction authority as a justice court.) We there held that the statute authorizing penalty and attorney’s fees “becomes a part of the contract of insurance.” Appellant cites Baltimore & Ohio Telegraph Co. v. Lovejoy, 48 Ark. 301 , 38 S. W. 183 (1886), contending that the municipal court could not exercise jurisdiction on a penalty.

1965Co., 73 Ark. 117 , 83 S. W. 317 , wherein we said: “. . . the clause in the application and the receipt given by the solicitor, which are to be read together, stipulate expressly that the insurance shall become effective only when the ‘ application shall be approved and the policy duly signed by the secretary at the head office of the company and issued. ’ It constituted no agreement at all for preliminary or temporary insurance.” The holding in the Cooksey case was reaffirmed in National Life & Accident Ins.

1965Co., 73 Ark. 117 , 83 S. W. 317 , wherein we said: “. . . the clause in the application and the receipt given by the solicitor, which are to be read together, stipulate expressly that the insurance shall become effective only when the ‘ application shall be approved and the policy duly signed by the secretary at the head office of the company and issued. ’ It constituted no agreement at all for preliminary or temporary insurance.” The holding in the Cooksey case was reaffirmed in National Life & Accident Ins.

1963Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768 , 286 S. W. 939 ; Mathis v. State, 191 Ark. 1053 , 89 S. W. 2d 599 ; Morrison v. State, 191 Ark. 720 , 87 S. W. 2d 50 ; Kennedy v. Quinn, 166 Ark. 509 , 266 S. W. 462 .

1963Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768 , 286 S. W. 939 ; Mathis v. State, 191 Ark. 1053 , 89 S. W. 2d 599 ; Morrison v. State, 191 Ark. 720 , 87 S. W. 2d 50 ; Kennedy v. Quinn, 166 Ark. 509 , 266 S. W. 462 .

1963The situation is rather like that described in Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686 , 175 S. W. 2d 361 : ‘ ‘ The evidence in the ease at bar is that both local groups do regard the grounds upon which they have divided as very vital and substantial.

1963The situation is rather like that described in Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686 , 175 S. W. 2d 361 : ‘ ‘ The evidence in the ease at bar is that both local groups do regard the grounds upon which they have divided as very vital and substantial.

1963Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768 , 286 S. W. 939 ; Mathis v. State, 191 Ark. 1053 , 89 S. W. 2d 599 ; Morrison v. State, 191 Ark. 720 , 87 S. W. 2d 50 ; Kennedy v. Quinn, 166 Ark. 509 , 266 S. W. 462 .

1963Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768 , 286 S. W. 939 ; Mathis v. State, 191 Ark. 1053 , 89 S. W. 2d 599 ; Morrison v. State, 191 Ark. 720 , 87 S. W. 2d 50 ; Kennedy v. Quinn, 166 Ark. 509 , 266 S. W. 462 .

1963Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768 , 286 S. W. 939 ; Mathis v. State, 191 Ark. 1053 , 89 S. W. 2d 599 ; Morrison v. State, 191 Ark. 720 , 87 S. W. 2d 50 ; Kennedy v. Quinn, 166 Ark. 509 , 266 S. W. 462 .

1963Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768 , 286 S. W. 939 ; Mathis v. State, 191 Ark. 1053 , 89 S. W. 2d 599 ; Morrison v. State, 191 Ark. 720 , 87 S. W. 2d 50 ; Kennedy v. Quinn, 166 Ark. 509 , 266 S. W. 462 .

1963Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768 , 286 S. W. 939 ; Mathis v. State, 191 Ark. 1053 , 89 S. W. 2d 599 ; Morrison v. State, 191 Ark. 720 , 87 S. W. 2d 50 ; Kennedy v. Quinn, 166 Ark. 509 , 266 S. W. 462 .

1963Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768 , 286 S. W. 939 ; Mathis v. State, 191 Ark. 1053 , 89 S. W. 2d 599 ; Morrison v. State, 191 Ark. 720 , 87 S. W. 2d 50 ; Kennedy v. Quinn, 166 Ark. 509 , 266 S. W. 462 .

1962The ease at bar is ruled by our eases of Schichtl v. Bowser, 175 Ark. 1141 , 1 S. W. 2d 816 , and Pate v. McWilliams, 193 Ark. 620 , 101 S. W. 2d 794 .

1962The ease at bar is ruled by our eases of Schichtl v. Bowser, 175 Ark. 1141 , 1 S. W. 2d 816 , and Pate v. McWilliams, 193 Ark. 620 , 101 S. W. 2d 794 .

1962The ease at bar is ruled by our eases of Schichtl v. Bowser, 175 Ark. 1141 , 1 S. W. 2d 816 , and Pate v. McWilliams, 193 Ark. 620 , 101 S. W. 2d 794 .

1962The ease at bar is ruled by our eases of Schichtl v. Bowser, 175 Ark. 1141 , 1 S. W. 2d 816 , and Pate v. McWilliams, 193 Ark. 620 , 101 S. W. 2d 794 .

1959Actually, there is no real distinction between the ease at bar and Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241 , 297 S. W. 2d 940 , although in that case it is pointed out that it deals only with the situation where a motion for judgment was filed more than five years after the child became of age.

1959Actually, there is no real distinction between the ease at bar and Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241 , 297 S. W. 2d 940 , although in that case it is pointed out that it deals only with the situation where a motion for judgment was filed more than five years after the child became of age.

1959Davis v. Herrington, 53 Ark. 5 , 13 S. W. 215 , is not directly in point because there the child was illegitimate, but it is analogous to the ease at bar.

1959Davis v. Herrington, 53 Ark. 5 , 13 S. W. 215 , is not directly in point because there the child was illegitimate, but it is analogous to the ease at bar.

1957In Morris v. Boyd, 110 Ark. 468 , 162 S. W. 69 , this Court had before it a case in which the Chancery Court had rendered a decree changing the terms of a trust; and what we said in that case is enlightening and guiding in the ease at bar.

1957In Morris v. Boyd, 110 Ark. 468 , 162 S. W. 69 , this Court had before it a case in which the Chancery Court had rendered a decree changing the terms of a trust; and what we said in that case is enlightening and guiding in the ease at bar.

1950For some of our cases in which “physical facts” were invoked, see: Alldread v. Mills, 211 Ark. 99 , 199 S. W. 2d 571 , and Newsom v. Glaze, 215 Ark. 40 , 219 S. W. 2d 232 , and cases there listed.

1950For some of our cases in which “physical facts” were invoked, see: Alldread v. Mills, 211 Ark. 99 , 199 S. W. 2d 571 , and Newsom v. Glaze, 215 Ark. 40 , 219 S. W. 2d 232 , and cases there listed.

1950The majority opinion in the ease at bar cites and quotes from Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Otis & Company, 182 Ark. 242 , 31 S. W. 2d 427 , as authority for the majority holding that § 2 of Act 191 of 1949 does not violate Art.

1950The majority opinion in the ease at bar cites and quotes from Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Otis & Company, 182 Ark. 242 , 31 S. W. 2d 427 , as authority for the majority holding that § 2 of Act 191 of 1949 does not violate Art.

1950For some of our cases in which “physical facts” were invoked, see: Alldread v. Mills, 211 Ark. 99 , 199 S. W. 2d 571 , and Newsom v. Glaze, 215 Ark. 40 , 219 S. W. 2d 232 , and cases there listed.

1950For some of our cases in which “physical facts” were invoked, see: Alldread v. Mills, 211 Ark. 99 , 199 S. W. 2d 571 , and Newsom v. Glaze, 215 Ark. 40 , 219 S. W. 2d 232 , and cases there listed.

1949Stats, oí 1947, and also sections 2380 to 2385 (inclusive) of Pope’s Digest come to us from Chapter 37, secs. 1 to 6 (inclusive) of the Revised Statutes of 1837, and provide how counties may have boundary lines surveyed; but these provisions have not prevented the adjudication of county boundaries in private litigation, such as is the ease at bar. 8 See p. 98 of Acts of the General Assembly of the Territory of Arkansas of 1838. 9 See page 16 of the Acts of the Arkansas Territory of 1835. 10 See p. 81 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas of 1838. 11 See page 81 of the Ac

1949Stats, oí 1947, and also sections 2380 to 2385 (inclusive) of Pope’s Digest come to us from Chapter 37, secs. 1 to 6 (inclusive) of the Revised Statutes of 1837, and provide how counties may have boundary lines surveyed; but these provisions have not prevented the adjudication of county boundaries in private litigation, such as is the ease at bar. 8 See p. 98 of Acts of the General Assembly of the Territory of Arkansas of 1838. 9 See page 16 of the Acts of the Arkansas Territory of 1835. 10 See p. 81 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas of 1838. 11 See page 81 of the Ac

1949Stats, oí 1947, and also sections 2380 to 2385 (inclusive) of Pope’s Digest come to us from Chapter 37, secs. 1 to 6 (inclusive) of the Revised Statutes of 1837, and provide how counties may have boundary lines surveyed; but these provisions have not prevented the adjudication of county boundaries in private litigation, such as is the ease at bar. 8 See p. 98 of Acts of the General Assembly of the Territory of Arkansas of 1838. 9 See page 16 of the Acts of the Arkansas Territory of 1835. 10 See p. 81 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas of 1838. 11 See page 81 of the Ac

1949Stats, oí 1947, and also sections 2380 to 2385 (inclusive) of Pope’s Digest come to us from Chapter 37, secs. 1 to 6 (inclusive) of the Revised Statutes of 1837, and provide how counties may have boundary lines surveyed; but these provisions have not prevented the adjudication of county boundaries in private litigation, such as is the ease at bar. 8 See p. 98 of Acts of the General Assembly of the Territory of Arkansas of 1838. 9 See page 16 of the Acts of the Arkansas Territory of 1835. 10 See p. 81 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas of 1838. 11 See page 81 of the Ac

1949Stats, oí 1947, and also sections 2380 to 2385 (inclusive) of Pope’s Digest come to us from Chapter 37, secs. 1 to 6 (inclusive) of the Revised Statutes of 1837, and provide how counties may have boundary lines surveyed; but these provisions have not prevented the adjudication of county boundaries in private litigation, such as is the ease at bar. 8 See p. 98 of Acts of the General Assembly of the Territory of Arkansas of 1838. 9 See page 16 of the Acts of the Arkansas Territory of 1835. 10 See p. 81 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas of 1838. 11 See page 81 of the Ac

1949Stats, oí 1947, and also sections 2380 to 2385 (inclusive) of Pope’s Digest come to us from Chapter 37, secs. 1 to 6 (inclusive) of the Revised Statutes of 1837, and provide how counties may have boundary lines surveyed; but these provisions have not prevented the adjudication of county boundaries in private litigation, such as is the ease at bar. 8 See p. 98 of Acts of the General Assembly of the Territory of Arkansas of 1838. 9 See page 16 of the Acts of the Arkansas Territory of 1835. 10 See p. 81 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas of 1838. 11 See page 81 of the Ac

1946Therefore cases like Carpenter v. Gibson, 104 Ark. 32 , 148 S. W. 508 , have no similarity to the facts in the ease at bar.

1946Therefore cases like Carpenter v. Gibson, 104 Ark. 32 , 148 S. W. 508 , have no similarity to the facts in the ease at bar.

1941In the case of O’Kane v. First National Bank of Paris, 189 Ark. 396 , 72 S. W. 2d 537 , this court again said: “The notary or other officer before whom an acknowledgment is taken performs a very important duty when he takes and certifies an acknowledgment of a deed or any instrument affecting the title to real estate.

1941In the case of O’Kane v. First National Bank of Paris, 189 Ark. 396 , 72 S. W. 2d 537 , this court again said: “The notary or other officer before whom an acknowledgment is taken performs a very important duty when he takes and certifies an acknowledgment of a deed or any instrument affecting the title to real estate.

1939In The Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. Briggs, 193 Ark. 311 , 99 S. W. 2d 579 , (quoting part of a syllabus), it was said: “Since the train was at the station not exceeding three or four minutes, the company was not required to keep a watchman at the crossing or to display a light signal or' give other warning of the standing train. ” Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. Sullivan, 193 Ark. 491 , 101 S. W. 2d 175 , is decisive of the ease at bar.

1939In The Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. Briggs, 193 Ark. 311 , 99 S. W. 2d 579 , (quoting part of a syllabus), it was said: “Since the train was at the station not exceeding three or four minutes, the company was not required to keep a watchman at the crossing or to display a light signal or' give other warning of the standing train. ” Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. Sullivan, 193 Ark. 491 , 101 S. W. 2d 175 , is decisive of the ease at bar.

1939In The Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. Briggs, 193 Ark. 311 , 99 S. W. 2d 579 , (quoting part of a syllabus), it was said: “Since the train was at the station not exceeding three or four minutes, the company was not required to keep a watchman at the crossing or to display a light signal or' give other warning of the standing train. ” Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. Sullivan, 193 Ark. 491 , 101 S. W. 2d 175 , is decisive of the ease at bar.

1939In The Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. Briggs, 193 Ark. 311 , 99 S. W. 2d 579 , (quoting part of a syllabus), it was said: “Since the train was at the station not exceeding three or four minutes, the company was not required to keep a watchman at the crossing or to display a light signal or' give other warning of the standing train. ” Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. Sullivan, 193 Ark. 491 , 101 S. W. 2d 175 , is decisive of the ease at bar.

1935Newton v. Askew, 53 Ark. 476 , 14 S. W. 670 ; Cole v. Schoonover, supra. The order challenged recites the preliminary order of the court made on March 3,-1930, calling in the county warrants, the service of notice in the manner required by law, and the warrants which were presented and filed for classification, cancellation and reissue.

1935Newton v. Askew, 53 Ark. 476 , 14 S. W. 670 ; Cole v. Schoonover, supra. The order challenged recites the preliminary order of the court made on March 3,-1930, calling in the county warrants, the service of notice in the manner required by law, and the warrants which were presented and filed for classification, cancellation and reissue.

1934“It is also a well-established rule that, in cases appealed from an inferior court to a superior court having appellate jurisdiction only, the appellate court acquires such jurisdiction as the inferior court had. * * * In cases of this kind the weight of authority holds that where parties on appeal to a court having original jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action have, without objection, as in the ease at bar, submitted their controversy to the court for trial and adjudication, and the cause proceeds to trial and final judgment, they will be held to have waived their right to object

1934“It is also a well-established rule that, in cases appealed from an inferior court to a superior court having appellate jurisdiction only, the appellate court acquires such jurisdiction as the inferior court had. * * * In cases of this kind the weight of authority holds that where parties on appeal to a court having original jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action have, without objection, as in the ease at bar, submitted their controversy to the court for trial and adjudication, and the cause proceeds to trial and final judgment, they will be held to have waived their right to object

1922We decided in Cook v. Ziff Colored Masonic Lodge, supra, that a failure to date the certificates did not render it void, and that in the absence of proof the presumption would be indulged that the clerk had properly performed his duty by placing the certificate of record before the date of sale; but in the present ease no presumption can be indulged, 'because the certificate affords affirmative evidence on its face that it was not placed of record until after the sale.

1922In addition to the date of the certificate, its language affords affirmative evidence that it was placed of record after the date of the sale, for it recites that the lands described in the notice “were sold according to said notices.” Earl v. Harris, 121 Ark. 621 .