ease bar in Montana

1969The principles involved are well stated by the California decision of Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420 , 97 P. 875 (1908) where it was said: “Appellant argues that the evidence establishes without conflict that if it be responsible at all, it is responsible solely because of the relationship of principal and agent found to exist between itself and the codefendant Rosenthal; that not one word of evidence tends to establish any direct personal participation, personal knowledge, or personal culpability upon its part, or that its employe was in any way carrying out its express instructions in th

1969The principles involved are well stated by the California decision of Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420 , 97 P. 875 (1908) where it was said: “Appellant argues that the evidence establishes without conflict that if it be responsible at all, it is responsible solely because of the relationship of principal and agent found to exist between itself and the codefendant Rosenthal; that not one word of evidence tends to establish any direct personal participation, personal knowledge, or personal culpability upon its part, or that its employe was in any way carrying out its express instructions in th

1963In Texas in State v. Upshur Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 156 Tex. 633 , 298 S.W.2d 805, 808 , the Supreme Court followed the Arkansas case insofar as it held that residents of an annexed area are not qualified to be members of a Cooperative.

1963In Texas in State v. Upshur Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 156 Tex. 633 , 298 S.W.2d 805, 808 , the Supreme Court followed the Arkansas case insofar as it held that residents of an annexed area are not qualified to be members of a Cooperative.

1963In Chicago Housing Authority v. Lamar, 21 Ill.2d 362 , 172 N.E.2d 790, 792 , the court observed: “No Illinois cases have been cited which involve facts similar to those alleged in the defendant’s petition.

1963In Chicago Housing Authority v. Lamar, 21 Ill.2d 362 , 172 N.E.2d 790, 792 , the court observed: “No Illinois cases have been cited which involve facts similar to those alleged in the defendant’s petition.

1962In State v. Board, 135 Mont. 139 , 337 P.2d 924 (1959), in discussing the requisites for a good Information, this court stated the test as follows: “would a person of common undertanding know what is intended to be charged?” Applying this test to the Information in the ease at bar, we think the conclusion is inescapable that a robbery victim is put in the fear required by section 94-4302 when he is forced to look down the barrel of a 45-caliber automatic pistol held by a stranger, whose purpose is to rob his victim.

1962In State v. Board, 135 Mont. 139 , 337 P.2d 924 (1959), in discussing the requisites for a good Information, this court stated the test as follows: “would a person of common undertanding know what is intended to be charged?” Applying this test to the Information in the ease at bar, we think the conclusion is inescapable that a robbery victim is put in the fear required by section 94-4302 when he is forced to look down the barrel of a 45-caliber automatic pistol held by a stranger, whose purpose is to rob his victim.

1957Bonners Ferry Lumber Co., Ltd. v. District Court, 74 Mont. 338 , at page 343, 240 Pac. 388, 390 , wherein the court held that “the court’s first duty was to pass upon the motion for a change of venue.

1957Bonners Ferry Lumber Co., Ltd. v. District Court, 74 Mont. 338 , at page 343, 240 Pac. 388, 390 , wherein the court held that “the court’s first duty was to pass upon the motion for a change of venue.

1955This supposition is clearly justified in the ease at bar.” Compare: State v. Sweet, Ohio App., 36 N. E. (2d) 13, 15, 16; Grady v. Commonwealth, 237 Ky. 156 , 35 S. W. (2d) 12, 13 ; People v. Cummings, 293 N. Y. 841 , 59 N. E. (2d) 437.

1955This supposition is clearly justified in the ease at bar.” Compare: State v. Sweet, Ohio App., 36 N. E. (2d) 13, 15, 16; Grady v. Commonwealth, 237 Ky. 156 , 35 S. W. (2d) 12, 13 ; People v. Cummings, 293 N. Y. 841 , 59 N. E. (2d) 437.

1955This supposition is clearly justified in the ease at bar.” Compare: State v. Sweet, Ohio App., 36 N. E. (2d) 13, 15, 16; Grady v. Commonwealth, 237 Ky. 156 , 35 S. W. (2d) 12, 13 ; People v. Cummings, 293 N. Y. 841 , 59 N. E. (2d) 437.

1955In the case of Johnson v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. 496, 164 S. W. (2d) 702, 703 , the court said: “It is sufficient to say that, to show the constituent elements of the offense charged, that is, *27 ■the theft of the cattle and the subsequent receipt thereof by •the appellant, with knowledge that they had been so acquired, the State depended primarily, upon the testimony of B.

1952Waite v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 56 Cal. App. (2d) 191, 132 Pac. (2d) 311 ; Pezzoni v. City and County of San Francisco, 101 Cal. App. (2d) 123, 225 Pac. (2d) 14 , and cases there cited; and Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 265 , 7 Pac. (2d) 228 .

1952Waite v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 56 Cal. App. (2d) 191, 132 Pac. (2d) 311 ; Pezzoni v. City and County of San Francisco, 101 Cal. App. (2d) 123, 225 Pac. (2d) 14 , and cases there cited; and Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 265 , 7 Pac. (2d) 228 .

1952Waite v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 56 Cal. App. (2d) 191, 132 Pac. (2d) 311 ; Pezzoni v. City and County of San Francisco, 101 Cal. App. (2d) 123, 225 Pac. (2d) 14 , and cases there cited; and Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 265 , 7 Pac. (2d) 228 .

1952Waite v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 56 Cal. App. (2d) 191, 132 Pac. (2d) 311 ; Pezzoni v. City and County of San Francisco, 101 Cal. App. (2d) 123, 225 Pac. (2d) 14 , and cases there cited; and Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 265 , 7 Pac. (2d) 228 .

1950In re Davis’ Estate, 35 Mont. 273, 281 , 88 Pac. 957 ; Lamont v. Vinger, supra. In the ease at bar it is admitted that the petition for the sale of the real property of the estate and the order to show cause issued as a result of the filing of that petition complied with the requirements of the statute. ‘ ‘ Proof of compliance with the order of court as to the publication of notice to show cause * * * conferred jurisdiction on all parties interested in the estate, and its subsequent action upon the petition was a movement within its jurisdiction, to be reversed only for some error of law which

1950In re Davis’ Estate, 35 Mont. 273, 281 , 88 Pac. 957 ; Lamont v. Vinger, supra. In the ease at bar it is admitted that the petition for the sale of the real property of the estate and the order to show cause issued as a result of the filing of that petition complied with the requirements of the statute. ‘ ‘ Proof of compliance with the order of court as to the publication of notice to show cause * * * conferred jurisdiction on all parties interested in the estate, and its subsequent action upon the petition was a movement within its jurisdiction, to be reversed only for some error of law which

1950In re Davis’ Estate, 35 Mont. 273, 281 , 88 Pac. 957 ; Lamont v. Vinger, supra. In the ease at bar it is admitted that the petition for the sale of the real property of the estate and the order to show cause issued as a result of the filing of that petition complied with the requirements of the statute. ‘ ‘ Proof of compliance with the order of court as to the publication of notice to show cause * * * conferred jurisdiction on all parties interested in the estate, and its subsequent action upon the petition was a movement within its jurisdiction, to be reversed only for some error of law which

1950In re Davis’ Estate, 35 Mont. 273, 281 , 88 Pac. 957 ; Lamont v. Vinger, supra. In the ease at bar it is admitted that the petition for the sale of the real property of the estate and the order to show cause issued as a result of the filing of that petition complied with the requirements of the statute. ‘ ‘ Proof of compliance with the order of court as to the publication of notice to show cause * * * conferred jurisdiction on all parties interested in the estate, and its subsequent action upon the petition was a movement within its jurisdiction, to be reversed only for some error of law which

1949In Connolly v. Harrel, 102 Mont. 295 , 57 Pac. (2d) 781 , the court distinguished the Great Falls Water Works Co., case, supra, and held that where the defendants went upon the land of Jensen with his consent and posted a notice of appropriation and directed their water through his ditch, they were not trespassers and their use of such water was a valid appropriation, stating that the prior Montana decisions are limited to cases of trespass.

1949In Connolly v. Harrel, 102 Mont. 295 , 57 Pac. (2d) 781 , the court distinguished the Great Falls Water Works Co., case, supra, and held that where the defendants went upon the land of Jensen with his consent and posted a notice of appropriation and directed their water through his ditch, they were not trespassers and their use of such water was a valid appropriation, stating that the prior Montana decisions are limited to cases of trespass.

1949Appellants place much reliance on the old case of Boman v. Boman, 9 Cir., 49 F. 329, 330 , decided in 1892, which construes sections 1325 and 1326 of the Code of Washington, being statutes of the “Missouri type” and not of the “Massachusetts type” to which latter class the Montana and California statutes belong.

1947Under our Constitution this cannot be done, “in any manner or for any purpose” to an amount in the aggregate “exceeding three per centum (3) of the value of the taxable property therein.” In Butler v. Andrus, 35 Mont. 575 , 90 Pac. 785, 786 , in construing this section, Chief Justice Brantly, speaking for the court, said: ‘ ‘ The constitutional limitation in question is clear and unambiguius, and means just what it says, to wit, that no indebtedness may be contracted in any manner or amount, for any purpose, in excess of the prescribed limit.” In the note to the case of the Board of Education

1947Under our Constitution this cannot be done, “in any manner or for any purpose” to an amount in the aggregate “exceeding three per centum (3) of the value of the taxable property therein.” In Butler v. Andrus, 35 Mont. 575 , 90 Pac. 785, 786 , in construing this section, Chief Justice Brantly, speaking for the court, said: ‘ ‘ The constitutional limitation in question is clear and unambiguius, and means just what it says, to wit, that no indebtedness may be contracted in any manner or amount, for any purpose, in excess of the prescribed limit.” In the note to the case of the Board of Education

1944The precise question involved in the ease at bar was before the Supreme Court of the state of Washington in City of Spokane v. Latham, 181 Wash. 161 , 42 Pac. (2d) 427, 428 .

1944The precise question involved in the ease at bar was before the Supreme Court of the state of Washington in City of Spokane v. Latham, 181 Wash. 161 , 42 Pac. (2d) 427, 428 .

1941Jur., sec. 41, p. 699; Kennedy v. Conrad, 91 Mont. 356 , 9 Pac. (2d) 1075 .) The obligations incurred in the ease at bar obviously related to matters strictly within the scope of the joint enterprise, and were reasonably necessary to carry on the venture.

1941Jur., sec. 41, p. 699; Kennedy v. Conrad, 91 Mont. 356 , 9 Pac. (2d) 1075 .) The obligations incurred in the ease at bar obviously related to matters strictly within the scope of the joint enterprise, and were reasonably necessary to carry on the venture.

1940The case of Jenkins v. First National Bank, 73 Mont. 110 , 236 Pac. 1085 , and the case of Hetrick v. Renwald, 73 Mont. 426 , 236 Pac. 1089 , both treat of eases where some of the questions involved in the ease at bar were involved.

1940The case of Jenkins v. First National Bank, 73 Mont. 110 , 236 Pac. 1085 , and the case of Hetrick v. Renwald, 73 Mont. 426 , 236 Pac. 1089 , both treat of eases where some of the questions involved in the ease at bar were involved.

1940The case of Jenkins v. First National Bank, 73 Mont. 110 , 236 Pac. 1085 , and the case of Hetrick v. Renwald, 73 Mont. 426 , 236 Pac. 1089 , both treat of eases where some of the questions involved in the ease at bar were involved.

1940The case of Jenkins v. First National Bank, 73 Mont. 110 , 236 Pac. 1085 , and the case of Hetrick v. Renwald, 73 Mont. 426 , 236 Pac. 1089 , both treat of eases where some of the questions involved in the ease at bar were involved.

1938Cas. 1915B, 1015, said: “The weight of modern authority, however, seems to recognize such agreements as enforceable where it appears to the advantage of the minor to enforce the same.” In Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248 , 28 S. W. 281, 282 , the court said: “Where, however, a parent, by writing or otherwise, has voluntarily transferred and delivered his minor child into the custody and under the control of another, as in the ease at bar, and then seeks to recover possession of the child by writ of habeas corpus, such parent is invoking the exercise of the equitable discretion of the court to dis

1938Cas. 1915B, 1015, said: “The weight of modern authority, however, seems to recognize such agreements as enforceable where it appears to the advantage of the minor to enforce the same.” In Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248 , 28 S. W. 281, 282 , the court said: “Where, however, a parent, by writing or otherwise, has voluntarily transferred and delivered his minor child into the custody and under the control of another, as in the ease at bar, and then seeks to recover possession of the child by writ of habeas corpus, such parent is invoking the exercise of the equitable discretion of the court to dis

1928(Harri v. Farmers’ Co-operative Co., 69 Mont. 149 , 223 Pac. 109 ; Dyer Law & Collection Co. v. Abbott, 52 Cal. App. 545 , *510 199 Pac. 340 .) It is so in the ease at bar.

1928(Harri v. Farmers’ Co-operative Co., 69 Mont. 149 , 223 Pac. 109 ; Dyer Law & Collection Co. v. Abbott, 52 Cal. App. 545 , *510 199 Pac. 340 .) It is so in the ease at bar.

1928(Harri v. Farmers’ Co-operative Co., 69 Mont. 149 , 223 Pac. 109 ; Dyer Law & Collection Co. v. Abbott, 52 Cal. App. 545 , *510 199 Pac. 340 .) It is so in the ease at bar.

1928(Harri v. Farmers’ Co-operative Co., 69 Mont. 149 , 223 Pac. 109 ; Dyer Law & Collection Co. v. Abbott, 52 Cal. App. 545 , *510 199 Pac. 340 .) It is so in the ease at bar.

1927The mayor is bound to grant a license to every person fulfilling these conditions, and thus the fact of fitness is submitted to the judgment of the officer, and it calls for the exercise of a discretion of a judicial nature by him. * * * Whether dealing in and selling cigarettes is that kind of business which ought to be licensed is, we think, considering the character of the article to be sold, a question for the state, and through it for the city to determine for itself, and that an ordinance providing reasonable conditions upon the performance of which a license may be granted to sell such

1927The mayor is bound to grant a license to every person fulfilling these conditions, and thus the fact of fitness is submitted to the judgment of the officer, and it calls for the exercise of a discretion of a judicial nature by him. * * * Whether dealing in and selling cigarettes is that kind of business which ought to be licensed is, we think, considering the character of the article to be sold, a question for the state, and through it for the city to determine for itself, and that an ordinance providing reasonable conditions upon the performance of which a license may be granted to sell such

1927In the two Montana cases cited, Territory v. McClin, 1 Mont. 394 , and Territory v. Underwood, 8 Mont. 131 , 19 Pac. 398 , the facts are greatly at variance from those of the case at bar and render those cases inapplicable.

1927In the two Montana cases cited, Territory v. McClin, 1 Mont. 394 , and Territory v. Underwood, 8 Mont. 131 , 19 Pac. 398 , the facts are greatly at variance from those of the case at bar and render those cases inapplicable.

1927I do not think the case of Gerry v. Bismarck Bank, 19 Mont. 191 , 17 Pac. 810 , cited in the majority opinion, is applicable to the facts in the ease at bar, or that plaintiff should be judged by it.

1927App. 208 , 125 S. W. 974 ; Moynahan v. Interstate Milling Co., 31 Wash. 417 , 72 Pac. 81 ; Wood on Master and Servant, sec. 123.) In the ease at bar the defendants did not rely upon the plea of waiver or estoppel as a defense, but asserted the action of the corporate officers as an agreement to, or sanction of, their interpretation of the contract as giving them sole command and control of the business, and conclusively demonstrated that they had no intention of reforming their methods to conform to the plaintiff’s interpretation of the contract.

1927App. 208 , 125 S. W. 974 ; Moynahan v. Interstate Milling Co., 31 Wash. 417 , 72 Pac. 81 ; Wood on Master and Servant, sec. 123.) In the ease at bar the defendants did not rely upon the plea of waiver or estoppel as a defense, but asserted the action of the corporate officers as an agreement to, or sanction of, their interpretation of the contract as giving them sole command and control of the business, and conclusively demonstrated that they had no intention of reforming their methods to conform to the plaintiff’s interpretation of the contract.

1927App. 208 , 125 S. W. 974 ; Moynahan v. Interstate Milling Co., 31 Wash. 417 , 72 Pac. 81 ; Wood on Master and Servant, sec. 123.) In the ease at bar the defendants did not rely upon the plea of waiver or estoppel as a defense, but asserted the action of the corporate officers as an agreement to, or sanction of, their interpretation of the contract as giving them sole command and control of the business, and conclusively demonstrated that they had no intention of reforming their methods to conform to the plaintiff’s interpretation of the contract.