ease bar in New Jersey

2014Ibid.

2013The first motion judge merely acknowledged the issue without deciding it while the next judge, in misapplying the law of the ease doctrine, Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538-39 , 25 A.3d 1080 (2011), simply chose to rely on her colleague’s non-decision.

2013The first motion judge merely acknowledged the issue without deciding it while the next judge, in misapplying the law of the ease doctrine, Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538-39 , 25 A.3d 1080 (2011), simply chose to rely on her colleague’s non-decision.

1999The most recent case concerning attorney’s liens is Steiger v. Armellino, 315 N.J.Super. 176 , 716 A.2d 1216 (Ch.Div.1998).

1999The most recent case concerning attorney’s liens is Steiger v. Armellino, 315 N.J.Super. 176 , 716 A.2d 1216 (Ch.Div.1998).

1998CPC International, supra; Beneficial Facilities, supra. In the ease at bar, there is even more reason to utilize the cost approach.

1997For example, in State v. Nutter, 258 N.J.Super. 41 , 609 A.2d 65 (App.Div.1992), the court held that it was error not to instruct a jury on its duty to determine if the defendant’s statement made to the police was credible.

1997For example, in State v. Nutter, 258 N.J.Super. 41 , 609 A.2d 65 (App.Div.1992), the court held that it was error not to instruct a jury on its duty to determine if the defendant’s statement made to the police was credible.

1996State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445 , 388 A.2d 587 (1978); N.J.R.E. 611(a)(2).

1996State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445 , 388 A.2d 587 (1978); N.J.R.E. 611(a)(2).

1993“Also, there is in any event the further principle that the law of the ease doctrine will not apply to an ambiguous or uncertain decision.” Sisler, supra, 222 N.J.Super. at 160 , 536 A.2d 299 .

1993“Also, there is in any event the further principle that the law of the ease doctrine will not apply to an ambiguous or uncertain decision.” Sisler, supra, 222 N.J.Super. at 160 , 536 A.2d 299 .

1977Unlike the ease at bar, Kahn concerned a challenge to a state tax law, an area where the states historically have enjoyed “large leeway.” 416 U. S. at 355 , 94 S. Ct. at 1737 , 40 L.

1977Unlike the ease at bar, Kahn concerned a challenge to a state tax law, an area where the states historically have enjoyed “large leeway.” 416 U. S. at 355 , 94 S. Ct. at 1737 , 40 L.

1976There is no conflict between the federal law and regulations and Ohio law in regard to housing. * * *' [ 300 N. E. 2d at 456-457 ] Similarly, in the ease at bar there is no conflict between the federal housing act and New Jersey law.

1975Or, as expressed by the court in Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., supra, 460 F. 2d at 1358 , the “use of the word ‘forecast’ in Tinker means a prediction by school officials that existing conduct, such as the wearing of arm bands — if allowed to continue — will probably interfere with school discipline.” (emphasis added) The ease with which the test is expressed does not mask the difficulty of its application.

1975Or, as expressed by the court in Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., supra, 460 F. 2d at 1358 , the "use of the word `forecast' in Tinker means a prediction by school officials that existing conduct, such as the wearing of arm bands — if allowed to continue — will probably interfere with school discipline." (emphasis added) The ease with which the test is expressed does not mask the difficulty of its application.

1967So in McCray v. State of Illinois, supra, 386 U. S. 300 , 87 S. Ct. 1056 , 18 L.

1967So in McCray v. State of Illinois, supra, 386 U. S. 300 , 87 S. Ct. 1056 , 18 L.

1962A situation somewhat similar to the ease at bar was presented in Smith v. Evening News Association, 362 Mich. 350 , 106 N. W. 2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1961), cert. granted 369 U. S. —, 82 S. Ct. 843 (March 26, 1962).

1962A situation somewhat similar to the ease at bar was presented in Smith v. Evening News Association, 362 Mich. 350 , 106 N. W. 2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1961), cert. granted 369 U. S. —, 82 S. Ct. 843 (March 26, 1962).

1962A situation somewhat similar to the ease at bar was presented in Smith v. Evening News Association, 362 Mich. 350 , 106 N. W. 2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1961), cert. granted 369 U. S. —, 82 S. Ct. 843 (March 26, 1962).

1961However, an analogous factual situation is found in Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. Cleveland, 86 Ariz. 288 , 345 P. 2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1959).

1961However, an analogous factual situation is found in Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. Cleveland, 86 Ariz. 288 , 345 P. 2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1959).

1955Cf. Reed v. Littleton, 275 N. Y. 150 , 9 N. E. 2d 814 (Ct. App. 1937). *410 In deciding whether the facts in the ease at bar constitute a lottery, we must resort to the accepted method of determining the meaning of a statute: we must look first to the mischief to be remedied and then to the means taken by the Legislature to achieve that end.

1955Cf. Reed v. Littleton, 275 N. Y. 150 , 9 N. E. 2d 814 (Ct. App. 1937). *410 In deciding whether the facts in the ease at bar constitute a lottery, we must resort to the accepted method of determining the meaning of a statute: we must look first to the mischief to be remedied and then to the means taken by the Legislature to achieve that end.

1943Mr. Justice Field said in Pennoyer v. Neff, supra: “Yeither do we mean to assert that a state may not require a non-resident * * * making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent or representative in the state to receive service of process and notice in legal proceedings instituted with respect to such * * * contracts, or to designate a place where such service may be made and notice given, and provide, upon their failure, to make such appointment or to designate such place that service may be made upon a public officer designated for that purpose, or in some other prescribed way, and

1931But, if though there may have been some negligence on the defendant’s part [e. g., in the equipment of his carriage] the injury was primarily due to the deceased having Hung himself recklessly in the defendant’s path, such contributory negligence is a defense.” Chief Justice Pennewill said, in State v. Disalvo (Delaware Court of Oyer), 121 Atl.

1928The state distinguishes the cases above cited from the present case and urges, in the ease at bar, the tax in question is *99 the only one imposed by statute upon the property right, i. e., the franchise right of the prosecutor, to use the public streets, and that, in valuing that property right account may be taken under the doctrine in the case of the United, States Express Co. v. State of Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 , of the total receipts of which the employment of such special franchise gives rise, including receipts from interstate commerce, or as expressed by Mr. Justice A an Deventer, in

1928The state distinguishes the cases above cited from the present case and urges, in the ease at bar, the tax in question is *99 the only one imposed by statute upon the property right, i. e., the franchise right of the prosecutor, to use the public streets, and that, in valuing that property right account may be taken under the doctrine in the case of the United, States Express Co. v. State of Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 , of the total receipts of which the employment of such special franchise gives rise, including receipts from interstate commerce, or as expressed by Mr. Justice A an Deventer, in

1918But that that statute has no application to the ease at bar is apparent from its title, which is “An act concerning the liability of railroads for injury to persons or property caused by running ears across public streets and highways at which crossings no safety gates, bell or other device to give warning to the traveling public has been installed.” This title very clearly expresses the object of the enactment (Waibel v. West Jersey and Seashore Railroad Co., supra), and as safety gates were installed and existed at the crossing where the accident happened at the time of its occurrence, this

1917The ease at bar is also to bo. distinguished from a case where a horse is let for a, particular journey, as in Leach v. French, 69 Me. 389 .

1915For myself, I think this tendency is -wholesome.” “Specific performance of agreements,” said Chief-Justice Fuller, in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Chicago, &c., Railway Co., 163 U. S. 564, “prevents the intolerable travesty of justice involved in permitting parties to refuse performance of their contracts at pleasure by electing to pay damages for the breach.” Now, in the ease at bar, it is obvious that no more than nominal damages could be recovered at law for the failure to furnish the bond, and if judgment should be recovered against the complainant, and perchance the defendant should becom

1914But if the decree be taken under a statute which authorizes the court to determine the question of title and to decree it to the party entitled, then it binds without such service or appearance if the statute has provided ‘a reasonable method of imparting notice.’ Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 .” For is there anything in. the learned Vice Chancellor’s observations concerning the difference between proceedings strictly in rem and those quasi in rem to the effect that the latter are more doubtful as to validity (citing Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 , and Freeman v. Alderson , 119 Id. 185 ), wh

1914But if the decree be taken under a statute which authorizes the court to determine the question of title and to decree it to the party entitled, then it binds without such service or appearance if the statute has provided ‘a reasonable method of imparting notice.’ Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 .” For is there anything in. the learned Vice Chancellor’s observations concerning the difference between proceedings strictly in rem and those quasi in rem to the effect that the latter are more doubtful as to validity (citing Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 , and Freeman v. Alderson , 119 Id. 185 ), wh

1910Baker v. Fales, supra. After the dissolution of the congregation, If the trustees refuse to convey the property to the Presbytery, they are necessarily using it for a purpose not sanctioned by the denomination, or not using it at all, which amounts to a diversion.

1902Connecticut Life Insurance Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U. S. 250, 257 .