ease bar in Maryland

2014The Ebersberger court reasoned that the challenged ordinance could have no injurious effect upon the plaintiffs until the prospect of its implementation became “substantially more certain.” 62 Md.App. at 371 , 489 A.2d at 102 .

2014The Ebersberger court reasoned that the challenged ordinance could have no injurious effect upon the plaintiffs until the prospect of its implementation became “substantially more certain.” 62 Md.App. at 371 , 489 A.2d at 102 .

2013In the ease at bar, there was evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, State v. Martin, 329 Md. 351, 354 , 619 A.2d 992 (1993), that suggested that there were three separate confrontations at the Carters’ cookout, a situation not unlike the one before us in Corbin v. State, 94 Md.App. 21 , 614 A.2d 1329 (1992), where we considered whether a murder defendant’s proposed self-defense jury instruction should have been given.

2013In the ease at bar, there was evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, State v. Martin, 329 Md. 351, 354 , 619 A.2d 992 (1993), that suggested that there were three separate confrontations at the Carters’ cookout, a situation not unlike the one before us in Corbin v. State, 94 Md.App. 21 , 614 A.2d 1329 (1992), where we considered whether a murder defendant’s proposed self-defense jury instruction should have been given.

2013In the ease at bar, there was evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, State v. Martin, 329 Md. 351, 354 , 619 A.2d 992 (1993), that suggested that there were three separate confrontations at the Carters’ cookout, a situation not unlike the one before us in Corbin v. State, 94 Md.App. 21 , 614 A.2d 1329 (1992), where we considered whether a murder defendant’s proposed self-defense jury instruction should have been given.

2013In the ease at bar, there was evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, State v. Martin, 329 Md. 351, 354 , 619 A.2d 992 (1993), that suggested that there were three separate confrontations at the Carters’ cookout, a situation not unlike the one before us in Corbin v. State, 94 Md.App. 21 , 614 A.2d 1329 (1992), where we considered whether a murder defendant’s proposed self-defense jury instruction should have been given.

2011Co., 217 Md. 367, 372 , 142 A.2d 796 (1958))), the Court of Appeals outlined the law of the ease doctrine, and articulated: Once [an appellate court] has ruled upon a question properly presented on an appeal, or, if the ruling be contrary to a question that could have been raised and argued in that appeal on the then state of the record, as aforesaid, such a ruling becomes the “law of the case” and is binding on the litigants and [courts] alike, unless changed or modified after reargument, and neither the questions decided [nor] the ones that could have been raised and decided are available to

2011Co., 217 Md. 367, 372 , 142 A.2d 796 (1958))), the Court of Appeals outlined the law of the ease doctrine, and articulated: Once [an appellate court] has ruled upon a question properly presented on an appeal, or, if the ruling be contrary to a question that could have been raised and argued in that appeal on the then state of the record, as aforesaid, such a ruling becomes the “law of the case” and is binding on the litigants and [courts] alike, unless changed or modified after reargument, and neither the questions decided [nor] the ones that could have been raised and decided are available to

2005He relies upon State v. Cayward, 552 So.2d 971 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989).

1954In Colie v. State, 193 Md. 608 , 69 A. 2d 497 , we recognized the general rule that in order to introduce a telephone conversation in evidence against the person at the other end of the line as the conversation of that person, it is necessary to identify him, but we held that where the purpose of the evidence is merely to show that the police placed a bet with a person who answered a certain telephone number given them by the accused, who told them that. bets could be placed there, no identification of the person answering the telephone is necessary. *449 In the ease at bar the detective did n

1954In Colie v. State, 193 Md. 608 , 69 A. 2d 497 , we recognized the general rule that in order to introduce a telephone conversation in evidence against the person at the other end of the line as the conversation of that person, it is necessary to identify him, but we held that where the purpose of the evidence is merely to show that the police placed a bet with a person who answered a certain telephone number given them by the accused, who told them that. bets could be placed there, no identification of the person answering the telephone is necessary. *449 In the ease at bar the detective did n

1943An enlightening summary of that doctrine is found in Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 , and quoted in Nims, supra, 107: “Primarily, it would seem that one might appropriate to himself for his goods any word or phrase that he chose; but this is not so, because the broader public right prevails, and one may not appropriate to his own exclusive use a word which already belongs to the public and so may be used by any one of the public.

1929A discretion could not he characterized as sound which wholly disregarded evidence by which its exercsie should have been aided. * * * In Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140 , the Supreme Court, in ruling upon an exception to the exclusion of certain affidavits offez’ed in suppoz’t of a motion for a new trial, said: ‘The allowance or z’efusal of a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the court to which the application is addressed, and the result cannot be made the subject of review by writ of error (Henderson v. Moore, 5 Cranch, 11 ; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S. 581 ), but in the ease a

1929A discretion could not he characterized as sound which wholly disregarded evidence by which its exercsie should have been aided. * * * In Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140 , the Supreme Court, in ruling upon an exception to the exclusion of certain affidavits offez’ed in suppoz’t of a motion for a new trial, said: ‘The allowance or z’efusal of a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the court to which the application is addressed, and the result cannot be made the subject of review by writ of error (Henderson v. Moore, 5 Cranch, 11 ; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S. 581 ), but in the ease a

1929A discretion could not he characterized as sound which wholly disregarded evidence by which its exercsie should have been aided. * * * In Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140 , the Supreme Court, in ruling upon an exception to the exclusion of certain affidavits offez’ed in suppoz’t of a motion for a new trial, said: ‘The allowance or z’efusal of a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the court to which the application is addressed, and the result cannot be made the subject of review by writ of error (Henderson v. Moore, 5 Cranch, 11 ; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S. 581 ), but in the ease a

1925The ease at bar is closely similar to that of Zihlman v. Zihlman, 75 Md. 372 , in which a, corporation had made a contract with the sole patentee of a device for its use upon payment of all royalties to him, and was confronted with a claim of title to a half interest in a brother of the patentee arising out of an alleged joint working out of the device, and joint ownership by an agreement antecedent to the taking out of the patent.

1923In Barrett v. Cemetery Association, supra ( 159 Ill. 385 ), it was .attempted to show that the waters were already polluted, but the court said: ‘We know of no rule of law that sanctions *99 one wrong because another has preceded it.’ And again it was there said ‘the mere fact that in the ease at bar the waters of this stream may have, to some extent, been rendered unwholesome when flooded by the washings from manured lands, or by the connections of other drains, is no excuse for the threatened pollution by the cemetery companies.’ ” The collection of drainage and sewage and emptying it on the

1923In Barrett v. Cemetery Association, supra ( 159 Ill. 385 ), it was .attempted to show that the waters were already polluted, but the court said: ‘We know of no rule of law that sanctions *99 one wrong because another has preceded it.’ And again it was there said ‘the mere fact that in the ease at bar the waters of this stream may have, to some extent, been rendered unwholesome when flooded by the washings from manured lands, or by the connections of other drains, is no excuse for the threatened pollution by the cemetery companies.’ ” The collection of drainage and sewage and emptying it on the

1920City, 88 Md. 475 , relied on by the defendants at the hearing presents a very different situation from the ease at bar.

1916The cases of De Bearn v. Winans, 115 Md. 604 and De Bearn v. De Bearn, 119 Md. 418 , relied upon by the appellee, are entirely unlike this, and have no bearing upon the questions raised by this record.

1916They are cases like Demill v. Reid, 71 Md. 175 , where the remainder was limited upon the happening of a contingency to a class, and was held to have vested only in those answering the description when the contingency happened; or where a contingent remainder of inheritance was held to vest only in the heirs of the contingent remainderman in esse at the time the contingency happened and the estate fell into possession as in Buck v. Lantz, 49 Md. 439 ; Garrison v. Hill, 79 Md. 75 , and Jenkins v. Bonsal, 116 Md. 629 ; or where the Court held that the use of the words “from and immediately after

1916They are cases like Demill v. Reid, 71 Md. 175 , where the remainder was limited upon the happening of a contingency to a class, and was held to have vested only in those answering the description when the contingency happened; or where a contingent remainder of inheritance was held to vest only in the heirs of the contingent remainderman in esse at the time the contingency happened and the estate fell into possession as in Buck v. Lantz, 49 Md. 439 ; Garrison v. Hill, 79 Md. 75 , and Jenkins v. Bonsal, 116 Md. 629 ; or where the Court held that the use of the words “from and immediately after

1916The cases of De Bearn v. Winans, 115 Md. 604 and De Bearn v. De Bearn, 119 Md. 418 , relied upon by the appellee, are entirely unlike this, and have no bearing upon the questions raised by this record.

1916They are cases like Demill v. Reid, 71 Md. 175 , where the remainder was limited upon the happening of a contingency to a class, and was held to have vested only in those answering the description when the contingency happened; or where a contingent remainder of inheritance was held to vest only in the heirs of the contingent remainderman in esse at the time the contingency happened and the estate fell into possession as in Buck v. Lantz, 49 Md. 439 ; Garrison v. Hill, 79 Md. 75 , and Jenkins v. Bonsal, 116 Md. 629 ; or where the Court held that the use of the words “from and immediately after

1916They are cases like Demill v. Reid, 71 Md. 175 , where the remainder was limited upon the happening of a contingency to a class, and was held to have vested only in those answering the description when the contingency happened; or where a contingent remainder of inheritance was held to vest only in the heirs of the contingent remainderman in esse at the time the contingency happened and the estate fell into possession as in Buck v. Lantz, 49 Md. 439 ; Garrison v. Hill, 79 Md. 75 , and Jenkins v. Bonsal, 116 Md. 629 ; or where the Court held that the use of the words “from and immediately after

1916They are cases like Demill v. Reid, 71 Md. 175 , where the remainder was limited upon the happening of a contingency to a class, and was held to have vested only in those answering the description when the contingency happened; or where a contingent remainder of inheritance was held to vest only in the heirs of the contingent remainderman in esse at the time the contingency happened and the estate fell into possession as in Buck v. Lantz, 49 Md. 439 ; Garrison v. Hill, 79 Md. 75 , and Jenkins v. Bonsal, 116 Md. 629 ; or where the Court held that the use of the words “from and immediately after

1916They are cases like Demill v. Reid, 71 Md. 175 , where the remainder was limited upon the happening of a contingency to a class, and was held to have vested only in those answering the description when the contingency happened; or where a contingent remainder of inheritance was held to vest only in the heirs of the contingent remainderman in esse at the time the contingency happened and the estate fell into possession as in Buck v. Lantz, 49 Md. 439 ; Garrison v. Hill, 79 Md. 75 , and Jenkins v. Bonsal, 116 Md. 629 ; or where the Court held that the use of the words “from and immediately after

1915The only case we have found sustaining a claim against the principal for the hire of vehicles used by the agent in making sales is that of Bentley v. Doggett, 51 Wis. 224 , but the theory of the ruling in that ease does not commend itself to our judgment as being a satisfactory principle for general application, and we are convinced that it is not appropriate to the very different state of facts presented in the ease at bar.

1912Altvaters Case was followed and approved in the case of Sinclair v. Baltimore, 59 Md. 592 , which resembles so closely in all respects, the case we are here considering, that a discussion of the ease at bar must necessarily involve a repetition of much of what was there said.

1910In Glenn v. Williams, 60 Md. 93 , it is said: “To constitute a good plea in bar, the matter pleaded, must, if true, afford a full and complete answer to the action and show there •is no right of recovery.” In the ease at bar, the plea states, these defendants were acting for, and' as agents of the trus *155 tees of Emmanuel M.