ease bar in Georgia

1944“It is well settled that the erroneous overruling of a special demurrer is not harmful error where it affirmatively appears from the evidence in the ease that the error did not result in injury to the party interposing the demurrer, and fin determining whether the error has resulted in injury, the court may look to the record as a whole.’ Hall v. State, 8 Ga. App. 747 (3), 750-752 ( 70 S. E. 211 ).” Coffee County v. Denton, 64 Ga. App. 368, 372 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 209 ); Cargile v. State, 67 Ga. App. 610, 617 (21.

1944“It is well settled that the erroneous overruling of a special demurrer is not harmful error where it affirmatively appears from the evidence in the ease that the error did not result in injury to the party interposing the demurrer, and fin determining whether the error has resulted in injury, the court may look to the record as a whole.’ Hall v. State, 8 Ga. App. 747 (3), 750-752 ( 70 S. E. 211 ).” Coffee County v. Denton, 64 Ga. App. 368, 372 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 209 ); Cargile v. State, 67 Ga. App. 610, 617 (21.

1963Bennett v. Lowry, 167 Ga. 347 (2, 3) ( 145 SE 505 ).

1963Bennett v. Lowry, 167 Ga. 347 (2, 3) ( 145 SE 505 ).

1956Johnson v. Sears, 199 Ga. 32 ( 34 S. E. 2d 541 ); Clements v. Hollingsworth, 205 Ga. 153 ( 52 S. E. 2d 465 ).

1956Johnson v. Sears, 199 Ga. 32 ( 34 S. E. 2d 541 ); Clements v. Hollingsworth, 205 Ga. 153 ( 52 S. E. 2d 465 ).

1956Johnson v. Sears, 199 Ga. 32 ( 34 S. E. 2d 541 ); Clements v. Hollingsworth, 205 Ga. 153 ( 52 S. E. 2d 465 ).

1943It was held in Mayor & Council of Washington v. Calhoun, 103 Ga. 675 ( 30 S. E. 434 ), that “A verdict rendered in an action for unliquidated damages must expressly state the amount to which- the jury deem the plaintiff entitled, or no lawful judgment can be entered thereon.” But that ruling is not controlling authority in the ease at bar, as contended by the plaintiff in error.

1943It was held in Mayor & Council of Washington v. Calhoun, 103 Ga. 675 ( 30 S. E. 434 ), that “A verdict rendered in an action for unliquidated damages must expressly state the amount to which- the jury deem the plaintiff entitled, or no lawful judgment can be entered thereon.” But that ruling is not controlling authority in the ease at bar, as contended by the plaintiff in error.

1943Fowler v. Johnson, 151 Ga. 122 ( 106 S. E. 90 ); Kirkpatrick v. Faw, 184 Ga. 170 ( 190 S. E. 566 ).

1943Fowler v. Johnson, 151 Ga. 122 ( 106 S. E. 90 ); Kirkpatrick v. Faw, 184 Ga. 170 ( 190 S. E. 566 ).

1943Fowler v. Johnson, 151 Ga. 122 ( 106 S. E. 90 ); Kirkpatrick v. Faw, 184 Ga. 170 ( 190 S. E. 566 ).

1943Fowler v. Johnson, 151 Ga. 122 ( 106 S. E. 90 ); Kirkpatrick v. Faw, 184 Ga. 170 ( 190 S. E. 566 ).

1942The ease at bar is distinguished from Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530 ( 182 S. E. 906 ), which dealt with a death claim.

1942The ease at bar is distinguished from Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530 ( 182 S. E. 906 ), which dealt with a death claim.

1942Even in the Davis case this court said: “Where it merely appeared that a policy on her life was issued by the defendant, naming the plaintiff as beneficiary, the petition should have been dismissed on general demurrer.” A case apparently to the contrary is Illinois Life Insurance Co. v. Connell, 8 Ga. App. 683 ( 70 S. E. 107 ), where the court said: “A petition alleging that an insurance company, in consideration of the premiums paid and to be paid, made to the petitioner, who was named as the beneficiary therein, a policy of insurance for a named amount, upon the life of a named person who ha

1942Even in the Davis case this court said: “Where it merely appeared that a policy on her life was issued by the defendant, naming the plaintiff as beneficiary, the petition should have been dismissed on general demurrer.” A case apparently to the contrary is Illinois Life Insurance Co. v. Connell, 8 Ga. App. 683 ( 70 S. E. 107 ), where the court said: “A petition alleging that an insurance company, in consideration of the premiums paid and to be paid, made to the petitioner, who was named as the beneficiary therein, a policy of insurance for a named amount, upon the life of a named person who ha

1941It is earnestly insisted by the plaintiff in error that Continental Casualty Co. v. Payne, 56 Ga. App. 873 ( 194 S. E. 428 ) is controlling in the ease at bar.

1941It is earnestly insisted by the plaintiff in error that Continental Casualty Co. v. Payne, 56 Ga. App. 873 ( 194 S. E. 428 ) is controlling in the ease at bar.

1941If there be any conflict between this ruling and that in Chappell v. State, 58 Ga. App. 450 (198 S. B. 791), the older decision is controlling. .The cases cited in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error axe distinguished by their facts from the instant case.

1941As to the general grounds, the cases of Jones v. State, 64 Ga. App. 308 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 91 ), and Chandler v. State, 63 Ga. App. 304 ( 11 S. E. 2d, 103 ), are different in their facts from those in the ease at bar.

1941As to the general grounds, the cases of Jones v. State, 64 Ga. App. 308 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 91 ), and Chandler v. State, 63 Ga. App. 304 ( 11 S. E. 2d, 103 ), are different in their facts from those in the ease at bar.

1941As to the general grounds, the cases of Jones v. State, 64 Ga. App. 308 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 91 ), and Chandler v. State, 63 Ga. App. 304 ( 11 S. E. 2d, 103 ), are different in their facts from those in the ease at bar.

1941As to the general grounds, the cases of Jones v. State, 64 Ga. App. 308 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 91 ), and Chandler v. State, 63 Ga. App. 304 ( 11 S. E. 2d, 103 ), are different in their facts from those in the ease at bar.

1940This ease is controlled in principle by Pollard v. Clifton, 62 Ga. App. 573 (9 S. E. 2d, ).

1939This was as it should have been pleaded under the act of 1901 (Ga. L. 1901; p. 55, Code, § 81-410), with reference to “pleas on suits on open accounts.” We quote as follows: “Whenever a suit may be brought on an open account and the same is verified by the plaintiff as provided by law, the plea filed shall either deny that the defendant is indebted in any sum or shall specify the amount in which the defendant admits he may be indebted, and shall be verified as required by law.” It will be noted that upon the passage of the act of 1901, a specific denial of indebtedness became insufficient, and

1939This was as it should have been pleaded under the act of 1901 (Ga. L. 1901; p. 55, Code, § 81-410), with reference to “pleas on suits on open accounts.” We quote as follows: “Whenever a suit may be brought on an open account and the same is verified by the plaintiff as provided by law, the plea filed shall either deny that the defendant is indebted in any sum or shall specify the amount in which the defendant admits he may be indebted, and shall be verified as required by law.” It will be noted that upon the passage of the act of 1901, a specific denial of indebtedness became insufficient, and

1938The present ease is in principle controlled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court in Parsons v. Fox, 179 Ga. 605 ( 176 S. E. 642 ); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 41 Ga. App. 216 ( 152 S. E. 289 ) ; Hinton v. Mack Purchasing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823 ( 155 S. E. 78 ); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., 184 Ga. 617 ( 192 S. E. 217 ); Hanes v. Henderson, 58 Ga. App. 475 , supra. We can add nothing to what has been said in those decisions on the subject.

1938The present ease is in principle controlled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court in Parsons v. Fox, 179 Ga. 605 ( 176 S. E. 642 ); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 41 Ga. App. 216 ( 152 S. E. 289 ) ; Hinton v. Mack Purchasing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823 ( 155 S. E. 78 ); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., 184 Ga. 617 ( 192 S. E. 217 ); Hanes v. Henderson, 58 Ga. App. 475 , supra. We can add nothing to what has been said in those decisions on the subject.

1938The present ease is in principle controlled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court in Parsons v. Fox, 179 Ga. 605 ( 176 S. E. 642 ); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 41 Ga. App. 216 ( 152 S. E. 289 ) ; Hinton v. Mack Purchasing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823 ( 155 S. E. 78 ); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., 184 Ga. 617 ( 192 S. E. 217 ); Hanes v. Henderson, 58 Ga. App. 475 , supra. We can add nothing to what has been said in those decisions on the subject.

1938The present ease is in principle controlled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court in Parsons v. Fox, 179 Ga. 605 ( 176 S. E. 642 ); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 41 Ga. App. 216 ( 152 S. E. 289 ) ; Hinton v. Mack Purchasing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823 ( 155 S. E. 78 ); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., 184 Ga. 617 ( 192 S. E. 217 ); Hanes v. Henderson, 58 Ga. App. 475 , supra. We can add nothing to what has been said in those decisions on the subject.

1938The present ease is in principle controlled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court in Parsons v. Fox, 179 Ga. 605 ( 176 S. E. 642 ); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 41 Ga. App. 216 ( 152 S. E. 289 ) ; Hinton v. Mack Purchasing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823 ( 155 S. E. 78 ); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., 184 Ga. 617 ( 192 S. E. 217 ); Hanes v. Henderson, 58 Ga. App. 475 , supra. We can add nothing to what has been said in those decisions on the subject.

1938The present ease is in principle controlled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court in Parsons v. Fox, 179 Ga. 605 ( 176 S. E. 642 ); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 41 Ga. App. 216 ( 152 S. E. 289 ) ; Hinton v. Mack Purchasing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823 ( 155 S. E. 78 ); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., 184 Ga. 617 ( 192 S. E. 217 ); Hanes v. Henderson, 58 Ga. App. 475 , supra. We can add nothing to what has been said in those decisions on the subject.

1938The present ease is in principle controlled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court in Parsons v. Fox, 179 Ga. 605 ( 176 S. E. 642 ); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 41 Ga. App. 216 ( 152 S. E. 289 ) ; Hinton v. Mack Purchasing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823 ( 155 S. E. 78 ); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., 184 Ga. 617 ( 192 S. E. 217 ); Hanes v. Henderson, 58 Ga. App. 475 , supra. We can add nothing to what has been said in those decisions on the subject.

1938The present ease is in principle controlled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court in Parsons v. Fox, 179 Ga. 605 ( 176 S. E. 642 ); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 41 Ga. App. 216 ( 152 S. E. 289 ) ; Hinton v. Mack Purchasing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823 ( 155 S. E. 78 ); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., 184 Ga. 617 ( 192 S. E. 217 ); Hanes v. Henderson, 58 Ga. App. 475 , supra. We can add nothing to what has been said in those decisions on the subject.

1938The present ease is in principle controlled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court in Parsons v. Fox, 179 Ga. 605 ( 176 S. E. 642 ); Jackson v. Bloodworth, 41 Ga. App. 216 ( 152 S. E. 289 ) ; Hinton v. Mack Purchasing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823 ( 155 S. E. 78 ); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., 184 Ga. 617 ( 192 S. E. 217 ); Hanes v. Henderson, 58 Ga. App. 475 , supra. We can add nothing to what has been said in those decisions on the subject.

1937The case of Burchfield v. State, 40 Ga. App. 506 ( 150 S. E. 459 ), cited in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error, is distinguished by its facts from the ease at bar.

1937The case of Burchfield v. State, 40 Ga. App. 506 ( 150 S. E. 459 ), cited in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error, is distinguished by its facts from the ease at bar.

1936The ease at bar is controlled by the ruling in Clayton v. Stetson, 101 Ga. 634 ( 28 S. E. 983 ). 2.

1936The ease at bar is controlled by the ruling in Clayton v. Stetson, 101 Ga. 634 ( 28 S. E. 983 ). 2.

1936L. 730 ( 119 Atl. 273 ), presented a situation similar to that of the ease at bar.

1935See Rigden v. Jordan, 81 Ga. 668 ; Horton v. Pintchunck, 110 Ga. 355 (35 S. E. 663 ).

1935See Rigden v. Jordan, 81 Ga. 668 ; Horton v. Pintchunck, 110 Ga. 355 (35 S. E. 663 ).

1935Furthermore, the trial judge, immediately in connection with the charge complained of in the case sub judice, charged “But the jury, as stated, are at last the sole and exclusive judges of what witnesses they will believe or disbelieve, and what testimony they will credit or discredit, and what weight they will give to the defendant’s statement.” If the ruling in Watson v. State, 50 Ga. App. 114 ( 176 S. E. 899 ), conflicts with Smith v. State, supra, decided by the Supreme Court, it must yield to the ruling in that case as binding authority upon this court.

1935Furthermore, the trial judge, immediately in connection with the charge complained of in the case sub judice, charged “But the jury, as stated, are at last the sole and exclusive judges of what witnesses they will believe or disbelieve, and what testimony they will credit or discredit, and what weight they will give to the defendant’s statement.” If the ruling in Watson v. State, 50 Ga. App. 114 ( 176 S. E. 899 ), conflicts with Smith v. State, supra, decided by the Supreme Court, it must yield to the ruling in that case as binding authority upon this court.