ease bar in Maine

1998Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 . [¶ 8] Rare is the instance in which a defendant journalist admits to publishing a defamatory article with either knowledge of, or reckless disregard to, the statement’s falsity — this ease is no exception.

1998Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 . [¶ 8] Rare is the instance in which a defendant journalist admits to publishing a defamatory article with either knowledge of, or reckless disregard to, the statement’s falsity — this ease is no exception.

1990The validity of a waiver is evaluated in the context of the ease at bar and is reviewed “in the light most favorable to the court’s ruling.” State v. Morrison, 567 A.2d 1350, 1351 (Me.1990) (quoting Walls, 501 A.2d at 805 ).

1981State v. Chubbuck, supra. The rationale as set forth in the cases cited in Chubbuck , is that the declaration of a mistrial renders the trial itself a nullity and returns both parties to their original positions, as if there had been no trial.

1978On the contrary, the allegations of the complaint plainly show that the Defendants’ activities were quasi-judicial in nature. 3 The ease at bar parallels Rodway v. Wiswall, supra, where we held that the defendants, three of the twelve trustees of the Maine Maritime Academy, acted in a quasi-judicial capacity in persuading the other trustees to vote to terminate the Plaintiff’s contract as superintendent of the Academy.

1906Or, at any rate, that it appears to have been so understood by them.” In Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208 , it was held that an agreement not to go into business in a certain place for five years was not within the statute as the death of the promisor would complete the performance of the contract, but the court, after comparing the case with Peters v. Westborough, 19 Pick. 364 , say, “ On the other hand, if the agreement cannot be completely performed within a year, the fact that it may be terminated, or further performance excused or rendered impossible, by the death of the promisee or of anothe

1906Or, at any rate, that it appears to have been so understood by them.” In Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208 , it was held that an agreement not to go into business in a certain place for five years was not within the statute as the death of the promisor would complete the performance of the contract, but the court, after comparing the case with Peters v. Westborough, 19 Pick. 364 , say, “ On the other hand, if the agreement cannot be completely performed within a year, the fact that it may be terminated, or further performance excused or rendered impossible, by the death of the promisee or of anothe

1906Or, at any rate, that it appears to have been so understood by them.” In Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208 , it was held that an agreement not to go into business in a certain place for five years was not within the statute as the death of the promisor would complete the performance of the contract, but the court, after comparing the case with Peters v. Westborough, 19 Pick. 364 , say, “ On the other hand, if the agreement cannot be completely performed within a year, the fact that it may be terminated, or further performance excused or rendered impossible, by the death of the promisee or of anothe

1901But this was declared in the opinion of the court to be “inoperative,” because “it is not in the power of a trustee to destroy the trust.” Quoting the language of the court in Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle, 33 , the opinion further states that “a different construction would make the beneficial interest, which the testator intended to provide for his son, subject to be sold for his debts, when he expressly declared that it should not be so subject, and would thus set up a new will in the place of that which it affected to interpret.” It is obvious that the deed of trust, between the trustees and t

1889Gill v. Middle ton., 105 Mass. 477 , which is on all fours with the ease at bar.