15 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kinggreen2 sentences2010Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1(d) provides that “[e]xcept for good cause ... an issue previously determined by the court shall not be reconsidered.” This rule and the law of the ease doctrine are rules of procedure, not substance; thus, they do not limit a court’s “power to change a ruling simply because it ruled on the question at an earlier stage.” King, 180 Ariz. at 279 , 883 P.2d at 1035 . 2010Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1(d) provides that “[e]xcept for good cause ... an issue previously determined by the court shall not be reconsidered.” This rule and the law of the ease doctrine are rules of procedure, not substance; thus, they do not limit a court’s “power to change a ruling simply because it ruled on the question at an earlier stage.” King, 180 Ariz. at 279 , 883 P.2d at 1035 . | 1 | 2 |
Vuagniaux v. Department of Professional Regulationgreen1 sentence2013Id. at 1164. ¶ 12 The ease at bar does not involve a participant in Board proceedings whose service was unauthorized by law. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bocharskigreen2 sentences2012See State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 489, ¶ 60 , 189 P.3d 403, 416 (2008) (noting that law of the ease rule applies to rulings “in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first decision rested” (emphasis added)); State v. Whelan, 208 Ariz. 168, 171, ¶ 10 , 91 P.3d 1011, 1014 (App.2004) (rejecting application of law of the case doctrine to two separate actions). 2012See State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 489, ¶ 60 , 189 P.3d 403, 416 (2008) (noting that law of the ease rule applies to rulings “in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first decision rested” (emphasis added)); State v. Whelan, 208 Ariz. 168, 171, ¶ 10 , 91 P.3d 1011, 1014 (App.2004) (rejecting application of law of the case doctrine to two separate actions). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Whelangreen2 sentences2012See State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 489, ¶ 60 , 189 P.3d 403, 416 (2008) (noting that law of the ease rule applies to rulings “in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first decision rested” (emphasis added)); State v. Whelan, 208 Ariz. 168, 171, ¶ 10 , 91 P.3d 1011, 1014 (App.2004) (rejecting application of law of the case doctrine to two separate actions). 2012See State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 489, ¶ 60 , 189 P.3d 403, 416 (2008) (noting that law of the ease rule applies to rulings “in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first decision rested” (emphasis added)); State v. Whelan, 208 Ariz. 168, 171, ¶ 10 , 91 P.3d 1011, 1014 (App.2004) (rejecting application of law of the case doctrine to two separate actions). | 1 | 1 |
London v. Broderickgreen2 sentences2011See London v. Broderick, 206 Ariz. 490, 495, ¶ 16 , 80 P.3d 769, 774 (2003) (finding that, although a prior case differed factually from the ease at bar, the reasoning of the prior case was still persuasive). 2011See London v. Broderick, 206 Ariz. 490, 495, ¶ 16 , 80 P.3d 769, 774 (2003) (finding that, although a prior case differed factually from the ease at bar, the reasoning of the prior case was still persuasive). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garzagreen2 sentences2010Nor do the rules “prevent a different judge, sitting on the same case, from reconsidering the first judge’s prior, nonfinal rulings.” Id. ¶ 44 More importantly, in reconsidering the earlier ruling, the second judge properly gave effect to Arizona law, which “specifically requires the trier of fact to make En-mund/Tison findings in the aggravation phase.” State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56 , 67 ¶ 46, 163 P.3d 1006, 1017 (2007) (citing A.R.S. § 13-752(P) (Supp.2009)); Ellison , 213 at 134-35 n. 12 ¶ 72, 140 P.3d at 917-18 n. 12. ¶ 45 Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Garcia’s mot 2010Nor do the rules “prevent a different judge, sitting on the same case, from reconsidering the first judge’s prior, nonfinal rulings.” Id. ¶ 44 More importantly, in reconsidering the earlier ruling, the second judge properly gave effect to Arizona law, which “specifically requires the trier of fact to make En-mund/Tison findings in the aggravation phase.” State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56 , 67 ¶ 46, 163 P.3d 1006, 1017 (2007) (citing A.R.S. § 13-752(P) (Supp.2009)); Ellison , 213 at 134-35 n. 12 ¶ 72, 140 P.3d at 917-18 n. 12. ¶ 45 Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Garcia’s mot | 1 | 1 |
State v. Waldripgreen2 sentences2004Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[4.1] (2d ed.1992)); State v. Waldrip, 111 Ariz. 516, 518 , 533 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1975) (decision of an appeals court in a prior appeal of the same case cannot be raised again in a subsequent appeal). ¶ 9 Rule 16.1(d), like the law of the ease doctrine, is procedural and applies in the setting of the same case. 2004Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[4.1] (2d ed.1992)); State v. Waldrip, 111 Ariz. 516, 518 , 533 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1975) (decision of an appeals court in a prior appeal of the same case cannot be raised again in a subsequent appeal). ¶ 9 Rule 16.1(d), like the law of the ease doctrine, is procedural and applies in the setting of the same case. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Spearsgreen2 sentences1997Rule 20, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, states: “[T]he court shall enter a judgment of acquittal ... if there is no substan tial evidence to warrant a conviction.” In State v. Spears, a unanimous 1996 opinion, this court stated in the context of Rule 20: “Substantial evidence is proof that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 184 Ariz. 277, 290 , 908 P.2d 1062, 1075 (emphasis added), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 393 , 136 L.Ed.2d 308 (1996). 1997Rule 20, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, states: “[T]he court shall enter a judgment of acquittal ... if there is no substan tial evidence to warrant a conviction.” In State v. Spears, a unanimous 1996 opinion, this court stated in the context of Rule 20: “Substantial evidence is proof that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 184 Ariz. 277, 290 , 908 P.2d 1062, 1075 (emphasis added), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 393 , 136 L.Ed.2d 308 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New Process Steel, L. P. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences2013Vuagniaux does not stand for the proposition that a membership vacancy deprives an administrative board of jurisdiction to pursue statutorily mandated regulatory functions. ¶ 13 Kahn’s reliance on New Process Steel, L.P. v. National Labor Relations Board, 560 U.S. 674 , 130 S.Ct. 2635 , 177 L.Ed.2d 162 (2010), is also unavailing. 2013Vuagniaux does not stand for the proposition that a membership vacancy deprives an administrative board of jurisdiction to pursue statutorily mandated regulatory functions. ¶ 13 Kahn’s reliance on New Process Steel, L.P. v. National Labor Relations Board, 560 U.S. 674 , 130 S.Ct. 2635 , 177 L.Ed.2d 162 (2010), is also unavailing. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Jordan v. Hargett
green
1 sentence1997Rule 20, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, states: “[T]he court shall enter a judgment of acquittal ... if there is no substan tial evidence to warrant a conviction.” In State v. Spears, a unanimous 1996 opinion, this court stated in the context of Rule 20: “Substantial evidence is proof that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 184 Ariz. 277, 290 , 908 P.2d 1062, 1075 (emphasis added), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 393 , 136 L.Ed.2d 308 (1996). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Ray v. California
green
1 sentence1997Rule 20, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, states: “[T]he court shall enter a judgment of acquittal ... if there is no substan tial evidence to warrant a conviction.” In State v. Spears, a unanimous 1996 opinion, this court stated in the context of Rule 20: “Substantial evidence is proof that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 184 Ariz. 277, 290 , 908 P.2d 1062, 1075 (emphasis added), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 393 , 136 L.Ed.2d 308 (1996). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Reynolds
green
2 sentences1996State v. Reynolds, 123 Ariz. 117 , 118 n. 1, 597 P.2d 1020 , 1021 n. 1 (App.1979). 1996State v. Reynolds, 123 Ariz. 117 , 118 n. 1, 597 P.2d 1020 , 1021 n. 1 (App.1979). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Roseberry v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1984Roseberry v. Industrial Commission, 113 Ariz. 66 , 546 P.2d 802 (1976)____ In the ease at bar, although the testimony reflects the applicant did not seek medical care for approximately one year after the issuance of the Notice, Dr. Moczynski’s medical report clearly contradicted the carrier’s finding the applicant had sustained no permanent impairment. 1984Roseberry v. Industrial Commission, 113 Ariz. 66 , 546 P.2d 802 (1976)____ In the ease at bar, although the testimony reflects the applicant did not seek medical care for approximately one year after the issuance of the Notice, Dr. Moczynski’s medical report clearly contradicted the carrier’s finding the applicant had sustained no permanent impairment. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Toney v. Bouthillier
green
2 sentences1984Toney v. Bouthillier, 129 Ariz. 402 , 631 P.2d 557 (App.1981) involved deposition statements by a child victim of a dog bite. 1984Toney v. Bouthillier, 129 Ariz. 402 , 631 P.2d 557 (App.1981) involved deposition statements by a child victim of a dog bite. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Vincent v. Grayson
green
2 sentences1982The case of Vincent v. Grayson, 30 Cal. App.3d 899 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 733 (1973), is very similar to the ease at bar, as it deals with an outdoor billboard and the plaintiff prayed for the total unpaid balance of the contract as damages. 1982The case of Vincent v. Grayson, 30 Cal. App.3d 899 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 733 (1973), is very similar to the ease at bar, as it deals with an outdoor billboard and the plaintiff prayed for the total unpaid balance of the contract as damages. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Leuck
green
2 sentences1971Vacated on other grounds, State v. Leuck, 107 Ariz. 49 , 481 P.2d 842 (1971). 1971Vacated on other grounds, State v. Leuck, 107 Ariz. 49 , 481 P.2d 842 (1971). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Johnson v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1970Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966). 1970Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1970The principles of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) are not applicable to the ease at bar since' those principles have been applied only to trials begun after June 13, 1966. 1970The principles of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) are not applicable to the ease at bar since' those principles have been applied only to trials begun after June 13, 1966. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Cochrane v. State of Arizona
green
2 sentences1944Under the rules it is not properly before us for consideration, and we give it only for the purpose of showing the unfair and oppressive conduct of prosecutor.” Accordingly we do not think the Britt case is at all similar to the ease at bar. *498 This issue is determined by our case of Cochrane v. State, 48 Ariz. 124 , 59 Pac. (2d) 658, 662 , from which we quote the following: “The excerpt from the argument of the county attorney, in his closing address to the jury, complained of as not based on the facts and as prejudicial, was called to the attention of the court by defendant’s counsel as fo 1944Under the rules it is not properly before us for consideration, and we give it only for the purpose of showing the unfair and oppressive conduct of prosecutor.” Accordingly we do not think the Britt case is at all similar to the ease at bar. *498 This issue is determined by our case of Cochrane v. State, 48 Ariz. 124 , 59 Pac. (2d) 658, 662 , from which we quote the following: “The excerpt from the argument of the county attorney, in his closing address to the jury, complained of as not based on the facts and as prejudicial, was called to the attention of the court by defendant’s counsel as fo | 1 | 1944–1944 |
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wooldridge
neutral
1 sentence1926The Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wooldridge, 295 Fed. 847 , after stating the facts, said: “The Guaranty Company could not acquire from the railway company a right not possessed by the latter. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Prindeville v. People
green
1 sentence1907It is said by the supreme court of Illinois in Prindeville v. People, 42 Ill. 217 , that “where, to convict of the higher offense, the prosecutor must prove every fact necessary to constitute the smaller offense, together with the additional facts which make it the higher offense before he can have a conviction, then the jury, if the facts warrant it, may convict of the lesser offense.” And by the supreme-court of Maine, in State v. Henry, 98 Me. 561 , 57 Atl. 891 , it is said that “a practically universal rule prevails that the-verdict may he for a lesser crime which is included in a greater | 1 | 1907–1907 |
State v. Henry
green
2 sentences1907It is said by the supreme court of Illinois in Prindeville v. People, 42 Ill. 217 , that “where, to convict of the higher offense, the prosecutor must prove every fact necessary to constitute the smaller offense, together with the additional facts which make it the higher offense before he can have a conviction, then the jury, if the facts warrant it, may convict of the lesser offense.” And by the supreme-court of Maine, in State v. Henry, 98 Me. 561 , 57 Atl. 891 , it is said that “a practically universal rule prevails that the-verdict may he for a lesser crime which is included in a greater 1907It is said by the supreme court of Illinois in Prindeville v. People, 42 Ill. 217 , that “where, to convict of the higher offense, the prosecutor must prove every fact necessary to constitute the smaller offense, together with the additional facts which make it the higher offense before he can have a conviction, then the jury, if the facts warrant it, may convict of the lesser offense.” And by the supreme-court of Maine, in State v. Henry, 98 Me. 561 , 57 Atl. 891 , it is said that “a practically universal rule prevails that the-verdict may he for a lesser crime which is included in a greater | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.