ease bar in Pennsylvania

2017Finally, the Supreme Court cited its decision in Gardner v. Re-pasky, 434 Pa. 126 , 252 A.2d 704, 706 (1969), when it noted proverbially, “A man cannot sit as judge when he is a member of a board which has brought the accusations.” 605 A.2d at 1208 , Accordingly, argues Purcell, applying Lyness to the ease at bar compete this Court to reverse the trial court’s affirmation of the Board’s adjudication because the Board “heard, defined, and issued the charges, as in Lyness , but [B]oard members were the chief, and sole substantive witnesses against [Purcell].” (Purcell’s brief at 16.) The Distric

2015In determining whether the law of the ease doctrine applies, the appellate court “looks to where the rulings occurred in the context of the procedural posture of the case.” Gerrow v. Shincor Silicones, Inc., 756 A.2d 697, 701 (Pa.Super.2000) (citing Goldey v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, 544 Pa. 150 , 675 A.2d 264 , *1133 267 (1996)), aff'd sub nom., Gerrow v. John Royle & Sons, 572 Pa. 134 , 813 A.2d 778 (2002).

2015In determining whether the law of the ease doctrine applies, the appellate court “looks to where the rulings occurred in the context of the procedural posture of the case.” Gerrow v. Shincor Silicones, Inc., 756 A.2d 697, 701 (Pa.Super.2000) (citing Goldey v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, 544 Pa. 150 , 675 A.2d 264 , *1133 267 (1996)), aff'd sub nom., Gerrow v. John Royle & Sons, 572 Pa. 134 , 813 A.2d 778 (2002).

2015In determining whether the law of the ease doctrine applies, the appellate court “looks to where the rulings occurred in the context of the procedural posture of the case.” Gerrow v. Shincor Silicones, Inc., 756 A.2d 697, 701 (Pa.Super.2000) (citing Goldey v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, 544 Pa. 150 , 675 A.2d 264 , *1133 267 (1996)), aff'd sub nom., Gerrow v. John Royle & Sons, 572 Pa. 134 , 813 A.2d 778 (2002).

2015In determining whether the law of the ease doctrine applies, the appellate court “looks to where the rulings occurred in the context of the procedural posture of the case.” Gerrow v. Shincor Silicones, Inc., 756 A.2d 697, 701 (Pa.Super.2000) (citing Goldey v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, 544 Pa. 150 , 675 A.2d 264 , *1133 267 (1996)), aff'd sub nom., Gerrow v. John Royle & Sons, 572 Pa. 134 , 813 A.2d 778 (2002).

2013Procedural due process is not a fixed precept, but rather, a flexible concept that “calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

2013Procedural due process is not a fixed precept, but rather, a flexible concept that “calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

2012Section 5387 of the Act governs requests for relocation, and § 5337(h) enumerates ten factors that a trial court must consider when ruling on a custodial parent’s request to relocate. 3 Prior to the new law’s enactment, requests for relocation were governed by the three-pronged test first set forth in Gruber v. Gruber, 400 Pa.Super. 174 , 583 A.2d 434 (1990).

2012Section 5387 of the Act governs requests for relocation, and § 5337(h) enumerates ten factors that a trial court must consider when ruling on a custodial parent’s request to relocate. 3 Prior to the new law’s enactment, requests for relocation were governed by the three-pronged test first set forth in Gruber v. Gruber, 400 Pa.Super. 174 , 583 A.2d 434 (1990).

2008In Commonwealth v. Pagan, 597 Pa. 69 , 950 A.2d 270 (2008), we examined the application of the Bomar exception to a ease in which the claim of ineffectiveness was record-based, but where there was no hearing on the ineffectiveness claim below and, thus, no testimony by counsel.

2008In Commonwealth v. Pagan, 597 Pa. 69 , 950 A.2d 270 (2008), we examined the application of the Bomar exception to a ease in which the claim of ineffectiveness was record-based, but where there was no hearing on the ineffectiveness claim below and, thus, no testimony by counsel.

2007Id. at 228 , 888 A.2d at 674 . ¶ 11 In the ease at bar, the trial court reviewed the facts surrounding the original filing of the praecipe for writ of summons and carefully considered Appellants’ actions, as well as their inaction, after September 19, 2003.

2007Id. at 228 , 888 A.2d at 674 . ¶ 11 In the ease at bar, the trial court reviewed the facts surrounding the original filing of the praecipe for writ of summons and carefully considered Appellants’ actions, as well as their inaction, after September 19, 2003.

2003In Grant , the Supreme Court identified two “limited circumstances” where “[that] court may choose to create an exception to the general rule [which it had just announced] and review those claims on direct appeal.” Grant, 813 A.2d at 738 n. 14.

2000Conahan, 589 A.2d at 1110 .

1999We explained that the application of that statutory exception is appropriate where attorney’s fees are not specifically authorized by statute, but that “[i]n actions such as this ... where counsel fees are statutorily authorized in order to promote the purposes of a particular legislative scheme, the trial court should not determine the appropriateness. of counsel fees under the general standards applicable in all litigation.” Krassnoski, 684 A.2d at 639 . ¶ 24 Our reasoning is consistent with the recent Supreme Court decision in Phillips v. WCAB (Century Steel, Westinghouse, Atlantic Plant Ma

1999We explained that the application of that statutory exception is appropriate where attorney’s fees are not specifically authorized by statute, but that “[i]n actions such as this ... where counsel fees are statutorily authorized in order to promote the purposes of a particular legislative scheme, the trial court should not determine the appropriateness. of counsel fees under the general standards applicable in all litigation.” Krassnoski, 684 A.2d at 639 . ¶ 24 Our reasoning is consistent with the recent Supreme Court decision in Phillips v. WCAB (Century Steel, Westinghouse, Atlantic Plant Ma

1999Moreover, unlike the appellant-mothers in either Adoption of Embick, 351 Pa.Super. 491 , 506 A.2d 455 (1986), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 513 Pa. 634 , 520 A.2d 1385 (1987), or In the Interest of Bender, 366 Pa.Super. 450 , 531 A.2d 504 (1987), two cases heavily relied by the Majority for the proposition that C.D. has no expectation of privacy at all in any proceeding because of his alleged agreement to be examined for the limited purposes of the federal civil action, C.D. is not a party to the disciplinary proceeding in the ease at bar, and the state agency prosecuting Dr. M has

1999Moreover, unlike the appellant-mothers in either Adoption of Embick, 351 Pa.Super. 491 , 506 A.2d 455 (1986), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 513 Pa. 634 , 520 A.2d 1385 (1987), or In the Interest of Bender, 366 Pa.Super. 450 , 531 A.2d 504 (1987), two cases heavily relied by the Majority for the proposition that C.D. has no expectation of privacy at all in any proceeding because of his alleged agreement to be examined for the limited purposes of the federal civil action, C.D. is not a party to the disciplinary proceeding in the ease at bar, and the state agency prosecuting Dr. M has

1999Moreover, unlike the appellant-mothers in either Adoption of Embick, 351 Pa.Super. 491 , 506 A.2d 455 (1986), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 513 Pa. 634 , 520 A.2d 1385 (1987), or In the Interest of Bender, 366 Pa.Super. 450 , 531 A.2d 504 (1987), two cases heavily relied by the Majority for the proposition that C.D. has no expectation of privacy at all in any proceeding because of his alleged agreement to be examined for the limited purposes of the federal civil action, C.D. is not a party to the disciplinary proceeding in the ease at bar, and the state agency prosecuting Dr. M has

1999Moreover, unlike the appellant-mothers in either Adoption of Embick, 351 Pa.Super. 491 , 506 A.2d 455 (1986), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 513 Pa. 634 , 520 A.2d 1385 (1987), or In the Interest of Bender, 366 Pa.Super. 450 , 531 A.2d 504 (1987), two cases heavily relied by the Majority for the proposition that C.D. has no expectation of privacy at all in any proceeding because of his alleged agreement to be examined for the limited purposes of the federal civil action, C.D. is not a party to the disciplinary proceeding in the ease at bar, and the state agency prosecuting Dr. M has

1999We explained that the application of that statutory exception is appropriate where attorney’s fees are not specifically authorized by statute, but that “[i]n actions such as this ... where counsel fees are statutorily authorized in order to promote the purposes of a particular legislative scheme, the trial court should not determine the appropriateness. of counsel fees under the general standards applicable in all litigation.” Krassnoski, 684 A.2d at 639 . ¶ 24 Our reasoning is consistent with the recent Supreme Court decision in Phillips v. WCAB (Century Steel, Westinghouse, Atlantic Plant Ma

1997In support of its argument, Claimant cites Effort v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 125 Pa.Cmwlth. 505 , 558 A.2d 571 (1989), as analogous to the ease at bar.

1997In support of its argument, Claimant cites Effort v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 125 Pa.Cmwlth. 505 , 558 A.2d 571 (1989), as analogous to the ease at bar.

1997Ford v. Zoning Hearing Board of Caernarvon Township, 151 Pa.Cmwlth. 323 , 616 A.2d 1089 (1992).

1997Ford v. Zoning Hearing Board of Caernarvon Township, 151 Pa.Cmwlth. 323 , 616 A.2d 1089 (1992).

1986Beth-Allen Ladder Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 53 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 323 , 417 A.2d 854 (1980). 5 In the ease at bar, the Board-found that Employer did not meet its burden of proof in that it did not show a change in Claimant’s condition.

1986Beth-Allen Ladder Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 53 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 323 , 417 A.2d 854 (1980). 5 In the ease at bar, the Board-found that Employer did not meet its burden of proof in that it did not show a change in Claimant’s condition.

1986Turning to the second issue raised by the District, regarding the extent to which the District can be required to provide individualized educational programs for gifted students, we begin by noting that gifted and talented students are considered to be “exceptional persons,” as that term is defined in 22 Pa. Code §13.1 (ii). 2 Lisa H. v. State Board of Education, 67 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 350 , 447 A.2d 669 (1982).

1986Turning to the second issue raised by the District, regarding the extent to which the District can be required to provide individualized educational programs for gifted students, we begin by noting that gifted and talented students are considered to be “exceptional persons,” as that term is defined in 22 Pa. Code §13.1 (ii). 2 Lisa H. v. State Board of Education, 67 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 350 , 447 A.2d 669 (1982).

1974It is, of course, true that if the amended Rule 2252 (a) is to have its desired effect it must be given a broad interpretation: Snoparsky v. Baer, 439 Pa. 140 (1970); Municipal Authority v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., supra. As long as the additional defendants’ alleged liability is related to the original claim asserted by the plaintiff against the original defendant, the third party complaint should be allowed even though it may not be on the same cause of action as that declared in the original suit: Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263 (1971); Connors v. Arters Bros., Inc., 50 D. & C. 2d 87 (C.

1974It is, of course, true that if the amended Rule 2252 (a) is to have its desired effect it must be given a broad interpretation: Snoparsky v. Baer, 439 Pa. 140 (1970); Municipal Authority v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., supra. As long as the additional defendants’ alleged liability is related to the original claim asserted by the plaintiff against the original defendant, the third party complaint should be allowed even though it may not be on the same cause of action as that declared in the original suit: Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263 (1971); Connors v. Arters Bros., Inc., 50 D. & C. 2d 87 (C.

1974It is, of course, true that if the amended Rule 2252 (a) is to have its desired effect it must be given a broad interpretation: Snoparsky v. Baer, 439 Pa. 140 (1970); Municipal Authority v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., supra. As long as the additional defendants’ alleged liability is related to the original claim asserted by the plaintiff against the original defendant, the third party complaint should be allowed even though it may not be on the same cause of action as that declared in the original suit: Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263 (1971); Connors v. Arters Bros., Inc., 50 D. & C. 2d 87 (C.