ease bar in Nebraska

1946“A natural stream may be used under certain conditions to conduct irrigation water, but where the water so, conducted contributes to an overflow which causes damage, liability therefor attaches to such use.” Hagadone v. Dawson County Irrigaton Co., 136 Neb. 258 , 285 N. W. 600 .

1946“A natural stream may be used under certain conditions to conduct irrigation water, but where the water so, conducted contributes to an overflow which causes damage, liability therefor attaches to such use.” Hagadone v. Dawson County Irrigaton Co., 136 Neb. 258 , 285 N. W. 600 .

1946We have held that, when structures are built across or •into natural drainways, as Fremont Slough is shown to be in the ease at bar, “It is the duty of those who build structures across natural drainways to provide for. the natural passage through such obstructions of all waters which may be reasonably anticipated to drain there, and this is a continuing duty.” Webb. v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, 146 Neb. 61 , 18 N. W. 2d 563 .

1946We have held that, when structures are built across or •into natural drainways, as Fremont Slough is shown to be in the ease at bar, “It is the duty of those who build structures across natural drainways to provide for. the natural passage through such obstructions of all waters which may be reasonably anticipated to drain there, and this is a continuing duty.” Webb. v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, 146 Neb. 61 , 18 N. W. 2d 563 .

1929Appellees also cite Webber v. Frye, 199 Ia. 448 .

1926In Welter v. State, 112 Neb. 22 , the same principle is discussed, and reference is there had to decisions which support the view expressed in this opinion; The following are among the cases there cited: Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584 , is a case in which the court held: “On the trial of a defendant for conspiracy to defraud the United States of public lands, evidence that he had previously been engaged in the illegal acquisition of public lands elsewhere by a different method was admissible as bearing upon the questions of intent, purpose, and design.” People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228 ; Fra

1926In Welter v. State, 112 Neb. 22 , the same principle is discussed, and reference is there had to decisions which support the view expressed in this opinion; The following are among the cases there cited: Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584 , is a case in which the court held: “On the trial of a defendant for conspiracy to defraud the United States of public lands, evidence that he had previously been engaged in the illegal acquisition of public lands elsewhere by a different method was admissible as bearing upon the questions of intent, purpose, and design.” People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228 ; Fra

1926In Welter v. State, 112 Neb. 22 , the same principle is discussed, and reference is there had to decisions which support the view expressed in this opinion; The following are among the cases there cited: Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584 , is a case in which the court held: “On the trial of a defendant for conspiracy to defraud the United States of public lands, evidence that he had previously been engaged in the illegal acquisition of public lands elsewhere by a different method was admissible as bearing upon the questions of intent, purpose, and design.” People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228 ; Fra

1926In Welter v. State, 112 Neb. 22 , the same principle is discussed, and reference is there had to decisions which support the view expressed in this opinion; The following are among the cases there cited: Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584 , is a case in which the court held: “On the trial of a defendant for conspiracy to defraud the United States of public lands, evidence that he had previously been engaged in the illegal acquisition of public lands elsewhere by a different method was admissible as bearing upon the questions of intent, purpose, and design.” People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228 ; Fra

1926In Welter v. State, 112 Neb. 22 , the same principle is discussed, and reference is there had to decisions which support the view expressed in this opinion; The following are among the cases there cited: Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584 , is a case in which the court held: “On the trial of a defendant for conspiracy to defraud the United States of public lands, evidence that he had previously been engaged in the illegal acquisition of public lands elsewhere by a different method was admissible as bearing upon the questions of intent, purpose, and design.” People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228 ; Fra

1926In Welter v. State, 112 Neb. 22 , the same principle is discussed, and reference is there had to decisions which support the view expressed in this opinion; The following are among the cases there cited: Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584 , is a case in which the court held: “On the trial of a defendant for conspiracy to defraud the United States of public lands, evidence that he had previously been engaged in the illegal acquisition of public lands elsewhere by a different method was admissible as bearing upon the questions of intent, purpose, and design.” People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228 ; Fra

1926In Welter v. State, 112 Neb. 22 , the same principle is discussed, and reference is there had to decisions which support the view expressed in this opinion; The following are among the cases there cited: Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584 , is a case in which the court held: “On the trial of a defendant for conspiracy to defraud the United States of public lands, evidence that he had previously been engaged in the illegal acquisition of public lands elsewhere by a different method was admissible as bearing upon the questions of intent, purpose, and design.” People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228 ; Fra

1926In Welter v. State, 112 Neb. 22 , the same principle is discussed, and reference is there had to decisions which support the view expressed in this opinion; The following are among the cases there cited: Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584 , is a case in which the court held: “On the trial of a defendant for conspiracy to defraud the United States of public lands, evidence that he had previously been engaged in the illegal acquisition of public lands elsewhere by a different method was admissible as bearing upon the questions of intent, purpose, and design.” People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228 ; Fra

1912A rehearing was had, and in an opinion prepared by Holcomb, J., the purpose of the act was stated more fully. 67 Neb. 325 .

1909In Clark v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 199 , it is said: “If, after acquiring jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, a superior court should order judgment for one of the parties without a trial, such judgment would not be ‘without or in excess of the jurisdiction’ of the court, although it might be erroneous; and in such case the only remedy would be by appeal.” The facts in that case are somewhat akin to the ease at bar.

1901The statute would read, when each of the two classes or different methods of killing .is stated separately, as follows: “If any person shall purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice kill another ; or if any person shall in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate either a rape, arson, robbery or burglary or by administering poison or causing the same to be done kill another, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree.” Or by omitting all the language not applicable to the offense charged in the ease at bar, pertaining to the question being consid

1901Rep. [Ky.], 416; State v. Gray, 19 Nev., 212 ; People v. Nichol, 34 Cal., 211 .

1901Rep. [Ky.], 416; State v. Gray, 19 Nev., 212 ; People v. Nichol, 34 Cal., 211 .

1901The statute would read, when each of the two classes or different methods of killing .is stated separately, as follows: “If any person shall purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice kill another ; or if any person shall in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate either a rape, arson, robbery or burglary or by administering poison or causing the same to be done kill another, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree.” Or by omitting all the language not applicable to the offense charged in the ease at bar, pertaining to the question being consid

1901The statute would read, when each of the two classes or different methods of killing .is stated separately, as follows: “If any person shall purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice kill another ; or if any person shall in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate either a rape, arson, robbery or burglary or by administering poison or causing the same to be done kill another, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree.” Or by omitting all the language not applicable to the offense charged in the ease at bar, pertaining to the question being consid

1893Co., 89 Mo., 44 .) It will be observed in the ease at bar that on page 457 of Municipal Code of Lincoln it is provided that “said railway company shall be subject to all reasonable regulations in the construction and use of said railway which may be imposed by ordinances.” The constitution of 1875, to prevent favoritism and fraud, required the consent of a majority of the electors thereof of any city, town, or incorporated village to the construction of a street railway.

1890(Pinney v. Andrus, 41 Vt., 631 ; Bank v. Grindstaff, 45 Ind., 158 .) The contract of warranty in the ease at bar expressly stipulates that “the enlargement of the horse’s bag in no way troubled him,” and is a guaranty against the extent of the injury.

1890(Pinney v. Andrus, 41 Vt., 631 ; Bank v. Grindstaff, 45 Ind., 158 .) The contract of warranty in the ease at bar expressly stipulates that “the enlargement of the horse’s bag in no way troubled him,” and is a guaranty against the extent of the injury.

1888Whi'e it is true that the testimony in that case is not all certified to this court in the ease at bar, yet it can hardly be supposed that, under the rule stated in Aultman v. Stout, 15 Neb., 586 , this amount of damages could have been allowed, without taking into consideration the faot that these notes were outstanding, and were to be paid by plaintiff in error.

1880In the ease at bar the debt was not created or the contract made by a single act, like the execution of a note, as in Leonard v. Vredenburgh, supra, but extended over a period of several weeks.