ease bar in California

1971(Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 407 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 928 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 ].) 9 Finally, the function of confrontation in subjecting the witness’ demeanor to the scrutiny of the trier of fact was undoubtedly served in the ease at bar.

1971(Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 407 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 928 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 ].) 9 Finally, the function of confrontation in subjecting the witness’ demeanor to the scrutiny of the trier of fact was undoubtedly served in the ease at bar.

1957(McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 420 [ 51 P. 696 , 39 L.RA. 691] ; Matter of Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 633 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.E.R. 856]; Langendorf etc. Bakeries v. Industrial Acc. Com., 87 Cal.App.2d 103, 104 [ 195 P.2d 887 ], and cases cited.) “In the ease at bar no evidence was offered against petitioner.

1957(McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 420 [ 51 P. 696 , 39 L.RA. 691] ; Matter of Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 633 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.E.R. 856]; Langendorf etc. Bakeries v. Industrial Acc. Com., 87 Cal.App.2d 103, 104 [ 195 P.2d 887 ], and cases cited.) “In the ease at bar no evidence was offered against petitioner.

1957In the situation prevailing in the ease at bar, it would have been highly improper and prejudicial to the codefendant Mack had the court in any way indicated he was an accomplice and that his testimony should be viewed with caution or distrust (People v. Burnette, 39 Cal.App.2d 215, 231 [ 102 P.2d 799 ]; People v. O’Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 180, 181 [ 31 P. 45 ]).

1957In the situation prevailing in the ease at bar, it would have been highly improper and prejudicial to the codefendant Mack had the court in any way indicated he was an accomplice and that his testimony should be viewed with caution or distrust (People v. Burnette, 39 Cal.App.2d 215, 231 [ 102 P.2d 799 ]; People v. O’Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 180, 181 [ 31 P. 45 ]).

1957(McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 420 [ 51 P. 696 , 39 L.RA. 691] ; Matter of Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 633 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.E.R. 856]; Langendorf etc. Bakeries v. Industrial Acc. Com., 87 Cal.App.2d 103, 104 [ 195 P.2d 887 ], and cases cited.) “In the ease at bar no evidence was offered against petitioner.

1957(McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 420 [ 51 P. 696 , 39 L.RA. 691] ; Matter of Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 633 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.E.R. 856]; Langendorf etc. Bakeries v. Industrial Acc. Com., 87 Cal.App.2d 103, 104 [ 195 P.2d 887 ], and cases cited.) “In the ease at bar no evidence was offered against petitioner.

1957(McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 420 [ 51 P. 696 , 39 L.RA. 691] ; Matter of Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 633 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.E.R. 856]; Langendorf etc. Bakeries v. Industrial Acc. Com., 87 Cal.App.2d 103, 104 [ 195 P.2d 887 ], and cases cited.) “In the ease at bar no evidence was offered against petitioner.

1957(McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 420 [ 51 P. 696 , 39 L.RA. 691] ; Matter of Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 633 [ 66 P. 851 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 296 , 55 L.E.R. 856]; Langendorf etc. Bakeries v. Industrial Acc. Com., 87 Cal.App.2d 103, 104 [ 195 P.2d 887 ], and cases cited.) “In the ease at bar no evidence was offered against petitioner.

1947(N.Y.) 421; Leavitt v. Palmer, 3 N.Y. 37 [51 Am.Dec. 333]; 1 Parsons Cont., 380.) ’ “In Innes v. Goldwater, 30 Cal.App. 101, 105 [ 157 P. 18, 19 ], the court again said: ‘In the light of this express approval of the principle declared in the case of Jackson v. Shawl , we are constrained to give application to that principle in the ease at bar to the extent of holding that the agreement of the plaintiff with the defendant for these several loans and pledges were legal in so far as the principle sum of such loans and security therefor were concerned, and only illegal as to the interest to be cha

1947(N.Y.) 421; Leavitt v. Palmer, 3 N.Y. 37 [51 Am.Dec. 333]; 1 Parsons Cont., 380.) ’ “In Innes v. Goldwater, 30 Cal.App. 101, 105 [ 157 P. 18, 19 ], the court again said: ‘In the light of this express approval of the principle declared in the case of Jackson v. Shawl , we are constrained to give application to that principle in the ease at bar to the extent of holding that the agreement of the plaintiff with the defendant for these several loans and pledges were legal in so far as the principle sum of such loans and security therefor were concerned, and only illegal as to the interest to be cha

1923(Estate of Willson, 171 Cal. 449 [ 153 Pac. 927 ]; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337, 341 [ 55 Pac. 1011 ].) In the ease at bar there is no doubtful or uncertain language in the will; the entire intention of the testator as to the disposition of his property is plainly expressed.

1923(Estate of Willson, 171 Cal. 449 [ 153 Pac. 927 ]; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337, 341 [ 55 Pac. 1011 ].) In the ease at bar there is no doubtful or uncertain language in the will; the entire intention of the testator as to the disposition of his property is plainly expressed.

1968These matters are for the trier of the facts and only where the evidence does not support a finding of substantial and unreasonable interference should the court decide the issue as a matter of law.” (Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 729 [ 123 P.2d 505 ].)

1964In Rose v. State, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 729 , in finding that substantial impairment of access in the narrowing of an abutting street resulted from construction of a subway, we said: “The issues before the trial court in the ease at bar were, whether plaintiffs’ right of access . . . was substantially and unreasonably impaired . . . and if so, the amount of damage suffered as the result of such interference . . . .” (Italics added.) More recently, in People ex rel.

1966Co., 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ].) Perhaps more important in this ease is the rule that requires us to indulge all inferences or deductions from the evidence most favorably in support of the jury’s verdict.

1966Co., 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ].) Perhaps more important in this ease is the rule that requires us to indulge all inferences or deductions from the evidence most favorably in support of the jury’s verdict.

1960(Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal.2d 754 [ 146 P.2d 905 ].) In the ease here at bar, however, there was no attempt to show that any such agreement was ever entered into.

1960(Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal.2d 754 [ 146 P.2d 905 ].) In the ease here at bar, however, there was no attempt to show that any such agreement was ever entered into.

1962Code, § 2273; Neet v. Holmes, 25 Cal.2d 447, 466 [ 154 P.2d 854 ]; Ochoa v. McCush, 213 Cal. 426, 431 [ 2 P.2d 357 ] ; In re Beisel, 110 Cal. 267, 275, 277 [ 40 P. 961 , 42 P. 819 ] ; Glide v. Dwyer, 83 Cal. 477, 487-488 [ 23 P.2d 706 ]; Bixby v. Hotchkis, 58 Cal.App.2d 445, 452 [ 136 P.2d 597 ] ; 49 Cal.Jur.2d 134-138.) In the ease at bar, among other things, the plaintiffs sought a determination of the extent of the wife’s share in community property which was subject to administration.

1962Code, § 2273; Neet v. Holmes, 25 Cal.2d 447, 466 [ 154 P.2d 854 ]; Ochoa v. McCush, 213 Cal. 426, 431 [ 2 P.2d 357 ] ; In re Beisel, 110 Cal. 267, 275, 277 [ 40 P. 961 , 42 P. 819 ] ; Glide v. Dwyer, 83 Cal. 477, 487-488 [ 23 P.2d 706 ]; Bixby v. Hotchkis, 58 Cal.App.2d 445, 452 [ 136 P.2d 597 ] ; 49 Cal.Jur.2d 134-138.) In the ease at bar, among other things, the plaintiffs sought a determination of the extent of the wife’s share in community property which was subject to administration.

1960Two examples of the exhaustive treatment of the subject and the careful wording of the rule are to be found in Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal and Metcalf v. County of Los Angeles , both noted supra. In Bernstein v. Smutz, 83 Cal.App.2d 108, 115 [ 188 P.2d 48 ], the court said, “In all of the cases in this state in which it has been held that a party had not exhausted his administrative remedies and therefore was not entitled to relief by the court, provision was made in the governing law for a proceeding of some nature before an administrative body which the party had not pursued.” We a

1960Two examples of the exhaustive treatment of the subject and the careful wording of the rule are to be found in Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal and Metcalf v. County of Los Angeles , both noted supra. In Bernstein v. Smutz, 83 Cal.App.2d 108, 115 [ 188 P.2d 48 ], the court said, “In all of the cases in this state in which it has been held that a party had not exhausted his administrative remedies and therefore was not entitled to relief by the court, provision was made in the governing law for a proceeding of some nature before an administrative body which the party had not pursued.” We a

1959Co. v. Long, 4 Cal.2d 547, 562 [ 51 P.2d 73 ]; Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294 [ 37 S.Ct. 506 , 61 L.Ed. 1148 ]; 3 Witkin, California Procedure, 1935.) The normal rule is that the defense of res judicata must be pleaded and proved at trial. (3 Witkin, California Procedure, 1931.) The reason for the exception established by the authorities last cited is made plain in the facts of the ease at bar.

1959Co. v. Long, 4 Cal.2d 547, 562 [ 51 P.2d 73 ]; Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294 [ 37 S.Ct. 506 , 61 L.Ed. 1148 ]; 3 Witkin, California Procedure, 1935.) The normal rule is that the defense of res judicata must be pleaded and proved at trial. (3 Witkin, California Procedure, 1931.) The reason for the exception established by the authorities last cited is made plain in the facts of the ease at bar.

1956It has been held accordingly that “the hearing officer is needful for the purpose of conducting all hearings after such fashion as will safeguard the legal rights of those concerned.” (Ba rtosh v. Board of Osteopathic Examiners, 82 Cal.App.2d 486, 492 [ 186 P.2d 984 ]; National Auto. & Cas.

1956It has been held accordingly that “the hearing officer is needful for the purpose of conducting all hearings after such fashion as will safeguard the legal rights of those concerned.” (Ba rtosh v. Board of Osteopathic Examiners, 82 Cal.App.2d 486, 492 [ 186 P.2d 984 ]; National Auto. & Cas.

1969The correction was not made until January 28, 1969. 8 A dictum in People v. Martin, supra, not applicable to the facts of the ease at bar, was disapproved in In re Gonsalves, 48 Cal.2d 638, 646 [ 311 P.2d 483 ]. 9 There appears to be a substantial question whether subdivisions (h) and (m) of section 1538.5 indicate that the district attorney concedes too much and he has reserved the right to argue otherwise on other occasions.

1969The correction was not made until January 28, 1969. 8 A dictum in People v. Martin, supra, not applicable to the facts of the ease at bar, was disapproved in In re Gonsalves, 48 Cal.2d 638, 646 [ 311 P.2d 483 ]. 9 There appears to be a substantial question whether subdivisions (h) and (m) of section 1538.5 indicate that the district attorney concedes too much and he has reserved the right to argue otherwise on other occasions.

1969(People v. Langdon, supra, 52 Cal.2d 425, 432 [2] et. seq. [ 341 P.2d 303 ].)” People v. Golston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 535, 538-539 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 375 P.2d 51 ].’ In People v. Lookadoo (1967) 66 Cal.2d 307, 311 [ 57 Cal. Rptr. 608 , 425 P.2d 208 ] the court states: “ [2] Although the trial court in a criminal ease is not required to explain to a defendant the nature and consequence of his action in waiving a jury trial where he is, as in the ease at bar, represented by counsel and fails to show that either he or his counsel has been misled .as to the result which might occur from his waiving a

1969(People v. Langdon, supra, 52 Cal.2d 425, 432 [2] et. seq. [ 341 P.2d 303 ].)” People v. Golston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 535, 538-539 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 375 P.2d 51 ].’ In People v. Lookadoo (1967) 66 Cal.2d 307, 311 [ 57 Cal. Rptr. 608 , 425 P.2d 208 ] the court states: “ [2] Although the trial court in a criminal ease is not required to explain to a defendant the nature and consequence of his action in waiving a jury trial where he is, as in the ease at bar, represented by counsel and fails to show that either he or his counsel has been misled .as to the result which might occur from his waiving a

1969(People v. Langdon, supra, 52 Cal.2d 425, 432 [2] et. seq. [ 341 P.2d 303 ].)” People v. Golston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 535, 538-539 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 375 P.2d 51 ].’ In People v. Lookadoo (1967) 66 Cal.2d 307, 311 [ 57 Cal. Rptr. 608 , 425 P.2d 208 ] the court states: “ [2] Although the trial court in a criminal ease is not required to explain to a defendant the nature and consequence of his action in waiving a jury trial where he is, as in the ease at bar, represented by counsel and fails to show that either he or his counsel has been misled .as to the result which might occur from his waiving a

1969(People v. Langdon, supra, 52 Cal.2d 425, 432 [2] et. seq. [ 341 P.2d 303 ].)” People v. Golston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 535, 538-539 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 375 P.2d 51 ].’ In People v. Lookadoo (1967) 66 Cal.2d 307, 311 [ 57 Cal. Rptr. 608 , 425 P.2d 208 ] the court states: “ [2] Although the trial court in a criminal ease is not required to explain to a defendant the nature and consequence of his action in waiving a jury trial where he is, as in the ease at bar, represented by counsel and fails to show that either he or his counsel has been misled .as to the result which might occur from his waiving a

1969(People v. Langdon, supra, 52 Cal.2d 425, 432 [2] et. seq. [ 341 P.2d 303 ].)” People v. Golston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 535, 538-539 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 375 P.2d 51 ].’ In People v. Lookadoo (1967) 66 Cal.2d 307, 311 [ 57 Cal. Rptr. 608 , 425 P.2d 208 ] the court states: “ [2] Although the trial court in a criminal ease is not required to explain to a defendant the nature and consequence of his action in waiving a jury trial where he is, as in the ease at bar, represented by counsel and fails to show that either he or his counsel has been misled .as to the result which might occur from his waiving a

1969(People v. Langdon, supra, 52 Cal.2d 425, 432 [2] et. seq. [ 341 P.2d 303 ].)” People v. Golston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 535, 538-539 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 375 P.2d 51 ].’ In People v. Lookadoo (1967) 66 Cal.2d 307, 311 [ 57 Cal. Rptr. 608 , 425 P.2d 208 ] the court states: “ [2] Although the trial court in a criminal ease is not required to explain to a defendant the nature and consequence of his action in waiving a jury trial where he is, as in the ease at bar, represented by counsel and fails to show that either he or his counsel has been misled .as to the result which might occur from his waiving a

1969We “cannot examine evidence to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. [Citations.] Our function is to determine whether the record contains any substantial evidence tending to support the finding of the trial court.” (In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 823-824 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 379 ].) Such evidence is present in the ease at bar.

1969We “cannot examine evidence to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. [Citations.] Our function is to determine whether the record contains any substantial evidence tending to support the finding of the trial court.” (In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 823-824 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 379 ].) Such evidence is present in the ease at bar.

1968There are, of course, situations—see for example People v. Grubb, 63 Cal.2d 614, 618-619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] and People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 800 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 382 , 409 P.2d 222 ]—where an automobile may be searched without a warrant, not incident to a legal arrest and without probable cause to believe that it contains contraband.

1968There are, of course, situations—see for example People v. Grubb, 63 Cal.2d 614, 618-619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] and People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 800 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 382 , 409 P.2d 222 ]—where an automobile may be searched without a warrant, not incident to a legal arrest and without probable cause to believe that it contains contraband.