ease bar in Wyoming

1998Similarly, “[a] trial court violates Wyoming’s constitutional due process guarantee when it fails to give to the jury the defendant’s theory of the ease or defense instruction if that theory properly articulates Wyoming law, is not presented by another instruction, and has competent evidence to underpin the request.” Wilkening v. State, 922 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Wyo.1996) (citing Oien, 797 P.2d at 548 ).

1993The primary issue to be resolved in this ease is whether the rule articulated in Bearpaw v. State, 803 P.2d 70 (Wyo.1990), should be applied retrospectively to a case in which the defendant was a fugitive for almost seven years after his conviction.

1985The district court quoted the following pertinent language from Walgreen Company v. State Board of Equalization, 62 Wyo. 288 , 166 P.2d 960, 964 , reh. denied 62 Wyo. 336 , 169 P.2d 76 (1946). “ ‘The vendor should, we think, not be permitted — unless the statute in clear and positive language so says, and this it is far from doing — to use the money of a vendee who for one reason or another has overpaid the sales tax on a pur *246 chased article to offset the failure of such vendor to collect the proper amount from another taxpayer.’ ” We also said in the Walgreen case: “There is no clause in

1985The district court quoted the following pertinent language from Walgreen Company v. State Board of Equalization, 62 Wyo. 288 , 166 P.2d 960, 964 , reh. denied 62 Wyo. 336 , 169 P.2d 76 (1946). “ ‘The vendor should, we think, not be permitted — unless the statute in clear and positive language so says, and this it is far from doing — to use the money of a vendee who for one reason or another has overpaid the sales tax on a pur *246 chased article to offset the failure of such vendor to collect the proper amount from another taxpayer.’ ” We also said in the Walgreen case: “There is no clause in

1981He does not sustain this burden by showing that up until the time of his motion his adversary has not produced sufficient evidence in support of his pleadings to require a trial. * * * * * * “A motion for a summary judgment does not create an T move — now you prove situation.’ The initial burden of proof is on the movant and absent his sustaining it he is not entitled to a summary judgment regardless of whether the opposing party comes forward with any proof or not.” Matarese was not a malpractice case, but the principle therein announced was carried forward by the Supreme Court of Florida in

1932The court said in part : '' The bank held a large debt against the Importing Company, and took these collaterals to secure it, and for a large additional loan, as plaintiff would have us believe, and released the payee of the collateral notes from all liability in *343 tbem (Rice v. Stearns, 3 Mass. 225 , 3 Am.

1932We think the petition in the ease at bar, unlike the bill discussed in the United States v. Cohen, supra, states facts that show the habitual, continuous or recurrent use of the building by defendants for the keeping for sale and the selling of intoxicating liquors; and, therefore, charges the maintenance of the statutory common nuisance which, under principles recognized in State ex rel.

1932In Merchant’s National Bank v. Branson, 165 N. C. 344 , 81 S. E. 410, 414 , the facts on the point now being considered were similar to those in the ease at bar.

1932In Merchant’s National Bank v. Branson, 165 N. C. 344 , 81 S. E. 410, 414 , the facts on the point now being considered were similar to those in the ease at bar.

1931Authorities, in addition to those cited in Hahn v. Citizens State Bank, supra, showing the application of the rule to situations not unlike that in the ease at bar are: Waterbury Lumber and Coal Co. v. Coogan, 73 Conn. 519 , 48 Atl. 204 ; French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636 , 68 Pac. 92 ; Live Oak Lumber Co. v. Farr, 28 Cal. App. 641 , 153 Pac. 741 ; Hotel Company v. Tacoma, 122 Wash. 335 , 210 Pac. 676 ; Baldridge v. Mor *416 gan, 15 N. Mex. 249, 106 Pac. 342 , Ann.

1931Authorities, in addition to those cited in Hahn v. Citizens State Bank, supra, showing the application of the rule to situations not unlike that in the ease at bar are: Waterbury Lumber and Coal Co. v. Coogan, 73 Conn. 519 , 48 Atl. 204 ; French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636 , 68 Pac. 92 ; Live Oak Lumber Co. v. Farr, 28 Cal. App. 641 , 153 Pac. 741 ; Hotel Company v. Tacoma, 122 Wash. 335 , 210 Pac. 676 ; Baldridge v. Mor *416 gan, 15 N. Mex. 249, 106 Pac. 342 , Ann.

1931Of similar purport is the language of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U. S. 290 , 39 Sup. Ct. 448, 63 L.

1931Of similar purport is the language of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U. S. 290 , 39 Sup. Ct. 448, 63 L.

1931Authorities, in addition to those cited in Hahn v. Citizens State Bank, supra, showing the application of the rule to situations not unlike that in the ease at bar are: Waterbury Lumber and Coal Co. v. Coogan, 73 Conn. 519 , 48 Atl. 204 ; French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636 , 68 Pac. 92 ; Live Oak Lumber Co. v. Farr, 28 Cal. App. 641 , 153 Pac. 741 ; Hotel Company v. Tacoma, 122 Wash. 335 , 210 Pac. 676 ; Baldridge v. Mor *416 gan, 15 N. Mex. 249, 106 Pac. 342 , Ann.

1931Cas. 1912C, 337; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., (Ind. App.) 156 N. E. 169 . ¥e are of opinion tbe petition supports tbe judgment, wbicb is affirmed.

1931In Boulter v. Cook, 31 Wyo. 373 , 226 Pac. 447, 451 , in considering a statute which, among other things, authorizes a district judge to sign and allow “all bills of exception” in any county where the judge may be when the bills are presented to him, it was said by Chief Justice Potter that the power “to sign and allow all bills of exception must be held to include the incidental act of extending the time for reducing exceptions to writing and presenting the same for allowance.” We think we should apply this principle to the ease at bar.

1931In Boulter v. Cook, 31 Wyo. 373 , 226 Pac. 447, 451 , in considering a statute which, among other things, authorizes a district judge to sign and allow “all bills of exception” in any county where the judge may be when the bills are presented to him, it was said by Chief Justice Potter that the power “to sign and allow all bills of exception must be held to include the incidental act of extending the time for reducing exceptions to writing and presenting the same for allowance.” We think we should apply this principle to the ease at bar.

1931Authorities, in addition to those cited in Hahn v. Citizens State Bank, supra, showing the application of the rule to situations not unlike that in the ease at bar are: Waterbury Lumber and Coal Co. v. Coogan, 73 Conn. 519 , 48 Atl. 204 ; French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636 , 68 Pac. 92 ; Live Oak Lumber Co. v. Farr, 28 Cal. App. 641 , 153 Pac. 741 ; Hotel Company v. Tacoma, 122 Wash. 335 , 210 Pac. 676 ; Baldridge v. Mor *416 gan, 15 N. Mex. 249, 106 Pac. 342 , Ann.

1931Authorities, in addition to those cited in Hahn v. Citizens State Bank, supra, showing the application of the rule to situations not unlike that in the ease at bar are: Waterbury Lumber and Coal Co. v. Coogan, 73 Conn. 519 , 48 Atl. 204 ; French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636 , 68 Pac. 92 ; Live Oak Lumber Co. v. Farr, 28 Cal. App. 641 , 153 Pac. 741 ; Hotel Company v. Tacoma, 122 Wash. 335 , 210 Pac. 676 ; Baldridge v. Mor *416 gan, 15 N. Mex. 249, 106 Pac. 342 , Ann.

1931Authorities, in addition to those cited in Hahn v. Citizens State Bank, supra, showing the application of the rule to situations not unlike that in the ease at bar are: Waterbury Lumber and Coal Co. v. Coogan, 73 Conn. 519 , 48 Atl. 204 ; French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636 , 68 Pac. 92 ; Live Oak Lumber Co. v. Farr, 28 Cal. App. 641 , 153 Pac. 741 ; Hotel Company v. Tacoma, 122 Wash. 335 , 210 Pac. 676 ; Baldridge v. Mor *416 gan, 15 N. Mex. 249, 106 Pac. 342 , Ann.

1931Authorities, in addition to those cited in Hahn v. Citizens State Bank, supra, showing the application of the rule to situations not unlike that in the ease at bar are: Waterbury Lumber and Coal Co. v. Coogan, 73 Conn. 519 , 48 Atl. 204 ; French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636 , 68 Pac. 92 ; Live Oak Lumber Co. v. Farr, 28 Cal. App. 641 , 153 Pac. 741 ; Hotel Company v. Tacoma, 122 Wash. 335 , 210 Pac. 676 ; Baldridge v. Mor *416 gan, 15 N. Mex. 249, 106 Pac. 342 , Ann.

1931Authorities, in addition to those cited in Hahn v. Citizens State Bank, supra, showing the application of the rule to situations not unlike that in the ease at bar are: Waterbury Lumber and Coal Co. v. Coogan, 73 Conn. 519 , 48 Atl. 204 ; French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636 , 68 Pac. 92 ; Live Oak Lumber Co. v. Farr, 28 Cal. App. 641 , 153 Pac. 741 ; Hotel Company v. Tacoma, 122 Wash. 335 , 210 Pac. 676 ; Baldridge v. Mor *416 gan, 15 N. Mex. 249, 106 Pac. 342 , Ann.

1931Authorities, in addition to those cited in Hahn v. Citizens State Bank, supra, showing the application of the rule to situations not unlike that in the ease at bar are: Waterbury Lumber and Coal Co. v. Coogan, 73 Conn. 519 , 48 Atl. 204 ; French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636 , 68 Pac. 92 ; Live Oak Lumber Co. v. Farr, 28 Cal. App. 641 , 153 Pac. 741 ; Hotel Company v. Tacoma, 122 Wash. 335 , 210 Pac. 676 ; Baldridge v. Mor *416 gan, 15 N. Mex. 249, 106 Pac. 342 , Ann.

1930They were not caused by the injunction. ’ ’ In logical application of the principles announced by the authorities just reviewed and quite closely touching the facts of the ease at bar, we find a more concrete statement of the law in 2 High on Injunctions (4th Ed.) 1637, Sec. 1689, where it is declared that: “When the bond is conditioned for the payment of all damages sustained by suing out an injunction if the same is dissolved, it is not proper to allow counsel fees for services rendered in the progress of the cause to a final decree after dissolution, since such fees are not properly damages

1930In Joiner v. State, 94 Ark. 198 , 126 S. W. 723, 724 , there was a conditional promise of immunity, just as in the ease at bar.

1930In Joiner v. State, 94 Ark. 198 , 126 S. W. 723, 724 , there was a conditional promise of immunity, just as in the ease at bar.

1930Plaintiff relies on Stanley v. Foote, 9 Wyo. 335 , 63 Pae. 940, in which it was held, as stated in the syllabus, that' ‘ a claimant to money garnished or property attached in an action between other parties, cannot intervene in the action for the purpose of having his rights thereto de *143 termined. ’ ’ Counsel for tbe interpleader contend that the principle announced in Stanley v. Foote has no application where the claimant to the money comes into the case pursuant to an order of court as in the ease at bar.

1930Neiderjohn v. Thompson, 38 Wyo. 28, 39 , 264 Pac. 699 ; Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 403 , 64 Pac. 225 .

1930Neiderjohn v. Thompson, 38 Wyo. 28, 39 , 264 Pac. 699 ; Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 403 , 64 Pac. 225 .

1930Neiderjohn v. Thompson, 38 Wyo. 28, 39 , 264 Pac. 699 ; Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 403 , 64 Pac. 225 .

1930Neiderjohn v. Thompson, 38 Wyo. 28, 39 , 264 Pac. 699 ; Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 403 , 64 Pac. 225 .

1930They were not caused by the injunction. ’ ’ In logical application of the principles announced by the authorities just reviewed and quite closely touching the facts of the ease at bar, we find a more concrete statement of the law in 2 High on Injunctions (4th Ed.) 1637, Sec. 1689, where it is declared that: “When the bond is conditioned for the payment of all damages sustained by suing out an injunction if the same is dissolved, it is not proper to allow counsel fees for services rendered in the progress of the cause to a final decree after dissolution, since such fees are not properly damages

1929See: Jaycox v. Varnum, supra; Atkinson v. Roosevelt County, supra; Briggs v. Ghrist, supra. If Mr. Paine is right in saying that it is the duty of the court to choose between a disregard of the alleged illegality and a rejection of the poll of the precinct, we think the court must choose the first of these courses, where, as in the case at bar, the election of a county official is in question, and the only misconduct charged is that in one precinct the election officials, acting without wrong motive, kept the poll open too long and received after closing time votes of qualified electors which

1929They contented themselves by relying upon their objection to the admissions of the contract in evidence, claiming that the contract alleged in the complaint is different from that offered, and hence insisting that the proof was not within the issue. * * * If defendants were in any way misled by the discrepancy between the allegations and proof, they should have made that fact appear to the court; and, not having done so, the variance must be considered immaterial, and the facts found according to the evidence.” See also Nelson v. Dawgiallo, 73 Ore. 342 , 143 Pac. 924, 1199 , and cases cited in

1929They contented themselves by relying upon their objection to the admissions of the contract in evidence, claiming that the contract alleged in the complaint is different from that offered, and hence insisting that the proof was not within the issue. * * * If defendants were in any way misled by the discrepancy between the allegations and proof, they should have made that fact appear to the court; and, not having done so, the variance must be considered immaterial, and the facts found according to the evidence.” See also Nelson v. Dawgiallo, 73 Ore. 342 , 143 Pac. 924, 1199 , and cases cited in

1929Such rulings are in my opinion wrong in morals and a travesty upon justice.” We are particularly referred to the cases of Choen v. Porter, 66 Ind. 194, 196 , and Quick v. Miller, 103 Pa. St. 67, as sustaining respondent’s contention on this phase of the ease at bar.

1928These cases, in so far as they are applicable in support of the contention in the ease at bar that Shreve did not hold the money in question as the agent of the plaintiff, are based, directly or indirectly, on a statement in White Mountain Bank v. West, 46 Me. 15, 20 , that: “Nor did this consent for him (the mortgagor) to sell, make him an agent of Carleton (the mortgagee) for that purpose.