ease bar in Oklahoma

2010Hurst v. Brown, 1954 OK 25 , 266 P.2d 438 (When a mandate is issued, the trial court has the duty to comply with its terms.) Bays, however, argues at great length that this case comes within exceptions to the rule that an appellate decision which is final after mandate becomes “the law of the ease.” ¶ 12 In addressing the law of the ease doctrine, the Supreme Court stated: Determinations made on a prior appeal of a cause are res judicata, and the decision of the appellate court on an issue of law becomes the law of the case once the decision is final and unreversed, in all subsequent stages.

2010Hurst v. Brown, 1954 OK 25 , 266 P.2d 438 (When a mandate is issued, the trial court has the duty to comply with its terms.) Bays, however, argues at great length that this case comes within exceptions to the rule that an appellate decision which is final after mandate becomes “the law of the ease.” ¶ 12 In addressing the law of the ease doctrine, the Supreme Court stated: Determinations made on a prior appeal of a cause are res judicata, and the decision of the appellate court on an issue of law becomes the law of the case once the decision is final and unreversed, in all subsequent stages.

2006On this issue, we find the case of Davenport v. Wilson, 1998 OK CIV APP 4 , 953 P.2d 764 , instructive.

2006On this issue, we find the case of Davenport v. Wilson, 1998 OK CIV APP 4 , 953 P.2d 764 , instructive.

1998The overriding royalty owners’ decision not to take the gas in kind does not impose different duties on the lessee. ¶ 27 In Application of Martin, 1956 OK 140 , 321 P.2d 659 (Okla.1956), we held that in the absence of an agreement otherwise an overriding royalty in gas deliverable in kind is to be measured and becomes the property of the overriding royalty owners at the mouth of the well.

1997The Supreme Court stated: The case of Shawnee National Bank v. United States, supra, 249 F. 583 , 161 C.C.A. 509 , ... an action in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to forfeit an automobile under Revised Statutes U.S. § 2140 (U.S. Compiled Statutes, § 4141), on the ground that it had been used in conveying intoxicating liquor into the Indian country, supports the rule that the claimant in the ease at bar was entitled to a trial by a jury, for the reason it is authority to the effect that upon the admission of Oklahoma as a state into the Union, and at the time of the adoption of the Constit

1997The Supreme Court stated: The case of Shawnee National Bank v. United States, supra, 249 F. 583 , 161 C.C.A. 509 , ... an action in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to forfeit an automobile under Revised Statutes U.S. § 2140 (U.S. Compiled Statutes, § 4141), on the ground that it had been used in conveying intoxicating liquor into the Indian country, supports the rule that the claimant in the ease at bar was entitled to a trial by a jury, for the reason it is authority to the effect that upon the admission of Oklahoma as a state into the Union, and at the time of the adoption of the Constit

1997Although it is true that the trial court typically retains jurisdiction to modify an award of support alimony under certain statutory circumstances, See 43 O.S.1991, § 134; 12 O.S.1991, § 1272.2; Bailey v. Bailey, 867 P.2d 1267 (Okla.1994), and cases cited therein, where there is no modifiable award, the trial court is powerless to modify a divorce decree. “[T]he purpose and function of a court in construing a divorce decree entered by it is to give effect to that which is already latently in the judgment, and the court has no warrant to add new provisions, substantive or otherwise, which were

1996Those cases held that if a plan is silent about the priority of payment, does not expressly give its managers the right to resolve ambiguities, and the facts do not clearly show that the beneficiary’s settlement included reimbursement for medical expenses, the plan will not be allowed to recover, despite ERISA. *576 In Sanders v. Scheideler and NEPCO EMBA, 816 F.Supp. 1338, 1344 (D.C.W.D.Wis.1993), affirmed without opinion, 25 F.3d 1053 , 1994 WL 234497 (7th Cir.1994), the court said: The subrogation clause does not address the priority of the plan’s subrogation rights ... to the undesignated

1996Those cases held that if a plan is silent about the priority of payment, does not expressly give its managers the right to resolve ambiguities, and the facts do not clearly show that the beneficiary’s settlement included reimbursement for medical expenses, the plan will not be allowed to recover, despite ERISA. *576 In Sanders v. Scheideler and NEPCO EMBA, 816 F.Supp. 1338, 1344 (D.C.W.D.Wis.1993), affirmed without opinion, 25 F.3d 1053 , 1994 WL 234497 (7th Cir.1994), the court said: The subrogation clause does not address the priority of the plan’s subrogation rights ... to the undesignated

1993In analyzing Brigance , the majority opinion in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508 (Okla.1991), commented that the purpose behind Section 537(A)(2) was to protect innocent third parties. 8 Brigance reveals that Shawn Brigance was in the group of minors who had been drinking, yet Todd includes him as an “innocent third party.” A jury may conclude that even if Brad Tomlinson had also been drinking, as a passenger in the motor vehicle, he was an innocent third party, subject to negligence defenses. 9 We conclude that the same reasoning that led this Court to allow a negligence acti

1990The Court there, finding that the housing project was a “dependent Indian community,” explained that the test was a “flexible one, not tied to any single technical standard such as percentage of Indian occupants.” Id. at 842 , quoting United States v. Mound, 477 F.Supp. 156, 160 (D.S.D.1979).

1982Bewley v. State, 404 P.2d 39 (Okl.Cr.1965).

1982As we stated in Bills v. State, 585 P.2d 1366 (Okl.Cr.1978), a “defendant is presumed to be sane and the burden is upon him to introduce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his sanity.” In the ease at bar, as in Bills, supra, the record reveals that the trial court, prior to trial, ordered the appellant admitted to Eastern State Hospital at Vinita for psychiatric evaluation.

1982As we stated in Bills v. State, 585 P.2d 1366 (Okl.Cr.1978), a “defendant is presumed to be sane and the burden is upon him to introduce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his sanity.” In the ease at bar, as in Bills, supra, the record reveals that the trial court, prior to trial, ordered the appellant admitted to Eastern State Hospital at Vinita for psychiatric evaluation.

1982In Johnson, et al v. Connaway, 184 Okl. 516 , 88 P.2d 338 (1939), this Court held that where the evidence is so clearly preponderant that it reasonably admits of but one conclusion, disposition of the case becomes a question of law for the court.

1982In Johnson, et al v. Connaway, 184 Okl. 516 , 88 P.2d 338 (1939), this Court held that where the evidence is so clearly preponderant that it reasonably admits of but one conclusion, disposition of the case becomes a question of law for the court.

1980As this Court pointed out in Roulston, supra, at 869 , the exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility of evidence of other crimes should be used with the “utmost caution” and doubts as to admissibility should be “resolved in favor of the defendant.” According to the State, Reames’ testimony was “proper in that it corroborated the victim’s identification of the accused.” While Reames’ testimony fails to support the victim’s identification of the accused as the person who held up the convenience store at 7:15 p. m. on January 13, it does refute the appellant’s claim that he was at the con

1976Respondent contends that the case of Southwest Factories Inc. v. Eaton, Okl., 453 P.2d 1021 (1969), is analogous with the facts in the ease at bar.

1952Houston v. State, 63 Okla.

1949Therein it was said, 7 Okla.

1948Cr. 323 , 48 P. 2d 869 .” *60 In the ease at bar, as to the proposition of ownership and possession, the evidence merely raises a suspicion or, to say the least, the defendant’s guilt is doubtful or dependent upon mere supposition, surmise, or conjecture.

1938Counsel for the trustee' cite the case of Johnson v. Provident Trust Co. (Pa.) 124 Atl. 436 , as being squarely in point with the ease at bar.

1938Co., 76 Okla. 172 , 184 P. 758 , for it is not involved in the ease at bar.

1938Co., 76 Okla. 172 , 184 P. 758 , for it is not involved in the ease at bar.

1938Co. v. Knapp, 175 Okla. 25 , 51 P.2d 963 , is the rule to be applied in the ease at bar.

1938Co. v. Knapp, 175 Okla. 25 , 51 P.2d 963 , is the rule to be applied in the ease at bar.

1938In Anderson v. McCarty Dry Goods Co., 49 Wash. 398 , 95 P. 325 , the syllabus is as follows: “Under the rule of res ipsa loquitur, a prima facie case of negligence is shown, where a basket from an overhead carrier system, of standard make and in general use, .falls on a customer in a store.” As was said in Goldstein v. Levy, 132 N. Y.

1938In Anderson v. McCarty Dry Goods Co., 49 Wash. 398 , 95 P. 325 , the syllabus is as follows: “Under the rule of res ipsa loquitur, a prima facie case of negligence is shown, where a basket from an overhead carrier system, of standard make and in general use, .falls on a customer in a store.” As was said in Goldstein v. Levy, 132 N. Y.

1937J. 657, section 426, states: “* * * if a party, under the mistaken apprehension that certain property could be held liable for his debts, conveys the property to evade this liability, he will be entitled to recover back the property if in fact it was not liable for his debts. * * *” The facts in Bobier v. Horn, 95 Okla. 8 , 222 P. 238 , are similar to the facts in the ease at bar, except that the property ’ was not a homestead, and p’aintiff was a creditor.

1937Plaintiff cites Mills v. Todd, 83 Ind. 25 , wherein it is said: “An agreement to extend the time for the payment of a debt for a limited period, even if founded on a sufficient consideration, is in substance an agreement not to sue within the time, and cannot be pleaded in bar.” Plaintiff concedes that Oklahoma takes *318 this Indiana view, but insists that the purport of this holding sustains his contention that the defense of premature action is eliminated thereby.