ease bar in Virginia

1928R., 93 Md. 475 , 49 Atl. 327 , was in many respects very similar to the ease at bar.

1928R., 93 Md. 475 , 49 Atl. 327 , was in many respects very similar to the ease at bar.

1928The ease of Burwell v. Anderson, supra, as well as the case of Granberry v. Granberry, 1 Wash. (1 Va.) 249, 1 Am.

1927It expressly negatived any purpose to depart from the rules laid down in Fosdick v. Schall, supra, or Huidekoper v. Locomotive Works, 99 U. S. 258 , 25 L.

1927It expressly negatived any purpose to depart from the rules laid down in Fosdick v. Schall, supra, or Huidekoper v. Locomotive Works, 99 U. S. 258 , 25 L.

1927In Bailey v. Humrickhouse, 83 Ind. App. 497 , 148 N. E. 428 , the court held that claimant was a farm laborer.

1927In Bailey v. Humrickhouse, 83 Ind. App. 497 , 148 N. E. 428 , the court held that claimant was a farm laborer.

1927In the ease at bar, the toilet which was being constructed was for the use of appellants’ employees and customers, was reasonably necessary in the operation of the public garage, and the doing of work in the construction of the toilet was employment in the ‘usual course’ of appellant’s business within the meaning of the above designated sections of the act.” In Caca v. Woodruff, 70 Ind. App. 93 , 123 N. E. 120 , the Indiana court held that a carpenter, who was employed by a miller to construct additional corn bins, by the hour, should be allowed to recover compensation.

1927In the ease at bar, the toilet which was being constructed was for the use of appellants’ employees and customers, was reasonably necessary in the operation of the public garage, and the doing of work in the construction of the toilet was employment in the ‘usual course’ of appellant’s business within the meaning of the above designated sections of the act.” In Caca v. Woodruff, 70 Ind. App. 93 , 123 N. E. 120 , the Indiana court held that a carpenter, who was employed by a miller to construct additional corn bins, by the hour, should be allowed to recover compensation.

1923Co., 163 N. Y. 447 , 57 N. E. 751 , which was an action by a passenger against a •carrier for a personal injury alleged to have been negligently-inflicted by the defendant, it was said: “In the ease at bar the plaintiff made out her cause of action prima facie by the aid of a legal presumption (referring to res ipsa loquitur) but when the proof was all in the burden of proof had not shifted, but was still upon the plaintiff.

1923Co., 163 N. Y. 447 , 57 N. E. 751 , which was an action by a passenger against a •carrier for a personal injury alleged to have been negligently-inflicted by the defendant, it was said: “In the ease at bar the plaintiff made out her cause of action prima facie by the aid of a legal presumption (referring to res ipsa loquitur) but when the proof was all in the burden of proof had not shifted, but was still upon the plaintiff.

1923Co. v. Jones, 118 Va. 685 , 88 S. E. 178 , both of which are relied upon very strongly by counsel for the defendant, are, as we think, distinguishable from the ease at bar by the fact that in both of them the negligen'ee of the driver was necessarily apparent to the passenger, whereas in this case the passenger was justified in assuming that the automobile would stop before the collision occurred. [9] 4.

1923Co. v. Jones, 118 Va. 685 , 88 S. E. 178 , both of which are relied upon very strongly by counsel for the defendant, are, as we think, distinguishable from the ease at bar by the fact that in both of them the negligen'ee of the driver was necessarily apparent to the passenger, whereas in this case the passenger was justified in assuming that the automobile would stop before the collision occurred. [9] 4.

1922If he fails to do so he is guilty of such contributory negligence as will prevent his recovery for any injury sustained, and there is nothing to submit to the jury.” If the conclusion reached in the ease at bar on the facts is different from the conclusion upon the facts in Kimball & Fink v. Friend’s Adm’r, 95 Va. 125 , 27 S. E. 901 , then I think that case must to that extent be deemed to be overruled.

1922If he fails to do so he is guilty of such contributory negligence as will prevent his recovery for any injury sustained, and there is nothing to submit to the jury.” If the conclusion reached in the ease at bar on the facts is different from the conclusion upon the facts in Kimball & Fink v. Friend’s Adm’r, 95 Va. 125 , 27 S. E. 901 , then I think that case must to that extent be deemed to be overruled.

1905Com'rs, 9 Sawy. 253 , 18 Fed. 10 ) ; and, .although it is argued that these decisions are not conclusive, the reason given by Mr. Justice Eield for his decision in the last cited case disposes equally of the ease at bar. ‘To bring the transportation within the control of the State, as part of its domestic commerce, the subject transported must be within the entire voyage under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.’ 9 Sawy. 258 , 18 Fed. 10 .” A number of other decisions are also cited as being in point.

1905Com'rs, 9 Sawy. 253 , 18 Fed. 10 ) ; and, .although it is argued that these decisions are not conclusive, the reason given by Mr. Justice Eield for his decision in the last cited case disposes equally of the ease at bar. ‘To bring the transportation within the control of the State, as part of its domestic commerce, the subject transported must be within the entire voyage under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.’ 9 Sawy. 258 , 18 Fed. 10 .” A number of other decisions are also cited as being in point.

1903Judge Lewis spoke for this court in Yancey v. Field, 85 Va. 756 , 8 S. E. 721 , and he has demonstrated the inaptness of that case as authority for this in an opinion filed by him in the case of Thomas v. Lewis, supra. It is further contended that George P. Cowherd was merely the agent of the donor to deliver the package of money to the appellant after the donor’s death; that the agency ceased with the death of the donor; and that Cowherd was left without authority to act or carry out the instructions of his principal with respect to the money placed in his hands.

1903Judge Lewis spoke for this court in Yancey v. Field, 85 Va. 756 , 8 S. E. 721 , and he has demonstrated the inaptness of that case as authority for this in an opinion filed by him in the case of Thomas v. Lewis, supra. It is further contended that George P. Cowherd was merely the agent of the donor to deliver the package of money to the appellant after the donor’s death; that the agency ceased with the death of the donor; and that Cowherd was left without authority to act or carry out the instructions of his principal with respect to the money placed in his hands.

1901Eq., Vol. 3, sec. 1377; Pownal v. Taylor, supra; Wampler v. Wampler, supra. The facts in the case last cited are very similar to those in the ease at bar.

1877In Campbell’s ex’ors v. Campbell’s ex’or, 22 Gratt. 649, 686 , Judge Moncure, speaking for the whole court, said: “The debt to the estate on account of these notes and bonds was, therefore, most amply se 'Cured; and it was a devastavit to call in that debt, or any part of it, for the purpose of making an investment in Confederate bonds.