protection privilege in Maryland

1916In New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104 , JUSTICE MILLER, in delivering the opinion in that case, uses the following language: "It has become the established law of this Court that a legislative enactment in the ordinary form of a statute may contain provisions which when accepted as the basis of action by individuals or corporations become contracts between them and the State within the protection of the clause of the Federal Constitution * * *.

1916In New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104 , Justice Miller, in delivering the opinion in that case, uses the following language: “It has become the established law of this Court that a legislative enactment in the ordinary form of a statute may contain provisions which when accepted as the basis of action by individuals or corporations become contracts between them and the State within the protection of the clause of the Federal Constitution * * * .

2014(N.S.) 108 [ 33 Utah 382 , 94 P. 731 ] in which it is said: “It may be laid down as a general rule of law, gathered from all the authorities, that, unless provided otherwise by statute, communications by a client to the attorney who drafted his will, in respect to that document, and all transactions occurring between them leading up to its execution, are not, after the client’s death, within the protection of the rule as to privileged communications, in a suit between the testator’s devisees and heirs at law, or other parties who all claim under him.” 134 Md. at 586 , 107 A. at 357 (quoting Bu

2014(N.S.) 108 [ 33 Utah 382 , 94 P. 731 ] in which it is said: “It may be laid down as a general rule of law, gathered from all the authorities, that, unless provided otherwise by statute, communications by a client to the attorney who drafted his will, in respect to that document, and all transactions occurring between them leading up to its execution, are not, after the client’s death, within the protection of the rule as to privileged communications, in a suit between the testator’s devisees and heirs at law, or other parties who all claim under him.” 134 Md. at 586 , 107 A. at 357 (quoting Bu

2014(N.S.) 108 [ 33 Utah 382 , 94 P. 731 ] in which it is said: “It may be laid down as a general rule of law, gathered from all the authorities, that, unless provided otherwise by statute, communications by a client to the attorney who drafted his will, in respect to that document, and all transactions occurring between them leading up to its execution, are not, after the client’s death, within the protection of the rule as to privileged communications, in a suit between the testator’s devisees and heirs at law, or other parties who all claim under him.” 134 Md. at 586 , 107 A. at 357 (quoting Bu

2014(N.S.) 108 [ 33 Utah 382 , 94 P. 731 ] in which it is said: “It may be laid down as a general rule of law, gathered from all the authorities, that, unless provided otherwise by statute, communications by a client to the attorney who drafted his will, in respect to that document, and all transactions occurring between them leading up to its execution, are not, after the client’s death, within the protection of the rule as to privileged communications, in a suit between the testator’s devisees and heirs at law, or other parties who all claim under him.” 134 Md. at 586 , 107 A. at 357 (quoting Bu

2011We have instructed that the “party seeking the protection of the privilege” ultimately “bears the burden of establishing its existence.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 415 , 718 A.2d at 1138 ; In re Criminal Investigation 1/242Q, 326 Md. 1, 11 , 602 A.2d 1220, 1225 (1992).

2011We have instructed that the “party seeking the protection of the privilege” ultimately “bears the burden of establishing its existence.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 415 , 718 A.2d at 1138 ; In re Criminal Investigation 1/242Q, 326 Md. 1, 11 , 602 A.2d 1220, 1225 (1992).

2011In Harrison, 276 Md. at 122 , 345 A.2d at 830 , we adopted Wigmore’s test for deciphering the existence and scope of an attorney-client privilege: (1) Where legal advice of [any] kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection [may] be waived.

2011In Harrison, 276 Md. at 122 , 345 A.2d at 830 , we adopted Wigmore’s test for deciphering the existence and scope of an attorney-client privilege: (1) Where legal advice of [any] kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection [may] be waived.

1998In Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md.App. 107, 115 , 627 A.2d 69 (1993), this Court held that it is “beyond dispute that municipal legislators enjoy the protection of immunity when acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” See also Manders v. Brown, 101 Md.App. 191, 205 , 643 A.2d 931 , cert. denied, 336 Md. 592 , 650 A.2d 238 (1994).

1998In Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md.App. 107, 115 , 627 A.2d 69 (1993), this Court held that it is “beyond dispute that municipal legislators enjoy the protection of immunity when acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” See also Manders v. Brown, 101 Md.App. 191, 205 , 643 A.2d 931 , cert. denied, 336 Md. 592 , 650 A.2d 238 (1994).

1995Leese, 64 Md.App. at 476 , 497 A.2d 159 .

1995Leese, 64 Md.App. at 476 , 497 A.2d 159 .

1987Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 [, 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 .] On the other hand, both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.

1987Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 [, 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 .] On the other hand, both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.

2008Smith, 400 Md. at 111 n. 6, 928 A.2d 795 .

1998In Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md.App. 107, 115 , 627 A.2d 69 (1993), this Court held that it is “beyond dispute that municipal legislators enjoy the protection of immunity when acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” See also Manders v. Brown, 101 Md.App. 191, 205 , 643 A.2d 931 , cert. denied, 336 Md. 592 , 650 A.2d 238 (1994).

1998In Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md.App. 107, 115 , 627 A.2d 69 (1993), this Court held that it is “beyond dispute that municipal legislators enjoy the protection of immunity when acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” See also Manders v. Brown, 101 Md.App. 191, 205 , 643 A.2d 931 , cert. denied, 336 Md. 592 , 650 A.2d 238 (1994).

1998Maxima, 100 Md.App. at 456 , 641 A.2d at 984 ; In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 11 , 602 A.2d at 1225 .

1998Maxima, 100 Md.App. at 456 , 641 A.2d at 984 ; In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 11 , 602 A.2d at 1225 .

1994In a nutshell, they suggest that modifying Urban Renewal Plan # 3 was a legislative action falling under the doctrine of legislative immunity, even if they failed to follow required procedures and hold a public hearing prior to modifying that legislation. *205 A The origin of the doctrine of legislative immunity or legislative privilege was carefully reviewed by Chief Judge Wilner in Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md.App. 107 , 627 A.2d 69 (1993). 5 Relying on federal case law, Judge Wilner concluded that it is “ ‘beyond dispute that municipal legislators enjoy the protection of immunity wh

1994In a nutshell, they suggest that modifying Urban Renewal Plan # 3 was a legislative action falling under the doctrine of legislative immunity, even if they failed to follow required procedures and hold a public hearing prior to modifying that legislation. *205 A The origin of the doctrine of legislative immunity or legislative privilege was carefully reviewed by Chief Judge Wilner in Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md.App. 107 , 627 A.2d 69 (1993). 5 Relying on federal case law, Judge Wilner concluded that it is “ ‘beyond dispute that municipal legislators enjoy the protection of immunity wh

1994In a nutshell, they suggest that modifying Urban Renewal Plan # 3 was a legislative action falling under the doctrine of legislative immunity, even if they failed to follow required procedures and hold a public hearing prior to modifying that legislation. *205 A The origin of the doctrine of legislative immunity or legislative privilege was carefully reviewed by Chief Judge Wilner in Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md.App. 107 , 627 A.2d 69 (1993). 5 Relying on federal case law, Judge Wilner concluded that it is “ ‘beyond dispute that municipal legislators enjoy the protection of immunity wh

1994In a nutshell, they suggest that modifying Urban Renewal Plan # 3 was a legislative action falling under the doctrine of legislative immunity, even if they failed to follow required procedures and hold a public hearing prior to modifying that legislation. *205 A The origin of the doctrine of legislative immunity or legislative privilege was carefully reviewed by Chief Judge Wilner in Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md.App. 107 , 627 A.2d 69 (1993). 5 Relying on federal case law, Judge Wilner concluded that it is “ ‘beyond dispute that municipal legislators enjoy the protection of immunity wh

1994Moreover, “[sjubject to the consequences of the Supremacy Clause, that immunity, conferred as a matter of common law, appears to be co-extensive in scope with the Constitutional immunity enjoyed by members of Congress and the Maryland General Assembly.” Id.

1991Both come within the protection of the clause of the 5th Amendment which provides: “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The plain difference between the privilege of witness and accused is that the latter may not be required to take the stand at all. *214 Id.

1988The Court said that the protection of the privilege “reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one’s papers.” Id. at 763-64 , 86 S.Ct. at 1832 .

1988The Court said that the protection of the privilege “reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one’s papers.” Id. at 763-64 , 86 S.Ct. at 1832 .

1986Id. at 486 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 .

1986Id. at 486 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 .

1985In Korb , we reaffirmed our adherence to the so-called English Rule, followed in a minority of American jurisdictions, under which the protection of this immunity is not dependent upon the relevance of the testimony to the subject matter of the judicial proceeding. 285 Md. at 701-04 , 402 A.2d 897 .

1985In Korb , we reaffirmed our adherence to the so-called English Rule, followed in a minority of American jurisdictions, under which the protection of this immunity is not dependent upon the relevance of the testimony to the subject matter of the judicial proceeding. 285 Md. at 701-04 , 402 A.2d 897 .

1981The objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof." 218 U.S., at 252-253 . *628 It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers.

1980“The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.” Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 .

1977We stressed that we had done so under the doctrine of harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 350 A. 2d 665 (1976), saying at 301: “We believe such error ordinarily to be reversible.

1977We stressed that we had done so under the doctrine of harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 350 A. 2d 665 (1976), saying at 301: “We believe such error ordinarily to be reversible.

1977We stressed that we had done so under the doctrine of harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 350 A. 2d 665 (1976), saying at 301: “We believe such error ordinarily to be reversible.

1977We stressed that we had done so under the doctrine of harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 350 A. 2d 665 (1976), saying at 301: “We believe such error ordinarily to be reversible.

1963The Wisconsin court said in part: “Contributory negligence and assumption of risk, if the former does not include the latter, are at least sufficiently related to bring both host and guest under the same rule as to non-exemption from responsibility.” In addition to Schubring v. Weggen, supra, the appellees might also have cited two Washington cases, Smith v. Harris, 248 P. 2d 551 , and Miller v. Treat, 358 P. 2d 143 , which hold that the protection of the doctrine of assumption of risk is not available to the driver of a second vehicle involved in a collision, if he is negligent.