60 Pennsylvania opinions name it 11 courts 1853–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lockhart v. Listgreen2 sentences2023Indeed, “the sudden emergency doctrine . . . does not apply to vehicles moving in the same direction, nor does it apply when the defendant is responsible for creating the emergency.” Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452-453 ; see Cunningham v. Byers, 732 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa. Super. 1999) (explaining that “the sudden emergency doctrine applies only to moving instrumentalities thrust into a driver’s path of travel”); see also Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1995) (“It is important to recognize, however, that a person cannot avail himself of the protection of this doctrine if that person was himself 1999Or, was she following too closely, traveling too fast, or inat tentive to the traffic ahead? “[A] person cannot avail himself of the protection of this doctrine if that person was himself driving carelessly or recklessly.” Lockhart v. List, 542 Pa. 141, 151 , 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (1995). | 6 | 9 |
Levey v. DeNardogreen2 sentences2023Id. at 159-60, citing Levey v. DeNardo, 725 A.2d 733, 735-36 (Pa. 1999) (quoting Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1995)). 2018"It is important to recognize, however, that a person cannot avail himself of the protection of this doctrine if that person was himself driving carelessly or recklessly." Levey , 725 A.2d at 736 . | 3 | 6 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2015This Court, in quoting the United States Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), has further explained: It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also, communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one’s papers. 2015This Court, in quoting the United States Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), has further explained: It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also, communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one’s papers. | 2 | 4 |
J.L. v. A.L.green2 sentences2024Jones v. Trojak, 634 A.2d 201, 204 (Pa. 1993). 6 As explained infra, although Brinkley was a plurality decision, four Justices agreed with the primary holding. [J-61-2023] - 6 of paternity is inapplicable where the marriage does not need protection from the effects of disputed paternity because the marital couple had fully reconciled and any damage to the marriage was “water under the bridge”); J.L. v. A.L., 205 A.3d 347 (Pa. Super. 2019) (presumption of paternity is inapplicable where the mother and husband did not have an intact marriage when the child was conceived or born, and the husband’ 2024See J.L., 205 A.3d at 356 (trial court expressly discredited the mother’s testimony that the marriage was intact and entitled to the protection of the presumption of paternity, concluding, instead, that the marriage was a façade, intended to keep the third party out of the child’s life). [J-61-2023] - 26 decisions are grounded in records of individual cases and the advocacy by the parties shaped by those records”). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Trojakgreen1 sentence2024Jones v. Trojak, 634 A.2d 201, 204 (Pa. 1993). 6 As explained infra, although Brinkley was a plurality decision, four Justices agreed with the primary holding. [J-61-2023] - 6 of paternity is inapplicable where the marriage does not need protection from the effects of disputed paternity because the marital couple had fully reconciled and any damage to the marriage was “water under the bridge”); J.L. v. A.L., 205 A.3d 347 (Pa. Super. 2019) (presumption of paternity is inapplicable where the mother and husband did not have an intact marriage when the child was conceived or born, and the husband’ | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Nazareth Andonian, Vahe Andonian, Ruben Saini, Raul Vivas, and Juan Carlos Seresigreen1 sentence2023While benefiting the individual defendant, courts applying the Rule of Specialty emphasize that the doctrine concerns international comity “rather than the rights of the defendant” and thus a defendant’s protection under the rule “exists only to the extent that the surrendering country wishes.” United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 205 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); State v. Gordon, 815 A.2d 379, 383 (N.H. 2002) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gordongreen1 sentence2023While benefiting the individual defendant, courts applying the Rule of Specialty emphasize that the doctrine concerns international comity “rather than the rights of the defendant” and thus a defendant’s protection under the rule “exists only to the extent that the surrendering country wishes.” United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 205 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); State v. Gordon, 815 A.2d 379, 383 (N.H. 2002) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Cunningham v. Byersgreen1 sentence2023Indeed, “the sudden emergency doctrine . . . does not apply to vehicles moving in the same direction, nor does it apply when the defendant is responsible for creating the emergency.” Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452-453 ; see Cunningham v. Byers, 732 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa. Super. 1999) (explaining that “the sudden emergency doctrine applies only to moving instrumentalities thrust into a driver’s path of travel”); see also Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1995) (“It is important to recognize, however, that a person cannot avail himself of the protection of this doctrine if that person was himself | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stephen Tsegreen1 sentence2023While benefiting the individual defendant, courts applying the Rule of Specialty emphasize that the doctrine concerns international comity “rather than the rights of the defendant” and thus a defendant’s protection under the rule “exists only to the extent that the surrendering country wishes.” United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 205 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); State v. Gordon, 815 A.2d 379, 383 (N.H. 2002) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Upjohn Co. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2018See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Drew v. Workgreen1 sentence2014S45042/14 [3] o whether an emergency situation existed, wholly independent of and recklessness, it is incumbent upon the trial [court] to Drew v. Work, 95 A.3d 324, 330 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Kukowski v. Kukowskigreen1 sentence2013He “will not be fully excused from liability where he responded to a sudden emergency in a reckless or otherwise unreasonable manner[.]” Kukowski v. Kukowski, 560 A.2d 222, 226 (Pa. Super. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Brewstergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hutchinson v. Proxmiregreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Morrill-Mascott Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaftgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stevenson v. Silvermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Speightsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lamb v. Schmittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wangler v. Harveygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weicht v. Automobile Banking Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hoffman v. United States
green
2 sentences2026Although Hoffman suggests a liberal construction of the Fifth Amendment, protecting answers that would furnish a “link in the chain” of incriminating evidence, and that a witness need not prove “the hazard of incrimination” because doing so could undermine the very protection the privilege is intended to afford, the Hoffman Court also expresses that the witness is not excused from answering “merely because [s]he declares” that responding would incriminate her; rather, “[her] say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination.” Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 . 2015He emphasizes he is not required to “prove the hazard, because then he … would surrender the protection the privilege was designed to protect.” Id. at 18, citing Hoffman, supra. Moreover, he claims he need not demonstrate “a real danger of prosecution exists.” Id. at 17. | 3 | 1978–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Clark
green
2 sentences2001The marital relationship gave rise to both the statements and the actions .... ” Clark, 500 A.2d at 443 . 2001The marital relationship gave rise to both the statements and the actions ...." Clark, 500 A.2d at 443 . | 3 | 1993–2001 |
Commonwealth v. Myrick
green
2 sentences1978"Thus the Commonwealth's claim that appellant waived the protection of rule 1100 is formally valid, for either the colloquy or the signed statement would by themselves be sufficient record indication that the waiver was, prima facie, informed and voluntary." Myrick, supra, 468 Pa. at 161 , 360 A.2d at 601 . 1978"Thus the Commonwealth's claim that appellant waived the protection of rule 1100 is formally valid, for either the colloquy or the signed statement would by themselves be sufficient record indication that the waiver was, prima facie, informed and voluntary." Myrick, supra, 468 Pa. at 161 , 360 A.2d at 601 . | 3 | 1978–1982 |
Boyd v. United States
red
2 sentences2015Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 [ 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) ]. 2015Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 [ 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) ]. | 2 | 1974–2015 |
Chadwick v. Popadick
green
2 sentences2013Moreover, “[i]t is important to recognize, however, that a person cannot avail himself of the protection of this doctrine if that person was himself driving carelessly or recklessly.” Id. (citing Chadwick v. Popadick, 159 A.2d 907 (Pa. 1960). 1995Chadwick v. Popadick, 399 Pa. 88 , 159 A.2d 907 (1960). | 2 | 1995–2013 |
Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co.
green
2 sentences1987Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa. Super. 456 , 462 n.2, 357 A.2d 689 (1976), and while, the statute refers only to communications from the client to the attorney and the privilege is intended to protect the client and not the attorney, the protection of the privilege must encompass all confidential professional communications from the attorney to the client, to the extent that such communication is based on confidential facts disclosed to the attorney by the client.” At p. 56. (emphasis added). 1987Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa. Super. 456 , 462 n.2, 357 A.2d 689 (1976), and while, the statute refers only to communications from the client to the attorney and the privilege is intended to protect the client and not the attorney, the protection of the privilege must encompass all confidential professional communications from the attorney to the client, to the extent that such communication is based on confidential facts disclosed to the attorney by the client.” At p. 56. (emphasis added). | 2 | 1982–1987 |
Crist v. Bretz
green
2 sentences1985Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 , 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2159 , 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). 1985Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 , 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2159 , 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). | 2 | 1985–1985 |
Casey v. Siciliano
green
2 sentences1959“We have frequently stated that the sudden emergency rule will not apply if the emergency arises through the prior negligence of him who seeks the protection of the rule.” Casey v. Siciliano,. 310 Pa. 238, 241 , 165 A. 1 (1933) ; Sarnak v. Cehula, 393 Pa. 5, 9 , 142 A. 2d 204 (1958) ; Bell v. Dugan, 189 Pa. Superior Ct. 322, 328 , 150 A. 2d 553 (1959). 1959“We have frequently stated that the sudden emergency rule will not apply if the emergency arises through the prior negligence of him who seeks the protection of the rule.” Casey v. Siciliano,. 310 Pa. 238, 241 , 165 A. 1 (1933) ; Sarnak v. Cehula, 393 Pa. 5, 9 , 142 A. 2d 204 (1958) ; Bell v. Dugan, 189 Pa. Superior Ct. 322, 328 , 150 A. 2d 553 (1959). | 2 | 1959–1974 |
Montgomery v. Philadelphia
green
2 sentences1944“We have frequently stated that the sudden emergency rule will not apply if the emergency arises through the prior negligence of him who seeks the protection of the rule: Montgomery v. Phila., 270 Pa. 346 ; Lieberman v. Pittsburgh Rys. 1932We have frequently stated that the sudden emergency rule will not apply if the emergency arises through the prior negligence of him who seeks the protection of the rule: Montgomery v. Phila., 270 Pa. 346 ; Lieberman v. Pittsburgh Rys. | 2 | 1932–1944 |
Lieberman v. Pittsburgh Railways Co.
green
2 sentences1944Co., 305 Pa. 412 ; Stewart v. P. R. 1932Co., 305 Pa. 412 ; Stewart v. P. R. | 2 | 1932–1944 |
Sitler, S. v. Jones, A.
green
1 sentence2025The Superior Court held that the 11 Sitler v. Jones, 312 A.3d 334 (Pa. Super. 2024). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
E.W. v. T.S.
green
1 sentence2024Respectfully, while we agree that a marital couple’s prior temporary separation is a factor to consider in determining whether the 18 A similar fact pattern arose in E.W., supra, where the Superior Court, pursuant to Strauser, applied the presumption of paternity where the couple had never separated or filed for divorce, but where the mother publicly held the child out as the child of a third party to the third party’s friends and family. [J-61-2023] - 25 marriage is intact at the time of the paternity hearing, we hold that such factor is not dispositive.19 In summary, we hold that the lower c | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Salinas v. Texas
green
2 sentences2023If he desires the protection of the privilege, he “must claim it at the time he relies on it.” Id. 2023If he desires the protection of the privilege, he “must claim it at the time he relies on it.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Matroni
green
1 sentence2023Indeed, “the sudden emergency doctrine . . . does not apply to vehicles moving in the same direction, nor does it apply when the defendant is responsible for creating the emergency.” Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452-453 ; see Cunningham v. Byers, 732 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa. Super. 1999) (explaining that “the sudden emergency doctrine applies only to moving instrumentalities thrust into a driver’s path of travel”); see also Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1995) (“It is important to recognize, however, that a person cannot avail himself of the protection of this doctrine if that person was himself | 1 | 2023–2023 |
White v. Keystone Insurance
green
1 sentence2019The insured had loaned the handgun to the employees “[f]or the protection of the bar’s assets and the safety of its employees….” Id. at 813 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Grand Jury (Impounded)
green
1 sentence2018In re Grand Jury (Impounded) , 138 F.3d 978 , 981 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted; bold and italic emphasis added). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Murrell
neutral
1 sentence2013Moreover, “[i]t is important to recognize, however, that a person cannot avail himself of the protection of this doctrine if that person was himself driving carelessly or recklessly.” Id. (citing Chadwick v. Popadick, 159 A.2d 907 (Pa. 1960). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Commonwealth v. Conway
green
2 sentences2011Commonwealth v. Conway, 368 Pa.Super. 488 , 534 A.2d 541 , 544 n. 3 (1987), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 581 , 549 A.2d 914 (1988) (italics in original). 2011Commonwealth v. Conway, 368 Pa.Super. 488 , 534 A.2d 541 , 544 n. 3 (1987), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 581 , 549 A.2d 914 (1988) (italics in original). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Campbell v. New York Evening Post, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| In Re Grand Jury Investigation. Appeal of United States of America green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Commonwealth v. Cody green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Pennsylvania v. Ritchie green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Commonwealth v. Wilson green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Morgan v. Bulletin Co. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hartman v. Hyman & Lieberman green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| O'Donnell v. Philadelphia Record Co. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Cheng v. Cheng green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Moore v. Bray green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Commonwealth v. Thompson green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| McDonald v. Berry green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Lamonna green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| United States v. Knox green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Holt v. United States green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Mager v. Kulp green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Siewicz v. Wyoming Valley Hospital neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Levine v. Mervis green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Sarnak v. Cehula neutral | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Bell v. Dugan green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern National Bank neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Colt v. Selden neutral | 1 | 1853–1853 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.