15 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hoffman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1983On the one hand is the danger of simply allowing a witness to invoke the privilege willy-nilly under circumstances where the risk of self incrimination is remote and thus thwart the judicial process, or, on the other hand, requiring the claim of privilege to be proven to such a degree, that the witness would be "compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 , 71 S.Ct. 814, 818 , 95 L.Ed. 1118, 1124 (1951). 1983On the one hand is the danger of simply allowing a witness to invoke the privilege willy-nilly under circumstances where the risk of self incrimination is remote and thus thwart the judicial process, or, on the other hand, requiring the claim of privilege to be proven to such a degree, that the witness would be "compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 , 71 S.Ct. 814, 818 , 95 L.Ed. 1118, 1124 (1951). | 2 | 2 |
Bain v. SUPER. CT. IN AND FOR MARICOPA CTY.green1 sentence2017See A.R.S. § 12-2236; Bain v. Superior Court (Mills), 148 Ariz. 331, 333 (1986) (noting that “statutes relating to the psychologist-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege are unique by containing express provisions specifying the conduct which will be deemed a waiver of the privilege”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schackartgreen2 sentences2013In addition, the State’s rebuttal evidence was closely tailored to refuting Fitzgerald’s allegations of mental impairment and did not re-open the issue of guilt or delve into the murder itself. ¶ 46 Estelle does not control when, as here, “a defendant claims a diminished mental condition and offers supporting psychiatric testimony.” State v. Schackart, 175 Ariz. 494, 501 , 858 P.2d 639, 646 (1993); cf. Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 324 , 746 P.2d at 494 (“The defendant cannot cast aside the protection of the privilege for matters that benefit him and then invoke the privilege to prevent the prosecuti 2013In addition, the State’s rebuttal evidence was closely tailored to refuting Fitzgerald’s allegations of mental impairment and did not re-open the issue of guilt or delve into the murder itself. ¶ 46 Estelle does not control when, as here, “a defendant claims a diminished mental condition and offers supporting psychiatric testimony.” State v. Schackart, 175 Ariz. 494, 501 , 858 P.2d 639, 646 (1993); cf. Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 324 , 746 P.2d at 494 (“The defendant cannot cast aside the protection of the privilege for matters that benefit him and then invoke the privilege to prevent the prosecuti | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tallabasgreen2 sentences2013In addition, the State’s rebuttal evidence was closely tailored to refuting Fitzgerald’s allegations of mental impairment and did not re-open the issue of guilt or delve into the murder itself. ¶ 46 Estelle does not control when, as here, “a defendant claims a diminished mental condition and offers supporting psychiatric testimony.” State v. Schackart, 175 Ariz. 494, 501 , 858 P.2d 639, 646 (1993); cf. Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 324 , 746 P.2d at 494 (“The defendant cannot cast aside the protection of the privilege for matters that benefit him and then invoke the privilege to prevent the prosecuti 2013In addition, the State’s rebuttal evidence was closely tailored to refuting Fitzgerald’s allegations of mental impairment and did not re-open the issue of guilt or delve into the murder itself. ¶ 46 Estelle does not control when, as here, “a defendant claims a diminished mental condition and offers supporting psychiatric testimony.” State v. Schackart, 175 Ariz. 494, 501 , 858 P.2d 639, 646 (1993); cf. Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 324 , 746 P.2d at 494 (“The defendant cannot cast aside the protection of the privilege for matters that benefit him and then invoke the privilege to prevent the prosecuti | 1 | 1 |
Foldi v. Jeffriesgreen2 sentences1994See Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533 , 461 A.2d 1145 (1983) (immunity for simple negligent supervision but not for supervision that amounts to willful or wanton negligence); Jenkins v. Snohomish County Public Utility Dist., 105 Wash.2d 99 , 713 P.2d 79 (1986) (no immunity for conduct which a reasonable person knew or should have known is highly dangerous); see also Jefferson L. 1994See Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533 , 461 A.2d 1145 (1983) (immunity for simple negligent supervision but not for supervision that amounts to willful or wanton negligence); Jenkins v. Snohomish County Public Utility Dist., 105 Wash.2d 99 , 713 P.2d 79 (1986) (no immunity for conduct which a reasonable person knew or should have known is highly dangerous); see also Jefferson L. | 1 | 1 |
Fuenning v. SUPER. CT. IN AND FOR CTY. OF MARICOPAgreen2 sentences1990The legislature could reasonably conclude that a driver who registers a BAC of O. 10 at the time of a test administered after the driver’s arrest for a section 28-692 violation presents sufficient danger to the public to justify license suspension, subject to the protection provided by the hearing procedure. 4 See Nance, 165 Ariz. at 289 , 798 P.2d at 1298 ; see also Fuenning, 139 Ariz. at 595 , 680 P.2d at 126 (the general consensus of scientific thought seems to be that most drivers experience significant impairment of driving ability at a BAC level of .05% to .08%). 1990The legislature could reasonably conclude that a driver who registers a BAC of O. 10 at the time of a test administered after the driver’s arrest for a section 28-692 violation presents sufficient danger to the public to justify license suspension, subject to the protection provided by the hearing procedure. 4 See Nance, 165 Ariz. at 289 , 798 P.2d at 1298 ; see also Fuenning, 139 Ariz. at 595 , 680 P.2d at 126 (the general consensus of scientific thought seems to be that most drivers experience significant impairment of driving ability at a BAC level of .05% to .08%). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1976In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the court stated: “It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take . . 1976In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the court stated: “It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take . . | 2 | 1972–1976 |
Jenkins v. Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1
green
2 sentences1994See Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533 , 461 A.2d 1145 (1983) (immunity for simple negligent supervision but not for supervision that amounts to willful or wanton negligence); Jenkins v. Snohomish County Public Utility Dist., 105 Wash.2d 99 , 713 P.2d 79 (1986) (no immunity for conduct which a reasonable person knew or should have known is highly dangerous); see also Jefferson L. 1994See Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533 , 461 A.2d 1145 (1983) (immunity for simple negligent supervision but not for supervision that amounts to willful or wanton negligence); Jenkins v. Snohomish County Public Utility Dist., 105 Wash.2d 99 , 713 P.2d 79 (1986) (no immunity for conduct which a reasonable person knew or should have known is highly dangerous); see also Jefferson L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State Ex Rel. Ross v. Nance
green
2 sentences1990The legislature could reasonably conclude that a driver who registers a BAC of O. 10 at the time of a test administered after the driver’s arrest for a section 28-692 violation presents sufficient danger to the public to justify license suspension, subject to the protection provided by the hearing procedure. 4 See Nance, 165 Ariz. at 289 , 798 P.2d at 1298 ; see also Fuenning, 139 Ariz. at 595 , 680 P.2d at 126 (the general consensus of scientific thought seems to be that most drivers experience significant impairment of driving ability at a BAC level of .05% to .08%). 1990The legislature could reasonably conclude that a driver who registers a BAC of O. 10 at the time of a test administered after the driver’s arrest for a section 28-692 violation presents sufficient danger to the public to justify license suspension, subject to the protection provided by the hearing procedure. 4 See Nance, 165 Ariz. at 289 , 798 P.2d at 1298 ; see also Fuenning, 139 Ariz. at 595 , 680 P.2d at 126 (the general consensus of scientific thought seems to be that most drivers experience significant impairment of driving ability at a BAC level of .05% to .08%). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Knapp v. Miller
green
2 sentences1990Id. at 529-532 , 799 P.2d at 870-873 . 1990Id. at 529-532 , 799 P.2d at 870-873 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Neville
green
2 sentences1987Id. 1987That error was our holding that “Neville’s refusal to submit to a blood test is evidence of a testimonial nature and thus within the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.” 346 N.W.2d at 429 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Womack
neutral
2 sentences1986State v. Womack, 131 Ariz. 158 , 639 P.2d 348 (App.1981). 1986State v. Womack, 131 Ariz. 158 , 639 P.2d 348 (App.1981). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
United States v. Gouveia
green
2 sentences1986United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 , 188 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2292 , 2298 n. 5, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984). 1986United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 , 188 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2292 , 2298 n. 5, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
John Lewis Jones v. Harold J. Cardwell, Superintendent, Arizona State Prison
green
1 sentence1985The court held that where the “state’s agent seeks from the convicted defendant a confession of additional criminal activity and that confession is used to enhance a defendant’s sentence, we think it beyond peradventure that the defendant may properly claim the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 756 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Imbler v. Pachtman
green
2 sentences1983In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), the United States Supreme Court stated that the common law immunity of a prosecutor when acting within the scope of his duties is based on the same considerations as immunity for judges and grand jurors and without the protection of the immunity, “... unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust.” 424 U.S. at 423 , 96 S.Ct. at 991 , 4 1983In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), the United States Supreme Court stated that the common law immunity of a prosecutor when acting within the scope of his duties is based on the same considerations as immunity for judges and grand jurors and without the protection of the immunity, “... unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust.” 424 U.S. at 423 , 96 S.Ct. at 991 , 4 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Berg
green
2 sentences1972For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the documents or chattels be already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by testimonial act or utterance of the person in response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process which treats him as a witness; because in virtue of it he would be at any time liable to make oath to the authenticity or origin of the articles produced.’ ” State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. at 100 , 259 P.2d at 264 . 1972For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the documents or chattels be already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by testimonial act or utterance of the person in response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process which treats him as a witness; because in virtue of it he would be at any time liable to make oath to the authenticity or origin of the articles produced.’ ” State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. at 100 , 259 P.2d at 264 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Hardy v. Vial
green
2 sentences1965The protection of the rule has been further extended so as to reach and include subordinate government officers when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed on them by law.” (Citing cases.) Supporting this textual statement are several leading cases: Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), Montgomery v. City Of Phila *219 delphia, 392 Pa. 178 , 140 A.2d 100 , and Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal.2d 577 , 311 P.2d 494 , 66 A.L.R.2d 739 (Cal.1957). 1965The protection of the rule has been further extended so as to reach and include subordinate government officers when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed on them by law.” (Citing cases.) Supporting this textual statement are several leading cases: Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), Montgomery v. City Of Phila *219 delphia, 392 Pa. 178 , 140 A.2d 100 , and Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal.2d 577 , 311 P.2d 494 , 66 A.L.R.2d 739 (Cal.1957). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Barr v. Matteo
green
2 sentences1965The protection of the rule has been further extended so as to reach and include subordinate government officers when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed on them by law.” (Citing cases.) Supporting this textual statement are several leading cases: Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), Montgomery v. City Of Phila *219 delphia, 392 Pa. 178 , 140 A.2d 100 , and Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal.2d 577 , 311 P.2d 494 , 66 A.L.R.2d 739 (Cal.1957). 1965The protection of the rule has been further extended so as to reach and include subordinate government officers when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed on them by law.” (Citing cases.) Supporting this textual statement are several leading cases: Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), Montgomery v. City Of Phila *219 delphia, 392 Pa. 178 , 140 A.2d 100 , and Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal.2d 577 , 311 P.2d 494 , 66 A.L.R.2d 739 (Cal.1957). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Montgomery v. Philadelphia
green
2 sentences1965The protection of the rule has been further extended so as to reach and include subordinate government officers when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed on them by law.” (Citing cases.) Supporting this textual statement are several leading cases: Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), Montgomery v. City Of Phila *219 delphia, 392 Pa. 178 , 140 A.2d 100 , and Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal.2d 577 , 311 P.2d 494 , 66 A.L.R.2d 739 (Cal.1957). 1965The protection of the rule has been further extended so as to reach and include subordinate government officers when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed on them by law.” (Citing cases.) Supporting this textual statement are several leading cases: Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), Montgomery v. City Of Phila *219 delphia, 392 Pa. 178 , 140 A.2d 100 , and Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal.2d 577 , 311 P.2d 494 , 66 A.L.R.2d 739 (Cal.1957). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.