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11 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1897–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Discipline of Schaefergreen2 sentences2010See In re Schaefer, 117 Nev. 496 , 25 P.3d 191, 199 (2001) (“The lawyer still has an advantage over the average layperson, and the integrity of the relationship between the represented person and counsel is not entitled to less protection merely because the lawyer is appearing pro se.”); In re Segall, 117 Ill.2d 1 , 109 Ill.Dec. 149 , 509 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1987) (“A party, having employed counsel to act as an intermediary between himself and opposing counsel, does not lose the protection of the rule merely because opposing counsel is also a party to the litigation.”). 2010See In re Schaefer, 117 Nev. 496 , 25 P.3d 191, 199 (2001) (“The lawyer still has an advantage over the average layperson, and the integrity of the relationship between the represented person and counsel is not entitled to less protection merely because the lawyer is appearing pro se.”); In re Segall, 117 Ill.2d 1 , 109 Ill.Dec. 149 , 509 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1987) (“A party, having employed counsel to act as an intermediary between himself and opposing counsel, does not lose the protection of the rule merely because opposing counsel is also a party to the litigation.”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Segallgreen2 sentences2010See In re Schaefer, 117 Nev. 496 , 25 P.3d 191, 199 (2001) (“The lawyer still has an advantage over the average layperson, and the integrity of the relationship between the represented person and counsel is not entitled to less protection merely because the lawyer is appearing pro se.”); In re Segall, 117 Ill.2d 1 , 109 Ill.Dec. 149 , 509 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1987) (“A party, having employed counsel to act as an intermediary between himself and opposing counsel, does not lose the protection of the rule merely because opposing counsel is also a party to the litigation.”). 2010See In re Schaefer, 117 Nev. 496 , 25 P.3d 191, 199 (2001) (“The lawyer still has an advantage over the average layperson, and the integrity of the relationship between the represented person and counsel is not entitled to less protection merely because the lawyer is appearing pro se.”); In re Segall, 117 Ill.2d 1 , 109 Ill.Dec. 149 , 509 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1987) (“A party, having employed counsel to act as an intermediary between himself and opposing counsel, does not lose the protection of the rule merely because opposing counsel is also a party to the litigation.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Faschinggreen1 sentence1991See State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761 (N.D.1990). | 1 | 1 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences1980The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a *245 suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-764 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1831-1832 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 916 (1966). 1980The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a *245 suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-764 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1831-1832 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 916 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
Counselman v. Hitchcockgreen2 sentences1976Such situations call to mind the principle that the protection of the privilege ‘is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.’ Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 , 12 S.Ct. 195, 198 [ 35 L.Ed. 1110 ]. 1976Such situations call to mind the principle that the protection of the privilege ‘is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.’ Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 , 12 S.Ct. 195, 198 [ 35 L.Ed. 1110 ]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ordahl v. Lykken
green
2 sentences2023Ordahl, LCC v. Lykken, 2022 ND 193, ¶ 6 , 981 N.W.2d 901 (citations and quotations omitted). [¶16] 4201 acknowledges the personal pledge signed by 4201 and the bank does not allow 4201 to recover fees but allows the bank to recover “all costs and expenses (including without limitation reasonable attorney fees and legal expenses) incurred by Lender in connection with the protection, defense or enforcement of this PLEDGE in any litigation or bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding.” The plain language of the contract clearly allows for reimbursement of fees related to the protection or defense of th 2023Ordahl, LCC v. Lykken, 2022 ND 193, ¶ 6 , 981 N.W.2d 901 (citations and quotations omitted). [¶16] 4201 acknowledges the personal pledge signed by 4201 and the bank does not allow 4201 to recover fees but allows the bank to recover “all costs and expenses (including without limitation reasonable attorney fees and legal expenses) incurred by Lender in connection with the protection, defense or enforcement of this PLEDGE in any litigation or bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding.” The plain language of the contract clearly allows for reimbursement of fees related to the protection or defense of th | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Skadberg v. Skadberg
green
2 sentences2010The [conduct for finding] disorderly conduct is defined differently from domestic violence.” This Court has said, “Like the domestic violence protection order statute, the disorderly conduct restraining order statute creates a special summary proceeding and directs a hearing upon order of the district court” and that “[b]oth statutes seek to quickly and effectively combat volatile situations before any tragic escalation.” Skadberg v. Skadberg, 2002 ND 97, ¶ 13 , 644 N.W.2d 873 . 2010The [conduct for finding] disorderly conduct is defined differently from domestic violence.” This Court has said, “Like the domestic violence protection order statute, the disorderly conduct restraining order statute creates a special summary proceeding and directs a hearing upon order of the district court” and that “[b]oth statutes seek to quickly and effectively combat volatile situations before any tragic escalation.” Skadberg v. Skadberg, 2002 ND 97, ¶ 13 , 644 N.W.2d 873 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In Re Application for Disciplinary Action Against Hoffman
green
2 sentences2010In addition, we have recognized Rule 4.2 “is to prevent lawyers from taking advantage of laypersons.” Disciplinary Bd. v. Hoffman, 2003 ND 161, ¶ 17 , 670 N.W.2d 500 . [¶ 10] Lucas relies on a Connecticut Supreme Court decision to argue Rule 4.2 does not apply when he is representing himself because he is not representing a client. 2010In addition, we have recognized Rule 4.2 “is to prevent lawyers from taking advantage of laypersons.” Disciplinary Bd. v. Hoffman, 2003 ND 161, ¶ 17 , 670 N.W.2d 500 . [¶ 10] Lucas relies on a Connecticut Supreme Court decision to argue Rule 4.2 does not apply when he is representing himself because he is not representing a client. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Chubb Integrated Systems Ltd. v. National Bank
green
1 sentence1990"Since Lois, the weight of authority is that waiver can occur through inadvertence. ( Chubb Integrated Systems v. National Bank of Wash. (D.D.C.1984) 103 F.R.D. 52, 67 .) The trend is to base the decision on all the circumstances. ( Hartford Fire Ins. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Gowin v. Hazen Memorial Hospital Ass'n
green
1 sentence1988E.g., Gowin v. Hazen Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 311 N.W.2d 554 (N.D. 1981). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Boyd v. United States
red
2 sentences1976Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 . 1976Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Wilson v. Yellow Cab Co. of Shreveport
green
1 sentence1958Co., La.App., 64 So.2d 463 . | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Wessel v. D. S. B. Johnston Land & Mortgage Co.
neutral
2 sentences1901The rule, as stated and recognized by this court in Wessel v. Mortgage Co., 3 N. D. 160 , 54 N. W. 1901The rule, as stated and recognized by this court in Wessel v. Mortgage Co., 3 N. D. 160 , 54 N. W. | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Speer v. Skinner
neutral
1 sentence1897In Bruner v. Dyball, 42 Ill. 34 , the court said: “In the case of Speer v. Skinner, 35 Ill. 282 , it was held that a landlord who had distrained goods of his tenant for rent in arrear lost his lien on the goods when they were replevied by the tenant, and it is now urged that the principle announced in that case governs this. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Bruner v. Dyball
neutral
1 sentence1897In Bruner v. Dyball, 42 Ill. 34 , the court said: “In the case of Speer v. Skinner, 35 Ill. 282 , it was held that a landlord who had distrained goods of his tenant for rent in arrear lost his lien on the goods when they were replevied by the tenant, and it is now urged that the principle announced in that case governs this. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.