protection privilege in New Mexico

2023Id. 8 {19} The United States Supreme Court, in Upjohn Co. explains the distinction 9 between communications and facts well: “The protection of the privilege extends 10 only to communications and not to facts.

2023Id. {19} The United States Supreme Court, in Upjohn Co. explains the distinction between communications and facts well: “The protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts.

2017The protection this clause provides, however, is limited. “[T]he only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases challenging multiple punishments is to prevent the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing court from imposing greater punishments, than the Legislative Branch intended.” Herron v. State, 1991-NMSC-012 , ¶ 6, 111 N.M. 357 , 805 P.2d 624 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). {39} “There are two classifications of double jeopardy multiple-punishment cases.” State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10 , 279 P.3d 747 .

2017The protection this clause provides, however, is limited. “[T]he only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases challenging multiple punishments is to prevent the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing court from imposing greater punishments, than the Legislative Branch intended.” Herron v. State, 1991-NMSC-012 , ¶ 6, 111 N.M. 357 , 805 P.2d 624 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). {39} “There are two classifications of double jeopardy multiple-punishment cases.” State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10 , 279 P.3d 747 .

2017The protection this clause provides, however, is limited. “[T]he only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases challenging multiple punishments is to prevent the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing court from imposing greater punishments, than the Legislative Branch intended.” Herron v. State, 1991-NMSC-012 , ¶ 6, 111 N.M. 357 , 805 P.2d 624 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). {39} “There are two classifications of double jeopardy multiple-punishment cases.” State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10 , 279 P.3d 747 .

2001However, if questioning persists and the individual desires the protection of the privilege, "`he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been `compelled' within the meaning of the [Fifth] Amendment.'" Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quoting Monia, 317 U.S. at 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409 ); see also Gutierrez, 119 N.M. at 620 , 894 P.2d at 397 ("[T]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is available only if it is invoked as the ground for refusing to speak.").

2001However, if questioning persists and the individual desires the protection of the privilege, "`he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been `compelled' within the meaning of the [Fifth] Amendment.'" Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quoting Monia, 317 U.S. at 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409 ); see also Gutierrez, 119 N.M. at 620 , 894 P.2d at 397 ("[T]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is available only if it is invoked as the ground for refusing to speak.").

1993Indeed, I believe that the "twin goals of encouraging unrestrained plea negotiations and assuring fairness to defendants[,]" Herman, 544 F.2d at 798 , are undermined, not promoted, by the majority's rigid "reliance" and/or "inducement" rule.

1993Indeed, I believe that the “twin goals of encouraging unrestrained plea negotiations and assuring fairness to defendants[,]” Herman, 544 F.2d at 798 , are undermined, not promoted, by the majority’s rigid “reliance” and/or “inducement” rule.

1989The plaintiff in Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595 , 187 A.2d 586 (1963) was stopped by New York State Police during the famous Apalachin meeting of alleged organized crime figures.

1989The plaintiff in Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595 , 187 A.2d 586 (1963) was stopped by New York State Police during the famous Apalachin meeting of alleged organized crime figures.

1988We take as our starting point the principle stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: “It is axiomatic that the burden is on a party claiming the protection of a privilege to establish those facts that are the essential elements of the privileged relationship.” von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 , 107 S.Ct. 1891 , 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987).

1988We take as our starting point the principle stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: “It is axiomatic that the burden is on a party claiming the protection of a privilege to establish those facts that are the essential elements of the privileged relationship.” von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 , 107 S.Ct. 1891 , 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987).

1988We take as our starting point the principle stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: “It is axiomatic that the burden is on a party claiming the protection of a privilege to establish those facts that are the essential elements of the privileged relationship.” von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 , 107 S.Ct. 1891 , 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987).

1977In Lahr v. Lahr, 82 N.M. 223 , 478 P.2d 551 (1970) this court held that a husband’s opinion as to the value of community real estate was admissible in evidence; however, the court ruled that the accountant employed by the husband could not testify by deposition regarding statements by the husband to the accountant as to the husband’s opinion regarding the value of community realty.

1977In Lahr v. Lahr, 82 N.M. 223 , 478 P.2d 551 (1970) this court held that a husband’s opinion as to the value of community real estate was admissible in evidence; however, the court ruled that the accountant employed by the husband could not testify by deposition regarding statements by the husband to the accountant as to the husband’s opinion regarding the value of community realty.

1970Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 , L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967), held that a handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of- what is written, like the voice or the body, is an identifying physical characteristic outside the protection of the privilege 'against sélfincrimination.

1970Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 , L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967), held that a handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of- what is written, like the voice or the body, is an identifying physical characteristic outside the protection of the privilege 'against sélfincrimination.

1964Appellant cites Wagner v. City of Portland, 40 Or. 389 , 60 P. 985 , 67 P. 300 , as authority for the proposition that the work of repairing a fire alarm system is ministerial in nature.

1964Appellant cites Wagner v. City of Portland, 40 Or. 389 , 60 P. 985 , 67 P. 300 , as authority for the proposition that the work of repairing a fire alarm system is ministerial in nature.