protection privilege in District of Columbia

2006This is primarily because the Fourth Amendment's ultimate focus is on the reasonableness of police conduct in detaining a person, while, in the Fifth Amendment analysis, the guiding inquiry is directed to "how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive his circumstances," Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 662 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 because the overarching value is the protection of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination safeguarded by Miranda warnings.

2006This is primarily because the Fourth Amendment's ultimate focus is on the reasonableness of police conduct in detaining a person, while, in the Fifth Amendment analysis, the guiding inquiry is directed to "how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive his circumstances," Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 662 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 because the overarching value is the protection of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination safeguarded by Miranda warnings.

2006In Terry, the court approved brief investigatory stops, based on a police officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity. 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 .

2005In Terry, the court approved brief investigatory stops, based on a police officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a per son may be involved in criminal activity. 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 .

1996If, therefore, [the witness] desires the protection of the privilege, [the witness] must claim it or [the witness] will not be considered to have been ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Amendment.” Harris, 614 A.2d at 1282 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409, 410-411 , 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943)).

1996If, therefore, [the witness] desires the protection of the privilege, [the witness] must claim it or [the witness] will not be considered to have been ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Amendment.” Harris, 614 A.2d at 1282 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409, 410-411 , 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943)).

2004To invoke the protection of the rule, a party must file “an affidavit stating how discovery would aid him or her to effectively oppose the summary judgment motion.” 2 Id. at 852-53 (citing Guthrie v. Sawyer, 970 F.2d 733, 738 (10th Cir.1992)).

2004To invoke the protection of the rule, a party must file "an affidavit stating how discovery would aid him or her to effectively oppose the summary judgment motion." [2] Id. at 852-53 (citing Guthrie v. Sawyer, 970 F.2d 733, 738 (10th Cir.1992)).

1996If, therefore, [the witness] desires the protection of the privilege, [the witness] must claim it or [the witness] will not be considered to have been ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Amendment.” Harris, 614 A.2d at 1282 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409, 410-411 , 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943)).

1996If, therefore, [the witness] desires the protection of the privilege, [the witness] must claim it or [the witness] will not be considered to have been `compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." Harris, 614 A.2d at 1282 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409, 410-411 , 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943)).

1972In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the Court said that "the essentials of due process and fair treatment" include written notice of the charges; advice as to the right of counsel — retained or appointed; confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses against him, and the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.

1972In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the Court said that "the essentials of due process and fair treatment" include written notice of the charges; advice as to the right of counsel — retained or appointed; confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses against him, and the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.

1972In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), the Court held that the safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required in a juvenile hearing as were the safeguards applied by the Court in Gault where, we note that in detailing the constitutional guarantees and protections that would have been accorded the juvenile had he been charged as an adult, the Court ( 387 U.S. at 29 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ) did not list a right to trial by jury. [15] For articles examining the District of Columbia juvenile system, see Lawton, Juvenile Proceedings — The New Look, 20 Am.

1972In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), the Court held that the safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required in a juvenile hearing as were the safeguards applied by the Court in Gault where, we note that in detailing the constitutional guarantees and protections that would have been accorded the juvenile had he been charged as an adult, the Court ( 387 U.S. at 29 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ) did not list a right to trial by jury. [15] For articles examining the District of Columbia juvenile system, see Lawton, Juvenile Proceedings — The New Look, 20 Am.

2025Thus, for example, in In re PDS, the parties litigated the application of the privilege in the context of a motion to quash a subpoena for counsel’s grand jury testimony, which was immediately appealed. 831 A.2d at 895 - 97.

2005With respect to the absolute privilege for attorneys for statements made in judicial proceedings, this court has stated: “An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he [or she'] participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.” Finkelstein, supra, 774 A.2d at 338 (quoting Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 586) (other citations omitted).

2004Id. at 994 .

2002Finally, the trial court’s order will render the issue of the Trustees’ immunity unre-viewable on appeal from a final judgment if the case proceeds to trial because the essence of the protection of immunity from suit is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 ,.

1996The Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), fashioned a three-part test to evaluate claims by a party that another party has exercised his or her right of peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner.

1996The Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), fashioned a three-part test to evaluate claims by a party that another party has exercised his or her right of peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner.

1989We need not decide whether the refusal of the trial court to permit appellant to be present at voir dire constituted in part a denial of his right of self-representation under Faretta, supra. It is sufficient to note that appellant has been denied the protection of a rule which “ ‘incorporates the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the common law right of presence....’” Beard v. United States, supra, 535 A.2d at 1375 (quoting Welsh v. United States, 466 A.2d 829, 838 (D.C.1983)).

1989It is sufficient to note that appellant has been denied the protection of a rule which "`incorporates the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the common law right *1241 of presence....'" Beard v. United States, supra, 535 A.2d at 1375 (quoting Welsh v. United States, 466 A.2d 829, 838 (D.C.1983)).

1980Accordingly, the Court in Gertz , while retaining the “actual malice” standard for “public figure” cases, see id. at 342-43 , 94 S.Ct. at 3008 , withdrew from the media the protection of that standard — so recently accorded in Rosenbloom — in cases brought by “private individuals.” See id. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010 .

1980Accordingly, the Court in Gertz , while retaining the “actual malice” standard for “public figure” cases, see id. at 342-43 , 94 S.Ct. at 3008 , withdrew from the media the protection of that standard — so recently accorded in Rosenbloom — in cases brought by “private individuals.” See id. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010 .