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10 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1875–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences1980Ed. 2d 908, 916 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832 (1966): “It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one’s papers. 1980In Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 , 31 S.Ct. 2 , 54 L.Ed. 1021, 1030 (1910), Justice Holmes explained that: "[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. . . ." This principle was more recently reasserted by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 916 (1966): "It is clear that the protection of the pr | 2 | 2 |
Russell v. Barrettgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Russell v. Barrett, 296 Ga. App. 114, 118 , 673 S.E.2d 623, 627 (2009) (“However, the 1991 amendment specifies the actions that remove the protection of immunity—those done with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury. 2019See, e.g., Russell v. Barrett, 296 Ga. App. 114, 118 , 673 S.E.2d 623, 627 (2009) (“However, the 1991 amendment specifies the actions that remove the protection of immunity—those done with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human resourcesgreen1 sentence2019Our Supreme Court has construed the term ‘“actual malice” [as requiring] a deliberate intention to do wrong.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 30 Res., 237 W. | 1 | 1 |
Holt v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1980In Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 , 31 S.Ct. 2 , 54 L.Ed. 1021, 1030 (1910), Justice Holmes explained that: "[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. . . ." This principle was more recently reasserted by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 916 (1966): "It is clear that the protection of the pr 1980In Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 , 31 S.Ct. 2 , 54 L.Ed. 1021, 1030 (1910), Justice Holmes explained that: "[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. . . ." This principle was more recently reasserted by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 916 (1966): "It is clear that the protection of the pr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Darlington v. . Mayor, C., of New Yorkgreen1 sentence1875But see, also, on this subject, per contra, to same extent, the note of Judge Dillon, in his work on Corporations, to section thirty-nine of chapter four, (vol. 1, p. 152) and also Darlington v. Mayor, &c, 31 N. Y., 164 ; 17 Wall. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Boyd v. United States
red
2 sentences1980Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 , 29 L ed 746, 6 S Ct 524 . 1980Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 , 29 L ed 746, 6 S Ct 524 . | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Potter
green
2 sentences2008In the only case this Court has decided involving the application of W.Va.Code, 57-3-9, we held in Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Potter, 197 W.Va. 734 , 478 S.E.2d 742 (1996) that: A communication will be privileged, in accordance with W.Va.Code, 57-3-9 (1992), if four tests are met: (1) the communication must be made to a clergyman; (2) the communication may be in the form of a confidential confession or a communication; (3) the confession or communication must be made to the clergyman in his professional capacity; and (4) the communication must have been made in the course of discipline enjoi 2008In the only case this Court has decided involving the application of W.Va.Code, 57-3-9, we held in Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Potter, 197 W.Va. 734 , 478 S.E.2d 742 (1996) that: A communication will be privileged, in accordance with W.Va.Code, 57-3-9 (1992), if four tests are met: (1) the communication must be made to a clergyman; (2) the communication may be in the form of a confidential confession or a communication; (3) the confession or communication must be made to the clergyman in his professional capacity; and (4) the communication must have been made in the course of discipline enjoi | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Whalen
green
2 sentences2003Perhaps most interesting in the context of this case, a person deemed a "sexually violent predator" may later request another hearing to challenge this designation, and if successful, may have this label removed. [9] *849 We also note that our recent case of State v. Whalen, 214 W.Va. 299 , 588 S.E.2d 677 (2003), holds that those who have committed a crime not listed in the Act, but later deemed by a judge to be sexual in nature, also have the protection of a hearing on the issue, and an explicit evidentiary burden that the state must carry, before such a determination can be made: In order fo 2003Perhaps most interesting in the context of this case, a person deemed a "sexually violent predator" may later request another hearing to challenge this designation, and if successful, may have this label removed. [9] *849 We also note that our recent case of State v. Whalen, 214 W.Va. 299 , 588 S.E.2d 677 (2003), holds that those who have committed a crime not listed in the Act, but later deemed by a judge to be sexual in nature, also have the protection of a hearing on the issue, and an explicit evidentiary burden that the state must carry, before such a determination can be made: In order fo | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hoffman v. United States
green
2 sentences1998Once the privilege is asserted, “[i]t is the duty of a court to determine the legitimacy of a witness’ reliance upon the Fifth Amendment.” Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 , 560 n. 7, 100 *435 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980). “[I]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). 1998Once the privilege is asserted, “[i]t is the duty of a court to determine the legitimacy of a witness’ reliance upon the Fifth Amendment.” Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 , 560 n. 7, 100 *435 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980). “[I]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Roberts v. United States
green
2 sentences1998Once the privilege is asserted, “[i]t is the duty of a court to determine the legitimacy of a witness’ reliance upon the Fifth Amendment.” Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 , 560 n. 7, 100 *435 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980). “[I]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). 1998Once the privilege is asserted, “[i]t is the duty of a court to determine the legitimacy of a witness’ reliance upon the Fifth Amendment.” Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 , 560 n. 7, 100 *435 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980). “[I]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Bump v. Barnett
green
2 sentences1981And if it is done by one who engages in *775 it as a business and holds himself out as peculiarly qualified or equipped, it comes under the ban of illegal practice of law. 235 Iowa at 313 , 16 N.W.2d at 582 . 1981And if it is done by one who engages in *775 it as a business and holds himself out as peculiarly qualified or equipped, it comes under the ban of illegal practice of law. 235 Iowa at 313 , 16 N.W.2d at 582 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Franklin v. Vandervort
green
1 sentence1917At all «vents, the duties performed by the commission, conceding the prematurity of the appointments, come within the protection of the rule laid down in Franklin v. Vandervort, 50 W. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Plummer v. Dill
green
1 sentence1915Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426 ; Campbell v. Putnam Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552 ; Parker v. Publishing Co., 69 Me. 173 ; Componio v. Railroad Co., 66 Conn. 528 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Pomponio v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
green
1 sentence1915Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426 ; Campbell v. Putnam Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552 ; Parker v. Publishing Co., 69 Me. 173 ; Componio v. Railroad Co., 66 Conn. 528 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co.
green
1 sentence1915Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426 ; Campbell v. Putnam Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552 ; Parker v. Publishing Co., 69 Me. 173 ; Componio v. Railroad Co., 66 Conn. 528 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Parker v. Portland Publishing Co.
green
1 sentence1915Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426 ; Campbell v. Putnam Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552 ; Parker v. Publishing Co., 69 Me. 173 ; Componio v. Railroad Co., 66 Conn. 528 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.