protection privilege in New York

2024Simply put, the Rogers rule states that the indelible right to counsel activates the moment that an attorney becomes involved ( see id. ["once an attorney has entered the proceeding ... a defendant in custody may not be further interrogated in the absence of counsel"]; People v. Steward, 88 NY2d 496, 501 [1996][emphasis supplied] [" Rogers establishes and still stands for the important protection and principle that once a defendant in custody on a particular matter is represented by or requests counsel, custodial interrogation about any subject, whether related or unrelated to the charge upon

2024Simply put, the Rogers rule states that the indelible right to counsel activates the moment that an attorney becomes involved ( see id. ["once an attorney has entered the proceeding ... a defendant in custody may not be further interrogated in the absence of counsel"]; People v. Steward, 88 NY2d 496, 501 [1996][emphasis supplied] [" Rogers establishes and still stands for the important protection and principle that once a defendant in custody on a particular matter is represented by or requests counsel, custodial interrogation about any subject, whether related or unrelated to the charge upon

2015The threat made by the declarant against his wife “is strong evidence that [the declarant] was not then relying upon any confidential relationship to preserve the secrecy of his acts and words, and is sufficient in itself to remove these communications from the protection of the privilege” (People v Dudley, 24 NY2d 410, 415 [1969]; cf. People v Fediuk, 66 NY2d 881, 883-884 [1985]).

2015The threat made by the declarant against his wife “is strong evidence that [the declarant] was not then relying upon any confidential relationship to preserve the secrecy of his acts and words, and is sufficient in itself to remove these communications from the protection of the privilege” (People v Dudley, 24 NY2d 410, 415 [1969]; cf. People v Fediuk, 66 NY2d 881, 883-884 [1985]).

2024"A client who voluntarily testifies to a privileged matter, who publicly discloses such matter or who permits his [or her] attorney to testify regarding the matter is deemed to have impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege" ( Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn , 97 AD2d 834, 835 [citations omitted]). "'Moreover, a waiver may be found where a party engages in selective disclosure, as a party may not rely on the protection of the privilege regarding damaging communications while disclosing other self-serving communications'" ( Siegel v Snyder , 202 AD3d 125, 132 , quoting Soussis v Lazer,

2002(Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d 834, 835 [2d Dept 1983]; see, Hearn v Rhay, 68 FRD 574 [ED Wash 1975].) The burden of establishing any right to protection under the privilege “is on the party asserting it; the protection claim must be narrowly construed; and its application must be consistent with the purposes underlying the immunity.” (Spectrum Sys.

2015The threat made by the declarant against his wife “is strong evidence that [the declarant] was not then relying upon any confidential relationship to preserve the secrecy of his acts and words, and is sufficient in itself to remove these communications from the protection of the privilege” (People v Dudley, 24 NY2d 410, 415 [1969]; cf. People v Fediuk, 66 NY2d 881, 883-884 [1985]).

2015The threat made by the declarant against his wife “is strong evidence that [the declarant] was not then relying upon any confidential relationship to preserve the secrecy of his acts and words, and is sufficient in itself to remove these communications from the protection of the privilege” (People v Dudley, 24 NY2d 410, 415 [1969]; cf. People v Fediuk, 66 NY2d 881, 883-884 [1985]).

1980In Schmerber v California ( 384 US 757, 763-764 ) the Supreme Court stated: "It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take”.

1978Interestingly, the Schmerber opinion, which did not reach the question before us now, itself stated "[i]t is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications” (Schmerber, supra, at pp 763-764 [emphasis mine]). 1 Not surprisingly, then, this court today attempts to base its decision on what it terms a more broadly stated rationale.

2024Simply put, the Rogers rule states that the indelible right to counsel activates the moment that an attorney becomes involved ( see id. ["once an attorney has entered the proceeding ... a defendant in custody may not be further interrogated in the absence of counsel"]; People v. Steward, 88 NY2d 496, 501 [1996][emphasis supplied] [" Rogers establishes and still stands for the important protection and principle that once a defendant in custody on a particular matter is represented by or requests counsel, custodial interrogation about any subject, whether related or unrelated to the charge upon

2024Simply put, the Rogers rule states that the indelible right to counsel activates the moment that an attorney becomes involved ( see id. ["once an attorney has entered the proceeding ... a defendant in custody may not be further interrogated in the absence of counsel"]; People v. Steward, 88 NY2d 496, 501 [1996][emphasis supplied] [" Rogers establishes and still stands for the important protection and principle that once a defendant in custody on a particular matter is represented by or requests counsel, custodial interrogation about any subject, whether related or unrelated to the charge upon

1997Considering that the Health Department’s handling of the tuberculosis incident had become a matter of public controversy, the forum in which the statements were made was sufficiently connected to the defendant’s official duties to warrant the protection provided by the privilege (see, Lombardo v Stoke, 18 NY2d 394 ; cf., Clark v McGee, supra, at 621).

1991The general rule, as expressed in Stukuls v State of New York ( 42 NY2d 272 , supra), Ward Telecommunications & Computer Servs. v State of New York ( 42 NY2d 289 ) and Cheatum v Wehle ( 5 NY2d 585 ), provides that a principal executive of State or local government and those entrusted by law with considerable administrative or executive policymaking responsibilities are entitled to absolute immunity from defamation claims emanating from official reports and communications. "[T]he privilege is not to be extended liberally, and instead must be carefully confined to that type of situation in which

1991The general rule, as expressed in Stukuls v State of New York ( 42 NY2d 272 , supra), Ward Telecommunications & Computer Servs. v State of New York ( 42 NY2d 289 ) and Cheatum v Wehle ( 5 NY2d 585 ), provides that a principal executive of State or local government and those entrusted by law with considerable administrative or executive policymaking responsibilities are entitled to absolute immunity from defamation claims emanating from official reports and communications. "[T]he privilege is not to be extended liberally, and instead must be carefully confined to that type of situation in which

1980For these reasons, the privilege is not to be extended liberally, and instead must be carefully confined to that type of situation in which the protection provided by the privilege will serve a necessary societal function (see Toker v Pollak, 44 NY2d 211 , supra; Stukuls v State of New York, 42 NY2d 272 , supra; Cheatum v Wehle, 5 NY2d 585, supra).

2026NSUH seeking to invoke the quality-assurance privilege pursuant to the foregoing provisions has the burden of establishing a right to the protection of the privilege. ( See Siegel v Snyder , 202 AD3d at 137 ).

2026NSUH seeking to invoke the quality-assurance privilege pursuant to the foregoing provisions has the burden of establishing a right to the protection of the privilege. ( See Siegel v Snyder , 202 AD3d at 137).

2024"A client who voluntarily testifies to a privileged matter, who publicly discloses such matter or who permits his [or her] attorney to testify regarding the matter is deemed to have impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege" ( Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn , 97 AD2d 834, 835 [citations omitted]). "'Moreover, a waiver may be found where a party engages in selective disclosure, as a party may not rely on the protection of the privilege regarding damaging communications while disclosing other self-serving communications'" ( Siegel v Snyder , 202 AD3d 125, 132 , quoting Soussis v Lazer,

2021Moreover, a waiver may be found where a party engages in selective disclosure, as a party may not rely on the protection of the privilege regarding damaging communications while disclosing other self-serving communications" ( Soussis v Lazer, Aptheker, Rosella & Yedid, P.C. , 91 AD3d 753, 754 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see e.g . 601 Realty Corp. v Conway, Farrell, Curtin & Kelly, P.C. , 74 AD3d 1179, 1180 [finding that the invasion of the attorney-client privilege with respect to certain documents was required in order for the defendants to assert their defense to the le

2014The marital privilege only applies to those statements made in confidence and “that are induced by the marital relation and prompted by the affection, confidence and loyalty engendered by such relationship.” (Poppe v Poppe, 3 NY2d 312, 315 [1957]; see also Parkhurst v Berdell, 110 NY 386, 393 [1888].) The term communication encompasses oral communications and conversations between husband and wife, as well as, “knowledge derived from the observance of disclosive acts done in the presence or view of one spouse by the other because of the confidence existing between them by reason of the marital

1980Ordinarily, a statement by a husband to his wife that he has committed a crime is privileged as a communication which would not have been made “except in reliance upon the free and unrestrained privacy of the marital relation” (People v Daghita, 299 NY 194, 199 , supra).

2007In view of the public policy to permit persons involved in a judicial proceeding to write and speak about it freely among themselves, pertinent statements made in the course of such proceedings are afforded the protection of privilege, “ ‘irrespective of the motive’ with which [the statements] are made” (Wiener v Weintraub, 22 NY2d 330, 331 [1968], quoting Marsh, 50 NY at 311 ; see also Mosesson, 257 AD2d at 383 ; Ticketmaster Corp. v Lidsky, 245 AD2d 142 [1997]; Allan & Allan Arts v Rosenblum, 201 AD2d 136, 138 [1994], lv denied 85 NY2d 921 [1995], cert denied 516 US 914 [1995]; 2 NY PJI3d 3:

2003Once pertinent speech in court or to a recognized participant in an ongoing judicial proceeding is established, virtually every speaker whose speech is connected with the litigation has standing to assert this immunity from suit (Herzfeld & Stern v Beck, 175 AD2d 689 [1st Dept 1991], appeal dismissed 79 NY2d 914 [1992], lv dismissed 82 NY2d 789 [1993]). “[T]he . . . privilege attaches ... to every step of the proceeding in question even if it is preliminary and/or investigatory” (175 AD2d at 691) and is extended “to all who take part in judicial proceedings, judge, attorney, counsel, printer,

2006(Id.; Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62, 69 [1980]; Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 NY2d 215, 218 [1979]; Koump v Smith, 25 NY2d 287, 294 [1969].) The attorney-client privilege, the oldest among common-law evidentiary privileges (8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 [McNaughton rev 1961]), fosters the open dialog between lawyer and client that is deemed essential to effective representation.

1992In its decision, the Court noted that determining whether a specific communication should be cloaked with the protection of the privilege depended " ' "on the circumstances of each case” ’ ”. ( 47 NY2d, at 222 , quoting Matter of Kaplan [Blumenfeld], supra, at 219, quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2313, at 609 [5th. ed].) Under appropriate circumstances, the privilege would be required to yield to social policy considerations.

1997Under the unequivocal language of CPL 50.10 (1), the petitioner is not immunized from prosecution with regard to the alleged perjury committed in the Grand Jury (see, People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747, 760 ["(i)t is * * * well-settled law that one who is granted immunity in return for his testimony receives no license to swear falsely with impunity while under the protection of that immunity”]; People v Tomasello, supra, 21 NY2d, at 150 [where the accused "acquired a protection from prosecution for substantive crimes based on his 'compelled’ testimony, he may not, and should not, be permitted to e

1997It is well-settled law that one who is granted immunity in return for his testimony receives no license to swear falsely with impunity under the protection of that immunity (United States v Apfelbaum, 445 US 115 ; People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747).

2026"Credentialing files 'fall squarely within the materials that are made confidential by Education Law 6527[3] and article 28 of the Public Health Law.'" ( Lamacchia v Schwartz , 94 AD3d 712, 714 , 941 NYS2d 245 quoting Logue v Velez , 92 NY2d 13, 18 , 699 NE2d 365 , 677 NYS2d 6 [1998]).

2026"Credentialing files 'fall squarely within the materials that are made confidential by Education Law 6527[3] and article 28 of the Public Health Law.'" ( Lamacchia v Schwartz , 94 AD3d 712, 714 , 941 NYS2d 245 quoting Logue v Velez , 92 NY2d 13, 18 , 699 NE2d 365 , 677 NYS2d 6 [1998]).

2026"Credentialing files 'fall squarely within the materials that are made confidential by Education Law 6527[3] and article 28 of the Public Health Law.'" ( Lamacchia v Schwartz , 94 AD3d 712, 714 , 941 NYS2d 245 quoting Logue v Velez , 92 NY2d 13, 18 , 699 NE2d 365 , 677 NYS2d 6 [1998]).

2026"Credentialing files 'fall squarely within the materials that are made confidential by Education Law 6527[3] and article 28 of the Public Health Law.'" ( Lamacchia v Schwartz , 94 AD3d 712, 714 , 941 NYS2d 245 quoting Logue v Velez , 92 NY2d 13, 18 , 699 NE2d 365 , 677 NYS2d 6 [1998]).

2024Tr., 43 AD3d 56, 64 [1st Dept 2007] ["selective disclosure is not permitted as a party may not rely on the protection of the privilege regarding damaging communications while disclosing other self-serving communications"]) and represents in her opposition that she has done so.

2024Ltd. v Gold , 44 AD3d 718, 718-719 [2d Dept 2007]; Fleet Natl.

2024Ltd. v Gold , 44 AD3d 718, 718-719 [2d Dept 2007]; Fleet Natl.

2021Moreover, a waiver may be found where a party engages in selective disclosure, as a party may not rely on the protection of the privilege regarding damaging communications while disclosing other self-serving communications" ( Soussis v Lazer, Aptheker, Rosella & Yedid, P.C. , 91 AD3d 753, 754 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see e.g . 601 Realty Corp. v Conway, Farrell, Curtin & Kelly, P.C. , 74 AD3d 1179, 1180 [finding that the invasion of the attorney-client privilege with respect to certain documents was required in order for the defendants to assert their defense to the le

2017The party seeking the protection of the privilege afforded by Education Law § 6527 (3) bears the burden of showing that a review procedure was in place and that the requested information was generated or prepared in accordance with such procedure (see Estate of Savage v Kredentser, 150 AD3d 1452, 1454 [2017]; Bluth v Albany Med.