protection privilege in California

1988Since the privilege is given for a particular *980 purpose, abuse of the privilege occurs when the publication is attributable to “any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given.” (Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 797 .) The privilege of the press to publish reports of official misconduct under section 47, subdivision 3 is given to advance the interest of informing the public in the pursuit of its constitutionally recognized responsibility of overseeing government. ( Snively, supra, 185 Cal. at pp. 571-572.) Tha

1986“Thus the privilege is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will toward plaintiff [citations], or by any cause *997 other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given.” (Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 797 [ 197 P.2d 713 ], quoted with approval in Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 945 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ].) The malice necessary to destroy a qualified privilege is “actual malice or malice in fact, that is, a state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, an

1984The trial judge in appraising the claim ‘must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at pp. 486-487 [ 95 L.Ed. at p. 1124 ].) Following Hoffman our Supreme Court held that “[a]n ordinary witness need not actually prove the existence of an incriminatory hazard as that *1044 would surrender the very protection which the privilege against self-incrimination was designed to guarantee.

1969It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, [Citation] and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken. ’ [Citation.] However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. ...” (Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 [ 95 L.Ed. 1118, 1123 , 71 S.Ct. 814 ].) Hoffman and Malloy tell us to look to the setting in which the question

1971Code, § 48a, subd. (4) par. (d).) "Various definitions have also been announced by the California courts, *629 among them: `[Malice is] a desire or disposition to injure another founded upon spite or ill will. [While the] absence of malice is the absence of enmity.' ( Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 618 [ 213 P. 954 ].) `[The privilege] is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will ... [citations], or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given.... [It] is lost if [the publisher] has no reasonable grounds for bel

1971Code, § 48a, subd. (4) par. (d).) "Various definitions have also been announced by the California courts, *629 among them: `[Malice is] a desire or disposition to injure another founded upon spite or ill will. [While the] absence of malice is the absence of enmity.' ( Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 618 [ 213 P. 954 ].) `[The privilege] is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will ... [citations], or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given.... [It] is lost if [the publisher] has no reasonable grounds for bel

2013Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1089 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 374 ].) Under California law, an insurer “must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy.” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Where a potential for coverage exits, the duty to defend arises immediately upon tender of the underlying suit in order “to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf.” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ]

2013Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1089 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 374 ].) Under California law, an insurer “must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy.” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Where a potential for coverage exits, the duty to defend arises immediately upon tender of the underlying suit in order “to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf.” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ]

2021Instead, the privilege forbids compelled disclosures which could serve as a ‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal offense; in ruling upon a claim of privilege, the 10 trial court must find that it clearly appears from a consideration of all the circumstances in the case that an answer to the challenged question[s] cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the witness.” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 , disapproved on other grounds in Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 , 371–372; see Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S.

1980(Prudhomme v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d 320, 326.) In Prudhomme , the court said, “[a]n ordinary witness need not actually prove the existence of an incriminatory hazard as that would surrender the very protection which the privilege against self-incrimination was *64 designed to guarantee.

2008For purposes of a statutory qualified privilege, “[t]he malice referred to ... is actual malice or malice in fact, that is, a state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person. [Citation.] The factual issue is whether the publication was so motivated. ‘Thus the privilege is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will toward plaintiff [citations], or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given’ [citations].” (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944-9

2008For purposes of a statutory qualified privilege, “[t]he malice referred to ... is actual malice or malice in fact, that is, a state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person. [Citation.] The factual issue is whether the publication was so motivated. ‘Thus the privilege is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will toward plaintiff [citations], or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given’ [citations].” (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944-9

1971Code, § 48a, subd. (4) par. (d).) “Various definitions have also been announced by the California courts, among them: ‘[Malice is] a desire' or disposition to injure another founded upon spite or ill will. [While the] absence of malice is the absence of enmity.’ (Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 618 [ 213 P. 954 ].) ‘[The privilege] is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will . . . [citations], or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given. . . . [It] is lost if [the publisher] has no reasonable grounds for bel

1971Code, § 48a, subd. (4) par. (d).) “Various definitions have also been announced by the California courts, among them: ‘[Malice is] a desire' or disposition to injure another founded upon spite or ill will. [While the] absence of malice is the absence of enmity.’ (Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 618 [ 213 P. 954 ].) ‘[The privilege] is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will . . . [citations], or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given. . . . [It] is lost if [the publisher] has no reasonable grounds for bel

1971Code, § 48a, subd. (4) par. (d).) "Various definitions have also been announced by the California courts, *629 among them: `[Malice is] a desire or disposition to injure another founded upon spite or ill will. [While the] absence of malice is the absence of enmity.' ( Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 618 [ 213 P. 954 ].) `[The privilege] is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will ... [citations], or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given.... [It] is lost if [the publisher] has no reasonable grounds for bel

1971Code, § 48a, subd. (4) par. (d).) "Various definitions have also been announced by the California courts, *629 among them: `[Malice is] a desire or disposition to injure another founded upon spite or ill will. [While the] absence of malice is the absence of enmity.' ( Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 618 [ 213 P. 954 ].) `[The privilege] is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will ... [citations], or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given.... [It] is lost if [the publisher] has no reasonable grounds for bel

1971Code, § 48a, subd. (4) par. (d).) "Various definitions have also been announced by the California courts, *629 among them: `[Malice is] a desire or disposition to injure another founded upon spite or ill will. [While the] absence of malice is the absence of enmity.' ( Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 618 [ 213 P. 954 ].) `[The privilege] is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will ... [citations], or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given.... [It] is lost if [the publisher] has no reasonable grounds for bel

1971Code, § 48a, subd. (4) par. (d).) "Various definitions have also been announced by the California courts, *629 among them: `[Malice is] a desire or disposition to injure another founded upon spite or ill will. [While the] absence of malice is the absence of enmity.' ( Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 618 [ 213 P. 954 ].) `[The privilege] is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will ... [citations], or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given.... [It] is lost if [the publisher] has no reasonable grounds for bel

1993(Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 11-12 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 661-662 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 ]; Hoffman v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. at p. 486 [95 L.Ed. at pp. 1123-1124].) Nonetheless, when it is not evident from the circumstances that the questions call for incriminating information, the court must require an explanation as to why and how the answers might be incriminating.

1993(Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 11-12 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 661-662 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 ]; Hoffman v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. at p. 486 [95 L.Ed. at pp. 1123-1124].) Nonetheless, when it is not evident from the circumstances that the questions call for incriminating information, the court must require an explanation as to why and how the answers might be incriminating.

2019The trial court took the view that under Price v. Shell Oil Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245 , 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ( Price ), strict liability applies to car rental companies only during the period when they lease a car to the public, and that upon selling a car after retiring it as a rental, they get the protection of the rule that sellers of used goods are not subject to strict liability. ( Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 268 , 161 Cal.Rptr. 789 ( Tauber-Arons ); see also LaRosa v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 741 , 176 Cal.Rptr. 224 ( LaRosa )

2019The trial court took the view that under Price v. Shell Oil Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245 , 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ( Price ), strict liability applies to car rental companies only during the period when they lease a car to the public, and that upon selling a car after retiring it as a rental, they get the protection of the rule that sellers of used goods are not subject to strict liability. ( Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 268 , 161 Cal.Rptr. 789 ( Tauber-Arons ); see also LaRosa v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 741 , 176 Cal.Rptr. 224 ( LaRosa )

2016(Kerner, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 111 .) Consequently, “it is neither customary nor necessary to review the contents of the communication in order to determine whether the [attorney-client] privilege applies . ...” (Cornish v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 467, 480 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 383 ] (Cornish).) A court’s determination of whether the privilege applies “does not involve the nature of the communications or the effect of disclosure but rather the existence of the relationship at the time the communication was made, the intent of the client and whether the communication emanates from

2016J.).) Considering Evidence Code section 952 “as a whole,” continued Chief Justice George, it becomes “even clearer that the Legislature intended to extend the protection of the privilege solely to those communications between the lawyer and the client that are made for the purpose of seeking or delivering the lawyer’s legal advice or representation.” (Costco, 47 Cal.4th at p. 743 (conc. opn. of George, C.

2014Co. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1155-1156 [“‘[i]mposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf’”].) “An insurer’s refusal to furnish a defense to a liability action against the insured is actionable as a breach of contract.” (Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group 2013) ¶ 7:690.) Until April 27, 2010 Lawyers Title was in breach of the policy, and, because of its change of position, admittedly so.

2011Co. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1155-1156 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 603 ] [“ ‘To defend [an insured] meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately . . .’ [because] ‘[imposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (citation omitted)].) When Janopaul filed its bad faith action for breach of contract, tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for declaratory relief, Janopaul put St.

2013Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1089 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 374 ].) Under California law, an insurer “must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy.” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Where a potential for coverage exits, the duty to defend arises immediately upon tender of the underlying suit in order “to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf.” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ]

1998Co. v. Barbara B., supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081 .) “To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately.” (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 49 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 939 P.2d 766 ].) “Imposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf.” (Montrose I, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 295 .) The nondefending insurers also incorrectly rely on Hurley Construction Co. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 533 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 629 ].

1994“Rule 2-100 does not define the scope of the attorney-client privilege; rather, it bars ex parte communications with opposing parties regardless of whether the information sought, obtained or conveyed is privileged from disclosure.” (Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. State of California (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 131, 140-141 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 493 ].) Thus, regardless of whether the minors failed to timely invoke the attorney-client privilege, they were still entitled to the protection of rule 2-100. 4.

1994“Rule 2-100 does not define the scope of the attorney-client privilege; rather, it bars ex parte communications with opposing parties regardless of whether the information sought, obtained or conveyed is privileged from disclosure.” (Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. State of California (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 131, 140-141 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 493 ].) Thus, regardless of whether the minors failed to timely invoke the attorney-client privilege, they were still entitled to the protection of rule 2-100. 4.

2013Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1089 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 374 ].) Under California law, an insurer “must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy.” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Where a potential for coverage exits, the duty to defend arises immediately upon tender of the underlying suit in order “to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf.” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ]

2013Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1089 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 374 ].) Under California law, an insurer “must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy.” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Where a potential for coverage exits, the duty to defend arises immediately upon tender of the underlying suit in order “to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf.” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ]

1998Co. v. Barbara B., supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081 .) “To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately.” (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 49 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 939 P.2d 766 ].) “Imposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf.” (Montrose I, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 295 .) The nondefending insurers also incorrectly rely on Hurley Construction Co. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 533 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 629 ].

1995(Gray v. Zurich (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) As we said in Gray , “the carrier must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy.” [Citations.] Implicit in this rule is the principle that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify; an insurer may owe a duty to defend its insured in an action in which no damages ultimately are awarded. [Citations.]’ (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081.)” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ].) The Court in Mo

1987Applying this analysis to the present case, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting the investigator’s testimony concerning the location of the wallet.” (Id., at p. 695.) In the court below, Fairbank argued that Goldsmith v. Superior Court (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 76 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 366 ], not Meredith, supra, 29 Cal.3d 682, controlled the result in this case.

1987Applying this analysis to the present case, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting the investigator’s testimony concerning the location of the wallet.” (Id., at p. 695.) In the court below, Fairbank argued that Goldsmith v. Superior Court (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 76 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 366 ], not Meredith, supra, 29 Cal.3d 682, controlled the result in this case.