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13 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1884–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Danforth v. Government Employees Insurancegreen2 sentences2019In that case, we affirmed the denial 11 of a motion to dismiss GEICO’s declaratory judgment action, finding that even though GEICO initially denied coverage, it then reevaluated its position specifically stating in its reservation of rights letter that it “‘maintain[ed] its right to contest coverage.’” Id. at 424 (2). 2019It then sent a reservation of rights agreement to the insured, indicating its intention to “‘maintain its right to contest coverage [under her policy], while at the same time affording the protection of a defense to [the insured].’” 282 Ga. App. at 422 . | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Rogers v. State, 282 Ga. 659 (6) (b) ( 653 SE2d 31 ) (2007). 16 Additionally, without the protection of privilege, the defendant’s attorneys run the risk that the psychiatric expert they have hired to evaluate the defendant will render an opinion inconsistent with the defense’s insanity theory and the expert will then be made an involuntary witness for the State. 2015See Rogers v. State, 282 Ga. 659 (6) (b) ( 653 SE2d 31 ) (2007). 16 Additionally, without the protection of privilege, the defendant’s attorneys run the risk that the psychiatric expert they have hired to evaluate the defendant will render an opinion inconsistent with the defense’s insanity theory and the expert will then be made an involuntary witness for the State. | 1 | 1 |
Gresham & Associates, Inc. v. Strianesegreen2 sentences2011Gresham & Assoc, v. Strianese, 265 Ga. App. 559, 562-563 (2) ( 595 SE2d 82 ) (2004). 2011Gresham & Assoc, v. Strianese, 265 Ga. App. 559, 562-563 (2) ( 595 SE2d 82 ) (2004). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cutts v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority
green
1 sentence1995In Cutts , we held that the protection of the doctrine did not extend to employees of the charitable hospital because individual professionals have a duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill when providing medical treatment and that “[i]nsulating them from liability for breaching this duty simply because they were employed by a charitable hospital would not further the purpose of the charitable immunity doctrine. ‘By design the charitable immunity doctrine protects the funds of the charitable institution from depletion in order that these funds may be (preserved) to carry out the | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Morton v. Stewart
green
2 sentences1987Appellant’s report of appellee’s conviction cannot be considered to be accurate or even “substantially accurate” (see Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636 (2b) ( 266 SE2d 230 ) (1980)) so as to bring it within the protection of the privilege. 1987Appellant’s report of appellee’s conviction cannot be considered to be accurate or even “substantially accurate” (see Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636 (2b) ( 266 SE2d 230 ) (1980)) so as to bring it within the protection of the privilege. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
McCray v. State
green
2 sentences1985“The personal privilege of a witness can not be set up by a party to the cause on trial, as a ground for excluding testimony which the witness gives without claiming the protection of his privilege.” McCray v. State, 134 Ga. 416 (8) ( 68 SE 62 ) (1910). 1985“The personal privilege of a witness can not be set up by a party to the cause on trial, as a ground for excluding testimony which the witness gives without claiming the protection of his privilege.” McCray v. State, 134 Ga. 416 (8) ( 68 SE 62 ) (1910). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Ladson Motor Company v. Croft
green
2 sentences1973Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga. App. 233 ( 160 SE2d 436 ) and Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275 ( 92 SE2d 103 ) to take this case out of the protection of the presumption stated in the first headnote in Conner as follows: "Where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance *170 of his duties, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.” The presumption did not apply in Bush because (1) the board found against it; (2) Bush was not admittedly in the course of employment while going to or from h 1973Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga. App. 233 ( 160 SE2d 436 ) and Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275 ( 92 SE2d 103 ) to take this case out of the protection of the presumption stated in the first headnote in Conner as follows: "Where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance *170 of his duties, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.” The presumption did not apply in Bush because (1) the board found against it; (2) Bush was not admittedly in the course of employment while going to or from h | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. v. Conner
green
2 sentences1973Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga. App. 233 ( 160 SE2d 436 ) and Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275 ( 92 SE2d 103 ) to take this case out of the protection of the presumption stated in the first headnote in Conner as follows: "Where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance *170 of his duties, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.” The presumption did not apply in Bush because (1) the board found against it; (2) Bush was not admittedly in the course of employment while going to or from h 1973Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga. App. 233 ( 160 SE2d 436 ) and Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275 ( 92 SE2d 103 ) to take this case out of the protection of the presumption stated in the first headnote in Conner as follows: "Where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance *170 of his duties, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.” The presumption did not apply in Bush because (1) the board found against it; (2) Bush was not admittedly in the course of employment while going to or from h | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta
green
2 sentences1942An airport is not a nuisance per se, although it might become such from the manner of its construction or operation.” Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 (2) ( 173 S. E. 817 , 99 A. L. 1942An airport is not a nuisance per se, although it might become such from the manner of its construction or operation.” Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 (2) ( 173 S. E. 817 , 99 A. L. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Finch v. Woods
green
2 sentences1915If he be a mere volunteer whose title has been derived by gift, inheritance, devise, or some kindred mode, he does not come within the term purchaser as used in these statutes.” In Finch v. Woods, 113 Ga. 996 (39 S. E. 418), the Supreme Court said that “the registry laws were not intended for the protection of those who claim under voluntary conveyances.” See also Martin v. White, 115 Ga. 866 ( 42 S. E. 279 ). 1915If he be a mere volunteer whose title has been derived by gift, inheritance, devise, or some kindred mode, he does not come within the term purchaser as used in these statutes.” In Finch v. Woods, 113 Ga. 996 (39 S. E. 418), the Supreme Court said that “the registry laws were not intended for the protection of those who claim under voluntary conveyances.” See also Martin v. White, 115 Ga. 866 ( 42 S. E. 279 ). | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Martin v. White
green
2 sentences1915If he be a mere volunteer whose title has been derived by gift, inheritance, devise, or some kindred mode, he does not come within the term purchaser as used in these statutes.” In Finch v. Woods, 113 Ga. 996 (39 S. E. 418), the Supreme Court said that “the registry laws were not intended for the protection of those who claim under voluntary conveyances.” See also Martin v. White, 115 Ga. 866 ( 42 S. E. 279 ). 1915If he be a mere volunteer whose title has been derived by gift, inheritance, devise, or some kindred mode, he does not come within the term purchaser as used in these statutes.” In Finch v. Woods, 113 Ga. 996 (39 S. E. 418), the Supreme Court said that “the registry laws were not intended for the protection of those who claim under voluntary conveyances.” See also Martin v. White, 115 Ga. 866 ( 42 S. E. 279 ). | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Tremere v. Barfield
green
2 sentences1915This court held in Tremere v. Barfield, 12 Ga. App. 774 ( 78 S. E. 729 ), that “where personal property is sold, with the condition affixed to the sale that the title is to remain in the vendor until the purchase-money is paid, the reservation of title must be in writing and recorded within thirty days from the date of its execution, in order to be valid against a third person who, without actual notice of the reservation of title, parts with money or other thing of value upon the faith of the vendee’s apparent unconditional ownership of the property, and in consideration therefor receives fro 1915This court held in Tremere v. Barfield, 12 Ga. App. 774 ( 78 S. E. 729 ), that “where personal property is sold, with the condition affixed to the sale that the title is to remain in the vendor until the purchase-money is paid, the reservation of title must be in writing and recorded within thirty days from the date of its execution, in order to be valid against a third person who, without actual notice of the reservation of title, parts with money or other thing of value upon the faith of the vendee’s apparent unconditional ownership of the property, and in consideration therefor receives fro | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Blitch v. Lee
neutral
2 sentences1913The tenant, under the protection of this rule, is invited to agricultural industry without the apprehension of loss by reason of some unforeseen contingency which might arise and terminate his estate.” See, also, Blitch v. Lee, 115 Ga. 112 ( 41 S. E. 275 ); Garrison v. Parker, 117 Ga. 537 ( 43 S. E. 849 ); Raines v. Hind-man, 136 Ga. 450 ( 71 S. E. 738 , 38 L. 1913The tenant, under the protection of this rule, is invited to agricultural industry without the apprehension of loss by reason of some unforeseen contingency which might arise and terminate his estate.” See, also, Blitch v. Lee, 115 Ga. 112 ( 41 S. E. 275 ); Garrison v. Parker, 117 Ga. 537 ( 43 S. E. 849 ); Raines v. Hind-man, 136 Ga. 450 ( 71 S. E. 738 , 38 L. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Garrison v. Parker
green
2 sentences1913The tenant, under the protection of this rule, is invited to agricultural industry without the apprehension of loss by reason of some unforeseen contingency which might arise and terminate his estate.” See, also, Blitch v. Lee, 115 Ga. 112 ( 41 S. E. 275 ); Garrison v. Parker, 117 Ga. 537 ( 43 S. E. 849 ); Raines v. Hind-man, 136 Ga. 450 ( 71 S. E. 738 , 38 L. 1913The tenant, under the protection of this rule, is invited to agricultural industry without the apprehension of loss by reason of some unforeseen contingency which might arise and terminate his estate.” See, also, Blitch v. Lee, 115 Ga. 112 ( 41 S. E. 275 ); Garrison v. Parker, 117 Ga. 537 ( 43 S. E. 849 ); Raines v. Hind-man, 136 Ga. 450 ( 71 S. E. 738 , 38 L. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Raines v. Hindman
green
2 sentences1913The tenant, under the protection of this rule, is invited to agricultural industry without the apprehension of loss by reason of some unforeseen contingency which might arise and terminate his estate.” See, also, Blitch v. Lee, 115 Ga. 112 ( 41 S. E. 275 ); Garrison v. Parker, 117 Ga. 537 ( 43 S. E. 849 ); Raines v. Hind-man, 136 Ga. 450 ( 71 S. E. 738 , 38 L. 1913The tenant, under the protection of this rule, is invited to agricultural industry without the apprehension of loss by reason of some unforeseen contingency which might arise and terminate his estate.” See, also, Blitch v. Lee, 115 Ga. 112 ( 41 S. E. 275 ); Garrison v. Parker, 117 Ga. 537 ( 43 S. E. 849 ); Raines v. Hind-man, 136 Ga. 450 ( 71 S. E. 738 , 38 L. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Taylor v. State
green
1 sentence1910Taylor v. State, 83 Ga. 647 (4), 657 ( 10 S. E. 443 ). 9. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Loeb v. State
green
1 sentence1907Loeb v. State, 75 Ga. 258 ; Harkey v. State, 89 Ga. 478 ; Burnett v. State, 92 Ga. 474 ; Blodgett v. State, 97 Ga. 351 . * Judgment affirmed. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Harkey v. State
neutral
1 sentence1907Loeb v. State, 75 Ga. 258 ; Harkey v. State, 89 Ga. 478 ; Burnett v. State, 92 Ga. 474 ; Blodgett v. State, 97 Ga. 351 . * Judgment affirmed. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Burnett v. State
neutral
1 sentence1907Loeb v. State, 75 Ga. 258 ; Harkey v. State, 89 Ga. 478 ; Burnett v. State, 92 Ga. 474 ; Blodgett v. State, 97 Ga. 351 . * Judgment affirmed. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Blodgett v. State
neutral
1 sentence1907Loeb v. State, 75 Ga. 258 ; Harkey v. State, 89 Ga. 478 ; Burnett v. State, 92 Ga. 474 ; Blodgett v. State, 97 Ga. 351 . * Judgment affirmed. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Robinson v. Howe
neutral
1 sentence1884Howe, 13 Wis., 341 , it is distinctly held, that “those rights which the law gives to, or obligations which it imposes upon persons in certain relations, independently of any stipulations which the parties themselves have made,” are not within the protection of this clause. | 1 | 1884–1884 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.