protection doctrine in North Carolina

1985The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable. 327 U.S. at 208 , 90 L.Ed. at 629 .

1985The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable. 327 U.S. at 208 , 90 L.Ed. at 629 .

1914“We do not assent to the opposite doctrine which would seem to be laid down by Pearson, J., in Wakefield v. Smithwick, 49 N. C., 327 , which is not supported by the authority he cites, and, doubtless, intended to follow; for if the words are true, a defendant does not need the protection of privilege.

1891We do not assent to the opposite doctrine which would seem to be laid down by Pearson, J., in Wakefield v. Smithwick, 49 N. C., 327 , which is not supported by the authority he cites, and, doubtless, intended to follow, for if the words are true a defendant does not need the protection of privilege.

2025Under English common law at that time, the Attorney General had the power to “prosecute all actions necessary for the protection and defense of the property and revenue of the Crown.” Martin, 320 N.C. at 546 .

2025Further, North Carolina law has established that the Attorney General has the power to “prosecute all actions necessary for the protection and defense of the property and revenue of the sovereign people of North Carolina.” Martin, 320 N.C. at 546 .

2011It is well established that “[t]he burden of establishing the attorney-client privilege rests upon the claimant of the privilege.” Evans, 142 N.C.

2002The two elements of the doctrine are (1) “an emergency situation must exist requiring immediate action to avoid injury” and (2) “the emergency must not have been created by the negligence of the party seeking the protection of the doctrine.” Id. (quoting Conner v. Continental Industrial Chemicals, 123 N.C.

1998App. 701, 703 , 474 S.E.2d 141, 142-143 (1996), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 639 , 483 S.E.2d 702 (1997) (citations omitted).

1998App. 701, 703 , 474 S.E.2d 141, 142-143 (1996), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 639 , 483 S.E.2d 702 (1997) (citations omitted).

1996Id.; Colvin v. Badgett, 120 N.C.

1991Kawamura Cycle Co., 649 F.2d 261 (4th Cir.1981), both parties agreed, and the court assumed, that "as a result of his voluntary dismissal of his first action, [plaintiff] gained the protection of the state rule [i.e., the savings provision in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1)]." Id. at 262.

1991Kawamura Cycle Co., 649 F.2d 261 (4th Cir. 1981), both parties agreed, and the court assumed, that “as a result of his voluntary dismissal of his first action, [plaintiff] gained the protection of the state rule [i.e., the savings provision in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1)].” Id. at 262.

1982Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-487 , 95 L.Ed. at 1124 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 .

1982Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-487 , 95 L.Ed. at 1124 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 .

1975The holding in Oklahoma Press was buttressed by language in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950) : “The respondents argue that since the Commission made no charge of violation either of the decree or the statute, it is engaged in a mere ‘fishing expedition’ to see if it can turn up evidence of guilt.

1975The holding in Oklahoma Press was buttressed by language in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950) : “The respondents argue that since the Commission made no charge of violation either of the decree or the statute, it is engaged in a mere ‘fishing expedition’ to see if it can turn up evidence of guilt.

1966When such a right has arisen, the repeal of the statute does not affect the right or an action for its enforcement.” Ibid 790. • The case of State v. Spencer, 114 N.C. 770 , 19 S.E. 93 , is quite similar to the one under consideration.

1966When such a right has arisen, the repeal of the statute does not affect the right or an action for its enforcement.” Ibid 790. • The case of State v. Spencer, 114 N.C. 770 , 19 S.E. 93 , is quite similar to the one under consideration.

1962Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N.C. 270 , 13 S.E.Rep. 775, and cases cited * * *." In Alexander v. Vann, 180 N.C. 187 , 104 S.E. 360 , the defendant wrote a letter to the Sheriff of Pitt County with regard to alleged misconduct of the plaintiff, a deputy sheriff of Hertford County.

1962Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N.C. 270 , 13 S.E.Rep. 775, and cases cited * * *." In Alexander v. Vann, 180 N.C. 187 , 104 S.E. 360 , the defendant wrote a letter to the Sheriff of Pitt County with regard to alleged misconduct of the plaintiff, a deputy sheriff of Hertford County.

1962Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N.C. 270 , 13 S.E.Rep. 775, and cases cited * * *." In Alexander v. Vann, 180 N.C. 187 , 104 S.E. 360 , the defendant wrote a letter to the Sheriff of Pitt County with regard to alleged misconduct of the plaintiff, a deputy sheriff of Hertford County.

1940Advertising Co. v. Asheville, supra (739).

1940Advertising Co. v. Asheville, supra (739).

1936R., 145 N. C., 218 (227), which was an action to recover damages for deceit growing out of drawing a deed for timher so as to include certain timher not included in the contract of sale, it is written: “Defendant assigns for error, further, that on the issue as to the statute of limitations the judge below declined to charge, as requested, that the registration of defendant’s deed was in itself such a notice of the alleged fraud as would put the statute in motion for the defendant’s protection and in bar of plaintiff’s claim; but the point has been resolved against the defendant.

1916R., 85 Minn., 318 .

1899In Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S., 368 , the Supreme Court of the United States says: “Notwithstanding the, interpretation placed by this decision upon the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress bas never amended that section; so it must be taken as clear tbat the construction thus placed is the true construction, and acceptable to the legislative as well as to the judicial branch of the govern-, ment.” May we not say the same of Hoke v. Henderson?