protection immunity in Connecticut

34 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1920–2023 8 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Crawfordgreen conn · 2001 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2021–2023 2 sentences 2023Our recent decision in Halladay surveyed our final judgment case law under the second prong of Curcio. ‘‘Paradigmatic examples of such rights that require immediate vindication via an interlocutory appeal are double jeopardy violations resulting in successive pros- ecutions; see, e.g., State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 777 , 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1138 , 122 S. Ct. 1086 , 151 L. 2023Our recent decision in Halladay surveyed our final judgment case law under the second prong of Curcio. ‘‘Paradigmatic examples of such rights that require immediate vindication via an interlocutory appeal are double jeopardy violations resulting in successive pros- ecutions; see, e.g., State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 777 , 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1138 , 122 S. Ct. 1086 , 151 L.	3	3
Draheim v. Abramajtysgreen scotus · 2002 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2021–2023 2 sentences 2023Our recent decision in Halladay surveyed our final judgment case law under the second prong of Curcio. ‘‘Paradigmatic examples of such rights that require immediate vindication via an interlocutory appeal are double jeopardy violations resulting in successive pros- ecutions; see, e.g., State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 777 , 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1138 , 122 S. Ct. 1086 , 151 L. 2023Our recent decision in Halladay surveyed our final judgment case law under the second prong of Curcio. ‘‘Paradigmatic examples of such rights that require immediate vindication via an interlocutory appeal are double jeopardy violations resulting in successive pros- ecutions; see, e.g., State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 777 , 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1138 , 122 S. Ct. 1086 , 151 L.	3	3
Daniel v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Boardgreen scotus · 2002 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2021–2023 2 sentences 2023Our recent decision in Halladay surveyed our final judgment case law under the second prong of Curcio. ‘‘Paradigmatic examples of such rights that require immediate vindication via an interlocutory appeal are double jeopardy violations resulting in successive pros- ecutions; see, e.g., State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 777 , 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1138 , 122 S. Ct. 1086 , 151 L. 2023Our recent decision in Halladay surveyed our final judgment case law under the second prong of Curcio. ‘‘Paradigmatic examples of such rights that require immediate vindication via an interlocutory appeal are double jeopardy violations resulting in successive pros- ecutions; see, e.g., State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 777 , 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1138 , 122 S. Ct. 1086 , 151 L.	3	3
Crawford v. Connecticutgreen scotus · 2002 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2021–2023 2 sentences 2023Our recent decision in Halladay surveyed our final judgment case law under the second prong of Curcio. ‘‘Paradigmatic examples of such rights that require immediate vindication via an interlocutory appeal are double jeopardy violations resulting in successive pros- ecutions; see, e.g., State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 777 , 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1138 , 122 S. Ct. 1086 , 151 L. 2023Our recent decision in Halladay surveyed our final judgment case law under the second prong of Curcio. ‘‘Paradigmatic examples of such rights that require immediate vindication via an interlocutory appeal are double jeopardy violations resulting in successive pros- ecutions; see, e.g., State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 777 , 778 A.2d 947 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1138 , 122 S. Ct. 1086 , 151 L.	3	3
Blakely v. Danbury Hospitalgreen conn · 2016 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2022–2023 2 sentences 2023See, e.g., Blakely v. Danbury Hospital, 323 Conn. 741 , 746–47, 150 A.3d 1109 (2016); see also id., 746 (‘‘the essence of the protection of immunity from suit is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2023See, e.g., Blakely v. Danbury Hospital, 323 Conn. 741 , 746–47, 150 A.3d 1109 (2016); see also id., 746 (‘‘the essence of the protection of immunity from suit is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).	2	5
State v. Skellygreen connappct · 2010 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2016–2019 2 sentences 2019"A defendant who acts as an initial aggressor is not entitled to the protection of the defense of self-defense." State v. Skelly , 124 Conn. App. 161 , 167-68, 3 A.3d 1064 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 909 , 10 A.3d 526 (2010) ; see also General Statutes § 53a-19 (c) (2) ; State v. Beltran , 246 Conn. 268 , 276, 717 A.2d 168 (1998) (concept of initial aggressor is limitation on what would otherwise constitute valid defense of use of force in self-defense). 2019"A defendant who acts as an initial aggressor is not entitled to the protection of the defense of self-defense." State v. Skelly , 124 Conn. App. 161 , 167-68, 3 A.3d 1064 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 909 , 10 A.3d 526 (2010) ; see also General Statutes § 53a-19 (c) (2) ; State v. Beltran , 246 Conn. 268 , 276, 717 A.2d 168 (1998) (concept of initial aggressor is limitation on what would otherwise constitute valid defense of use of force in self-defense).	1	2
Heard v. Johnsongreen dc · 2002 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 1 sentence 2011Thus, we find persuasive the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decision to permit interlocutory appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on a church’s first amendment immunity from suit because that issue is “unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment if the case proceeds to trial because the essence of the protection of immunity from suit is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 877 (D.C. 2002).	1	1
State v. Singletongreen conn · 2009 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010State v. Singleton, 292 Conn. 734, 762 , 974 A.2d 679 168 (2009). 2010State v. Singleton, 292 Conn. 734, 762 , 974 A.2d 679 168 (2009).	1	1
Dicie Ellen Hibley Swayze, Legal Guardian and Next Friend of Michael Wayne Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.green ca5 · 1987 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 1 sentence 2006In response to the plaintiffs’ specific contentions as to why the doctrine has no application to this case, the defendant makes the following assertions: the pace *320 maker is a complex medical device and, therefore, falls within the protection of the doctrine; the doctrine applies to prescription devices regardless of whether the manufacturer has an opportunity to communicate directly with the patient because physicians, as learned intermediaries, still “stand in the best position to evaluate a patient’s needs and assess [the] risks and benefits of a particular course of treatment”; (interna	1	1
Aronson v. Lewisgreen del · 1984 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (33)

Case	Cited	Years
Shay v. Rossi green conn · 2000 2 sentences 2023We have also described state sovereign immunity, which is an immunity from suit, as a ‘‘doctrine [that] protects against suit as well as liability—in effect, against having to litigate at all.’’ Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 166 , 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301 , 828 A.2d 549 (2003). 2023We have also described state sovereign immunity, which is an immunity from suit, as a ‘‘doctrine [that] protects against suit as well as liability—in effect, against having to litigate at all.’’ Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 166 , 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301 , 828 A.2d 549 (2003).	3	2016–2023
Miller v. Egan green conn · 2003 2 sentences 2023We have also described state sovereign immunity, which is an immunity from suit, as a ‘‘doctrine [that] protects against suit as well as liability—in effect, against having to litigate at all.’’ Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 166 , 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301 , 828 A.2d 549 (2003). 2023We have also described state sovereign immunity, which is an immunity from suit, as a ‘‘doctrine [that] protects against suit as well as liability—in effect, against having to litigate at all.’’ Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 166 , 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301 , 828 A.2d 549 (2003).	3	2016–2023
United States v. Monia green scotus · 1943 2 sentences 2000United States v. Monia , [ 317 U.S. 424 , 427 (1943)] (footnote omitted).'" Minnesota v. Murphy , 465 U.S. 420 , 427 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 , reh. denied, 466 U.S. 945 , 104 S.Ct. 1932 , 80 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). 1995United States v. Mania, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 63 S. Ct. 409 , 87 L.	3	1993–2000
State v. Skelly green conn · 2010 2 sentences 2019"A defendant who acts as an initial aggressor is not entitled to the protection of the defense of self-defense." State v. Skelly , 124 Conn. App. 161 , 167-68, 3 A.3d 1064 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 909 , 10 A.3d 526 (2010) ; see also General Statutes § 53a-19 (c) (2) ; State v. Beltran , 246 Conn. 268 , 276, 717 A.2d 168 (1998) (concept of initial aggressor is limitation on what would otherwise constitute valid defense of use of force in self-defense). 2016The initial aggressor is the person who first acts in such a manner that creates a reasonable belief in another person's mind that physical force is about to be used based upon that other person." (Citations omitted.) State v. Skelly, 124 Conn.App. 161 , 167-68, 3 A.3d 1064 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 909 , 10 A.3d 526 (2010).	2	2016–2019
TOWN OF TRUMBULL v. Palmer green conn · 2010 2 sentences 2019"A defendant who acts as an initial aggressor is not entitled to the protection of the defense of self-defense." State v. Skelly , 124 Conn. App. 161 , 167-68, 3 A.3d 1064 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 909 , 10 A.3d 526 (2010) ; see also General Statutes § 53a-19 (c) (2) ; State v. Beltran , 246 Conn. 268 , 276, 717 A.2d 168 (1998) (concept of initial aggressor is limitation on what would otherwise constitute valid defense of use of force in self-defense). 2016The initial aggressor is the person who first acts in such a manner that creates a reasonable belief in another person's mind that physical force is about to be used based upon that other person." (Citations omitted.) State v. Skelly, 124 Conn.App. 161 , 167-68, 3 A.3d 1064 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 909 , 10 A.3d 526 (2010).	2	2016–2019
State Ex Rel. North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Unis green or · 1978 2 sentences 2005North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Unis, 282 Or. 457, 464 , 579 P.2d 1291 (1978) (“[g]ood-faith consultations with attorneys by clients who are uncertain about the legal implications of a proposed course of action are entitled to the protection of the privilege, even if that action should later be held improper” [internal quotation marks omitted]). 2005North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Unis, 282 Or. 457, 464 , 579 P.2d 1291 (1978) (“[g]ood-faith consultations with attorneys by clients who are uncertain about the legal implications of a proposed course of action are entitled to the protection of the privilege, even if that action should later be held improper” [internal quotation marks omitted]).	2	2000–2005
Minnesota v. Murphy green scotus · 1984 2 sentences 2000United States v. Monia , [ 317 U.S. 424 , 427 (1943)] (footnote omitted).'" Minnesota v. Murphy , 465 U.S. 420 , 427 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 , reh. denied, 466 U.S. 945 , 104 S.Ct. 1932 , 80 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). 2000United States v. Monia , [ 317 U.S. 424 , 427 (1943)] (footnote omitted).'" Minnesota v. Murphy , 465 U.S. 420 , 427 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 , reh. denied, 466 U.S. 945 , 104 S.Ct. 1932 , 80 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984).	2	1986–2000
Jones v. Comm'r of Corr. green conn · 2019 2 sentences 2020Furthermore, ‘‘[a] defendant who acts as an initial aggressor is not entitled to the protection of the defense of self-defense . . . [unless] he withdraws from the [initial] encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so.’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Berrios, 187 Conn. App. 661, 715 , 203 A.3d 571 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 917 , 204 A.3d 1159 (2019); see General Statutes § 53a-19 (c). 2020Furthermore, ‘‘[a] defendant who acts as an initial aggressor is not entitled to the protection of the defense of self-defense . . . [unless] he withdraws from the [initial] encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so.’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Berrios, 187 Conn. App. 661, 715 , 203 A.3d 571 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 917 , 204 A.3d 1159 (2019); see General Statutes § 53a-19 (c).	1	2020–2020
State v. Berrios neutral connappct · 2019 2 sentences 2020Furthermore, ‘‘[a] defendant who acts as an initial aggressor is not entitled to the protection of the defense of self-defense . . . [unless] he withdraws from the [initial] encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so.’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Berrios, 187 Conn. App. 661, 715 , 203 A.3d 571 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 917 , 204 A.3d 1159 (2019); see General Statutes § 53a-19 (c). 2020Furthermore, ‘‘[a] defendant who acts as an initial aggressor is not entitled to the protection of the defense of self-defense . . . [unless] he withdraws from the [initial] encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so.’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Berrios, 187 Conn. App. 661, 715 , 203 A.3d 571 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 917 , 204 A.3d 1159 (2019); see General Statutes § 53a-19 (c).	1	2020–2020
State v. Beltran green conn · 1998 2 sentences 2019"A defendant who acts as an initial aggressor is not entitled to the protection of the defense of self-defense." State v. Skelly , 124 Conn. App. 161 , 167-68, 3 A.3d 1064 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 909 , 10 A.3d 526 (2010) ; see also General Statutes § 53a-19 (c) (2) ; State v. Beltran , 246 Conn. 268 , 276, 717 A.2d 168 (1998) (concept of initial aggressor is limitation on what would otherwise constitute valid defense of use of force in self-defense). 2019"A defendant who acts as an initial aggressor is not entitled to the protection of the defense of self-defense." State v. Skelly , 124 Conn. App. 161 , 167-68, 3 A.3d 1064 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 909 , 10 A.3d 526 (2010) ; see also General Statutes § 53a-19 (c) (2) ; State v. Beltran , 246 Conn. 268 , 276, 717 A.2d 168 (1998) (concept of initial aggressor is limitation on what would otherwise constitute valid defense of use of force in self-defense).	1	2019–2019
State v. Longo green conn · 1984 2 sentences 2016The second prong of Curcio has been deemed satisfied under this rationale for actions that are claimed to violate: sovereign immunity; Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 164-67, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan , 265 Conn. 301 , 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003) ; immunity for statements made in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings; Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital , 272 Conn. 776 , 787, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005) ; religious institutions' first amendment immunity; Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford , supra, at 771-72, 23 A.3d 1192 ; statutory immunity; Manifol 2016The second prong of Curcio has been deemed satisfied under this rationale for actions that are claimed to violate: sovereign immunity; Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 164-67, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan , 265 Conn. 301 , 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003) ; immunity for statements made in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings; Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital , 272 Conn. 776 , 787, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005) ; religious institutions' first amendment immunity; Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford , supra, at 771-72, 23 A.3d 1192 ; statutory immunity; Manifol	1	2016–2016
Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford green conn · 2011 2 sentences 2016The rationale for immediate appellate review is that "the essence of the protection of immunity from suit is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 2016The second prong of Curcio has been deemed satisfied under this rationale for actions that are claimed to violate: sovereign immunity; Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 164-67, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan , 265 Conn. 301 , 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003) ; immunity for statements made in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings; Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital , 272 Conn. 776 , 787, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005) ; religious institutions' first amendment immunity; Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford , supra, at 771-72, 23 A.3d 1192 ; statutory immunity; Manifol	1	2016–2016
Lindley v. Life Investors Insurance green oknd · 2010 1 sentence 2016Co. of America, 267 F.R.D. 382 , 392 (N.D.Okla.2010) ("[w]here ... the legal and business purposes of the communication are inextricably intertwined, the entire communication is privileged only if the legal purpose outweighs the business purpose"), aff'd in part as modified, Docket No. 08-cv-0379-CVE-PJC, 2010 WL 1741407 (N.D.Okla.	1	2016–2016
Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital green conn · 2005 2 sentences 2016The second prong of Curcio has been deemed satisfied under this rationale for actions that are claimed to violate: sovereign immunity; Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 164-67, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan , 265 Conn. 301 , 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003) ; immunity for statements made in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings; Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital , 272 Conn. 776 , 787, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005) ; religious institutions' first amendment immunity; Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford , supra, at 771-72, 23 A.3d 1192 ; statutory immunity; Manifol 2016The second prong of Curcio has been deemed satisfied under this rationale for actions that are claimed to violate: sovereign immunity; Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 164-67, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan , 265 Conn. 301 , 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003) ; immunity for statements made in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings; Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital , 272 Conn. 776 , 787, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005) ; religious institutions' first amendment immunity; Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford , supra, at 771-72, 23 A.3d 1192 ; statutory immunity; Manifol	1	2016–2016
Manifold v. Ragaglia green connappct · 2006 2 sentences 2016The second prong of Curcio has been deemed satisfied under this rationale for actions that are claimed to violate: sovereign immunity; Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 164-67, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan , 265 Conn. 301 , 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003) ; immunity for statements made in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings; Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital , 272 Conn. 776 , 787, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005) ; religious institutions' first amendment immunity; Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford , supra, at 771-72, 23 A.3d 1192 ; statutory immunity; Manifol 2016The second prong of Curcio has been deemed satisfied under this rationale for actions that are claimed to violate: sovereign immunity; Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 164-67, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan , 265 Conn. 301 , 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003) ; immunity for statements made in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings; Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital , 272 Conn. 776 , 787, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005) ; religious institutions' first amendment immunity; Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford , supra, at 771-72, 23 A.3d 1192 ; statutory immunity; Manifol	1	2016–2016
State v. Flores green or · 1977 2 sentences 2010It seems far less justifiable to omit the protection of the warning when, by the very act of seeking consent, the officer is depriving the person from whom it is sought of the protective screening of judicial involvement in the issuance of the warrant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 286 , 570 P.2d 965 (Linde, J., dissenting). 2010It seems far less justifiable to omit the protection of the warning when, by the very act of seeking consent, the officer is depriving the person from whom it is sought of the protective screening of judicial involvement in the issuance of the warrant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 286 , 570 P.2d 965 (Linde, J., dissenting).	1	2010–2010
Kotler v. Lalley green conn · 1930 2 sentences 2007The dissent stated: "To permit the `hit and run driver,' under the circumstances present in this case, to escape civil liability for his wrong because the dead cannot speak is to give him the protection of a rule of law, that the plaintiff to recover must prove that the decedent's own negligence did not materially contribute to her death, which his own conduct has made inapplicable, and a rule which in any relation of life under like circumstances would be repudiated as unjust and inhuman." Id., at 100 , 151 A. 433 ( Wheeler, C.J., dissenting). [7] In 1931, our legislature enacted the predeces 2007The dissent stated: "To permit the `hit and run driver,' under the circumstances present in this case, to escape civil liability for his wrong because the dead cannot speak is to give him the protection of a rule of law, that the plaintiff to recover must prove that the decedent's own negligence did not materially contribute to her death, which his own conduct has made inapplicable, and a rule which in any relation of life under like circumstances would be repudiated as unjust and inhuman." Id., at 100 , 151 A. 433 ( Wheeler, C.J., dissenting). [7] In 1931, our legislature enacted the predeces	1	2007–2007
Voronelis v. White Line Bus Corp. neutral conn · 1937 2 sentences 2007The dissent stated: "To permit the `hit and run driver,' under the circumstances present in this case, to escape civil liability for his wrong because the dead cannot speak is to give him the protection of a rule of law, that the plaintiff to recover must prove that the decedent's own negligence did not materially contribute to her death, which his own conduct has made inapplicable, and a rule which in any relation of life under like circumstances would be repudiated as unjust and inhuman." Id., at 100 , 151 A. 433 ( Wheeler, C.J., dissenting). [7] In 1931, our legislature enacted the predeces 2007The dissent stated: "To permit the `hit and run driver,' under the circumstances present in this case, to escape civil liability for his wrong because the dead cannot speak is to give him the protection of a rule of law, that the plaintiff to recover must prove that the decedent's own negligence did not materially contribute to her death, which his own conduct has made inapplicable, and a rule which in any relation of life under like circumstances would be repudiated as unjust and inhuman." Id., at 100 , 151 A. 433 ( Wheeler, C.J., dissenting). [7] In 1931, our legislature enacted the predeces	1	2007–2007
Glover v. Patten green scotus · 1897 2 sentences 2005Rep. 558 (1851)]; In re [Young’s Estate, 33 Utah 382, 388 , 94 P. 731 (1908)]; Glover v. Patten, [ 165 U.S. 394, 395-406 , 17 S. Ct. 411 , 41 L. 2005Rep. 558 (1851)]; In re [Young’s Estate, 33 Utah 382, 388 , 94 P. 731 (1908)]; Glover v. Patten, [ 165 U.S. 394, 395-406 , 17 S. Ct. 411 , 41 L.	1	2005–2005
In re Young's Estate green utah · 1908 2 sentences 2005Rep. 558 (1851)]; In re [Young’s Estate, 33 Utah 382, 388 , 94 P. 731 (1908)]; Glover v. Patten, [ 165 U.S. 394, 395-406 , 17 S. Ct. 411 , 41 L. 2005Rep. 558 (1851)]; In re [Young’s Estate, 33 Utah 382, 388 , 94 P. 731 (1908)]; Glover v. Patten, [ 165 U.S. 394, 395-406 , 17 S. Ct. 411 , 41 L.	1	2005–2005
Pao Ch'en Lee v. GREGORICU green cal · 1958 2 sentences 2003Pao Ch’en Lee v. Gregoriou, 50 Cal. 2d 502 , 326 P.2d 135 (1958); Ross v. Florida Sun Life Ins. 2003Pao Ch’en Lee v. Gregoriou, 50 Cal. 2d 502 , 326 P.2d 135 (1958); Ross v. Florida Sun Life Ins.	1	2003–2003
Horine v. Oregon green scotus · 1984	1	2000–2000
Bryson v. Macfield Texturing, Inc. green scotus · 1984	1	2000–2000
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Kluczinsky green conn · 1976	1	1996–1996
Dolnack v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad green connappct · 1994	1	1995–1995
Patterson v. New York green scotus · 1977	1	1979–1979
Dickau v. Town of Glastonbury green conn · 1968	1	1971–1971
Pet Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett green conn · 1962	1	1971–1971
Boyd v. United States red scotus · 1886	1	1967–1967
Larx Co. Inc. v. Nicol green minn · 1946	1	1950–1950
Hoffman & Co. v. Bank of Milwaukee green · 1871	1	1920–1920
Munson v. Detamble Motors Co. neutral conn · 1914	1	1920–1920
Springs v. Hanover National Bank neutral · 1913	1	1920–1920

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-2z (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-263 (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-265a (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 28-13 (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-118 (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110h (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-190a (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-19 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 107 (1881–2026) NY 99 (1840–2026) PA 60 (1853–2026) IL 52 (1873–2024) TX 48 (1885–2025) AL 44 (1866–2018) NJ 40 (1830–2026) IN 37 (1872–2024) CT 34 (1920–2023) MD 32 (1878–2014) NC 29 (1891–2025) VA 28 (1919–2024) WA 27 (1912–2026) FL 26 (1917–2020) WI 26 (1888–2018) MO 25 (1889–2024) MA 21 (1869–2025) MN 21 (1925–2025) DC 20 (1972–2025) OH 19 (1907–2024) OR 18 (1875–2020) LA 17 (1940–2008) KS 16 (1913–2005) AZ 15 (1965–2017) KY 15 (1916–2021) MI 15 (1963–2022) DE 14 (1952–2022) NM 14 (1964–2023) SD 13 (1972–2015) GA 13 (1884–2019) CO 13 (1927–2025) AK 12 (1972–2025) OK 12 (1912–2016) IA 12 (1922–2022) NE 11 (1899–2016) SC 11 (1884–2025) ND 11 (1897–2023) WV 10 (1875–2019) MS 9 (1970–2017) AR 9 (1882–2012) ME 9 (1984–2017) TN 8 (1953–2024) WY 8 (1923–2021) ID 7 (1971–2020) RI 6 (1962–2007) VT 5 (1920–1996) NH 5 (1981–2021) HI 5 (1947–2008) NV 4 (1923–2020) UT 4 (1922–2020) MT 4 (1977–1999) PR 3 (1953–1969)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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