13 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1927–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Begley v. Iresongreen2 sentences2023Thus, an attorney cannot make a defamatory statement and then “cloak it in the privilege by subsequently filing a bad faith and meritless claim related to the otherwise tortious statement.” Begley I, ¶ 16, 399 P.3d at 781 . ¶25 Finally, in light of the privilege’s above-described purpose, although an attorney’s publication of defamatory statements that are “plainly irrelevant and impertinent” would not be privileged, any doubts about whether a statement is 12 privileged “should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or pertinency.” Club Valencia, 712 P.2d at 1027 ; see also id. (“No strained or 2021At the same time, "[n]o strained or close construction will be indulged to exempt a case from the protection of privilege." Id. at 1027-28 . ¶ 17 Over the ensuing years, divisions of this court have refined the doctrine. ¶ 18 Significantly, in Buckhannon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc. , 928 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. App. 1996), the division held that the privilege "not only shields attorneys from defamation claims arising from statements made during the course of litigation, but it also bars other non-defamation claims that stem from the same conduct." Id. ¶ 19 Five years later, in Merrick v. | 1 | 2 |
Club Valencia Homeowners Ass'n v. Valencia Associatesgreen2 sentences2023Thus, an attorney cannot make a defamatory statement and then “cloak it in the privilege by subsequently filing a bad faith and meritless claim related to the otherwise tortious statement.” Begley I, ¶ 16, 399 P.3d at 781 . ¶25 Finally, in light of the privilege’s above-described purpose, although an attorney’s publication of defamatory statements that are “plainly irrelevant and impertinent” would not be privileged, any doubts about whether a statement is 12 privileged “should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or pertinency.” Club Valencia, 712 P.2d at 1027 ; see also id. (“No strained or 2023Thus, an attorney cannot make a defamatory statement and then “cloak it in the privilege by subsequently filing a bad faith and meritless claim related to the otherwise tortious statement.” Begley I, ¶ 16, 399 P.3d at 781 . ¶25 Finally, in light of the privilege’s above-described purpose, although an attorney’s publication of defamatory statements that are “plainly irrelevant and impertinent” would not be privileged, any doubts about whether a statement is 12 privileged “should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or pertinency.” Club Valencia, 712 P.2d at 1027 ; see also id. (“No strained or | 1 | 2 |
Hoffman v. Brookfield Republic, Inc.green1 sentence2025Further, the protection provided by the privilege extends beyond "in-court testimony" and sweeps in the "pretrial discovery of information." Hoffman v. Brookfield Republic, Inc. , 87 P.3d 858, 861 (Colo. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Buckhannon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc.green2 sentences2021At the same time, "[n]o strained or close construction will be indulged to exempt a case from the protection of privilege." Id. at 1027-28 . ¶ 17 Over the ensuing years, divisions of this court have refined the doctrine. ¶ 18 Significantly, in Buckhannon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc. , 928 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. App. 1996), the division held that the privilege "not only shields attorneys from defamation claims arising from statements made during the course of litigation, but it also bars other non-defamation claims that stem from the same conduct." Id. ¶ 19 Five years later, in Merrick v. 2021At the same time, "[n]o strained or close construction will be indulged to exempt a case from the protection of privilege." Id. at 1027-28 . ¶ 17 Over the ensuing years, divisions of this court have refined the doctrine. ¶ 18 Significantly, in Buckhannon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc. , 928 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. App. 1996), the division held that the privilege "not only shields attorneys from defamation claims arising from statements made during the course of litigation, but it also bars other non-defamation claims that stem from the same conduct." Id. ¶ 19 Five years later, in Merrick v. | 1 | 1 |
Merrick v. Burns, Wall, Smith & Mueller, P.C.green2 sentences2021At the same time, "[n]o strained or close construction will be indulged to exempt a case from the protection of privilege." Id. at 1027-28 . ¶ 17 Over the ensuing years, divisions of this court have refined the doctrine. ¶ 18 Significantly, in Buckhannon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc. , 928 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. App. 1996), the division held that the privilege "not only shields attorneys from defamation claims arising from statements made during the course of litigation, but it also bars other non-defamation claims that stem from the same conduct." Id. ¶ 19 Five years later, in Merrick v. 2021At the same time, "[n]o strained or close construction will be indulged to exempt a case from the protection of privilege." Id. at 1027-28 . ¶ 17 Over the ensuing years, divisions of this court have refined the doctrine. ¶ 18 Significantly, in Buckhannon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc. , 928 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. App. 1996), the division held that the privilege "not only shields attorneys from defamation claims arising from statements made during the course of litigation, but it also bars other non-defamation claims that stem from the same conduct." Id. ¶ 19 Five years later, in Merrick v. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Charles Ortizgreen1 sentence2006Skipworth v. United States, supra, 508 F.2d at 601-02 ; see State v. McDonald, 272 Kan. 222 , 32 P.3d 1167 (2001) (ex parte order extending the defendant’s probation did not violate due process; the extension of probation is not equivalent to the “grievous loss” of liberty arising from probation revocation proceedings); see also United States v. Ortiz, 733 F.2d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir.1984) (the extension of the defendant’s probation based on his failure to pay a fine did not violate fundamental fairness, but rather “appears to have been contemplated by the Supreme Court when it required that alt | 1 | 1 |
State v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences2006Skipworth v. United States, supra, 508 F.2d at 601-02 ; see State v. McDonald, 272 Kan. 222 , 32 P.3d 1167 (2001) (ex parte order extending the defendant’s probation did not violate due process; the extension of probation is not equivalent to the “grievous loss” of liberty arising from probation revocation proceedings); see also United States v. Ortiz, 733 F.2d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir.1984) (the extension of the defendant’s probation based on his failure to pay a fine did not violate fundamental fairness, but rather “appears to have been contemplated by the Supreme Court when it required that alt 2006Skipworth v. United States, supra, 508 F.2d at 601-02 ; see State v. McDonald, 272 Kan. 222 , 32 P.3d 1167 (2001) (ex parte order extending the defendant’s probation did not violate due process; the extension of probation is not equivalent to the “grievous loss” of liberty arising from probation revocation proceedings); see also United States v. Ortiz, 733 F.2d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir.1984) (the extension of the defendant’s probation based on his failure to pay a fine did not violate fundamental fairness, but rather “appears to have been contemplated by the Supreme Court when it required that alt | 1 | 1 |
Bearden v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2006Skipworth v. United States, supra, 508 F.2d at 601-02 ; see State v. McDonald, 272 Kan. 222 , 32 P.3d 1167 (2001) (ex parte order extending the defendant’s probation did not violate due process; the extension of probation is not equivalent to the “grievous loss” of liberty arising from probation revocation proceedings); see also United States v. Ortiz, 733 F.2d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir.1984) (the extension of the defendant’s probation based on his failure to pay a fine did not violate fundamental fairness, but rather “appears to have been contemplated by the Supreme Court when it required that alt 2006Skipworth v. United States, supra, 508 F.2d at 601-02 ; see State v. McDonald, 272 Kan. 222 , 32 P.3d 1167 (2001) (ex parte order extending the defendant’s probation did not violate due process; the extension of probation is not equivalent to the “grievous loss” of liberty arising from probation revocation proceedings); see also United States v. Ortiz, 733 F.2d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir.1984) (the extension of the defendant’s probation based on his failure to pay a fine did not violate fundamental fairness, but rather “appears to have been contemplated by the Supreme Court when it required that alt | 1 | 1 |
Burns v. Board of Sup'rs of Stafford Countygreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Mayor of Wilmington v. Dukes, 157 A.2d 789, 794-95 (Del.1960); State Dep't of Transp. v. Sullivan, 38 Ohio St.3d 137 , 527 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1988); Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 354 , 315 S.E.2d 856, 858-60 (1984). 1996See, e.g., Mayor of Wilmington v. Dukes, 157 A.2d 789, 794-95 (Del.1960); State Dep't of Transp. v. Sullivan, 38 Ohio St.3d 137 , 527 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1988); Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 354 , 315 S.E.2d 856, 858-60 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Mayor and Council of Wilmington v. Dukesgreen1 sentence1996See, e.g., Mayor of Wilmington v. Dukes, 157 A.2d 789, 794-95 (Del.1960); State Dep't of Transp. v. Sullivan, 38 Ohio St.3d 137 , 527 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1988); Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 354 , 315 S.E.2d 856, 858-60 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
State, Department of Transportation v. Sullivangreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Mayor of Wilmington v. Dukes, 157 A.2d 789, 794-95 (Del.1960); State Dep't of Transp. v. Sullivan, 38 Ohio St.3d 137 , 527 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1988); Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 354 , 315 S.E.2d 856, 858-60 (1984). 1996See, e.g., Mayor of Wilmington v. Dukes, 157 A.2d 789, 794-95 (Del.1960); State Dep't of Transp. v. Sullivan, 38 Ohio St.3d 137 , 527 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1988); Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 354 , 315 S.E.2d 856, 858-60 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pennsylvania v. Muniz
green
2 sentences2021Accordingly, we must decide whether the officer's inquiry as to Compos's name amounted to an interrogation. ¶20 In Pennsylvania v. Muniz , 496 U.S. 582 , 600-02 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 ( 1990 ) , the Supreme Court addressed this very question. 2021Accordingly, we must decide whether the officer's inquiry as to Compos's name amounted to an interrogation. ¶20 In Pennsylvania v. Muniz , 496 U.S. 582 , 600-02 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 ( 1990 ) , the Supreme Court addressed this very question. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2021In Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , the Supreme Court concluded that the protection of this privilege during custodial questioning requires the application of certain "procedural safeguards." Thus, the Court stated, "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. ¶18 Because the Miranda Court was primarily concerned that the "interrogation environment" created by the interplay of int 2021In Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , the Supreme Court concluded that the protection of this privilege during custodial questioning requires the application of certain "procedural safeguards." Thus, the Court stated, "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. ¶18 Because the Miranda Court was primarily concerned that the "interrogation environment" created by the interplay of int | 1 | 2021–2021 |
v. Davis
green
1 sentence2021In Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , the Supreme Court concluded that the protection of this privilege during custodial questioning requires the application of certain "procedural safeguards." Thus, the Court stated, "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. ¶18 Because the Miranda Court was primarily concerned that the "interrogation environment" created by the interplay of int | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re Adoption of Taylor
green
1 sentence2018Ct. App. 1979) (concluding that grandparents have no constitutionally recognized liberty interest requiring the protection of a hearing in a contested adoption case); In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (surveying law of other states and concluding that grandparents have no constitutionally protected interest in the society of their grandchildren). ¶ 27 Accordingly, we conclude that grandmother, here, does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the society or custody of the child, where the grandmother (1) enjoys limited visitation rights derived fr | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ronald Skipworth v. United States
green
1 sentence2006Skipworth v. United States, supra, 508 F.2d at 601-02 ; see State v. McDonald, 272 Kan. 222 , 32 P.3d 1167 (2001) (ex parte order extending the defendant’s probation did not violate due process; the extension of probation is not equivalent to the “grievous loss” of liberty arising from probation revocation proceedings); see also United States v. Ortiz, 733 F.2d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir.1984) (the extension of the defendant’s probation based on his failure to pay a fine did not violate fundamental fairness, but rather “appears to have been contemplated by the Supreme Court when it required that alt | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Monia
green
2 sentences2005The privilege is generally not automatically invoked, meaning if one "desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been `compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409 , 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943)). 2005The privilege is generally not automatically invoked, meaning if one "desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been `compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409 , 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Minnesota v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2005The privilege is generally not automatically invoked, meaning if one "desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been `compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409 , 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943)). 2005The privilege is generally not automatically invoked, meaning if one "desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been `compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409 , 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Wesp v. Everson
green
2 sentences2002Indeed, without the protection the privilege provides to such confidential communications, "clients *865 may be reluctant or unwilling to seek legal advice or to confide fully in their attorney." Wesp, 33 P.3d at 196 . 2002Thus, we have said that "the right of parties within our justice system to consult professional legal experts is rendered meaningless unless communications between attorney and client are ordinarily protected from later disclosure without client consent." Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Chard v. Galton
green
1 sentence1985Chard v. Galton, 277 Or. *1028 109, 559 P.2d 1280 (1977). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson
green
2 sentences1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. 1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Wilson v. United States
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Harry I. Schwimmer v. United States
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. Morton Salt Co.
green
2 sentences1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. 1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Dixon v. Pennsylvania Crime Commission
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
In Re Corrado Brothers, Inc.
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
In Re Grand Jury Proceedings. In Re Jacqueline Schofield, Witness
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States of America and Carl Rosen, Revenue Agent of the Internal Revenue Service v. Alvin I. Malnik
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. W. F. Reno, A/K/A Bill Reno
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
In Re Blue Hen Country Network, Inc.
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , 70 S.Ct. 357 , 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125 , 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, supra; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Reno, 522 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Corrado Bros., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1126 (D.Del. 1973); Dixon v. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Hoffman v. United States green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| People v. Morgan green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.