52 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1873–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Moniagreen2 sentences2010If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the [ajmendment.” United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 87 L. 2010If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the [ajmendment.” United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 87 L. | 4 | 4 |
People v. Gionisgreen2 sentences2018Wigmore, Evidence § 2304, at 587 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see also 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 88 n.3, at 540 (7th ed. 2013) (“Of course, statements made after the employment is declined are not privileged.”); People v. Gionis, 892 P.2d 1199, 1207 (Cal. 1995) (collecting cases and observing that “authorities in other jurisdictions appear to uniformly hold that the attorney-client privilege does not protect statements made after an attorney declines employment”). 2018Wigmore, Evidence § 2304, at 587 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see also 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 88 n.3, at 540 (7th ed. 2013) (“Of course, statements made after the employment is declined are not privileged.”); People v. Gionis, 892 P.2d 1199, 1207 (Cal. 1995) (collecting cases and observing that “authorities in other jurisdictions appear to uniformly hold that the attorney-client privilege does not protect statements made after an attorney declines employment”). | 2 | 3 |
Hoffman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010Ed. 1118, 1124 , 71 S. Ct. 814, 818 (1951) (cautioning that, in establishing his claim to the fifth amendment privilege, a witness should not be “compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee”). 2010See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 , 71 S.Ct. 814, 818 , 95 L.Ed. 1118, 1124 (1951) (cautioning that, in establishing his claim to the fifth amendment privilege, a witness should not be *816 "compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee"). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Fieldsgreen2 sentences2014But we are reluctant to require courts to inquire into the quality of a marriage beyond examining whether the marriage was for purposes of disqualifying a witness.” Glover v. State, 836 N.E.2d 414, 419 (Ind. 2005) (citing Lilley, 581 F.2d at 189 , People v. Fields, 328 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544-45 (N.Y. 2014But we are reluctant to require courts to inquire into the quality of a marriage beyond examining whether the marriage was for purposes of disqualifying a witness.” Glover v. State, 836 N.E.2d 414, 419 (Ind. 2005) (citing Lilley, 581 F.2d at 189 , People v. Fields, 328 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544-45 (N.Y. | 2 | 2 |
In the Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled October 18, 1979. Appeal of Witness (Malfitano)green2 sentences2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United States 2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that - 19 - courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Cornell Byrdgreen2 sentences2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United States 2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that - 19 - courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Camille T. Lilleygreen2 sentences2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United States 2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that - 19 - courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United | 2 | 2 |
Glover v. Stategreen2 sentences2014But we are reluctant to require courts to inquire into the quality of a marriage beyond examining whether the marriage was for purposes of disqualifying a witness.” Glover v. State, 836 N.E.2d 414, 419 (Ind. 2005) (citing Lilley, 581 F.2d at 189 , People v. Fields, 328 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544-45 (N.Y. 2014But we are reluctant to require courts to inquire into the quality of a marriage beyond examining whether the marriage was for purposes of disqualifying a witness.” Glover v. State, 836 N.E.2d 414, 419 (Ind. 2005) (citing Lilley, 581 F.2d at 189 , People v. Fields, 328 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544-45 (N.Y. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Snowgreen2 sentences2011If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been “compelled” within the meaning of the Amendment.’ ” People v. Snow, 403 Ill. 2011If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been "compelled" within the meaning of the Amendment.' " People v. Snow, 403 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Batesgreen2 sentences2008See Bates, 212 Ill. 2d at 517 (allowing the appellate court judgment to stand where the petitioner “fail[ed] to give this court an adequate basis to grant her relief on this issue”). (2) Whether the Court of Claims Has Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Claims in Tort Defendant claims the protection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 2008See Bates, 212 Ill.2d at 517 , 289 Ill.Dec. 218 , 819 N.E.2d 714 (allowing the appellate court judgment to stand where the petitioner "fail[ed] to give this court an adequate basis to grant her relief on this issue"). (2) Whether the Court of Claims Has Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' Claims in Tort Defendant claims the protection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. | 2 | 2 |
Yip v. Paganogreen2 sentences2005See also Yip, 606 F. Supp. at 1571 (“it is not necessary that a witness be subpoenaed in order to receive the protection of the privilege” and it is “irrelevant” that a defendant’s statement was not made in response to a specific question). 2005See also Yip, 606 F.Supp. at 1571 ("it is not necessary that a witness be subpoenaed in order to receive the protection of the privilege" and it is "irrelevant" that a defendant's statement was not made in response to a specific question). | 2 | 2 |
Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurancegreen1 sentence2024In Illinois there is “a strong policy of encouraging disclosure, with an eye toward ascertaining that truth which is essential to the proper disposition of a lawsuit.” Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 190 (1991). 7 No. 1-23-1958 ¶ 23 Further, “courts limit the protection of the privilege, especially in a corporate context where broad privilege would effectively make most relevant material immune from discovery.” Claxton v. Thackston, 201 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Claxton v. Thackstongreen1 sentence2024In Illinois there is “a strong policy of encouraging disclosure, with an eye toward ascertaining that truth which is essential to the proper disposition of a lawsuit.” Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 190 (1991). 7 No. 1-23-1958 ¶ 23 Further, “courts limit the protection of the privilege, especially in a corporate context where broad privilege would effectively make most relevant material immune from discovery.” Claxton v. Thackston, 201 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Albertson v. Raboffgreen1 sentence2012We adopted the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405, 409 (Cal. 1956), which stated that it would be incongruous to apply a privilege to statements made in a lawsuit, but withdraw the protection of the privilege where a litigant publishes only the fact that he has brought the suit, particularly where he is authorized by statute to make that publication. ¶ 15 The recording of a lien is readily distinguishable from the publishing of a lis pendens notice. | 1 | 1 |
Gerrity v. Beattygreen2 sentences1993See Gerrity, 71 Ill.2d at 51 , 15 Ill.Dec. 639 , 373 N.E.2d 1323 (immunity protects teacher's disciplinary and supervisory authority). 1993See Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d at 51 (immunity protects teacher’s disciplinary and supervisory authority). | 1 | 1 |
Washburn v. Beckergreen1 sentence1990See Washburn, 186 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Radiac Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Technology, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024And “[g]ood-faith consultations with attorneys by clients who are uncertain about the legal implications of a proposed course of action are entitled to the protection of the privilege, even if that action should later be held ¶ 34 - improper.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 1992North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Unis (1978), 282 Or. 457, 464 , 579 P.2d 1291, 1295 .” Radiac Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Technology, Inc. (1988), 177 Ill. | 2 | 1992–2024 |
In Re Segall
green
2 sentences2020The Segall court reasoned: “[a] party, having employed counsel to act as an intermediary between himself and opposing counsel, does not lose the protection of the rule merely because opposing counsel is also a party to the litigation.” Id. 2020The Segall court reasoned: “[a] party, having employed counsel to act as an intermediary between himself and opposing counsel, does not lose the protection of the rule merely because opposing counsel is also a party to the litigation.” Id. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Daniel B. Sims
green
2 sentences2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United States 2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that - 19 - courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Detention of Varner
green
2 sentences2000Varner, 315 Ill. 2000Varner , 315 Ill. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp.
green
2 sentences2000Conversely, Osco maintains that pursuant to our supreme court's decision in Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp. , 153 Ill. 2d 26 (1992), it was protected by the doctrine. 2000Conversely, Oseo maintains that pursuant to our supreme court’s decision in Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 153 Ill. 2d 26 (1992), it was protected by the doctrine. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Smith v. Jones
green
2 sentences1994Such an allegation does not deprive the defendants of the protection of the bar of sovereign immunity.” (Smith, 113 Ill. 2d at 132-33 , 497 N.E.2d at 741 .) In the instant case, however, petitioners alleged more than a breach of contract. 1994Such an allegation does not deprive the defendants of the protection of the bar of sovereign immunity.” (Smith, 113 Ill. 2d at 132-33 , 497 N.E.2d at 741 .) In the instant case, however, petitioners alleged more than a breach of contract. | 2 | 1992–1994 |
State Ex Rel. North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Unis
green
2 sentences1992North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Unis (1978), 282 Or. 457, 464 , 579 P.2d 1291, 1295 .” Radiac Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Technology, Inc. (1988), 177 Ill. 1992North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Unis (1978), 282 Or. 457, 464 , 579 P.2d 1291, 1295 .” Radiac Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Technology, Inc. (1988), 177 Ill. | 2 | 1988–1992 |
Keller v. Hicks
neutral
2 sentences1934Municipal warrants, though negotiable in form, are non-negotiable in fact, hence they are not within the protection of the rule which guards commercial paper. ’ To the same effect, is Keller v. Hicks, 22 Cal. 457 ; 83 Am. 1904Municipal warrants, though negotiable in form, are non-negotiable in fact, hence they are not within the protection of the rule which guards commercial paper.” To the same effect is Keller v. Hicks, 22 Cal. 457 ; 83 Am. | 2 | 1904–1934 |
Green v. Chicago Board of Education
green
1 sentence2015In a case on point and similar to the case at bar, Green v. Chicago Board of Education, 407 Ill. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Minnesota v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2009Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427 , 79 L. 2009Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427 , 79 L. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995(See, e.g., Belden Corp. v. InterNorth Corp., 90 Ill. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People, Ex Rel. Moll v. Danziger
green
2 sentences1992Moll v. Danziger (1927), 238 Mich. 39 , 213 N.W. 448 . 1992Moll v. Danziger (1927), 238 Mich. 39 , 213 N.W. 448 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Ashe v. Hatfield
green
1 sentence1991(Ashe, 13 Ill. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Barth v. Board of Education of City of Chicago
green
1 sentence1991App. 3d 266 , 490 N.E.2d 77 , for the proposition that a municipality or its employees will lose the protection of the immunity provisions if they engage in acts based upon corrupt or malicious motives or willful and wanton misconduct. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Shatkin Investment Corp. v. Connelly green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Hicklin v. Orbeck green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Dalton green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Campbell v. New York Evening Post, Inc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| In re Delehanty green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| In re Delehanty green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| In re Delehanty green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Levine v. Bornstein green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Counselman v. Hitchcock green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Schmerber v. California green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Giberson v. Ford Motor Company green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Darryl v. Ford Motor Company green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Moss v. Polyco, Inc. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Winnett v. Winnett green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Jones v. Hutchinson Manufacturing, Inc. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Elmore v. American Motors Corp. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Howes v. Hansen green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Mieher v. Brown green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Mieher v. Brown green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Illinois Crime Investigating Commission v. Buccieri green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Glenn v. the People green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| The PEOPLE v. Milligan green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Brown v. the People green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| People v. Edge green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.