contention waiver in New Jersey

1972The contention of error in admission of prior convictions to affect credibility, insofar as based on the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Burgett v. Texas, [ 389 U. S. 109 , 88 S. Ct. 2581 , 19 L.

1972The contention of error in admission of prior convictions to affect credibility, insofar as based on the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Burgett v. Texas, [ 389 U.S. 109 , 88 S.Ct. 258 ], 19 L.Ed. 2d 319 (1967), is not available on the record of this appeal as that record fails to show defendant was not represented on the earlier conviction, or, if unrepresented, that he had failed to waive counsel.

1972The district judge agreed with the contention of error (see 404 U. S. at 445 , 92 S. Ct. at 591 , 30 L.

1972The district judge agreed with the contention of error (see 404 U. S. at 445 , 92 S. Ct. at 591 , 30 L.

2024We rejected the appellant's contention that the hearing officer denied him due process by failing to swear witnesses, finding that such "formalities" are only required in "formal adversarial proceedings" and must be "predicated upon some basic statute or rule." Id. at 511 .

2019However, upon reviewing the State's contention of waiver, we invited defendant to submit a supplemental brief on the subject, and have considered that additional submission. 3 Having now done so, we agree with the State that defendant failed to preserve his right to appeal the trial court's allowance of the buccal swab evidence. 3 We also invited counsel to address whether the Supreme Court's recent grant of leave to appeal in In re the Investigation of Burglary & Theft, 236 N.J. 629 (2019), a case that concerns DNA buccal swab applications, should affe ct our consideration of this appeal.

2017Indeed, "[t]rial courts must understand, as well, that nothing is more important than that they set the atmosphere of calm, unhurried, and studied deliberation that is the hallmark of a fair trial." Id. at 60 . 14 A-0347-15T1 The defendant argues this charge served as the functional equivalent of an Allen charge, because it stressed judicial economy and stated minority jurors "'should' reconsider their views in light of the majority jurors' beliefs." We disagree with the State's contention that the error was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.

2003However, a transformation of the dismissal to one without prejudice offers plaintiff no particular benefit in this case because any reinstitution of suit is barred by the statute of limitations. [ Konopka, supra, 356 N.J.Super. at 228 , 812 A. 2d 363 .] In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the doctrine of substantial compliance should have been invoked to avoid the statute-of-limitations bar, since she had submitted, within one month of the filing of the defendant's answer, "a report by her treating chiropractor that established permanency[,]" ibid., the Konopka court stated, in pertin

2003However, a transformation of the dismissal to one without prejudice offers plaintiff no particular benefit in this case because any reinstitution of suit is barred by the statute of limitations. [ Konopka, supra, 356 N.J.Super. at 228 , 812 A. 2d 363 .] In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the doctrine of substantial compliance should have been invoked to avoid the statute-of-limitations bar, since she had submitted, within one month of the filing of the defendant's answer, "a report by her treating chiropractor that established permanency[,]" ibid., the Konopka court stated, in pertin

1997Nonetheless, the court reversed the aggravated manslaughter conviction, noting that the State’s contention that the error did not extend to that conviction “assumes one major premise that we cannot accept: it assumes that the jury inevitably proceeded on a step-by-step basis to consider murder first, and then aggravated manslaughter.” 102 N.J. at 146, 506 A.2d 708 .

1993We reject, therefore, the dissent's contention that the rule we enunciate today is unfairly biased against the "indigent defendant with no previous experience with law enforcement who is arrested while alone." Post at 279, 627 A. 2d at 652 .

1992In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987), the Court rejected the defendant’s contention that his waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights did not extend to later questioning about a crime different from the one for which he had been arrested.

1992In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987), the Court rejected the defendant’s contention that his waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights did not extend to later questioning about a crime different from the one for which he had been arrested.

1984Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533 , cert. den. 342 *555 U.S. 886, 72 S.Ct. 175 , 96 L.Ed. 664 (1951), is the last judicial pronouncement by this Court on the subject area prior to abolition of the doctrine in 1958.

1984Mary’s Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533 , cert. den. 342 U.S. 886 , 72 S.Ct. 175 , 96 L.Ed. 664 (1951), is the last judicial pronouncement by this Court on the subject area prior to abolition of the doctrine in 1958.

1984Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533 , cert. den. 342 *555 U.S. 886, 72 S.Ct. 175 , 96 L.Ed. 664 (1951), is the last judicial pronouncement by this Court on the subject area prior to abolition of the doctrine in 1958.

1984Mary’s Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533 , cert. den. 342 U.S. 886 , 72 S.Ct. 175 , 96 L.Ed. 664 (1951), is the last judicial pronouncement by this Court on the subject area prior to abolition of the doctrine in 1958.

1984Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533 , cert. den. 342 *555 U.S. 886, 72 S.Ct. 175 , 96 L.Ed. 664 (1951), is the last judicial pronouncement by this Court on the subject area prior to abolition of the doctrine in 1958.

1984Mary’s Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533 , cert. den. 342 U.S. 886 , 72 S.Ct. 175 , 96 L.Ed. 664 (1951), is the last judicial pronouncement by this Court on the subject area prior to abolition of the doctrine in 1958.

1984Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533 , cert. den. 342 *555 U.S. 886, 72 S.Ct. 175 , 96 L.Ed. 664 (1951), is the last judicial pronouncement by this Court on the subject area prior to abolition of the doctrine in 1958.

1984Mary’s Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533 , cert. den. 342 U.S. 886 , 72 S.Ct. 175 , 96 L.Ed. 664 (1951), is the last judicial pronouncement by this Court on the subject area prior to abolition of the doctrine in 1958.

1981Additionally, in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 481 (1980), reh. den. 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 606 (1980), wherein plaintiffs claimed that California state parole board officials were liable for damages resulting *41 from the death of their 15 year old daughter at the hands of a parolee, the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that the immunity provision of the California Tort Claims Act constituted a deprivation of constitutional rights to due process emphasizing that: [The] inhibiting effect could impair the

1981Additionally, in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 481 (1980), reh. den. 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 606 (1980), wherein plaintiffs claimed that California state parole board officials were liable for damages resulting *41 from the death of their 15 year old daughter at the hands of a parolee, the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that the immunity provision of the California Tort Claims Act constituted a deprivation of constitutional rights to due process emphasizing that: [The] inhibiting effect could impair the

1981Additionally, in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 481 (1980), reh. den. 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 606 (1980), wherein plaintiffs claimed that California state parole board officials were liable for damages resulting *41 from the death of their 15 year old daughter at the hands of a parolee, the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that the immunity provision of the California Tort Claims Act constituted a deprivation of constitutional rights to due process emphasizing that: [The] inhibiting effect could impair the

1981Additionally, in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 481 (1980), reh. den. 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 606 (1980), wherein plaintiffs claimed that California state parole board officials were liable for damages resulting *41 from the death of their 15 year old daughter at the hands of a parolee, the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that the immunity provision of the California Tort Claims Act constituted a deprivation of constitutional rights to due process emphasizing that: [The] inhibiting effect could impair the

1981Additionally, in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 481 (1980), reh. den. 445 U.S. 920 , 100 S.Ct. 1285 , 63 L.Ed. 2d 606 (1980), wherein plaintiffs claimed that California state parole board officials were liable for damages resulting *41 from the death of their 15 year old daughter at the hands of a parolee, the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that the immunity provision of the California Tort Claims Act constituted a deprivation of constitutional rights to due process emphasizing that: [The] inhibiting effect could impair the

1978NOTES [1] Wenskowski admits, however, that he stated in his report and to a fellow officer at the scene providing "back-up" that he had given the money to Lorraine. [2] See United States v. Demma, supra, 523 F. 2d at 982-984 , which holds that Chief Justice Hughes in Sorrells * * * "expressly rejected the Government's contention that a claim of entrapment necessarily involved an admission of guilt and that it was in the nature of a plea in bar." 523 F. 2d at 983 .

1978NOTES [1] Wenskowski admits, however, that he stated in his report and to a fellow officer at the scene providing "back-up" that he had given the money to Lorraine. [2] See United States v. Demma, supra, 523 F. 2d at 982-984 , which holds that Chief Justice Hughes in Sorrells * * * "expressly rejected the Government's contention that a claim of entrapment necessarily involved an admission of guilt and that it was in the nature of a plea in bar." 523 F. 2d at 983 .

1976It rejected the defendants' contention that the principle of Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital, 40 N.J. 389 (1963), was limited to hospital policies excluding physicians from practicing at a hospital and held that "[t]he fact that the policy under attack here is concerned directly with patient services is not sufficient to distinguish the holding in Greisman so as to render it inapplicable." [ 130 N.J.

1976It rejected the defendants' contention that the principle of Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital, 40 N.J. 389 (1963), was limited to hospital policies excluding physicians from practicing at a hospital and held that "[t]he fact that the policy under attack here is concerned directly with patient services is not sufficient to distinguish the holding in Greisman so as to render it inapplicable." [ 130 N.J.

1974Ed. 2d 446 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld a pretrial discovery re *67 quirement that the defendant “give notice of an alibi defense and disclose his alibi witnesses” and it flatly rejected the defendant’s contention that the requirement unconstitutionally interfered with “his right to wait until after the State had presented its case to decide how to defend against it.” 399 U. S. at 83 , 90 S. Ct. at 1896 , 26 L.

1974Ed. 2d 446 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld a pretrial discovery re *67 quirement that the defendant “give notice of an alibi defense and disclose his alibi witnesses” and it flatly rejected the defendant’s contention that the requirement unconstitutionally interfered with “his right to wait until after the State had presented its case to decide how to defend against it.” 399 U. S. at 83 , 90 S. Ct. at 1896 , 26 L.

1971This court rejected the contention that the clause should be deemed inapplicable because it did not specifically refer to actions grounded in negligence, saying "there are no required words of art and, whatever be the language used or the rule of construction applied, the true goal is still the ascertainment and effectuation of the intent of the parties." ( 48 N.J. at 489 ).

1968In Lowry , it is stated that the word "penal" as used in R.R. 3:2 A -6, is inherently a much broader term than "criminal" as used in R.R. 3:1-1, and that the incarceration of a juvenile is sufficiently penal in nature to bring the juvenile action under the provisions of R.R. 3:2 A -6. ( 95 N.J.