contention error in Missouri

1996Mitchell v. Board of Educ., 913 S.W.2d 130, 135 (Mo.App.

1996Mitchell v. Board of Educ., 913 S.W.2d 130, 135 (Mo. App. E.D.1996).

1996Moreover, in State v. Graham, 641 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Mo. banc 1982), the court rejected a contention that it was error to permit a doctor to base his opinion upon the medical findings made by another doctor.

1984Nor is any attack made upon the adequacy of the facts set forth in the memorandum to support the opinions. 1 Moreover, in State *101 v. Graham, 641 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Mo. banc 1982) the court rejected a contention that it was error to permit a doctor to base his opinion upon the medical findings made by another doctor.

1987The point is before us for plain error review only, inasmuch as the only reference to the matter in defendant’s motion for new trial was: “That the trial court erred in failing to give ‘Instruction A’ the Entrapment Instruction, in that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the giving of such Jury Instruction, said Instruction attached hereto and marked ‘Exhibit 1’.” In State v. Sanders, 541 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. banc 1976), a virtually identical paragraph in a motion for new trial was held insufficient to preserve for appellate review the contention that an instruction should have been given.

1977State v. Sanders, 541 S.W.2d 530, 532 [1] (Mo. banc 1976); State v. Schulten, 529 S.W.2d 432, 434 [8] (Mo.App.1975).

2025Essential to this contention is the principle that “a trial court cannot grant judgment on a cause of action not pleaded.” Allen Quarries, Inc. v. Auge, 244 S.W.3d 781, 783 (Mo.App. 2008).

2013To support the contention that his claim is cognizable on direct appeal, Defendant cites State v. Craig, 287 S.W.3d 676, 679-80 (Mo.2009).

2011See Committee on Legislative Research v. Mitchell, 886 S.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Mo.App.

2008Nevertheless, the Landowners were not required to request judgment as a matter of law for their claim that the opposing party offered insufficient evidence. “[T]he question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment may be raised whether or not the question was raised in the trial court.” State v. Dillon, 41 S.W.3d 479, 483 (Mo.App.

2003Id. at 1209.

1998Faith Baptist Church of Berkeley, Inc. v. Heffner, 956 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Mo.App.1997) Plaintiffs argue under this point that the trial court erred in concluding the application of the master meter billing policy did not violate the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under Article I, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C.

1997Artman v. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 918 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Mo. banc 1996).

1994“The general rule of appellate procedure is that, in the absence of a cross-appeal, the reviewing court is concerned only with the complaint of the party appealing and that the opposing party who filed no appeal will not be heard to complain of any portion of the trial court’s judgment adverse to him.” Goldberg v. State Tax Commission, 618 S.W.2d 635, 642 (Mo.1981) (emphasis added).

1993Rule 69.-01(b)(4) provides that a jury trial is waived “by entering into trial before the court without objection.” In Ballard v. Ryan, 646 S.W.2d 398, 401 [8] (Mo.App.1983), the court stated, “No request for a jury or objection to the failure to have a jury was made by defendants before trial.

1993State v. Roberts, 709 S.W.2d 857, 864 [6] (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 946 , 107 S.Ct. 427 , 93 L.Ed.2d 378 (1986); State v. Jordan, 834 S.W.2d 900, 901 [1] (Mo.App.1992).

1993State v. Roberts, 709 S.W.2d 857, 864 [6] (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 946 , 107 S.Ct. 427 , 93 L.Ed.2d 378 (1986); State v. Jordan, 834 S.W.2d 900, 901 [1] (Mo.App.1992).

1989Scott v. State, 741 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Mo.App.1987).

1989Hammell, supra at 364.

1987State v. Chambers, 671 S.W.2d 781, 783 [1-3] (Mo. banc 1984).

1987Goldberg v. Mos, 631 S.W.2d 342, 345 [1-4] (Mo.1982).

1987Appellants further assert that the court’s approval of the “settlement agreement” was erroneous because the agreement was not “fair and equitable” and was not supported by “valid consideration.” We are guided in our review of this contention by the standard enunciated in Murphy v. Carrón, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976), and will sustain the court’s judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it erroneously declares or applies the law.

1987Id.

1987Keeshan v. Embassy Investment Company, 303 S.W.2d 666, 669 [1, 2] (Mo.App.1957).

1986The Beck court stated that the defendant’s contention that the waiver was not knowing and intelligent is premised on the notion that information “not disclosed to him would have had a material bearing on his reasoning process had it been made known to him.” Beck, supra at 159.